Background
The Honourable Hellen Wasilwa, in good conscience, do hereby disqualify herself from any further conduct of this matter.
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Honourable Hellen Wasilwa, in good conscience, do hereby disqualify herself from any further conduct of this matter.
Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT NAIROBI
ELRC MISC. APPLICATION NO. E094 OF 2026
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, KENYA BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (KBC) STAFF
RETIREMENT BENEFITS SCHEME..………......APPLICANT/CLIENT
VS
MORARA OMOKE t/a
MORARA OMOKE ADVOCATES………....RESPONDENT/ADVOCATE
RULING
1 The Respondent/Advocate filed a Notice of Motion application dated 4th May 2026 seeking orders:
1. The Honourable Hellen Wasilwa, in good conscience, do hereby disqualify herself from any further conduct of this matter.
2. This Reference be placed before the Presiding Judge in the Claims Division of this Court; or before the Presiding Judge of the Court for re-allocation to any other judge in the Division for hearing.
3. Costs of this application be in the cause.
2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and the supporting affidavit of Morara Omoke, the Respondent/Advocate.
Respondent/Advocate’s Case
3 The Advocate avers that that the application is not an attack on the Court but a rebuttal of the presumption of judicial impartiality.
4 He states that he has a reasonable, solemn and objective apprehension that the Court will neither bring an impartial and open mind to bear in the adjudication of this reference, nor the openness to evaluate the evidence and hear the submissions of his counsel. He premises this apprehension on three instances arising in the mother file, ELRC Cause No. 1352 of 2018.
5 The Advocate avers that a decision was hastily passed before he was granted an opportunity to respond to the Client's application dated 10th November 2025, which sought variation of orders and in which he was named as the 1st Respondent.
6 He states that his preliminary objection was swiftly dismissed and a leapfrog procedure, unknown to the practice of this Court, was applied to dispose of the substantive application without directions being given and without his being accorded an opportunity to file a response and submissions.
7 He avers that despite finding the said application defective and dismissing it, the Court went on to grant the key prayer for change of advocates. It is his case that this caused him reasonable apprehension that the Court will not ensure the proper and impartial application of the law in these proceedings.
8 The Advocate avers that on 9th March 2026 the Court adopted a consent purportedly entered into on 15th January 2026 between the Client and Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), despite the pendency of an application dated 19th January 2026 for adoption of that consent, in which he was named as the 1st Respondent.
9 He states that the application expressly sought to transplant the consent sum onto the taxation of his Bill of Costs, yet it was not heard, and that his counsel's protest against the adoption was ignored.
10 He contends that, in addition to failing to meet the constitutional imperative of a fair hearing, the consent was adopted in disregard of the subsisting orders of Onyango J. issued on 16th November 2022 staying proceedings in the matter.
11 He further avers that the application for adoption was brought in disobedience of the Court's own order, which had permitted the firm of Gikera & Vadgama Advocates to come on record for the sole purpose of lodging an application for variation of the stay of proceedings order.
12 It is his case that the Court appeared unburdened by this, causing him to develop a sense of mistrust and fear that he is being hoodwinked into participating in a pre-determined legal process.
13 The Advocate states that while he appreciates that absolute neutrality in the judicial context is a chimera, the Court could have heard him in the above instances before deciding whichever way it desired, as granting him an opportunity to be heard was a constitutional imperative. He avers that the lapses identified are highly likely to be repeated in these proceedings.
14 It is the Advocate's case that had he been heard, he would have demonstrated that the consent is founded on unconstitutionality, illegality and material misrepresentation.
15 He avers that although the consent states that the sum of Kshs. 1,511,161,174.27 comprises the accurate and true computations of the sums outstanding and payable by KBC, the computations are inaccurate, grossly miscomputed and calculated to disadvantage the members of the Scheme.
16 He contends that they ignore the formula set out at paragraph 50 of the judgment delivered by Onyango J. on 27th April 2022, which remains unappealed.
17 He particularizes the errors apparent on the face of the consent as follows: the unremitted contributions have been subjected to simple interest per annum instead of the statutory compound interest of 3% per month; unremitted employee contributions, employer contributions and rental income from 2008 to 2018 have not been included; costs of the suit have been omitted wholly; and some essential components of the claim, such as employer contributions and rental income, were not subjected to interest at all.
