REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E039 OF 2025
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
CALISTUS SELEBWA ALIERA ………………………………..………………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
CENTURY MICROFINANCE BANK ……………………………….…..……… RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 11th February, 2025. It arises from a judgment delivered on 31st January, 2025 in MCELRC No. E712 of 2021.
The Appellant was employed by the Respondent as a debt recovery officer from 1st September 2015 at a monthly salary of Kshs. 45,000.00 and his employment was brought to an end by way of summary dismissal on 23rd December, 2020. The trial court in this case dismissed the Appellant's claim for unfair termination in its entirety, but allowed the Appellant's own claim for accrued leave pay, computed over the whole of his period of service, in the sum of Kshs. 181,731.00 and awarded the Appellant the costs of the suit with interest. The Respondent, aggrieved by the leave pay award and the costs order, sought and obtained leave to file a cross-appeal confined to those two matters, the standing of which is addressed as a threshold issue below.
The Appellant's grounds of appeal come out as follows;
1. THAT the Appellant herein being dissatisfied with the judgment delivered by the Honourable Trial Court in Milimani Magistrate's Court - Employment and Labour Division in MCELRC NO. E712 OF 2021 hereby appeals against part of the judgment on the following grounds THAT:-
2. The learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to properly evaluate the evidence presented, which led to a wrong conclusion that the Claimant’s termination was lawful and fair.
3. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that the Respondent had provided valid reasons for the Claimant's purported lawful termination from employment, despite glaring evidence corroborating that the procedure and entire process(es) leading thereto was unlawful.
4. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to take into account critical evidence presented by the Appellant regarding the procedural unfairness of the termination which were contrary with the express provisions of the Employment Act, 2007.
5. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by ignoring critical evidence to the effect that the Respondent had not provided any evidence corroborating the alleged M-PESA transactions and or evidence and testimony of the alleged payment made to the Claimant which were the crux leading to his unlawful termination..
6. Crucially, the Learned Trial Magistrate equally erred in law and fact by wholly rejecting the Report/Responses and or findings by the Appellant pursuant to the Show Cause Letter dated 28/11/2020.
7. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in fact and in fact and law by failing to properly consider and uphold the principles of natural justice against the glaring and illegal appellate tribunal formed to handle the Appellant’s appeal against his unlawful termination which tribunal had the same committee members involved in his disciplinary hearing.
8. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to apply the correct legal standards and guidelines under the Employment Act, 2007.
9. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by disregarding relevant case law and legal precedents cited by the Appellant in support of his claim.
10. The Learned Trial Magistrate's decision was manifestly unjust and unreasonable in light of the circumstances of the case and the evidence on record
The Appellant prays for orders thus;
a) The Appeal be allowed.
b) The Judgment of the Honourable Trial Court in Milimani Magistrate's Court, Employment and Labour Division, in MCELRC No. E712 of 2021 be set aside.
c) Judgment be entered in favour of the Appellant.
d) The Appellant be awarded the costs of this appeal and the costs in the lower Court.
A threshold issue arises as to the Cross Memorandum of Appeal. By a Notice of Motion dated 11th June, 2025 the Respondent sought enlargement of time to file its cross-appeal, citing delay occasioned by an internal restructuring. In a Ruling delivered on 10th December, 2025 (Aliera v Century Microfinance Bank [2025] KEELRC 3560 (KLR), this Court (Keli, J.) found that explanation to be hollow, but extended time on the footing that no prejudice would be occasioned to the Appellant since the appeal had not been set down for hearing, directing that the cross-appeal be filed within 30 days of the order, that is, on or before 9th January, 2026 and awarding the costs of the application to the Appellant notwithstanding the extension granted. The Cross Memorandum of Appeal placed before this court bears a filing stamp of 9th February, 2026 a month outside that period, and no further leave was sought to explain the second default.
