Employment law

Anami v Obaro [2026] KEELRC 4661 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E304 of 2025
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that an employment relationship existed between the Appellant and the Respondent, contrary to the evidence adduced and the applicable legal definitions under Section 2 and 37 of the Employment Act, 2007.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E304 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

MOLLIE ANAMI ………………………………………………………… APPELLANT

VERSUS

ROBERT WANZALA OBARO ……………………………..………… RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th September, 2025. It arises from a judgment and Decree delivered on 8th August, 2025 in CM ELRC Cause No. E2301 of 2023.

In this the trial court found that the Respondent's engagement by the Appellant had crystallised from casual employment into a term contract, and that his termination from that employment was unlawful and unfair. It awarded him one month's salary in lieu of notice, underpayment, service pay and compensation for unfair termination, together with interest and costs, and directed that a certificate of service do issue.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the present appeal, which comes out on the following grounds;

1. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that an employment relationship existed between the Appellant and the Respondent, contrary to the evidence adduced and the applicable legal definitions under Section 2 and 37 of the Employment Act, 2007.

2. That the Honourable Magistrate misdirected himself in law and fact by finding that the Respondent was employed on a term contract, when the overwhelming evidence showed that the Respondent was a casual worker and/or independent contractor engaged on an as-needed basis and paid a retainer, with no continuous or permanent employment relationship.

3. That the Honourable Magistrate erred in fact and in law in disregarding the Appellant's uncontroverted evidence and testimony, especially that of Mr. Tom Mboya (RW2), which clearly established the casual and non-continuous nature of the Respondent's engagement.

4. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the Respondent's termination was unlawful and unfair, despite the Appellant not having terminated the Respondent's services and the fact that the Respondent was arrested in connection with serious criminal allegations, thereafter never returning to the workplace.

5. That the trial court failed to properly evaluate the evidence adduced, particularly the fact that the Respondent was never formally terminated but instead absconded work following his arrest for attempted rape, thereby failing to discharge the burden of proof placed upon him under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007.

6. That the trial court erred in law and in fact in holding that the Appellant owed the Respondent a duty to initiate internal disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the Respondent had been lawfully arrested for criminal conduct and there was no employer-employee relationship that warranted such procedures.

7. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law by ignoring the definition and legal framework on casual employment under Sections 2 and 37 of the Employment Act, and improperly deemed a casual engagement to have crystallized into a term contract without adequate legal basis.

8. That the Honourable Magistrate erred in awarding underpayments to the Respondent based on wage rates for a general labourer/security guard, contrary to the fact that the Respondent's role was not one of a licensed or formally appointed security guard, and in a gated community already serviced with security.

9. That the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding service pay, compensation for unfair termination, and one month's notice pay in favour of the Respondent, without any statutory or contractual foundation, and despite the Appellant being a private homeowner rather than a commercial employer.

10. That the Learned Magistrate's award of Kshs. 262,234/= plus interest and costs to the Respondent was excessive, speculative, unsubstantiated, and unsupported by evidence, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.

11. That the entire judgment was against the weight of evidence, and the trial court's interpretation and application of employment law was grossly erroneous.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) That this appeal be allowed.

b) That the entire judgment and decree of the Chief Magistrate's Court delivered on 1st August 2025 in CHELRC SUM No. E2301 of 2023 be set aside in its entirety.

c) That the Respondent's claim at the trial court be dismissed with costs.

d) That the costs of this appeal and costs of the lower court be awarded to the Appellant.

It is the Appellant's case and submission that she never employed the Respondent at all. He was at all material times an independent contractor and, more precisely, a casual worker engaged at her residence at Forest View Estate, Karen from late 2019 on an ad hoc basis to assist one Tom Mboya as and when required. She says he was paid a retainer of Kshs. 2,500.00 per week, calculated on an assumption that he would work an average of three days a week at a daily rate of Kshs. 833.00 He was at liberty to decline work, and did on occasion decline it because he was engaged in other economic activities.

She adds that her house was under construction and only occupied in November, 2019 that the estate is a gated community served by security guards around the clock so that she had no need of a guard of her own, and that until 2018 the Respondent was in the employ of Kenya Shield Security Limited.

On the law, she submits that the burden of proving both the existence and the nature of the alleged employment lay on the Respondent under Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act and Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007. He produced no written contract, appointment letter, pay slips, NSSF or NHIF records, leave records or payroll records capable of demonstrating continuous monthly employment.

