Employment law

Agevi v Delmonte Kenya Ltd [2026] KEELRC 2816 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E110 of 2025
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in facts by exercising his judicial discretion capriciously, whimsically and unknown legal principles.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E110 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

BONIFACE AGENGO AGEVI ………………………………………………… APPELLANT

VERSUS

DELMONTE KENYA LIMITED ……………………………………………… RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 1st April, 2025 and lodged in court on 17th April, 2025. It arises from a Judgment and Decree delivered on 20th March, 2025 in MC.ELRC No. E014 of 2023.

That suit was, by consent of counsel, designated the lead file for four related suits filed by other claimants against the Respondent on materially similar facts, namely MC.ELRC No. E015 of 2023, MC.ELRC No. E016 of 2023, MC.ELRC No. E021 of 2024 and MC.ELRC No. E022 of 2024, and the trial Judgment was expressed to apply mutatis mutandis to those four files. However this appeal concerns only the lead file; the four companion matters are not before this court, and nothing in this Judgment binds them.

The Record of Appeal was filed on 21st October, 2025 and by directions given on 9th December, 2025 the appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions, the Appellant filing on 17th March 2026 and the Respondent on 23rd April 2026. It comes out as follows;

1. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in facts by exercising his judicial discretion capriciously, whimsically and unknown legal principles.

2. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact and misdirected himself by failing to appreciate that the Appellant's employment had been converted from a casual to a term contract by the dint of Section 37 of the Employment Act and thus arrived at a wrong conclusion.

3. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred and misdirected himself by failing to find and appreciate that the Appellant was a permanent employee having worked for the Respondent for a number of continuous working days which amount in the aggregate to the equivalent of more than three months for a period of ten years.

4. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to find that the Appellant was entitled to all the benefits that accrued to a permanent employee having served the Respondent continuously from August, 2010 to 31st March, 2021 when he was unlawfully terminated from his employment.

5. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself by relying finding that the Appellant had failed to produce a Letter of employment to confirm his employment status when he had filed his Mammal Control Contract dated 28th March,2012 as proof of employment.

6. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself by relying on the provisions Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act to support his finding that it was the duty of the Appellant to produce his employment records to prove his employment status when the Employment Act puts such burden upon the Respondent.

7. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself by failing to appreciate that Section 10(7) of the Employment Act puts the burden of producing employment records upon the Respondent in any legal proceedings where the terms of engagement are in question.

8. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself in finding that the Appellant had only produced a paltry 3 pay slips for his entire period of over ten years when he in fact also produced his Mammal Control Contract, Staff Identification Card, NSSF Provisional Statement of Account and the CBA between the Respondent and his Union.

9. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself by relying on the samples of undated and unsigned letters of appointment and pay slips produced by the Respondent in determining the Appellant's employment status since they had no relevance to Appellant's case and were mere draft letters.

10. THAT the learned trial Magistrate misdirected himself, failed to give due consideration to the legal principles applicable to when an employee is considered to be a unionisable employee(employee eligible for membership of a trade union) and thus arrived at a wrong conclusion

11. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant being an employee for membership of the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union, he was entitled to all the benefits that accrued to the members of that trade union regardless of whether he was a subscribed member or not

12. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was a Plantation employee within the meaning of the CBA between the Respondent and the Appellant's Union since he was a Mammal Guard who was not excluded from the Union coverage.

13. THAT the learned trial Magistrate misdirected himself, failed to give due consideration to the legal principles applicable to when an employee is rendered redundant and thus arrived at wrong conclusion.

14. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Respondent did not follow the procedure laid down under the employment laws and hence the Appellant's termination was not done within the law.

15. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was rendered redundant due to lack of work at the Respondent company and/or abolishment of Mammal Control department hence the rules of redundancy as laid down in the Employment Act should have been applied by the Respondent

16. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that there was no evidence that was tendered before Court to show that there was no work in the Respondent company to warrant the Appellant's termination hence an unlawful termination.

17. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was entitled to 80 days salary in lieu of notice as provided in the CBA between the Respondent and the Appellant's Union.

18. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to find that the Appellant was entitled to underpayment for the 3 years period that he was underpaid as provided in the CBA between the Respondent and the Appellant's Union.

19. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was entitled to unpaid overtime at the rate of 1.5 for the 3 years period that he worked overtime on weekdays without pay

20. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was entitled to unpaid rest days at the rate of 2.0 for the 3 years period that he worked on rest days without pay.

21. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was entitled to unpaid public holidays at the rate of 2.0 for the 3 years period that he worked on public holidays without pay

22. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was entitled to unpaid dog handling fees at the rate of Kshs.980/= the 3 years period that he was forced to bring his own dogs to work without pay as provided in the CBA between the Respondent and the Appellant's Union.

23. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant was entitled to leave pay for the unspent leave days in the years 2019, 2020 and 2021.

24. THAT learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that the Appellant having been rendered redundant was entitled to severance pay at the rate of 27days for the 10 years that he had served the Respondent as provided in the CBA between the Respondent and the Appellant's Union and/ or the Employment Act.

25. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to appreciate that in Employment disputes the burden of production of employment records lies with the Respondent who is the custodian of the same as per Section 74 of the Employment Act.

26. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts and misdirected himself by partially allowing the Appellant's Claim without considering his evidence and filed pleadings on whether he was entitled to all the reliefs sought as a result of his unlawful termination.

27. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact and misdirected himself by granting the Appellant 50% costs of the suit despite having found that he was unlawfully terminated.

28. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by disregarding the Appellant’s evidence, pleadings filed in Court, submissions and judicial authorities cited.

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29. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and facts by considering extraneous issues that were neither pleaded, canvassed or proven by the Respondent during the hearing of the suit.

30. THAT the learned trial Magistrate failed to appreciate that the prejudice occasioned to the Appellant by partially allowing the suit herein without taking into account his evidence could not be cured by an award of costs.

31. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself by failing to exercise judicial authority on known legal principles and judiciously thus rendering a biased, unfair, unjust and inconsistent decision/Judgment.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) This Appeal be allowed.

b) The Judgment and Orders issued on 20th March, 2025 be set aside and be substituted with an Order allowing the Appellant's Claim dated 23rd May,2023 as well as his co-Appellants' consolidated Claims which are MCELRC NO. E 015 of 2023, MCELRC NO. E 016 of 2023, MCELRC NO. E 022 of 2023 and MCELRC NO. E 021 of 2024

c) The Respondent to bear the full costs of all the suits at the Magistrate’s Court as well as this Appeal.

d) Any other Order and relief that this Honourable Court may deem fit and just to grant.

It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the trial court erred at the first hurdle by finding that the Appellant had not proved the existence of a contract of service. The Appellant contends that the trial court treated proof of permanent employment as a precondition to proving an employment relationship and that this was an error. On the burden of proof, the Appellant submits that Sections 10(7) and 74 of the Employment Act, 2007 which place the burden of producing employment records on the employer, should have been applied rather than the general provisions of the Evidence Act.

On CBA coverage, the Appellant submits that the CBA did not list a Mammal Control Officer among the excluded management categories, and that he was a plantation employee entitled to its benefits. On termination, the Appellant’s primary case is that he was orally informed by his supervisor, in the course of a subsisting contract, that he was to stop working, without notice or valid cause; in the alternative, he submits that the true reason was the abolition of the Mammal Control department for want of work, such that the Respondent ought to have followed the redundancy procedure under Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007. On costs, the Appellant submits that having established unlawful termination, he was entitled to full costs of the suit below and of this appeal.

The Respondent’s case and submission is that the Appellant was engaged on a series of fixed-term contracts for services, not a contract of service, and that the engagement was a classic contract for services on the footing of the distinct legal and control test applicable to such relationships. On Section 37, the Respondent submits that the provision applies only to a casual employee as statutorily defined, and the Appellant was never a casual employee.

On CBA coverage, the Respondent relies on Part One, Section 1(iii) of the CBA, which limits application to plantation employees, and on the absence of any union dues deduction on the Appellant’s payslips. On termination, the Respondent’s case, both at trial and on appeal, is that the Appellant’s services were terminated for absenteeism under Clause 2.5.2 of his contract, not on account of redundancy or effluxion of time. The Respondent’s submissions do not, however, address or cross-appeal the trial court’s finding that this stated reason was not proved and that the termination was accordingly illegal and unfair.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the Appellant proved the existence of an employment relationship with the Respondent, as opposed to a contractor relationship.