18 The Advocate states that after judgment, the parties filed their computations as directed by the Court, with the judgment sum as computed on behalf of the Client amounting to Kshs. 18,421,704,159.11 and that computed by KBC amounting to Kshs. 18,045,740,788.84.
19 He avers that shortly thereafter, the Board of Trustees, working in cahoots with the senior management and Board of Directors of KBC, attempted to disinherit the members of the Scheme by directing him to reduce the computations already filed to Kshs. 6,369,152,342.26, a reduction of approximately 65.4%. He states that he declined to aid this illegality, in line with his duty to protect the interests of the members.
20 He avers that the consent now adopted purports to settle on Kshs. 1,511,161,174.27 as the sum due to the Scheme, thereby lowering the claim by 91.8%, and that the impact of such a reduction on his fees, were that sum transplanted onto the taxation of his Bill of Costs, requires no emphasis.
21 It is his case that the consent sum, in whose negotiation and adoption he did not participate, is now a central issue in the taxation reference. He states that he reasonably believes it will automatically be transplanted onto this reference, which is before the same Judge who denied him audience during its adoption.
22 The Advocate further avers that had he been heard, he would have presented additional facts calling into question the factual soundness of the consent, which he contends did not make material disclosures and falsified the actual agreement between the parties.
23 He states that it was not disclosed that during the pendency of the suit he recovered Kshs. 230,057,009.43 for the Scheme. He adds that it was not disclosed that on 23rd October 2025 KBC transferred to the Scheme a 72-unit property in Shauri Moyo generating Kshs. 900,000 per month and last valued in 2015 at Kshs. 216 million, nor that KBC is set to pay the Scheme Kshs. 3.27 billion on or before 31st May 2026. He contends that it must therefore be obvious that the parties agreed on a higher sum than the one presented in the consent.
24 In addition to his apprehension, the Advocate avers that it is in the interest of justice that the reference be laid before a fresh judicial eye and mind.
25 He states that the earlier reference in Miscellaneous Application No. E002 of 2024 was determined by Ocharo Kebira J., the main suit by Onyango J., and the consent adopted by this Court. It is his case that the present reference should therefore be evaluated by a different judge for an independent re-evaluation of the subject matter value.
Applicant/Client’s Case
26 In opposition to the application, the Client filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 13th May 2026 by Martin Nyongesa King'asia, the Chairperson of its Board of Trustees.
27 The Client avers that the application is devoid of merit, misconceived in law and an abuse of the court process, and that it discloses no factual, legal or constitutional basis capable of warranting the recusal of the Court.
28 It is the Client's case that recusal of a judicial officer is an extraordinary remedy grounded on the constitutional imperative of preserving public confidence in judicial impartiality, and is not a procedural avenue for dissatisfied litigants seeking to avoid unfavourable outcomes.
29 The Client states that the applicable test is an objective one, namely whether a fair-minded, informed and reasonable observer, having considered all the relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that there exists a real possibility or likelihood of bias. It avers that this threshold is necessarily high and cannot be met by speculation, suspicion, subjective perception or disagreement with judicial reasoning.
30 The Client contends that the Advocate's application falls far short of this threshold and is founded entirely on dissatisfaction with judicial determinations previously rendered against him.
31 It avers that the Advocate does not allege any pecuniary interest, personal relationship, extraneous influence, improper communication, conflict of interest or personal misconduct on the part of the Court, nor any predisposition arising from matters external to the judicial process. It is the Client's case that such disagreement is properly ventilated through review or appeal and cannot found recusal proceedings.
32 On the Advocate's complaint regarding the ruling of 14th January 2026 on the Client's change of advocates, the Client states that the Advocate alleges that the Court determined the Client's application dated 10th November 2025 without affording him an opportunity to file a response and submissions. The Client avers that these allegations are factually inaccurate and omit material portions of the procedural history.
33 It states that the record shows that the Advocate was fully aware of the proceedings and actively participated in them by filing a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 19th November 2025 and submissions dated 10th December 2025.
34 The Client avers that those submissions were expressed to be both in support of his Preliminary Objection and in opposition to the Client's Notice of Motion, its supporting affidavit and its further affidavit sworn on 3rd December 2025.