On conversion, she submits that Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007 is not engaged by the mere passage of time. What must be proved is continuous service and the character of the work performed, and neither was proved. She relies for that proposition on Rashid Mazuri Ramadhani & 10 others v Doshi & Company (Hardware) Limited & another [2018] KECA 427 (KLR).

On termination, the Appellant's position is that there was no termination to speak of. The Respondent was arrested on or about 30th March, 2023 on an allegation of attempted rape of another of her workers, admitted the offence and pleaded for forgiveness in the presence of the police, and thereafter simply never returned. No dismissal letter was issued and no communication terminating the engagement was ever sent.

The evidence, she submits, points to desertion and abandonment of duty, and an employee who fails of his own volition to return cannot shift responsibility to his employer. She could not have held a disciplinary process against a man who had disappeared, and she disputed in any event the existence of any formal employment relationship calling for one.

On the awards, she submits that nothing on the record showed the Respondent to be a licensed or formally appointed security guard, no job description, licence, deployment record or shift schedule having been produced, so that an award of underpayments premised on wage orders was speculative.

She further submits that service pay, notice pay and compensation are remedies arising only from an established contract of service and a proved unlawful termination, that she is a private homeowner and not a commercial entity operating a structured employment establishment, and that the award of Kshs. 262,234.00 was excessive and occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

She prays that the appeal be allowed, the judgment and decree set aside in their entirety, the claim before the trial court dismissed, and the costs of both courts awarded to her.

The Respondent opposes the appeal in its entirety. His case is that he was employed by the Appellant on 1st August, 2018 as a security guard at her residence at a wage of Kshs. 10,000.00 per month, paid to him in two instalments of Kshs. 6,000.00 and Kshs. 4,000.00 through M-Pesa. He worked seven days a week from 5.00 p.m. to 10.00 a.m. under an oral agreement, the Appellant having declined to give him a letter of appointment.

He submits that the Appellant produced no record of any kind to support the alleged weekly retainer of Kshs. 2,500.00 or the alleged three-day week. Section 74 of the Employment Act obliged her to keep records of the terms of engagement of every employee, and Section 10(7) placed on her the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment where no written contract is produced.

On the letter from Kenya Shield Security Limited, he submits that it is curious that a company said to have ceased operations in 2018 should have an officer author such a letter in July, 2024 and that its author, one Moses Kaniaru, was never called to authenticate it.

On the contention that he was not a security guard, he submits that residence in a gated community does not prevent a resident from engaging her own security, and that in any event he worked within her premises performing various duties which would classify him at the very least as a general labourer.

On termination, the Respondent submits that Sections 45 and 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 impose a twofold requirement of a valid and fair reason and of fair procedure. He was terminated at the very moment of his arrest and on a mere allegation, and he was never formally charged with any offence.

Where an employer alleges desertion, he submits, it must demonstrate the efforts it made to reach the employee, and even an employer minded to dismiss summarily remains bound by Section 41, which is mandatory and not optional.

On the awards, he submits that his M-Pesa statements established his monthly earnings, that Section 48 of the Labour Institutions Act, 2007 prohibits payment below the prescribed minimum wage, and that the Regulation of Wages Orders he produced confirmed the shortfall.

Service pay was properly awarded because the Appellant neither remitted contributions to the National Social Security Fund nor paid service pay. Notice pay followed as a statutory entitlement once termination without notice was found, and compensation of two months' salary was well within the ceiling in Section 49(1)(c).

He submits that no error of law, misapprehension of fact or improper exercise of discretion has been shown, and prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that an employment relationship existed between the parties and that it crystallised into a term contract.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Respondent's termination from employment was unlawful and unfair.

3. Whether the trial court erred in the awards granted to the Respondent.

Before turning to those issues one is reminded of the duty of a first appellate court. In the authority of Abok James Odera t/a A. J. Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates (Civil Appeal 161 of 1999) [2013] KECA 208 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held that a first appeal is in the nature of a retrial, and that the first appellate court must reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record, weigh it afresh and draw its own conclusions.

That duty is tempered by the recognition that this court neither saw nor heard the witnesses, and due allowance must be made for that disadvantage. It is on that footing that this court approaches the record. On the 1st issue for determination, Section 2 of the Employment Act defines an employee as a person employed for wages or a salary, and a contract of service as an agreement, whether oral or in writing and whether express or implied, to employ or to serve as an employee for a period of time.

