Employment law

Gathura Investments Limited v Mose [2026] KEELRC 4663 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E280 of 2024
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

The Learned Judge erred in law and fact by not considering the weight of the evidence adduced by the Appellant that clearly showed that the Respondent was not terminated from his employment.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E280 OF 2024

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

GATHURA INVESTMENTS LIMITED…………………………………… APPELLANT

VERSUS

VESTUS OBIRI MOSE…………………………………………………… RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 26th September, 2024. It arises from a judgment and decree delivered on 19th September, 2023 in MCELRC No. E917 of 2020.

In that judgment the trial court found that the Respondent’s termination from employment by the Appellant was unlawful and unfair. It awarded him one month’s salary in lieu of notice, unpaid leave for the year 2019 and compensation for unfair termination in the total sum of Kshs. 95,250.00, together with costs and interest.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the present appeal, which comes out on the following grounds;

1. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact by not considering the weight of the evidence adduced by the Appellant that clearly showed that the Respondent was not terminated from his employment.

2. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to find that the evidence proffered by the Appellant was more credible than that given by the Respondent.

3. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in using a higher standard of proof than a balance of probability in arriving at the determination as to whether the Appellant had proved its case.

4. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact by not considering that the Respondent made several calls to the Claimant after the Claimant deserted work, which calls the Claimant refused to answer.

5. That the whole judgement and decree of the Principal Magistrate is against the pleadings, submissions and the law.

6. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in expressing outright bias against the Appellant and wholly disregarded its argument.

7. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to consider the documentary evidence provided by the Appellant and the submissions adduced in support of the Appellant’s case.

8. The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in awarding the Respondent excessive damages taking into account the nature of the claim.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

1. This Appeal be allowed.

2. The Judgement and Decree of the lower court be set aside and the Respondent’s case in the lower Court be dismissed.

3. The Appellant be awarded costs of this appeal and those in the lower court.

It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the Respondent was engaged by it as a security guard on terms which contemplated his deployment to different workstations, on account of the nature of the work and the preference of its clients.

It states that on 24th July, 2019 the Respondent was informed of a proposed transfer to an assignment at a site called Executive in Githunguri, which he declined, whereupon he left the office in a huff and never returned. It maintains that he was never terminated, that he neither resigned nor tendered notice, that several telephone calls were made to him which he refused to answer, and that his guarantors were sent to look for him after seven days had elapsed.

The Appellant further states that in or about December, 2019 the Respondent returned the uniforms issued to him and collected his savings, which had been deducted from his salary every month, and that by so doing he signified that he had himself brought his engagement to an end.

On the law, the Appellant submits that under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 the burden lay first upon the Respondent to establish that a termination had in fact occurred, and that he failed to discharge it, having produced neither a termination letter nor any corroborating witness. It submits that the trial court thereby shifted the burden of proof onto the Appellant before the Respondent had discharged the burden imposed upon him.

It submits further that under Section 44(4)(a) of the Act absence from the place appointed for the performance of work, without leave or other lawful cause, amounts to gross misconduct warranting summary dismissal. It contends that the trial court failed to evaluate its evidence and in particular a letter which it says it addressed to the Labour Office reporting the Respondent’s desertion of duty.

On the reliefs, the Appellant submits that remedies under Section 49 of the Act can only issue where unfair termination has been proved, that compensation is discretionary and governed by the factors set out in Section 49(4), and that the award made was excessive and against the evidence on record.

It is the Respondent’s case and submission that he was employed by the Appellant on 12th April, 2004 as a night security guard at a final monthly salary of Kshs. 15,000.00, and that he served the Appellant continuously and without blemish for some fifteen years.

He states that on 24th July, 2019 he reported for duty as usual only to be told verbally by the Appellant’s manager, one Mr. Mwendwa, to go back home as his services were no longer required. He states that he did not decline the assignment at Githunguri but accepted it and asked only for a per diem for his upkeep, that the Appellant’s accountant told him there was no money, and that upon being referred back to the manager he was told there was nothing to discuss and was thereupon dismissed. He denies having deserted duty. He points out that a man who deserts his employment does not thereafter lodge a complaint with the Labour Office, as he did within a fortnight of the events complained of.

