Employment law

Juma v Sawa Industries Company Ltd [2026] KEELRC 2813 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E309 of 2025
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

THAT the Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence adduced before the trial court in arriving at its final conclusion.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E309 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

ELVIN WESONGA JUMA APPELLANT

VERSUS

SANA INDUSTRIES COMPANY LIMITED RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th September, 2025. It arises from a judgment and Decree delivered on 8th August, 2025 in MCELRC No. E174 of 2024.

Here, the trial court found that the Appellant was a casual employee whose engagement was terminable at the close of any day without notice and dismissed his claim in its entirety with costs to the Respondent.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the present appeal, which comes out on the following grounds;

1. THAT the Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence adduced before the trial court in arriving at its final conclusion.

2. THAT the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the Appellant failed to prove his case on a balance of probability on unlawful termination on account of redundancy.

3. THAT the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider that the Appellant's employment was terminated without a valid reason and in breach of the fair procedure provided under Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007, thereby arriving at a wrong finding.

4. THAT the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to award the Appellant terminal dues resulting from the unfair termination on account of redundancy.

5. THAT the Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Respondent failed to produce any documentary evidence in support of the allegations laid by it hence arriving at a wrong conclusion.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) The Honourable Trial Magistrate's judgement dated and delivered on the 8th day of August 2025 be set aside in its entirety.

b) Costs of this Appeal be awarded to the Appellant.

c) This court makes such further orders as it may deem just in the circumstances and in the interest of Justice.

The Appellant was the Claimant before the trial court. By a Memorandum of Claim dated 12th August, 2024 he pleaded that he was employed by the Respondent in or about February, 2022 as a General Worker at a basic salary of Kshs. 17,420.00 per month and served until 28th August, 2023.

His pleaded case was that on that date a supervisor by the name Wycliffe called out several employees including himself, told them there was a reduction of work, directed them not to report the following day and assured them they would be recalled. He was never recalled.

He pleaded that the termination was on account of redundancy and was unlawful, unfair and unprocedural for want of notice to himself and to the labour officer, want of consultation, want of any criteria of selection and non-payment of leave and severance pay, contrary to Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007. He sought a declaration to that effect, Kshs. 297,614.00 made up of one month's salary in lieu of notice, house allowance, unpaid leave, severance pay and twelve months' compensation, a certificate of service, interest and costs.

The Respondent opposed the claim by a Memorandum of Response dated 14th November, 2024 supported by the witness statement of Agnes Kagwiria, its Human Resource Officer. Its case was that the Appellant was never a permanent employee but a casual retained throughout on that footing, reporting intermittently as work became available and paid a consolidated daily wage every fortnight on the number of days actually worked.

It denied that any redundancy was declared. Its case was that on 4th August, 2023 the Appellant reported to work and signed in, declined to proceed to his work station, staged a protest, exited through gate 3 and never returned. It pleaded that it thereafter issued a notice to show cause dated 10th August, 2023 a notice of disciplinary hearing dated 16th August, 2023 convening a hearing on 21st August, 2023 and on his failure to respond or attend, a summary dismissal letter dated 31st August, 2023 under Section 44(a) of the Act. It relied on a security check book for gate 3, attendance sheets, payroll extracts and the disciplinary notices.

The parties agreed, and the trial court directed, that the claim be disposed of by way of documentary evidence and written submissions. No witness was called and no oral evidence was taken.

In the impugned judgment the learned trial magistrate found that the Appellant had produced no document supporting his engagement, that he was paid every two weeks for days worked, and that there was no evidence of regular monthly payments of Kshs. 17,420.00. He concluded that the Appellant was a casual employee.

Turning on to Section 35 of the Act, the trial court held that a casual employee needed only a day's notice, that wages paid to casual employees are inclusive of house allowance, that casual employees are not entitled to leave. Further casual employees whose remittances have been sent to the National Social Security Fund cannot recover the same. He held the claim unsustainable and dismissed it with costs.