The same section defines a casual employee as a person the terms of whose engagement provide for his payment at the end of each day and who is not engaged for a longer period than twenty-four hours at a time.

Measured against those definitions, the Appellant's own evidence is telling. In her evidence in chief she said, in terms, "I employed him on casual basis - 2018". In cross-examination she confirmed, "He was a casual worker… He was being paid a wage of Kshs. 10,000.00", and then conceded, "I did not have a sheet to show that he worked for 3 days a week. It was a verbal agreement".

The dispute was therefore never whether she engaged and paid the Respondent, but only how that engagement is to be characterised. Her sworn evidence also places the engagement in 2018 and not, as pleaded, in late 2019.

The characterisation for which she contended, namely three days a week at Kshs. 833.00 a day aggregated into a weekly retainer of Kshs. 2,500.00, was not supported by a single document. No attendance register, muster roll, wage register, payment voucher or written particulars of employment were placed before the trial court. What was placed before it, by the Respondent, was a certified M-Pesa statement covering 1st January, 2019 to 31st December, 2023. It discloses an unbroken series of payments from the Appellant twice each month, in amounts of about Kshs. 6,084.00 and Kshs. 4,067.00, aggregating to a little over Kshs. 10,000.00 in every month from March 2019 to April, 2023.

That pattern is irreconcilable with a weekly retainer of Kshs. 2,500.00. It is equally irreconcilable with the statutory definition of a casual employee, whose defining feature is payment at the end of each day, for the Respondent was never paid at the end of any day. Nor was there anything to suggest a contract for services. There were no tools of his own, no business of his own, no right of substitution and no invoices.

The failure to produce records is not evidentially neutral. Section 74(1) of the Employment Act, 2007 obliges every employer to keep a written record of every employee including the terms and conditions of employment, and Section 10(7) provides that where an employer fails to produce a written contract or the prescribed written particulars, the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment lies on the employer. That is precisely the course the Court of Appeal took in Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR). Addressing the true construction of Section 37, the court held that a clear burden of proof lay on the employer which it had not discharged, and that its refusal to testify served only to give credence to the employees' version of events.

The court held further that the contracts of service of employees engaged and paid as casuals, who had worked for a number of continuous days amounting in the aggregate to not less than a month on work that could not reasonably be completed in less than three months, were deemed by Section 37 to be contracts where wages are paid monthly, to which Section 35(1)(c) applies. The Appellant here stands in a weaker position than the employer in that case, which at least produced its muster rolls. She produced nothing.

The Doshi authority, on which the Appellant places her principal reliance, does not carry her case. The employees in that matter admitted through their own lead witness that they worked only two days a week depending on the availability of materials, and the employer produced petty cash analysis sheets which proved both the payments and the two-day pattern and which went unchallenged. Neither feature is present here. The Respondent made no such admission. His evidence was that he worked seven days a week. And the Appellant produced no equivalent of those petty cash sheets. An authority turns on its own facts, and the facts that decided that case are the very facts absent from this one. Nor does the complaint that the Respondent was not a licensed security guard assist at this stage. Whether his correct designation was watchman, guard or general labourer goes to the applicable wage category and not to whether he was an employee at all, and residence in a gated community does not disable a householder from engaging her own worker.

Ground 3 calls for a word of its own. The Appellant complains that the trial court disregarded the evidence of RW2, Mr. Tom Mboya. The certified proceedings of 19th March 2025 contained in the Record of Appeal record the evidence of CW1 and of RW1 only, whereupon counsel for the Appellant stated, "we close the Respondent case".

On that record Mr. Mboya did not testify, and his witness statement, never having been adopted, never became evidence, so that there was no testimony capable of being disregarded.

If, on the other hand, the trial judgment is taken at its word where it recites that he testified, then that court plainly did not disregard him, for the judgment expressly records that the Appellant's account was corroborated by him. On either footing the ground fails.

In any event his statement says in terms that he did not ask the Respondent about his engagement or the arrangements he had with the Appellant, so it establishes neither the frequency of attendance nor the rate of pay. The finding that the Respondent was an employee whose engagement crystallised into a term contract was open to the trial court on this evidence and is affirmed. Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 7 fail.