Again, the Appellant states further that he returned to the company in August, 2019 to follow up on his employment status, was sent away, and was told by the manager to return the uniform in order to receive his savings. He returned it on the same day, and his savings of Kshs. 3,500.00 were paid into his account in December, 2019.

On the law, the Respondent submits that Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 place upon the employer the burden of proving the reason for the termination and the fairness of the procedure adopted, and that the Appellant discharged neither. He submits that a defence of desertion must be supported by evidence of reasonable attempts to contact the employee and by a notice to show cause, of which there was none.

It is their submission in finality that Section 41 of the Act is couched in mandatory terms and was wholly disregarded, that Article 41(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 guarantees every person the right to fair labour practices, and that the appeal raises no arguable error of law or fact.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent was terminated from employment by the Appellant.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination was unlawful and unfair.

3. Whether the trial court erred in the awards made to the Respondent.

On the 1st issue for determination, this being a first appeal, my duty is to reconsider and re-evaluate the whole of the evidence tendered before the trial court and to draw my own conclusions from it. I must bear in mind that I have neither seen nor heard the witnesses and must make due allowance in that respect. The principle was restated in Mbae (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate Koome Mbae) v Kinya [2024] KEHC 2285 (KLR).

Interference is accordingly warranted only where the trial court has proceeded upon a wrong principle, has misapprehended the evidence, or has arrived at a conclusion which no tribunal properly directing itself could have reached upon that evidence. It is not open to me to disturb a finding merely because I might have reached a different result had I been hearing the matter at first instance.

The Appellant’s first, second, fifth and seventh grounds all turn upon the finding that a termination occurred, and I take them together. Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 provides that the burden of proving that an unfair termination has occurred rests on the employee, while the burden of justifying the grounds for the termination rests on the employer. The provision has two limbs and the Appellant’s submissions address only the first.

What the Respondent had to prove was that his employment came to an end at the instance of his employer. He was not obliged to prove it by documentary evidence. It would be a strange rule of law which allowed an employer who terminates orally, and who therefore generates no document, to defeat the claim upon the very ground that no document exists.

His evidence was that he presented himself for duty on 24th July, 2019 and was sent home with the words that his services were no longer required. That evidence was given upon oath and was tested in cross-examination. More significantly, the fact of the separation was never in dispute. It was common ground that from 24th July, 2019 the Respondent did no further work for the Appellant, that he did not resign, that he was issued with no letter of any description and that he did not thereafter return to the payroll.

The Appellant’s own pleaded case at paragraph 4 of its Defence was that the Respondent left the office in a huff on that very day and did not return. The parties were therefore agreed as to the date, the place and the fact of the severance. What divided them was its character. The Respondent said he was sent away; the Appellant said he walked away. In that state of affairs the trial court had before it two competing accounts of a single event. The onus of establishing the fact it asserted lay upon each party, in accordance with Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80, Laws of Kenya. Desertion is a species of gross misconduct and the party alleging it must prove it. It was therefore not, as the Appellant submits, a case of the trial court shifting the burden of proof. It was a case of the trial court weighing two accounts and finding, as it was entitled to find, that one was supported by the evidence and the other was not.

Two subsidiary matters arose at the trial which I should dispose of here. The first is the suggestion, put to the Respondent in cross-examination, that his documents bore the name of Gain Security Services and not that of the Appellant. The point goes nowhere. The Appellant admitted at paragraph 3 of its Defence that it had contracted the Respondent as a security guard. Its own witness told the trial court that he was the Manager, Security at Gain Security Services under Gathura Investment Limited, and that he was the person who recruited the Respondent. The National Social Security Fund statement names the employer as Gathura Investments Limited in terms. A trading name is not a separate legal person. An employer who has admitted the contract of service upon the pleadings cannot afterwards seek shelter behind the name appearing on a job card.

The second matter is the length of service. The Respondent pleaded and testified that he was employed on 12th April, 2004. The National Social Security Fund statement records the date of employment as 3rd August, 2009 and shows contributions remitted by the Appellant from 2009 to 2019.