It is the Appellant's case and submission dated 8th April, 2026 that the Respondent asserted casual engagement but adduced no evidence to support it. He relies on Section 74 of the Employment Act, 2007, which places the obligation to keep employment records on the employer, and on Section 112 of the Evidence Act, submitting that a failure to produce those records leads to the conclusion that what the employee alleges is most probably true. He submits that he worked continuously from February 2022 to 28th August, 2023 and relies on Empire Feeds Ltd v King'ou (Appeal 6 of 2020) [2022] KEELRC 1501 (KLR.)

On redundancy he sets out Section 40 in extension and submits that no notice issued to him personally or to the labour officer, that he belonged to no trade union so that Section 40(1)(b) applied, and that no regard was had to seniority, relying on Nation Media Group Limited v Munene (Civil Appeal E603 of 2021) [2025] KECA 114 (KLR).

On applicable procedure he relies on Alphonce Maghanga Mwachanya v Operation 680 Limited [2013] eKLR, submitting that even if he committed the offence alleged he was never heard. On the duty of this court he relies on Abok James Odera t/a A. J. Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates [2013] eKLR.

The Respondent, by submissions dated 14th May, 2026 opposes the appeal. It submits that the threshold for appellate interference is not met, relying on Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123. It submits that there was a valid and fair reason for summary dismissal under Section 44(4)(a), the attendance rolls and security check book establishing both the absence and the genuine belief required by Section 43(2), and that on procedure it did all that Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) requires, the law not obliging an employer to compel an employee to attend a hearing.

It submits further that redundancy was never proved, no redundancy notice, notification to the labour officer, list of affected employees or evidence of restructuring having been produced, relying on Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 others [2014] KECA 403 (KLR) and Sana Industries Limited v Odera & 2 others [2025] KEELRC 2638 (KLR). It distinguishes Nation Media Group Limited v Munene on the footing that redundancy was there admitted and a letter issued. It relies on Section 47(5) of the Act and prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether this court ought to interfere with the findings of the trial court.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant was a casual employee whose engagement was terminable at the close of any day.

3. Whether the Appellant proved that his employment was terminated on account of redundancy.

4. Whether the termination of the Appellant's employment was substantively justified and procedurally fair.

5. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the reliefs sought and who should bear the costs.

The 1st issue for determination is whether this court ought to interfere with the findings of the trial court. This being a first appeal my duty is to re-evaluate, re-assess and re-analyse the evidence on the record and arrive at my own independent conclusions, giving reasons either way, as held in the authority of Abok James Odera t/a A. J. Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates [2013] eKLR. That duty is qualified by Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123 which counsels that an appellate court re-evaluating the evidence must bear in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses, and that a finding of fact will not lightly be disturbed. I accept that statement of principle in full. It is qualified here, however, by a feature both parties have overlooked.

The Respondent submits at paragraphs 13 and 24 of its submissions that the learned Magistrate heard the witnesses. The impugned judgment itself recites at paragraph 8 the oral evidence adduced before the court. Neither statement is accurate. The certified proceedings at pages 71 to 73 of the Record disclose four appearances, every one of them for directions on filing and the fixing of dates, and a fifth at which judgment was delivered. No witness was ever sworn and no cross-examination was conducted. The trial court itself confirms at paragraph 7 of its judgment that the parties agreed to proceed by way of documentary evidence and submissions.

The restraint counselled in Selle attaches in its full rigour to findings of primary fact turning on the demeanour and credibility of witnesses seen and heard. Where the whole record is documentary, and the trial court read precisely what is now before this court and no more. Therefore, this court is at no disadvantage. It is satisfied that the threshold for interference is met, for the reasons appearing under the 2nd and 4th issues, namely that the learned trial magistrate left unaddressed two questions of law which the record squarely raised and which were determinative of the claim.