35 The Client avers that the Court considered the objections comprehensively, and even referred to an earlier ruling of 13th February 2024 by Mwaure J., in which a similar objection raised by the Advocate was dismissed.
36 It contends that, having actively participated and invited the Court to determine his objections, the Advocate cannot now claim that he was denied audience merely because the Court declined to uphold his position.
37 The Client further states that the Court expressly found that the substantive application had been filed by advocates not properly on record, and struck out the substantive prayers sought.
38 It avers that the Court nonetheless addressed the constitutional implications of the breakdown of the advocate-client relationship, considered the right to counsel under Article 50 of the Constitution, and exercised its discretion to permit the Client to appoint advocates of its choice for purposes of filing a substantive application.
39 It is the Client's case that there was nothing unlawful, irregular or indicative of bias in the Court exercising its discretion in that manner.
40 It avers that if the Advocate considered the ruling erroneous, the law provides appellate remedies, and that recusal proceedings cannot be turned into surrogate appellate proceedings. The Client adds that the Advocate has not identified any statement, conduct, language or action by the Court demonstrating hostility, prejudgment, malice or favouritism.
41 On the Advocate's complaint regarding the adoption, on 9th March 2026, of the consent dated 15th January 2026 between the Client and Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, the Client avers that the allegations are equally misconceived.
42 It states that following the judgment of 27th April 2022, the Client and KBC undertook a reconciliation of the decretal computations, which was lawful and undertaken pursuant to the judgment and directions of the Court. The exercise culminated in agreed computations, which were presented before the Court and adopted as an order.
43 The Client contends that the Advocate's dissatisfaction stems from the perceived implications of the reconciled figure on his pending Advocate-Client Bill of Costs, and that dissatisfaction with the financial consequences of a judicial determination cannot amount to evidence of bias.
44 It avers that the Advocate was not a substantive party to the reconciliation, which concerned the indebtedness between the parties to the main suit, and that his pecuniary interest in maximizing the subject matter value for taxation cannot elevate him into a decision-maker in that process.
45 It is the Client's case that substantial portions of the Advocate's supporting affidavit are devoted not to alleged bias but to challenging the merits of the reconciled computations, including alleged omitted sums, valuation methodology, interest computations and subject matter value. These matters are irrelevant to judicial impartiality and reveal the true nature of the application as an attempt to reopen or strategically reassign substantive disputes on taxation and subject matter valuation.
46 The Client contends that the Advocate seeks a different judicial forum not because of demonstrated bias, but in the hope that another court may take a more favourable view, which amounts to forum shopping.
47 It avers that an informed and reasonable observer would note that the Court has merely performed its ordinary judicial functions, that the Advocate participated in the proceedings and his objections were considered, and that his complaints arise entirely from adverse judicial outcomes and are matters for appeal or review.
48 The Client further avers that judicial officers take a constitutional oath to administer justice impartially, and that unfounded recusal applications undermine judicial independence and erode public confidence in the administration of justice.
49 It contends that if litigants could procure recusal merely by expressing dissatisfaction with judicial outcomes, adjudication would become hostage to tactical manoeuvres by disgruntled parties.
50 It is the Client's case that the Advocate himself concedes that he does not allege personal impropriety on the part of the Court.
51 The Client avers that the timing, tenor and substance of the application show that it is intended to delay, obstruct and strategically influence the determination of the pending taxation proceedings. It adds that the application forms part of a broader pattern in which the Advocate has persistently litigated issues of subject matter value, computations, taxation and representation across multiple proceedings, including several pending applications in the Court of Appeal.
52 The Client therefore urges the Court to find that the Advocate has failed to establish any factual or legal basis warranting recusal, and to dismiss the application with costs.
Respondent/Advocate’s Submissions
53 The Advocate filed written submissions dated 30th June 2026 and identified three issues for determination: whether he has established a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to warrant recusal; whether his constitutional right to a fair hearing and the interests of justice require that the Reference be heard by a different Judge; and whether the risk of the impugned consent influencing the taxation Reference justifies recusal.
54 By way of background, the Advocate submitted that following the judgment of 27th April 2022 in ELRC Cause No. 1352 of 2018, he and the Client fell out, and on 16th November 2022 Onyango J. stayed proceedings in the main suit, and the coming on record of new counsel, until his Bill of Costs was taxed and settled.