The Appellant’s witness told the trial court that the Respondent had been at the company for close to fifteen years and that they had worked together at Embakasi Pipeline. The Appellant never pleaded any different date of commencement, and Section 74 of the Employment Act, 2007 placed the duty of keeping the employment records squarely upon it. The pleaded date therefore stands, and upon even the most conservative view would be that this was an employment of not less than ten years.

I come now to the circumstance which is, in my view, decisive upon this issue, and to which the Appellant makes no answer at all.

On 8th August, 2019 barely a fortnight after 24th July, 2019 the Sub-County Labour Officer, Industrial Area, wrote to the Managing Director of the Appellant’s security business conveying a labour complaint lodged by the Respondent. In it he stated that he had been employed as a security officer from April, 2004 at a monthly wage of Kshs. 15,000.00 and that his services had been terminated on 24th July, 2019 without lawful cause. The letter invited the employer either to settle the matter immediately or to furnish its comments within seven days. It was produced as the Respondent’s exhibit. The Appellant neither responded to it nor honoured the summons of the Labour Office.

The conduct of a man who abandons his employment of his own volition is not the conduct of a man who, within two weeks, walks into a government labour office and files a formal complaint that he has been dismissed. That complaint is contemporaneous, it is documentary, and it is consistent in every particular with the case the Respondent pleaded a year later. It corroborates his account and it undermines that of the Appellant.

I must at this point address a matter which has caused me some disquiet. At paragraphs 17 to 22 of its written submissions the Appellant asserts that it produced before the trial court a letter addressed to the Labour Office reporting the Respondent’s desertion of duty, and builds upon that assertion an extended argument that its conduct evinced good faith.

There is no such letter. The only correspondence with the Labour Office anywhere upon this record is that of 8th August 2019, which is the Labour Officer’s letter to the Appellant conveying the Respondent’s complaint against it. It was the Respondent’s document and it says the precise opposite of what is attributed to it. The Appellant’s own witness confirmed in cross-examination that the Appellant had no documentary evidence whatsoever on the subject.

A submission of that character, advanced upon appeal in respect of a document which is not merely absent from the record but is contradicted by it, is one I cannot allow to pass without comment. Counsel owe this court a duty of candour, and that duty is not discharged by the confident assertion of facts which the record does not bear out. For these reasons I find that the Respondent discharged the burden which Section 47(5) placed upon him. He established upon a balance of probabilities, that his employment was brought to an end on 24th July 2019 at the instance of the Appellant and not on his own volition. The finding of the trial court to that effect is affirmed.

On the 2nd issue for determination, the Appellant’s answer to the claim was and remains that the Respondent deserted duty. This is where this court wishes to begin. Desertion of duty is a grave administrative offence which, if proved, renders an employee liable to summary dismissal under Section 44(4)(a) of the Employment Act, 2007. But it must be proved, and it is not enough for an employer simply to state that an employee has deserted.

In Ronald Nyambu Daudi v Tornado Carriers Limited [2019] KEELRC 2150 (KLR) this court held that an employer alleging desertion must show the efforts made towards reaching out to the employee, and must put the employee on notice that termination upon that ground is under consideration. Desertion is in truth a state of mind and a state of mind must be established by evidence from which it may properly be inferred.

What evidence did the Appellant place before the trial court? Its sole witness testified that he told the Respondent he would be transferred to Githunguri, that the Respondent said he would not go and stormed out, that the Appellant looked for him until December, that several calls were made which he refused to answer, and that guarantors were sent after seven days.

In cross-examination that account came apart. The witness conceded that there was no documentary evidence that guarantors had been sent, that no guarantor was called as a witness, that no notice to show cause was served, that no transfer letter was issued, and that the Appellant did not know where the Respondent lived. No call log was produced. No telephone number upon which the Respondent was allegedly called was ever placed before the trial court. No attendance register or muster roll was produced for the days upon which the desertion is said to have occurred, though such records are kept by the employer under Section 74 of the Act. No report of desertion was made to the Labour Office. Not one document of any description was produced by the Appellant in the whole of its case.

The fourth ground of appeal, that the trial court failed to consider that several calls were made which the Respondent refused to answer, is in truth a complaint that the trial court declined to accept an assertion made from the witness box and abandoned under cross-examination. There was nothing before it to consider beyond the bare assertion.