2. Whether the trial court misdirected itself on the burden of proof.

3. Whether Section 37 of the Employment Act, 2007 had any application to the Appellant’s case.

4. Whether the Appellant was a unionisable plantation employee entitled to the benefits of the CBA.

5. Whether the termination of the Appellant’s engagement was unlawful and unfair.

6. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the terminal dues and other benefits claimed.

7. Who should bear the costs of the appeal.

This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify, and will not lightly disturb findings of fact reached by the trial court unless they are shown to be based on no evidence, on a demonstrable misapprehension of the evidence, or on a departure from correct principles as is in the authorities of Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123; Jabane v Olenja [1986] KLR 661.

On the 1st issue for determination, there is a well-recognised distinction between a contract of service, which creates an employment relationship governed by the Employment Act, 2007 and a contract for services, under which the engaged party is an independent contractor outside the Act’s protection. The classic test, articulated by Denning L.J. in Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101 and applied locally in Everret Aviation Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority [2013] KEHC 6352 (KLR), asks whether the engaging party controls not merely what is to be done but how it is to be done, and whether the worker’s efforts are integrated into the business or merely accessory to it. The ILO Recommendation No. 198 indicia, applied in Wanjihi v Gibb Africa Limited [2026] KEELRC 876 (KLR), point the same way: instructions and control, integration into the enterprise, duration and continuity, and the provision of tools by the engaging party.

Applying those principles, the record discloses features on both sides of the divide. The Appellant guarded the Respondent’s plantation using, on the terms of his own contract, “any legal and environmentally friendly means”, a measure of autonomy over method more consistent with a contract for services. Against that, he was integrated into the Respondent’s operations over an extended period, issued a staff identification card and an ATM card for payment through the Respondent’s payroll, and paid a daily rate fixed unilaterally by the Respondent, indicia more consistent with a contract of service.

The trial court proceeded on the latter footing, applying the unfair-termination provisions of the Employment Act, 2007 in the Appellant’s favour; it is that finding, and not a finding that no employment relationship existed at all, which grounds the unappealed award below of notice pay and compensation for unlawful termination, and this court does not disturb it. What the Appellant did not prove, and what the trial court correctly rejected, was that this employment was continuous or permanent across the ten-year period claimed, rather than a series of discrete fixed-term engagements. The Appellant produced payslips for only a handful of months across a decade, no letter of appointment, and contracts for only isolated periods and the gaps in that record were neither explained nor filled. This answers the 1st issue for determination to the extent that there is no evidence of continuous or permanent employment and I find as such.

On the 2nd issue for determination, Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80, Laws of Kenya codify the ordinary rule that he who alleges must prove, and place the initial legal burden on the party making an assertion; that legal burden does not shift, though an evidential burden may pass once it is discharged as observed in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR. Sections 10(7) and 74 of the Employment Act, 2007 operate alongside, not in substitution for, that principle: where an employer fails to produce a written contract or the particulars prescribed under section 10(1), the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment passes to the employer Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 Others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR). Here, the Respondent did not fail to produce records; it produced the operative Mammal Control Contract, the CBA, and sample comparator documents, none of which the Appellant successfully impeached. The threshold question, whether a contract of service as opposed to a contract for services existed and whether it was continuous, was squarely in dispute from the outset, and the general burden on that threshold question rested on the Appellant. The trial court did not misdirect itself by applying the general burden of proof principles to that foundational question, the Respondent having in any event discharged any burden that passed to it under section 10(7). The 2nd issue is resolved against the Appellant.

On the 3rd issue for determination, Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007 defines a casual employee as one whose terms of engagement provide for payment at the end of each day and who is engaged for a period not exceeding twenty-four hours at a time. Section 37 converts such casual engagements into term contracts once the continuous service described in the section is proved (Nanyuki Water & Sewage Company Limited v Benson Mwiti Ntiritu & 4 Others [2018] KECA 196 (KLR), applying Chemelil Sugar Company v Ebrahim Ochieng Otuon & 2 Others [2015] KECA 202 (KLR)). Those authorities, however, presuppose a claimant who was, in fact, a casual employee within the statutory definition. The Appellant was, on the record, paid a monthly consolidated rate through the Respondent’s payroll under successive fixed-term contracts of three months’ duration each, not at the end of each day. He was accordingly never a casual employee within that statutory definition in the first place and there was no casual engagement capable of conversion under section 37. This ground fails, not for want of sufficiently continuous service, but because the section has no application to a claimant who was never a casual employee to begin with.