On the 2nd issue for determination, Section 45(2) of the Employment Act renders a termination unfair where the employer fails to prove that the reason for it was valid, that it was a fair reason related to the employee's conduct, capacity or compatibility or to the operational requirements of the employer, and that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure.

Section 41 requires the employer, before terminating on grounds of misconduct, to explain to the employee in a language he understands the reason for which termination is being considered, to afford him the presence of another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice when that explanation is made, and to hear and consider any representations he makes. Those requirements are cast in mandatory terms and need no glossing. Not one of them was met here, for the simple reason that nothing at all was done.

The Appellant's answer is that there was no termination to be procedurally fair about, because the Respondent deserted. But desertion is itself a matter to be proved, and the burden of proving it rests on the employer who asserts it.

In Gathira v Rwathia Suppliers Ltd & 2 others (Cause E363 of 2021) [2024] KEELRC 1969 (KLR), a decision reproduced in full in the Record of Appeal, an employer likewise contended that its employee had failed to resume work after release from police custody.

This court held that where an employee deserts duty the employer is expected to take reasonable steps to ascertain his whereabouts, and that it is not sufficient merely to allege abscondment without proving the absence or demonstrating the steps taken to ascertain those whereabouts and to require the employee to explain himself.

The court observed further that absence from work without permission is itself a ground for summary dismissal under Section 44(4)(a), so that an employer who genuinely believes an employee has absconded has a route open to it under the Act. The Appellant took none of those steps. She did not write to the Respondent, issue him a notice to show cause at his last known address or hold any process of any description. She told the trial court, "I did not contact labour office", and "I did not give one-month lieu notice", and "I did not chase the claimant away. We did not have any discussion as he had left". The criminal allegation does not supply what is missing. The only document produced on it is the Karen Plains Police Station OB No. 12 in Police File No. 171/2023, in which the fields for the date and time of arrest and for the result of the case are both blank and no court file number is entered.

No charge sheet was ever produced, and the complainant, herself the Appellant's employee, was never called. The Respondent's evidence that he was not arrested and was never charged therefore stood unrebutted. Even had he been charged, that would not have relieved the Appellant of her statutory obligations. An employer is not required to await the outcome of a criminal trial before acting, but neither is a criminal complaint a substitute for the process the Act demands.

As to Section 47(5), the Respondent discharged the burden it places on him. He testified that the Appellant's husband came to the house with police officers, accused him of attempted rape and ordered him to pack his belongings and leave as his employment had been terminated, and that he telephoned the Appellant, who confirmed it. Whatever view is taken of Mr. Vincent Anami's authority to speak for the Appellant, her own conduct told the same story. She engaged a replacement, she pleaded that the Respondent had departed with property of hers that was never returned, and she never communicated with him again.

Once an employee lays an evidential foundation of that kind, the burden of justifying the grounds for the termination shifts to the employer under the same subsection, and the Appellant did not discharge it.

Ground 6 proceeds on the premise that there was no employment relationship warranting disciplinary procedures, and that premise has fallen away with my finding on the first issue. Grounds 4, 5 and 6 fail, and the finding that the termination was both substantively and procedurally unfair is affirmed.

On the 3rd issue for determination, Ground 8 attacks the award of underpayment on the footing that the Respondent was not a licensed or formally appointed security guard. The ground is misconceived on its own terms. The rates the trial court applied were Kshs. 13,573.00 to April, 2022 and Kshs. 15,202.00 thereafter. Those are the basic minimum monthly wages for a general labourer in Nairobi under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2018 and the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2022 respectively, and they are the lowest category in each schedule.

Had the trial court treated the Respondent as a night watchman the applicable figures would have been Kshs. 15,141.55 and Kshs. 16,959.00. The trial court therefore applied the very category for which the Appellant herself contended and applied it at the most conservative rate available to it.

Section 48 of the Labour Institutions Act, 2007 provides that the minimum rates established by a wages order constitute a term of employment of every employee to whom the order applies and may not be varied by agreement, and that where a contract provides for less, the order's rates are substituted. Even on the Appellant's own account of an agreed wage of Kshs. 10,000.00 the shortfall was recoverable.

Ground 9 contends that service pay, notice pay and compensation had no statutory or contractual foundation, and that the Appellant, being a private homeowner, stood outside these obligations. There is no such exemption in the Act. Section 2 defines an employer as any person, public body, firm, corporation or company who or which has entered into a contract of service to employ any individual. The Regulation of Wages (General) Order itself prescribes minimum wages for house servants, children's ayahs, day watchmen and gardeners, which puts beyond argument that domestic and household engagements fall within its reach.

