Employment law

Bimal & another v Sakasa [2026] KEELRC 2818 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E003 of 2026
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

The Appellant, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the entire judgment of the Honourable D. O. Mbeja (MR) (SRM) delivered virtually on the 8th day of December 2025 in Magistrate’s Court Case Number MCELRC/E1274/2022, hereby appeals to the Employment and Labour relations Court against the said decision, in which the trial court held that the Appellant has unlawfully terminated the Respondent’s employment and awarded the Respondent the…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E003 OF 2026

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

DR. YAJNIK BIMAL ……………………………………………………… 1ST APPELLANT

BIMAL YAJNIK & ASSOCIATES ………………………………….…… 2ND APPELLANT

VERSUS

JOAN NASIMIYU SAKASA ……………………………….…………………… RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the Judgment of Hon. D.O. Mbeja (SRM) delivered virtually on 8th December 2025 at the Chief Magistrate’s Court, Milimani Commercial Courts, in MCELRC/E1274/2022: Joan Nasimiyu Sakasa v Dr. Yajnik Bimal & Bimal Yajnik & Associates)

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 6th January, 2026. It arises from a judgment delivered virtually on 8th December, 2025 in MCELRC/E1274/2022. The suit before the trial court was, by consent of the parties, determined pursuant to Rule 59 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 on the basis of documentary evidence, without oral testimony.

The Appeal is premised on the following grounds:

1. The Appellant, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the entire judgment of the Honourable D. O. Mbeja (MR) (SRM) delivered virtually on the 8th day of December 2025 in Magistrate’s Court Case Number MCELRC/E1274/2022, hereby appeals to the Employment and Labour relations Court against the said decision, in which the trial court held that the Appellant has unlawfully terminated the Respondent’s employment and awarded the Respondent the sum of Ksh1,412,076/- together with costs of the claim.

2. The Appeal is to be determined by the Employment and Labour Relations Court at a date, time and place to be set by Notice to the Parties.

3. The Appeal is based on the following grounds:

a) The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by treating the matter as if the Respondent had been terminated by the Appellants, thereby unlawfully shifting the burden of proof onto the Appellants, despite clear evidence showing that the Respondent voluntarily ceased employment.

b) The Learned Magistrate misdirected himself in reaching the impugned decision by failing to observe the provisions of Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, which requires the Claimant to first prove that a termination occurred.

c) The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by disregarding critical documentary evidence, namely the handwritten note dated 15th July 2021 signed by the Respondent, in which she acknowledged receipt of her maternity leave pay and stated that she was “not in a position to continue working,” and the Respondent’s own letter dated 17th November 2020. The court further failed to provide reasons for rejecting this decisive evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

d) The Learned Magistrate erred in fact by finding that the Respondent commenced employment on 19th April 2014, despite there being no evidence to support this finding and notwithstanding uncontroverted documentary evidence showing that the Respondent actually started working for the Appellants in September 2015. This error resulted in an unjustified and inflated award of compensation to the Respondent.

e) The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding one month’s salary in lieu of notice, despite the Respondent having voluntarily ceased employment.

f) The Learned Magistrate erred in law by applying inconsistent and contradictory standards of proof, dismissing the Respondent’s claim for unpaid annual leave for lack of cogent evidence, while upholding larger claims for overtime and public holidays despite the absence of any supporting evidence. In so doing, the court acted arbitrarily and contrary to the principles of fair and consistent determination.

g) The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding claims for overtime, public holidays, and house allowance based on mere speculation, while disregarding the Appellants’ uncontroverted proof of standard working hours and settled entitlements.

h) The Learned Magistrate erred in law in assessing compensation under Sections 49 and 50 of the Employment Act by failing to consider mandatory factors, including the circumstances of cessation of employment and the conduct of the Respondent, resulting in improper exercise of judicial discretion.

i) The Learned Magistrate erred in law by awarding maternity leave pay without requiring the Respondent to prove entitlement or non-payment, notwithstanding evidence, namely the signed note of 15th July 2021, demonstrating that all maternity leave pay had been fully settled.

The Appellants pray for orders thus;

a) Allow the appeal.

b) Set aside the judgment, decree, and/or orders of the trial court delivered on the 8th day of December 2025 and substitute the same with an order dismissing the Respondent’s claim with costs, or such other orders as this Honourable Court may deem just and equitable.

c) Award the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the court below to the Appellant.