The 2nd issue for determination is Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant was a casual employee whose engagement was terminable at the close of any day. This court begins with what the trial court got right. He was correct to find that the Appellant did not prove a monthly salary of Kshs. 17,420.00. The only evidence of remuneration on the record is the Appellant's own Co-operative Bank statement at pages 12 to 22, which discloses credits from the Respondent twice in most months in sums ranging from Kshs. 2,010.00 to Kshs. 7,880.00. No credit of Kshs. 17,420.00 appears anywhere in it. The figure is a computation and not a payment, being a daily rate of Kshs. 670.00 multiplied by twenty-six days. It is at the next step that the judgment falls into error. Having found casual engagement, the learned trial magistrate proceeded directly to Section 35(1)(a) of the Act and held the relationship terminable at the close of any day. He never asked the anterior question the record squarely raised, namely whether that casual engagement had already converted by operation of law into a contract in which wages are deemed to be paid monthly. That question was determinative, because the holdings on notice, house allowance and leave all follow from the answer to it.

Section 37(1) of the Act provides that where a casual employee works for a period or number of continuous working days amounting in the aggregate to not less than one month, the contract of service shall be deemed to be one where wages are paid monthly and Section 35(1)(c) shall apply. Section 37(3) provides that such an employee, having worked continuously for two months or more, is entitled to such terms and conditions of service as he would have been entitled to had he not initially been employed as a casual. The very bank statement which defeats the pleaded salary establishes something else. Read in sequence, it records payments by the Respondent in every month from February to December, 2022 and again in January, March, April, June, July and August, 2023 in most months twice, one payment mid-month and one at its end, in the pattern of a fortnightly wage. Save for two months, the Respondent paid the Appellant every month for some eighteen consecutive months. Its own payment list at page 36 records a payment to the Appellant by name, account number, identity card, NHIF and NSSF particulars. That is not the pattern of a man engaged occasionally as work happened to arise.

The Respondent's answer was that the Appellant worked intermittently and never continuously for a month. That was an assertion and it was never proved. It produced attendance sheets for 1st to 16th August, 2023 and for 28th August, 2023 and nothing else. There is not one muster roll, signing sheet, pay slip or wage register anywhere on the record for the eighteen months between February, 2022 and July, 2023 which is precisely the period over which conversion falls to be decided.

The burden of that omission lies where the statute places it. Section 10(7) of the Act provides that where an employer fails to produce a written contract or the prescribed particulars, the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term is on the employer. Section 74 obliges every employer to keep a written record of all employees. The Respondent, author and custodian of its own muster rolls and payroll, did not discharge that burden, and it is the party that had every means of doing so.

The reasoning of this court in Empire Feeds Ltd v King'ou (Appeal 6 of 2020) [2022] KEELRC 1501 (KLR) is directly applicable. There, as here, the employer produced a single payroll extract covering a short window and nothing more, and the learned Judge held that in the absence of proof to the contrary the contract of service assumed permanency and was deemed one where wages are paid monthly. The Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion on the same provision in Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR) both of which this court adopts and applies here.

I accordingly find and hold that the Appellant's contract of service converted by operation of law under Section 37(1) of the Act, and that by Section 37(3) he became entitled to the terms and conditions to which he would have been entitled had he not initially been engaged as a casual. The trial court erred in law in applying Section 35(1)(a) and in treating a finding of initial casual engagement as the end of the enquiry rather than its beginning. Grounds 1, 2 and 5 succeed to that extent. Two collateral holdings fall away with that finding. It is not correct that an employee whose contract has converted is not entitled to leave, Sections 37(3) and 28 providing otherwise. And the observation on service pay and remittances to the National Social Security Fund did not arise at all, service pay never having been claimed.

The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Appellant proved that his employment was terminated on account of redundancy. That finding does not carry the Appellant nearly as far as anticipated. This is because the case he pleaded and the case the record discloses are not the same case.

Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007 defines redundancy as the loss of employment by involuntary means through no fault of an employee, at the initiative of the employer, where the services of the employee are superfluous. Section 40(1) then prescribes, in mandatory terms, the conditions to be met before terminating on that account.