In the authority of Njuguna v Magichu & 3 Others [2003] KLR 507, the Court of Appeal held that a record filed outside a period previously extended by the court is invalid as filed, and that a party in that position must return to court for a fresh extension, tested afresh on the same principles of length of delay, reason, prejudice, and merit; an indulgence once granted does not excuse a subsequent, separate default. Applying that principle, the Respondent has now defaulted twice in the same appeal, first in missing the twenty-one days prescribed by Rule 17, and again in missing the thirty days this court granted as a further indulgence, with no explanation offered for the second default. Although neither party has raised the point, this court is entitled to satisfy itself that a pleading before it is competently on record before addressing its merits. The Cross Memorandum of Appeal dated 10th December, 2025 was filed outside the extended time and without leave, is incompetent and is struck out. Consequently its grounds, touching on the leave pay award and the costs order, are not addressed on their merits.
The Appellant's case in both the Memorandum of Appeal and in his written submissions, that his summary dismissal followed a disciplinary process deficient in substance and in form. Again, he claims that he was subjected to successive and shifting notices to show cause and that the complainant, Lorna Waruinu Gichore, was never called to testify at any stage. Besides, no M-PESA statement or other documentary evidence was produced to prove receipt of the Kshs. 3,000.00 alleged against him; and that his internal appeal, heard on 8th February, 2021 was heard by a panel that included the Respondent's Acting Chief Executive Officer, who had also sat on the disciplinary hearings leading to his dismissal. On this note, the Appellant contends the Respondent did not discharge the burden placed on it by sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 and that the process leading to his dismissal fell short of section 41.
The Respondent did not file written submissions on the main appeal. Its case, as it appears from the record and the trial court's judgment, is that the Appellant's summary dismissal was founded on three grounds: that he issued two demand letters to a client in breach of the Respondent's credit and debt-recovery policy, one of them on a public holiday; that he failed, without reasonable excuse, to submit his daily recovery reports, filing only seven over the relevant period; and that he received Kshs. 3,000.00 from a client and failed to account for it, a transaction the Respondent sought to establish through WhatsApp correspondence linked to a mobile number it associated with the Appellant. The Respondent's position was that each ground was independently established and that the disciplinary and appellate processes met the requirements of the law.
The issues for determination in this appeal therefore become;
1. Whether the Respondent proved valid reason for the Appellant’s summary dismissal.
2. Whether the process leading to the Appellant’s summary dismissal met the threshold of fairness under Section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007.
The 1st issue for determination is whether the Respondent proved valid reason for the Appellant’s summary dismissal. It must be observed at the outset that the trial court's finding of a valid reason rested on three distinct grounds, and that the Appellant's case engages substantially with only one of them. As to the first two, the record is not in serious dispute: the Appellant himself admitted issuing two demand letters to a client in a manner inconsistent with the Respondent's credit policy. One of them on a public holiday when the Respondent was not operating, and offered no substantive answer to that admission. It is similarly not disputed that he submitted only seven of his required daily recovery reports and the trial court found, correctly in this court's view, that his excuses for that failure were unsupported by evidence. The third ground, the alleged receipt of Kshs. 3,000.00 from a client, stands on materially weaker footing. The Respondent's own witness conceded under cross-examination that no M-PESA statement or other transaction record confirmed receipt of the sum, that no Airtel evidence confirmed the mobile number belonged to the Appellant.
Further the complainant was never called to testify. The trial court accepted the line's continued registration in the Appellant's name as sufficient without engaging with the significance of its suspended status or the absence of any witness able to speak to the alleged transaction. This court is not satisfied that the third ground was proved to the standard section 43 of the Employment Act, 2007 requires and sets aside reliance on it. That does not mean the Respondent failed to prove valid reason overall: sections 43 and 45 do not require every asserted ground to be sustained where others are independently established. In the authority of Ondari v National Hospital Insurance Fund [2025] KECA 687 (KLR) the Court of Appeal confirmed that the enquiry is whether the employer had reasonable and genuine grounds for its belief that misconduct occurred, cautioning against a court substituting its own view once such grounds are shown. This approach was also taken in Kenfreight (E.A.) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] KECA 409 (KLR). The Appellant's admitted breach of the credit policy and his admitted failure to submit his reports are together sufficient to found valid reason. The 1st issue is resolved substantially, though not wholly, in the Respondent's favour.