On the 4th issue for determination, the CBA dated 13th August 2020 between the Respondent and the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union, by Part One, Section 1(iii), covers plantation employees only, and by Section 3(i) requires the Respondent to deduct union dues from covered employees under a check-off system. The burden of proving union membership rests on the party asserting it; a bare allegation of membership, without proof, cannot found entitlement to CBA benefits (Tailors & Textiles Workers Union v New Wide Garments Kenya (EPZ) Limited [2013] KEELRC 925 (KLR); Kenya Union of Commercial, Food and Allied Workers v Jade Collections Limited [2025] KEIC 1 (KLR)).

Unionisable employees must, moreover, not be confused with the Respondent’s total workforce; only staff eligible for union membership are covered (Civicon Limited v Amalgamated Union of Kenya Metal Workers [2016] KECA 164 (KLR)). The Respondent deducts union dues from the wages of its plantation workforce and remits them; no union dues were ever deducted from the payments made to the Appellant, and he could not, in cross-examination, identify a shop steward or union representative or explain the absence of any deduction on his own payslips. The Appellant is therefore not a unionisable plantation employee within the meaning of the CBA.

On the 5th and 6th issues for determination, the trial court found that the Appellant’s last contract, dated 10th February, 2021 was a three-month engagement due to expire on or about 10th May, 2021 and that his services were terminated before that date, in March, 2021 when he was informed that he was to stop working. The Respondent’s stated reason, that he had absconded duty, was never proved: its own witness conceded on cross-examination that no attendance register was produced, that no show-cause letter was issued, and that no disciplinary hearing was held. Applying sections 43, 45(2) and 47(5) of the Employment Act, which place the burden of proving the reason for termination on the employer, the trial court found the termination illegal and unfair, a finding neither cross-appealed nor otherwise impugned by the Respondent and which this court has no basis to disturb. I do not, however, accept the Appellant’s alternative submission that the termination ought instead to have been treated as a redundancy.

Redundancy was not either party’s pleaded case at trial: the Appellant’s case was that of a permanent employee dismissed without notice, and the Respondent’s case was that of a fixed-term contractor terminated for absenteeism under Clause 2.5.2 of his contract. No evidence was led, and none appears on the record, that the Mammal Control department was abolished or that work was in fact unavailable. This theory surfaces only in submissions. It is without evidential foundation and a party cannot recast the character of a termination on appeal on a basis neither pleaded nor proved below. The authority of Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 Others [2014] KECA 404 (KLR) comparatively offers what a valid redundancy defence requires an employer to establish.

The redundancy procedure under Section 40 does not arise on the facts of this case. It follows that the terminal dues anchored to the Appellant’s claimed status as a permanent employee or a unionisable employee, namely service pay, severance pay, unpaid leave, underpayment, overtime, rest days, public holidays and dog-handling fees, were correctly denied, each having been pegged on a status not proved. The trial court’s awards of seven days’ pay in lieu of notice and compensation for loss of future earnings, made in consequence of the finding of illegal and unfair termination and not specifically impugned as to quantum in the grounds of appeal, are not disturbed.

It is noted, for accuracy, that the Respondent’s submissions before this court, while correctly stating the figure of seven days’ notice pay (Kshs. 3,538.85) and the 50% costs order made below, did not address the trial court’s further award of Kshs. 30,333 as compensation for loss of future earnings, nor its finding that the termination was illegal and unfair, from which no cross-appeal was taken. That omission does not disturb the unappealed finding; this court has had regard to the certified judgment itself, rather than to either party’s characterisation of it, in arriving at the conclusions above.

On the 7th issue, costs. Costs are a matter of discretion under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, applicable mutatis mutandis. Having regard to that discretion, and to the same considerations that moved the trial court, there shall be no order as to the costs of this appeal.

I am therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The Judgment and Decree of the trial court delivered on 20th March, 2025 in MC. ELRC No. E014 of 2023 is upheld and affirmed.

(ii) Each party shall bear their costs of the appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mr. Ochogo instructed by Okello Ochogo & Company Advocates LLP for the Appellant.

2. M.M. Uvyu instructed by Uvyu & Company Advocates for the Respondent.

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