The whole of the Appellant's evidence that a redundancy occurred is his own statement that a supervisor named Wycliffe told a group of employees there was a job reduction and that they would be called back. There is no redundancy notice, no letter of termination on that account, no notification to the area labour officer, no list of the class affected and no evidence that any other employee was affected at all. There is nothing to show that his position was abolished or that his services had become superfluous. Neither is there evidence that the Respondent undertook any restructuring, or that any criteria of selection were applied. This is far from the truth. Redundancy is a specific, defined and highly regulated statutory mode of separation. It is not established by a bare assertion that work had reduced, and cannot in any event be presumed.

In the authority of Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 others [2014] KECA 403 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held that a termination by way of redundancy must be both substantively justified and procedurally fair, substantive justification going to the existence of a genuine redundancy situation. The Appellant fails at that first stage and Section 40 is never reached. Likewise, in Sana Industries Limited v Odera & 2 others (Appeal E245 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 2638 (KLR), this court sitting on appeal from the same Ruiru court against this same Respondent on materially indistinguishable facts, held that the respondents had not sufficiently demonstrated that they were declared redundant, no evidence having been adduced that their termination was on account of organisational changes rendering their positions superfluous, and that an award of severance pay on that footing was unsubstantiated. This is respectful and its reasoning agreeable. The case of Nation Media Group Limited v Munene on which the Appellant relies is not useful due to a differentiated factual basis. In this case, the employer admitted the redundancy and issued a letter headed "redundancy", and the court's concern was with how the redundancy was carried out. The present case is about whether this occurred, or at all.

There is a further feature of the Appellant's case which does not pass the test. He does not engage with the Respondent's documents at all. These are the show cause letter, the disciplinary hearing notice and the summary dismissal letter appear at pages 33 to 35 of the Record. None of his pleadings, to it neither his Memorandum of Claim, witness statement, submissions below, nor his submissions before this court interrogates the Respondent’s case and documentation. He neither denies them nor says that he never received them. This would have been the obvious answer and, on this court’s findings below, a good one. The Appellant instead maintains an account of a termination on 28th August, 2023 which the attendance sheets contradict. His name appears on the sheets of 1st to 4th August, 2023 and not any other sheet thereafter. It does not at all appear on the sheet for 28th August, 2023 the day he purports to have been sent home. See!

This court finds and hold that the Appellant totally failed to prove termination on account of redundancy. The conclusion of the trial court on that point, though arrived at through a different route, is affirmed. Grounds 3 and 4 fail in so far as they are founded on Section 40 and on an entitlement to severance pay.

The 4th issue for determination is whether the termination of the Appellant's employment was substantively justified and procedurally fair. The collapse of the redundancy case is not the end of the matter. This is the second and more consequential respect in which the impugned judgment is incomplete. The Respondent did not confine itself to denying the redundancy. It advanced a positive case of its own, pleaded, deposed to and documented. This is to the extent that it summarily dismissed the Appellant under Section 44(4)(a) of the Act for absenting himself from the place appointed for the performance of his work without leave or other lawful cause.

Having invoked Section 44 it brought itself squarely within Sections 41, 43 and 45. The Appellant's contract having converted under Section 37, he fully enjoys the protection of those provisions. The trial court, having stopped at Section 35(1)(a), never examined the dismissal the Respondent presented as their case. It was always obligated to. A court seised of a claim of unlawful termination cannot decline to examine the termination the employer admits it effected merely because the employee has mischaracterised it.