The Appellant relied before the trial court upon Julius Kyalo Malonza v Ruth Osolo t/a Eraeva Catering Services [2021] KEELRC 835 (KLR.) That authority does not assist. In Malonza the employer testified to repeated telephone attempts and, when those failed, wrote to the Labour Commissioner after thirty days reporting the desertion, the letter bearing the stamp of the Nairobi Labour Office being upon the record. It was that documentary step which persuaded the court that reasonable efforts had been made.

The Appellant took no such step. Indeed, when the Labour Office wrote to it upon this very employment relationship, it ignored the letter. The contrast is complete.

The single fact upon which the Appellant can properly rely is that in December, 2019 the Respondent returned his uniform and collected his savings of Kshs. 3,500.00. It says this signified that he had ended his own engagement.

The Respondent’s explanation, pleaded in his Reply to Defence and never displaced, is that he went back in August, 2019 to follow up on his status, was sent away, and was told to return the uniform in order to receive his savings. That explanation sits far more comfortably with the surrounding circumstances, and in particular with the labour complaint filed in the very same month.

An employee who has been dismissed, and who is told his savings will be released only against the return of his uniform, can hardly be faulted for returning it. He does not by that act convert a dismissal into a resignation. I find that the Appellant did not establish the defence of desertion, and that it did not come close to establishing it.

It follows that the Appellant established no reason at all for the severance of this employment. Section 43(1) of the Act requires an employer to prove the reason for a termination, and Section 43(2) provides that where it fails to do so the termination shall be deemed unfair within the meaning of Section 45. Section 45(2) renders a termination unfair where the employer fails to prove a valid and fair reason and fails to prove that fair procedure was followed.

The Appellant, having staked its case upon the proposition that it never terminated the Respondent at all, was left with no reason to prove and no procedure to defend. An employer who denies that a termination occurred necessarily forfeits the opportunity to justify it. The statutory presumption operated against the Appellant and it did nothing to displace it.

As to procedure, Section 41 of the Act requires an employer, before terminating on the grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity, to explain to the employee in a language he understands the reason for which termination is being considered, to allow him the presence of a fellow employee or union representative of his choice, and to hear and consider his representations. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held that four elements must be discernible for the procedure to pass muster: an explanation of the grounds in a language understood by the employee; the reason for which termination is being considered; the employee’s entitlement to the presence of another employee of his choice; and the hearing and consideration of any representations made. Not one of those elements is present here. There was no explanation, no hearing, no notice to show cause, no disciplinary process of any description and no notice of termination.

Even upon the Appellant’s own version, taken at its highest, does not come out any better. Assume the Respondent did refuse a lawful instruction to transfer and did walk out of the manager’s office. Refusal of a lawful and reasonable instruction is a disciplinary matter, and the Act provides for it.

The answer known to the law was a notice to show cause, followed by a hearing at which the employee might explain himself, followed by a reasoned decision. It was not a severance effected by silence, in which the employer lets the employment lapse, keeps the employee off the payroll, ignores the summons of the Labour Office, and then contends years later that the employee dismissed himself. The Employment Act does not recognise separation by attrition.

The third ground of appeal, that the trial court applied a higher standard of proof than a balance of probabilities, finds no support in the judgment appealed from. The trial court set out Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act and Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 in terms and measured the two competing accounts one against the other. That is the civil standard applied in the ordinary way.

The sixth ground, that the trial court expressed outright bias against the Appellant, is a serious charge. An allegation of bias against a judicial officer is not to be thrown into a memorandum of appeal as a makeweight. It must be particularised and it must be supported by material. The Appellant has not done any of these.

Reading the judgment appealed from, this court find a court which recorded both cases, identified three issues, set out the applicable statutory provisions and authorities, and gave reasons for preferring one account over the other. A litigant who loses is not thereby entitled to say that the court was biased. This ground is not merely unproved; it ought not to have been pleaded.

The fifth ground, that the judgment is against the pleadings, submissions and the law, is generalised and omnibus. It does not discharge the burden lying upon an appellant to demonstrate a specific error.

Having re-evaluated the whole of the evidence for myself, this court arrives at the same conclusion as the trial court, and again do this independently. The Appellant’s evidence was not the more credible. It was that of a single witness whose account was unsupported by a single document and who resiled from its material particulars under cross-examination. Grounds 1 to 7 fail and the finding that the termination was both substantively and procedurally unfair is affirmed.