The 2nd issue for determination is whether the process leading to the Appellant’s summary dismissal met the threshold of the Employment Act, 2007. This section requires an employer, before terminating an employee's contract on grounds of misconduct, to explain to the employee the grounds on which termination is being considered, in a language the employee understands, and to hear and consider any representations made, including through a representative of the employee's choice. In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR), the Court of Appeal distilled this into four elements: an explanation of the grounds of termination in a language the employee understands; the reason for which termination is being considered; the employee's entitlement to the presence of a person of his choice; and the hearing and consideration of any representations made. The Appellant was issued with successive notices to show cause, to which he responded in writing, and disciplinary hearings were held at which his responses were considered; the trial court found he was informed of his right to appear with a representative, and this court has not been shown a basis to disturb that finding. The successive notices, while numerous, do not on their own establish unfairness where each was met with a substantive opportunity to respond.
The position is different in respect of the internal appeal. The Appellant's evidence, unrebutted on the record, was that the panel which heard his internal appeal on 8th February, 2021 included a member who had also participated in the disciplinary hearings that led to his dismissal. The Respondent's witness, under cross-examination, was unable to confirm the composition of the appeals committee or produce its minutes. The burden of proving the process was fair rests on the employer, this was not discharged on this discrete point. It is a foundational principle, reflected in the maxim nemo judex in causa sua, that a person who sat in judgment at an earlier stage of a disciplinary process cannot also sit in impartial judgment on the appeal from that same decision.
This court reasoning in Mutisya v G4S Kenya Limited [2025] KEELRC 2474 (KLR) is instructive, that the presence on a disciplinary panel of a member with a conflict of interest taints the entire process and renders the resulting termination unfair, however solid the underlying allegations. The trial court's judgment does not engage with this aspect of the Appellant's case at all. This court accordingly finds that while the disciplinary process up to and including the decision to dismiss met the threshold of section 41, the internal appeal did not, the Respondent having failed to establish it was heard by an impartial panel. Where an employer has established valid reason but fallen short of procedural fairness confined to the appeal stage, the remedy is ordinarily compensatory rather than a finding of unfair termination in its entirety. In Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Thomas Nyangi Mwita [2019] KECA 337 (KLR) the Court of Appeal reduced an award of twelve months' compensation to four months where there was ample evidence of the claimant's own wrongdoing, notwithstanding the employer's procedural shortcomings. Similarly, in Samuel Kalomit Murkomen v Telkom Kenya Limited [2017] KECA 664 (KLR) a single month's compensation was upheld where valid grounds for termination existed despite procedural flaws. Having regard to the narrow compass of the defect found here, confined to the internal appellate stage, and to the Appellant's own admitted contribution to the circumstances of his dismissal, an award of two months' gross salary, being Kshs. 90,000.00 is proportionate.
I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;
(i) The Cross Memorandum of Appeal dated 10th December, 2025 is struck out for want of competence, having been filed outside the time extended by the Ruling of this court delivered on 10th December, 2025 without further leave of court.
(ii) Each party bears their costs of the cross-appeal.
(iii) The finding of the trial court that the Respondent had valid reason for the Appellant's dismissal, founded on the Appellant's admitted issuance of unauthorised demand letters and his admitted failure to submit his daily recovery reports is upheld.
(iv) The finding that the process leading to the Appellant's summary dismissal was, in its entirety, procedurally fair is set aside to the limited extent of the internal appeal stage, which was not demonstrated to have been heard by an impartial panel, contrary to section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007.
(v) Two (2) months’ gross salary as compensation for unfair termination of Kshs. 45,000.00 x 2 months …………………………………………………………..……….Ksh. 90,000.00.
Total of award…………………………………………………..………… Ksh. 90,000.00
(vi) Interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.
(vii) The award of Kshs. 181,731.00 for accrued leave pay and the order for the costs of the suit before the trial court, both made in favour of the Appellant, are affirmed, the cross-appeal against them having failed on the threshold ground above.
(viii) Each party shall bear the costs of this appeal.
Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Miss Kiombe instructed by Kiombe & Company Advocates for the Appellant.
2. Mr. Odhiambo instructed by OG Law LLP for the Respondent.