On the issue of substantive justification, Section 43(1) places on the employer the burden of proving the reason for termination and Section 43(2) confines it to the matters the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time. The attendance sheets at pages 38 to 49 show the Appellant, listed in the Huckling group of the Fibre Section, signing in on 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th August 2023, with an annotation and strike-through against his name on the sheet of 4th August, and thereafter not signing at all while his colleagues on the same sheets continued to sign daily through to 16th August, 2023. That is contemporaneous evidence of the very kind Section 74 requires an employer to keep, and here the Respondent kept it and produced it. On that material the Respondent genuinely believed, and was entitled to believe, that the Appellant had absented himself without leave. Absence from duty is conduct within Section 45(2)(b)(i) and expressly a ground for summary dismissal under Section 44(4)(a). The Respondent discharged its burden under Section 43 of proving a valid and fair reason.

As to procedural fairness the position is quite otherwise. Section 41 is couched in mandatory terms. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui [2019] eKLR the Court of Appeal held that four elements must be discernible before the procedure passes muster, namely an explanation of the grounds of termination in a language understood by the employee, the reason for which the employer is considering termination, the employee's entitlement to the presence of another employee of his choice when that explanation is made, and the hearing and consideration of any representations made.

The Respondent's compliance rests entirely on three letters. Each is addressed to the Appellant, each is copied to a union shop steward, and not one bears any indication that it ever reached him. Four difficulties arise. First, there is no proof of service. There is no dispatch register, no acknowledgement of receipt, no signature of the Appellant or anyone on his behalf, no postal record, no email or message, and no return, receipt or stamp from the labour office to which the letters are said to have been forwarded.

Secondly, the account of union membership is inconsistent with the Respondent's own documents. Each letter is copied to the shop steward of the Kenya Union of Hair and Beauty Workers, while its submissions below state at paragraph 24 that the Appellant was a member of the Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied Workers. Those are two different unions, and no check-off record, membership form or deduction entry was produced to establish membership of either.

Thirdly, the show cause letter required a written explanation within twenty-four hours. This is addressed to an employee the Respondent says had by then been absent six days. The means of delivery, including the address of the Appellant are not established. The Respondent can therefore be said to have denied their employee a reasonable opportunity to be heard

Lastly, Agnes Kagwiria deposed that despite multiple efforts to locate the Appellant he never responded. Not one such effort is evidenced anywhere on the record. There is no telephone log, no letter to his known address and no record of any visit, this notwithstanding that Section 10(1) and (2) required the Respondent to hold his particulars.

The Respondent is right that the law does not require an employer to compel an employee to attend a disciplinary hearing. That is not the point. What the law requires is that the employer demonstrate that it afforded the employee a real and effective opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity of which the employee is never made aware is no opportunity at all. The Respondent has demonstrated the writing of letters. It has not demonstrated their delivery, and the writing of a letter is not the hearing of an employee.

I therefore find and hold that while the Respondent proved a valid and fair reason for the dismissal within the meaning of Sections 43 and 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Act, it failed to prove that the dismissal was effected in accordance with fair procedure as required by Sections 41 and 45(2)(c). The termination was to that extent, and to that extent only, unfair. Ground 3 succeeds in part, not on the redundancy footing on which it is pleaded, but on the footing of procedural unfairness which the record discloses.

On the 5th issue for determination, I must first settle the applicable wage, since every monetary head turns on it.

The Appellant pleaded a daily rate of Kshs. 670/=. The Respondent has advanced three figures in the same proceedings: Kshs. 730/= in its Memorandum of Response, Kshs. 650/= in the statement of Agnes Kagwiria, and Kshs. 672/= in its submissions below, the last being the minimum daily wage for Ruiru under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2022, Legal Notice No. 119 of 2022. It produced no pay slip at any stage, and being the author and custodian of its own wage records the inconsistency is its own to bear. I adopt the Appellant's pleaded figure of Kshs. 670.00 per day, being the figure by which he is bound and the lowest contended for by either side, which yields a deemed monthly wage of Kshs. 17,420.00 on twenty-six working days.

On compensation, an award under Section 49(1)(c) is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised on sound principle and not capriciously, and Section 49(4) prescribes the considerations. In Ol Pejeta Ranching Limited v David Wanjau Muhoro [2017] eKLR the Court of Appeal set aside a maximum award where the trial court had not attempted to justify or explain it, the object of the remedy being to compensate the employee and not to punish the employer.