On the 3rd issue for determination, the eighth ground of appeal is that the damages awarded were excessive having regard to the nature of the claim. I take each head of the award in turn.

As to one month’s salary in lieu of notice, the Respondent was employed upon monthly terms and was entitled under Section 35(1)(c) of the Act to not less than twenty-eight days’ notice. No notice was given and none was paid. The award of Kshs. 15,000.00 is unimpeachable.

As to leave, Section 28 of the Act confers an entitlement to not less than twenty-one working days of leave with full pay after every twelve consecutive months of service. The Respondent claimed Kshs. 7,500.00 for the year 2019. The trial court awarded Kshs. 5,250.00, being the twenty-one days pro-rated over the six months of 2019 he had worked. That computation is correct and is more conservative than the sum claimed.

The Appellant’s witness said the Respondent had taken his leave, but conceded he had no document to confirm it and that the leave records were kept by the Appellant. Where records which an employer is obliged by Section 74 to keep are not produced, the employer cannot be heard to complain that the court proceeded upon the employee’s evidence. The award stands.

As to compensation, Section 49(1)(c) of the Act permits an award not exceeding twelve months’ gross monthly wages and Section 49(4) sets out the matters to be taken into account. The trial court awarded Kshs. 75,000.00.

It is observable that at that point in its Judgment the trial court described the award as five months’ salary and then wrote the computation as 15,000x4. The sum of Kshs. 75,000.00 is arithmetically, five months’ salary at Kshs. 15,000.00 per month, and it is that sum which was carried into the total and into the decree. The reference to the multiplier four is a manifest slip of the pen which does not affect the decretal sum. Is five months’ compensation excessive? The Respondent served the Appellant from 2004, a period of some fifteen years upon his evidence and not less than ten upon the National Social Security Fund statement. He was a night security guard earning Kshs. 15,000.00 a month. He was severed from that employment without a word of explanation, without notice and without any process at all, and was left to seek the assistance of the Labour Office, which the Appellant ignored. Measured against the statutory ceiling of twelve months, an award of five months for fifteen years of unblemished service is a moderate one. Had the trial court awarded more, I should not have thought it wrong. Considerably, this ought to be increased in view of the circumstances and this court awards ten (10) months salary as such compensation.

An appellate court does not interfere with an award of compensation, which is discretionary, merely because it might itself have arrived at a different figure. It interferes only where the trial court took into account an irrelevant factor, failed to take into account a relevant one, proceeded upon a wrong principle, or arrived at a figure so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. None of those factors is present.

The Appellant’s complaint that the trial court failed to consider the Respondent’s conduct, his contribution to the termination and his mitigation of loss loses its force once the factual premise upon which it rests, namely desertion, has been rejected. The eighth ground fails and the awards are affirmed in the following terms;

One (1) month’s salary in lieu of notice……………………………………….Kshs. 15,000.00

Unpaid leave for the year 2019……………………………………….…..…….Kshs. 5,250.00

Ten (10) months salary as compensation for unfair termination of employment…………………………………………………………..……..Kshs. 150,000.00

Total of award……………………………………………………..………Kshs. 170,250.00

On costs, in the exercise of the discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, costs follow the event. The Respondent has succeeded in resisting this appeal and there is no reason to deprive him of his costs. He is a night watchman who obtained judgment in September, 2023 and who has been kept from the fruits of it by an appeal which is, upon a re-evaluation of the whole of the evidence, unarguable.

I am therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The judgment and decree delivered on 19th September, 2023 in MCELRC No. E917 of 2020 are upheld in their entirety.

(ii) The award of Kshs. 170,250.00 shall be paid to the Respondent within thirty (30) days of this judgment of court.

(iii) Interest thereon at court rates from the date of the judgment of the trial court until payment in full, as decreed by that court.

(iv) The costs of the suit in the trial court as well as in this appeal shall be borne by the Appellant, as ordered by the trial court.

(v) The Appellant shall bear the costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mukathe instructed by Maina Makome & Company Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Mr. Onyango holding brief for Namada instructed by Namada & Company Advocates for the Respondent.

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