Service pay under Section 35(5) is payable on a termination under subsection (1)(c), and Section 35(6) exempts an employer only where the employee is covered by a registered pension or provident fund scheme, the National Social Security Fund, a gratuity or service pay scheme or a similar arrangement. The Appellant led no evidence of any such cover. Notice pay follows from Sections 35 and 36 once termination without notice is established, and the Appellant conceded that none was given. Compensation of two months' wages falls well within the ceiling of twelve months in Section 49(1)(c).

The reliefs under that section are discretionary, and an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of such a discretion only on the principles settled in Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93, namely where the court below is shown to have been clearly wrong through misdirection, or through taking into account matters it ought not to have taken into account, or failing to take into account matters it ought to have. An award of two months against a ceiling of twelve, in respect of an employee of some four years' standing dismissed without any process whatever, discloses no such error.

Ground 10 complains that the award of Kshs. 262,234.00 plus interest and costs was excessive and speculative. That figure appears nowhere in the judgment or the decree and I take it to be a slip. The record does, however, disclose a slip of another kind which a re-evaluation obliges me to address.

The four heads awarded were one month's salary in lieu of notice Kshs. 15,202.00, underpayment Kshs. 194,625.00, service pay Kshs. 22,803.00 and compensation Kshs. 30,404.00. Those four figures aggregate to Kshs. 263,034.00. The judgment and the decree both express the total as Kshs. 270,635.00, which exceeds the sum of its own components by Kshs. 7,601.00.

Each component is itself sound. The underpayment computation of (13,573 - 10,000) x 37 and (15,202 - 10,000) x 12 yields Kshs. 132,201.00 and Kshs. 62,424.00 totalling Kshs. 194,625.00; service pay at 15,202 x 15/30 x 3 yields Kshs. 22,803.00; and compensation at two months yields Kshs. 30,404.00.

The error lies in the addition alone. It is a manifest arithmetical slip, it must be corrected, and as the correction operates in the Appellant's favour no question of prejudice arises.

Beyond that correction the complaint of excess cannot be sustained. The trial court computed underpayment from March, 2019 rather than from the pleaded August, 2018 allowed service pay for three years rather than for the whole period of service it had found, and declined the claim for leave pay of Kshs. 69,929.00 altogether.

Against a claim of Kshs. 521,159.00 the Respondent therefore recovered less than half. There is no cross-appeal, and I say no more about the heads disallowed or under-computed than that the resulting decree cannot fairly be described as excessive. The certificate of service is a statutory entitlement under Section 51 of the Act and nothing was urged against it, and no basis has been laid for disturbing the trial court's discretion on interest. Ground 10 succeeds only to the extent of the arithmetical correction, and grounds 8 and 9 fail.

Ground 11, being a general complaint that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, fails with them. The trial court had before it, on the one hand, a certified and unchallenged four-year record of regular payments and, on the other, an assertion of casual engagement unsupported by a single document which the employer was under a statutory duty to keep. Its conclusions were not merely open to it but were those the evidence compelled.

On costs, in the exercise of the discretion under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and having regard to the fact that the Appellant has succeeded only on a point of arithmetic which neither party identified, each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

I am therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal save in one respect and order as follows;

(i) The appeal is dismissed save to the extent set out in order (ii) below.

(ii) The decretal sum in the judgment and decree delivered on 8th August, 2025 in CM ELRC Cause No. E2301 of 2023 is revised from Kshs. 270,635.00 to Kshs. 263,034.00, being the correct aggregate of the heads awarded, namely one month's salary in lieu of notice of Kshs. 15,202.00, underpayment of Kshs. 194,625.00, service pay of Kshs. 22,803.00 and compensation for unfair termination of Kshs. 30,404.00.

(iii) The judgment and decree of the trial court are in all other respects affirmed, including the direction that a certificate of service do issue.

(iv) Interest at court rates from the date of the trial court's judgment until payment in full.

(v) The costs of the suit in the trial court shall be borne by the Appellant.

(vi) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Paul Macharia instructed by Macharia, Gaitho & Murigu Advocates LLP for the Appellant.

2. Miss Kariuki instructed by Lemmy Regau & Company Advocates for the Respondent.

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