The Appellants contend that the Respondent was employed as a cleaner at the 2nd Appellant’s dental clinic commencing 1st September, 2015 as evidenced by a personal employment record annotated “STARTED ON 1/9/15” and a payroll record dated 1st October, 2015 showing an opening salary of Kshs. 10,000.00 and not 19th April, 2014 as pleaded. The Appellants rely on the Respondent’s own signed, typed letter dated 17th November, 2020 in which she requested maternity leave with an agreed return date of 12th April, 2021 and stated that she did not expect any problem returning to her position. The Respondent did not resume duty on that date; she attended at the clinic on 15th July, 2021 at which point, on the Appellants’ account, she communicated that she was not in a position to continue working and was paid her final month’s maternity salary of Kshs. 15,000.00 together with a further Kshs. 5,000.00 as a gift for her child, evidenced by a handwritten note of that date recording the payment as “full and final.” There was no further contact from the Respondent until she filed her claim about a year later, in July 2022. In reliance on the authorities of Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123 and Kenya Ports Authority v Kuston (Kenya) Ltd [2009] 2 EA, the Appellants submit that this being a first appeal, the court is under a duty to re-evaluate, re-analyse and reconsider the whole of the evidence on record and reach its own independent conclusions. On quantum, the Appellants submit that the awards for overtime and public holiday pay were made without any cogent, particularised evidence of the specific hours or days worked, and that the award of six months’ compensation failed to have regard to the mandatory factors under Section 49(4) of the Employment Act, 2007.

The Respondent’s case and submission is that upon returning from maternity leave she was verbally informed that her services were no longer required and was ejected from the workplace without notice or hearing. This characterises discriminatory practice on account of her pregnancy, contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 5(3)(a) of the Employment Act. She submits that Section 47(5) imposes a dual evidentiary burden, and that having proved a prima facie case of termination by adducing evidence of verbal dismissal, the burden shifted to the Appellants to justify the termination both substantively and procedurally again relying on the authorities of Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui [2019] eKLR, Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] eKLR and Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR.

On the documentary evidence, the Respondent does not directly engage with the contents of the letter of 17th November, 2020 or the handwritten note of 15th July, 2021 in terms of disputing their authenticity or the circumstances in which they were produced. The authorities of Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123, Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424 and Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93 support the Respondent’s submission that an appellate court ought not to interfere with findings of fact or the exercise of discretion by a trial court merely because it might have reached a different conclusion.

The issues for determination in the circumstances come out thus;

1. Whether the Respondent proved that her employment was terminated by the Appellants, or whether she voluntarily ceased employment.

2. Whether the Respondent’s employment commenced on 19th April, 2014 or 1st September, 2015.

3. Whether the reliefs awarded by the trial court are sustainable.

4. What orders do issue in this cause.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the Respondent proved that her employment was terminated by the Appellants, or whether she voluntarily ceased employment. Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 places on an employee the initial burden of proving that a termination occurred and that it was unfair, before the burden shifts to the employer to justify the reason and procedure of termination as in Pius Machafu Isindu v Lavington Security Guards Limited [2017] eKLR. The Respondent’s account of the circumstances of cessation is, on re-evaluation of the record, thin and internally inconsistent. Her witness statement pleads employment from 19th April 2014, yet elsewhere avers to a period of “4” and, separately, to “seven years” of service, and states that she reported back to work on “15th May, 2021” a date found nowhere else in the record and irreconcilable with the agreed return date of 12th April, 2021 in her letter, or with 15th July, 2021 the date consistently referred to elsewhere in the record. Her assertion of verbal dismissal is contradicted by two documents: first, her own signed, typed letter of 17th November, 2020 in which she requested maternity leave with an agreed return date and stated she did not expect any problem returning to her position; and second, the handwritten note of 15th July, 2021 which records payment of her final month’s maternity pay and a further sum for her child as “full and final.” Notably this material is phrased in the third person about the Respondent rather than as her own statement, which bears on the weight of particular phrases within it, but it remains a contemporaneous, signed record of a final settlement payment that the Respondent has at no stage disputed signing or explained.

The trial court’s analysis proceeded substantially on the footing that the Appellants were required to show that a notice to show cause over an alleged abscondment of duty had been issued as was enunciated in Owudu v Digital Sanitation Services Limited (Appeal E109 of 2023) [2024] KEELRC 917 (KLR.) That line of authority addresses an employer’s obligation to trace an employee whose whereabouts or intentions are unknown; it was never the Appellants’ pleaded case that the Respondent absconded their case was that she attended in person and communicated her unwillingness to continue working, before accepting a final settlement, which is properly treated as a voluntary cessation of employment: Abdulah Firimbi t/a Sinai Hotel v Imungu (Appeal E131 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 1283 (KLR.)

Applying the abscondment line of authority to that different factual matrix was a misdirection that led the trial court unfairly to shift the burden of proof before the Respondent had discharged her own threshold burden. This court is further guided that, although this being a first appeal the court is enjoined to be cautious about disturbing a trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, having neither seen nor heard the witnesses testify (Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123), that caution carries diminished force here since the trial itself proceeded by consent under Rule 59 entirely on documents, with no oral evidence taken and no witness cross-examined by either side; the trial court made its own findings on precisely the same documentary record now before this court.

The year-long silence after these communications, with no further contact, grievance or attempt to return to work between 15th July, 2021 and the filing of the Memorandum of Claim on or about 1st July, 2022 is inconsistent with an employee who considered herself unlawfully and forcefully dismissed. On a full re-evaluation of the record, the Respondent did not discharge the burden resting upon her of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that her employment was terminated by the Appellants; the weight of the documentary evidence supports a finding that she voluntarily ceased her employment on 15th July, 2021. Grounds (a), (b) and (c) of the appeal succeed, and the 1st issue is resolved in the Appellants’ favour.