55 He submitted that in Miscellaneous Application No. E002 of 2024 the Court fixed the subject matter value for taxation at Kshs. 18,421,704,159.11, on which basis the Bill was re-taxed on 6th February 2026 at Kshs. 641,642,954.72.
56 It was submitted that the Client's attempts at reviewing and appealing that decision have failed and that it now seeks to reverse it through methods not allowed in law.
57 On the first issue, the Advocate submitted that the test for recusal on grounds of apparent bias is objective and well settled. He relied on Philip K. Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commision & another [2016] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held: - "the test to be applied is that of a fair minded and informed observer who will adopt a balanced approach and will neither be complacent nor be unduly sensitive or suspicious in determining whether or not there is real possibility of bias."
58 He further cited P.J Dave Flowers & another v Limuru Hills Limited & 3 others Equity Bank Limited(Interested Party) [2019] KEELC 92 (KLR), where the Court held that in considering whether to recuse itself, the Court answers first whether on its own evaluation it would likely be biased, and secondly whether in the opinion of an informed mind it would appear to be biased.
59 The Advocate submitted that the Client's application of 10th November 2025 named him as the 1st Respondent and sought, among other prayers, variation of the order of 16th November 2022, nullification of his computation of Kshs. 18,421,704,159.11 and adoption of a reconciled sum agreed between the Client and KBC. He argued that a fair-minded and informed observer would expect a party named as a respondent to such an application to be afforded an opportunity to respond before any of its prayers were determined.
60 It was submitted that on 14th January 2026 the Court granted the prayer for change of advocates without affording him that opportunity, applying a leapfrog procedure to dispose of the application without directions or the filing of a response and submissions. He further argued that the disposal was internally inconsistent, in that the Court found the application defective and dismissed it, yet granted the substantive prayer sought in the same application.
61 The Advocate submitted that this is not mere disagreement with an outcome but conduct falling within the test in Kalpana H Rawal & 2 others v Judicial Service Commission & 2 others [2016] eKLR, citing Attorney General of Kenya v Prof. Anyang' Nyong'o & 10 Others, EACJ Application No. 5 of 2007,: -"do the circumstances give rise to a reasonable apprehension, in the mind of a reasonable, fair-minded and informed member of the public, that the Judge did not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the matter."
62 He submitted that the position deteriorated on 9th March 2026, when the Court recorded and adopted the consent of 15th January 2026 settling the judgment debt at Kshs. 1,511,161,174.27, a reduction of 91.8%. This was despite the pendency of the application dated 19th January 2026, in which he was named as the 1st Respondent and which sought to have the consent sum applied to the taxation of his Bill of Costs.
63 It was submitted that his counsel's protest was disregarded, and that the adoption proceeded in disregard of the subsisting stay order of 16th November 2022 and of the Court's own limitation confining the mandate of Gikera & Vadgama Advocates to filing an application for variation of the stay order.
64 The Advocate argued that the right to be heard is a foundational rule of natural justice, the breach of which independently vitiates a decision. He relied on James Kanyiita Nderitu & another v Marios Philotas Ghikas & another [2016] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal adopted the formulation in Sangram Singh v Election Tribunal that: -"our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence."
65 It is the Advocate's submission that, taken cumulatively, the events of 14th January 2026 and 9th March 2026 are capable of giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
66 He distinguished Republic v Assa Kibagendi Nyakundi [2022] KEHC 1913 (KLR), where the recusal application was found to be a disguised challenge to considered findings which could only be challenged on appeal. He argued that his grievance is not that the Court reached an unfavourable conclusion on the merits, but that he was twice denied the opportunity to be heard before conclusions directly affecting his legal and economic interests were reached.
67 The Advocate acknowledged that the threshold for recusal is high. He cited the Supreme Court in Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others [2013] KESC 20 (KLR) for the standard of a "well-informed, thoughtful observer who understands all the facts", and that an "unsubstantiated suspicion of personal bias or prejudice" will not suffice. He submitted that he meets this threshold by relying on specific, dated and verifiable procedural events rather than general dissatisfaction with previous decisions.
68 He further relied on Republic v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Trade & Industry & 6 others Ex-parte Josphat Kimani Gacugu & 4 others [2020] eKLR, where the Court stated that:"justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking the judge was biased."