The possible failure in this matter is the procedural aspect and default in the termination of employment. The Respondent had and proved a valid and fair reason for dismissal. This is because the Appellant's conduct in leaving his place of work on 4th August, 2023 and never returning is the proximate and effective cause of his separation. It falls squarely within the ambit of Section 49(4)(c) and (f). He did not report the matter to the labour officer as Section 47(1) permitted him to do. He then advanced a case of redundancy which the record does not support and a monthly salary that was never once paid to him. His service was some eighteen months and therefore not long. An award at or near the upper end of the scale would reward him for his own misconduct. Weighing against that is the single fact that the Respondent, which alone held the records and alone controlled the process, could not show that any of its three letters ever reached the man to whom they were addressed, and could not state consistently which union it says he belonged to. Balancing the one against the other, I assess compensation at the equivalent of two months' wages, being Kshs. 34,840.00.

On one month's salary in lieu of notice, the dismissal was summary and, on my finding, substantively justified under Section 44(4)(a). Summary dismissal is by the express terms of Section 44(1) termination without notice, and where the ground is made out notice pay does not arise. The claim is declined.

On the issue of house allowance, the Appellant was paid a consolidated daily wage. Section 31(2) relieves an employer of the obligation to pay a separate allowance where the wage is consolidated and inclusive of housing, the minimum daily wage for Ruiru was itself such a rate and the Appellant neither pleaded nor proved that his own wage excluded a housing element. The claim is declined.

On severance pay, the relief is available under Section 40(1)(g) only where redundancy is established. Redundancy has not been established. This claim is declined.

On unpaid leave days, Section 28(1) entitles an employee who has completed twelve consecutive months of service to not less than twenty-one working days of annual leave with full pay. The Appellant's contract having converted, and he having served from February, 2022 to August, 2023 that entitlement accrued. The burden of showing that leave was taken or paid for lay on the Respondent as keeper of the records under Section 74. It produced no leave register and no leave application. Its pleaded assertion that the Claimant always took leave in December when the company went on holiday is supported by no document at all.

Its submission before this court that permission slips and attendance records from page 40 onwards show that the Appellant took permission and sick leave is not borne out. Those pages are the August, 2023 attendance sheets, and the entries recording sick leave, child sickness and permission upon them relate to other employees and not to the Appellant. The claim is allowed for one completed year at twenty-one days, being Kshs. 14,070.00 as pleaded.

On a certificate of service, Section 51(1) obliges an employer, upon the termination of an employee's engagement, to issue that employee with a certificate of service. The obligation is statutory and unqualified, and is not conditional upon the employee first clearing with the employer. The claim is allowed.

On costs, in the exercise of the discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and this appeal having succeeded in part only with each party losing on issues of substance, each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal and of the proceedings before the trial court.

I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;

i) The judgment and decree delivered on 8th August 2025 in MCELRC No. E174 of 2024 is set aside in its entirety and substituted with the orders set out below.

ii) A declaration be and is hereby issued that the termination of the Appellant's employment by the Respondent was unfair for want of fair procedure within the meaning of Sections 41 and 45(2)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007.

iii) The Respondent shall pay the Appellant compensation for unfair termination of employment as follows;

a) Two (2) months salary as compensation for unlawful termination of employment ………………………………………………. Kshs. 34,840.00

b) Unpaid and untaken leave days …………………………. Kshs. 14,070.00

Total of award…………………………………………… Kshs. 48,910.00

iv) Interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.

v) The Respondent shall issue the Appellant with a certificate of service within thirty (30) days of the date of this judgment of court.

vi) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal and of the proceedings before the trial court.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Miss Mwangi holding brief for Mburia instructed by Samuel Mburia & Company Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Eredi instructed by Eredi Mulama & Company Advocates for the Respondent.

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