The 2nd issue for determination is whether the Respondent’s employment commenced on 19th April, 2014 or 1st September, 2015. The trial court found that the Respondent’s employment commenced on 19th April, 2014 a date pleaded by the Respondent but one she was unable to state consistently even in her own witness statement, and denied by the Appellants. The documentary evidence on record a personal employment record annotated “STARTED ON 1/9/15” and a payroll record dated 1st October, 2015 showing an opening salary of Kshs. 10,000.00 consistent with a salary progressively reviewed upwards establishes a commencement date of 1st September, 2015. No document on the record supports 19th April, 2014. The trial court’s finding on commencement date is set aside and the date of 1st September, 2015 is substituted. Ground (d) of the appeal succeeds.

The 3rd issue for determination raises the issue of whether the reliefs awarded by the trial court are sustainable. Compensation under Section 49(c) and one month’s notice pay were both predicated on the finding that the Respondent’s employment was unlawful terminated. Having found that unlawful termination was not established, those awards fall away and Grounds (e) and (h) succeed to this extent. As to unpaid maternity salary, the handwritten note of 15th July, 2021 records payment of the Respondent’s final month’s maternity pay and describes the total payment made as “full and final”; nothing in the Respondent’s pleadings particularises which months, if any, remained unpaid, and the claim for unpaid maternity salary is accordingly not established. Ground (i) succeeds.

As to overtime and public holiday pay, claims of this nature must be strictly and specifically proved, with particulars of the actual hours or days worked: KUDHEIHA Workers v Charles Waithaka Goka t/a Apple Bees Pub and Restaurant [2013] eKLR; Fred Makori Ondari v The Management Committee of the Ministry of Works Sports Club [2013] eKLR. The Respondent’s evidence was a generalised, undated assertion that she worked twelve-hour days and on all public holidays, unsupported by any attendance record, register or other corroborating document, and contradicted by the Appellants’ unrebutted evidence of the clinic’s ordinary hours of business (Monday to Friday 830 to 1700 hours. Saturdays 900. to 1300 hours, closed on public holidays). This court notes that the trial court’s own approach was internally inconsistent, declining the claim for annual leave for want of cogent evidence while upholding the overtime and public holiday claims on materially the same quality of evidence, a point fairly taken in Ground (f). The claims for overtime and public holiday pay ought to have been declined for want of proof, and any award made under these heads is set aside. Grounds (f) and (g) succeed to this extent.

On the issue of house allowance is a statutory entitlement under Section 31 of the Employment Act, payable in respect of the period an employee actually serves, and does not depend on whether the employment relationship ended by termination or voluntary cessation. This is the reasoning in the authority of Grain Pro Kenya Inc. Limited v Andrew Waithaka Kiragu [2019] eKLR. The Respondent’s entitlement to house allowance therefore survives the setting aside of the termination finding, but the trial court’s computation of Kshs. 193,500.00 was based on 86 months of service calculated from the unsupported commencement date of 19th April, 2014. Having found that the Respondent’s service in fact ran from 1st September, 2015 to 15th July, 2021 approximately 70 completed months — I apply the same method of computation adopted by the trial court, namely 15% of the monthly salary of Kshs. 15,000.00 (Kshs. 2,250.00 per month). On that basis, the sustainable award for house allowance is Kshs. 2,250.00 x 70 months = Kshs. 157,500.00, and I substitute that figure for the trial court’s award of Kshs. 193,500.00. The trial court’s rejection of the claim for unpaid annual leave days, for want of cogent evidence, was not challenged on this appeal and is affirmed.

As to costs these lie in the discretion of the court under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. Notwithstanding that the Appellants have substantially succeeded, this court find no sufficient reason to depart from the position that each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal. The trial court’s costs order, not having been made a specific ground of appeal remain as set-out.

I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order relief as follows;

(i) The finding of the trial court that the Respondent’s employment was unfairly terminated by the Appellants is set aside.

(ii) The finding of the trial court that the Respondent’s employment commenced on 19th April, 2014 is equally set aside and substituted with a finding that employment commenced on 1st September, 2015.

(iii) The awards of compensation under Section 49(c), one month’s salary in lieu of notice, overtime, public holiday pay, and maternity leave salary are all set aside and the corresponding claims dismissed.

(iv) The award for house allowance is set aside and substituted with an award of Kshs. 157,500.00, computed from 1st September, 2015 at the applicable statutory rate.

(v) The trial court’s rejection of the claim for unpaid annual leave days is affirmed.

(vi) The trial court’s order on costs is not disturbed.

(vii) Each party bears their costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mr. Mamburi Instructed by M/s Bowry & Co. Advocates for the Appellants.

2. Miss Kwamboka instructed by Kwamboka Marie & Associates Advocates for the Respondent.

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