69 On the second issue, the Advocate submitted that Article 50(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to have any dispute decided in a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial court, that Article 25(c) entrenches the right to a fair trial as non-derogable, and that Articles 47 and 48 guarantee fair administrative action and access to justice.
70 He submitted, on the authority of Kalpana Rawal, that the test is not whether the Judge personally believes herself to be impartial, but whether a reasonable, fair-minded and informed member of the public would apprehend that she is not.
71 He also cited Konchellah & others v Chief Justice and President of Supreme Court of Kenya & others [2021] eKLR, where the Court observed that, impartiality being a fundamental tenet of the rule of law, the pragmatic practice is for the judicial officer concerned to recuse himself as a matter of course.
72 The Advocate argued that the interests of justice are served not merely by the correctness of the eventual outcome but by the visible integrity of the process. It was submitted that a litigant who was denied a hearing on two prior occasions touching the same transaction, and who must now litigate its financial consequences before the same Judge, cannot be expected to perceive the process as impartial. He added that reassignment would occasion no prejudice to the Client, as it would neither alter the issues nor deprive either party of any right.
73 The Advocate submitted that he is aware that recusal must not be used for forum shopping or as a substitute for an appeal, citing Gladys Boss Shollei v Judicial Service Commission & another [2018] eKLR for the proposition that a recusal application is a shield to protect a litigant's right to an impartial tribunal and not a sword to secure a preferred forum. He argued that the present application falls outside that mischief, as it was brought promptly, rests on objectively verifiable procedural circumstances, and does not seek the review, variation or reversal of any previous decision of the Court.
74 On the third issue, the Advocate submitted that his apprehension is not generalized, as the consent adopted on 9th March 2026 is liable to be transplanted directly onto the taxation of his Bill of Costs in this Reference. He argued that this nexus arises from the pleadings. The application of 10th November 2025 sought both the change of advocates and adoption of the reconciled sum, showing that these were integrated steps directed at the same end, and the application of 19th January 2026 sought adoption of the consent for the disclosed purpose of reviewing his fees.
75 It is his submission that the consent sum sits at the centre of the valuation exercise the Reference now requires the Court to undertake, and was reached without hearing him at all. He contended that a reasonable and fair-minded observer would therefore apprehend a real possibility of bias in the determination of the subject matter value, and that this direct nexus independently justifies recusal.
76 To demonstrate that the application is not a disguised appeal, the Advocate submitted that he has separately challenged the impugned decisions in the Court of Appeal in COACA/E237/2026 and COACA/E365/2026, which contest, among other things, the denial of his right to be heard before adoption of the consent. He added that he has also filed Civil Application No. E173 of 2026, which is pending and seeks a stay of these proceedings pending determination of the appeals, and Civil Application No. E030 of 2026.
77 In conclusion, the Advocate urged the Court to allow the application, recuse itself from further conduct of the matter and direct that the Reference be placed before the Presiding Judge for reallocation, with costs of the application in the cause.
Advocate/Client’s Submissions
78 The Advocate/Client submitted that the application is not founded on any demonstrable evidence of actual bias, conflict of interest, improper conduct, personal relationship, pecuniary interest or extraneous influence affecting the Court, but is a collateral attack on judicial decisions rendered in the exercise of the Court's adjudicative mandate.
79 It was submitted that the Advocate has converted disagreement with judicial outcomes into allegations of bias, and that the law does not permit recusal applications to be used as surrogate appeals or instruments of forum shopping.
80 On the law governing recusal, the Client submitted that judicial officers are presumed to act impartially, independently and in fidelity to their oath of office, and that recusal is not to be granted lightly or on the basis of a litigant's subjective dissatisfaction.
81 It relied on the Supreme Court decision in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2013] eKLR, where it was held: -"The objective test of reasonable apprehension of bias is good law. The test is stated variously, but amounts to this: what would an informed fair-minded observer think?" The Client further cited Philip K. Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commision & another [2016] eKLR, where the Court stated: -"The test is whether the perception of bias is held by reasonable, fair minded and informed persons applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information."
82 The Applicant/Client submitted that the test is objective and does not turn on the feelings, anxieties or suspicions of the litigant seeking recusal. The Client maintained that the threshold is necessarily high because recusal implicates two competing constitutional imperatives: the right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, and the duty of judges to hear and determine disputes allocated to them without succumbing to intimidation, pressure or tactical manipulation by litigants.
83 The Client relied on Republic v Mwalulu & 8 others [2005] KECA 344 (KLR), where the Court stated: -"Bias is a serious allegation and the courts will not lightly infer bias or partiality on the part of a judicial officer." It further cited Kalpana H. Rawal & 2 others v Judicial Service Commission & 6 others [2016] eKLR for the proposition that recusal cannot be founded on bare allegations, conjecture, insinuation, suspicion or dissatisfaction.
84 The Client also referred to Rule 5 of the Judicial Code of Conduct, which it submitted sets out the circumstances warranting recusal as where a judicial officer has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, has served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or has a close family or financial relationship or any interest in the matter. It was submitted that the only allegation made here is bias in the exercise of judicial discretion.
85 The Client submitted that the application is founded entirely on dissatisfaction with judicial outcomes. It contended that the Advocate's complaints are that his preliminary objection was dismissed, that the Client was permitted to appoint advocates of its choice, and that the consent between the Client and KBC was adopted.
86 It was submitted that he does not allege any personal relationship, pecuniary interest, improper ex parte communication, extraneous influence, expression of hostility or reliance on material external to the judicial record, and that the absence of such allegations is telling.
87 It was argued that if dissatisfaction with judicial reasoning were sufficient to found recusal, every unsuccessful litigant would acquire the power to engineer reassignment of judicial officers simply by alleging apprehension after an unfavourable ruling.
88 In this regard, the Client relied on Mama Millers Limited v Sunrise Synthetic Limited [2020] eKLR, which cited the Court of Appeal in Miller v Miller [1988] KLR 555 as follows: -"No party should be placed in a position where he can choose his Court... It would be disastrous if the practice was that once there are allegations made against a Judge and the judge's honour is in question, that Judge must disqualify himself. The administration of justice through Court would be adversely affected since mischievous parties to cases would obtain disqualification by judges with ease and the consequence would be a choice of trial of a Judge by a party."
89 The same decision was cited for the holding in Anyang' Nyong'o & Others that the Court must guard against litigants who all too often blame their losses in court cases on bias on the part of the Judge. The Client further submitted that the application is an attempt to maneuver the matter towards a preferred forum.
90 It was submitted that when the matter came up before Hon. Linet M. Mwangangi on 11th March 2026, the Advocate expressly sought to have it placed before Kebira J., but was informed that it had already been placed before this Court. The Client argued that it is not coincidental that the recusal application followed shortly thereafter, and that it is calculated to have the matter placed before Kebira J., who has previously rendered determinations favourable to the Advocate in disputes between the parties.
91 On the allegation that the Advocate was denied audience, the Client submitted that the record demonstrates the opposite. It argued that he actively participated in the proceedings on the application dated 10th November 2025 by filing a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 19th November 2025 and written submissions dated 10th December 2025, which were expressed to be both in support of the objection and in opposition to the substantive application.
92 It was submitted that the Court considered and rendered itself extensively on those objections, and even referred to an earlier determination by another judicial officer on similar objections raised by him.
93 It is the Client's submission that what the Advocate contests is not the absence of audience but the Court's refusal to adopt his preferred legal conclusions. It contended that the right to be heard does not guarantee that a party's arguments will be accepted, and that once a court has heard a party and rendered itself, dissatisfaction with the outcome is an appellate issue and not a recusal issue. It was submitted that even assuming the decisions were erroneous, the remedy lies in review or appeal.
94 In support of this position, the Client relied on Joyce N. Simitu v Stephen O. Mallowah & 2 Others [2013] eKLR, where the Court held: -"...While litigants have the right to apply for the disqualification of a judicial officer when there is a reasonable apprehension that the court will not decide a case impartially, this does not give them the right to object to their cases being heard by particular judicial officers simply because they believe such persons will not be likely to decide the case in their favour... Judicial officers are nevertheless required to administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with their Oath, the Constitution and the law. To this end they must resist all manner of pressure, regardless of where it comes from."
95 Further reliance was placed on Engen Kenya Limited v Rukan Limited [2020] eKLR, where the Court, in dismissing a recusal application premised on the grant of ex parte orders, stated: -"The Law is very clear on what should happen should a party be dissatisfied with the Orders of the Court. The party has a right to seek for review or appeal against the said order... Even though the Applicant has a right to call for recusal of a Judicial Officer... on apprehension of bias, that apprehension must be a reasonable one."
96 On the arguments relating to the computations, the consent and the subject matter value, the Client submitted that they are irrelevant to recusal. It submitted that the Advocate's contentions on statutory interest, omitted contributions, rental income, valuation of transferred property and computation methodology are substantive disputes on computation, taxation and implementation of the judgment, and that whether the reconciled figures are correct is entirely separate from whether the Court is impartial.
97 It was submitted that the true grievance, by the Advocate's own deposition, is his fear that the reconciled amount may be transplanted onto the taxation proceedings and affect the fees recoverable under his Bill of Costs. The Client argued that this reflects dissatisfaction with the possible legal and financial consequences of orders already issued and not evidence of bias, and that recusal cannot operate as a protective mechanism against the unfavorable economic implications of judicial determinations.
98 The Client further submitted that the reconciliation was undertaken by the substantive parties to the main suit pursuant to the judgment and directions of the Court, as part of its implementation. It contended that the Advocate was not a substantive party to that exercise, and that his financial interest in maximizing the subject matter value for taxation does not entitle him to veto or control agreements reached between the parties to the main proceedings.
99 It was also submitted that the reconciled figures were adopted as an order of the Court on 9th March 2026 and will remain part of the record irrespective of which judicial officer hears the Reference. The Client argued that the Advocate has not demonstrated how this Court would place any heavier or improper reliance on those orders than any other judge properly applying the law to the record. It added that the Court's familiarity with the background and procedural history of the dispute is not evidence of bias, and if anything enhances efficiency and consistency in adjudication.
100 On forum shopping, the Client submitted that the Advocate seeks recusal only after the Court rendered determinations unfavorable to him on representation and adoption of the consent, and expressly asks that the matter be placed before another judge. It maintained that the unavoidable inference is that he believes another forum may take a more favorable view on taxation and subject matter value. It was submitted that the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing protects litigants from actual or reasonably apprehended bias, but does not give them the right to choose their preferred judicial officer.
101 It is the Applicant/Client’s submission that the Court has a duty to hear the matter, relying on Jasbir Singh Rai (supra) for the proposition that a judge has a duty to sit and hear cases assigned to him or her and should not disqualify himself lightly, and that mere apprehension of bias is not sufficient without reasonable grounds.
102 The Client submitted that the Advocate has failed to establish any objective factual basis capable of displacing the presumption of judicial impartiality, and that the application is an abuse of process, a collateral attack on prior determinations and an improper attempt at forum shopping.
103 I have examined all the averments and submission of the parties herein. The applicant has filed the application seeking my recusal from hearing this case and he avers obvious biases directed at him and the attendant application before court.
104 The applicant has indicated that he was not granted an opportunity to respond to the application dated 10th November 2025 in Cause No 1352/2018.
105 The correct position on the file and as stated in this court’s ruling of 14/1/2026 is that the application dated 10th November 2025 was filed on by the applicants seeking stay and to be allowed to come on record for the claimants.
106 The 1st respondent who are the applicants in the current application opposed the application and filed a replying affidavit dated 19/11/25. This court considered the application and the respondents replying affidavit dated 19/11/25. This court considered the application and the respondent’s replying affidavit and submissions and disallowed the application in substance but allowed the claimants to get services of another counsel. The averment by the applicants that this court did not allow them to participate in the application is therefore factually incorrect.
107 The other orders granted were a consent recorded by the parties herein and which the applicant was opposed to despite not being a substantive party. The fact that the orders granted did not favour the respondent does not in my view point to any bias.
108 This court has not been faulted by the applicant for any personal relationships or conflict of interest or other misconduct. The applicant seems to only aver that the orders granted by the court were contrary to his expectations and for which he has recourse to an appeal.
109 That notwithstanding and given the nature of this case wherein the counsel needs to not only have justice done but also to see it is done, I will recuse myself from further handling this cause and refer it to the Presiding Judge Claims Division for further direction. Costs in the cause.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 13th Day of October 2026.
HELLEN WASILWA
JUDGE