Employment law

Njue & 39 others v Telkom Kenya Limited [2026] KEELRC 14718 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Petition E158 of 2025
Judgment date
14 October 2026
Judge(s)
Dr. Jacob Gakeri

Case research

SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the petition, filed nearly twenty years after the 2006 retrenchment, was barred by laches and unreasonable delay despite being framed as a constitutional claim; whether the petitioners, who were not parties to the earlier Ochanda litigation, could…

Material facts

The 40 petitioners were former Telkom Kenya employees retrenched in 2006 under Phase I because they were aged 50 or above. They received three months’ notice pay, severance of one month’s salary for every year remaining to retirement, and Kshs.40,000…

Get the complete brief with membership →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

PETITION NO. E158 OF 2025

(Before Hon. Justice Dr. Jacob Gakeri)

CASPER KINYUA NJUE & 39 OTHERS………………...…. APPLICANT

-VERSUS-

TELKOM KENYA LIMITED………………………………. RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

The Petitioners, numbering forty (40), former employees of Telkom Kenya Co. Ltd filed the instant Suit on 13th August 2025 vide a petition dated 8th August 2025.

The Petitioners’ case is that they were retrenched by the Respondent in 2006 as Phase I, those aged 50 and above under which they received:

a) three (3) months Basic Salary in lieu of notice

b) Severance pay of one (1) month's basic salary for each year remaining until the employee's retirement age; and

c) a transport allowance of Kshs.40,000

Then in contradistinction, those in Phase II, those under 50 years received:

a) two (2) months Basic Salary in lieu of notice;

b) Severance pay of two-and-a-half (2 ½) months basic salary for each year of completed service;

c) a one-time "golden handshake" Payment of Kshs.150,000; and

d) a transport allowance Kshs.40,000.

The Petitioners’ averred that those in Phase II and younger in age received more and the differentiation was discriminatory and many affected employees instituted cases in the High Court in 2007 John O. Ochanda v Telkom Kenya Ltd HCCC No. 2016 of 2007, consolidated with HCCC No. 219 and HCCC No. 255 of 2007 comprising 996 employees, and the High Court found that differential treatment was unlawful and discriminatory and ordered that affected employees be paid severance at the rate of 2 ½ months' Salary for each completed year of service and a golden handshake of Kshs.150,000 as enjoyed by those in Phase II and the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2013.

The petitioners averred that the judgment notwithstanding, a large number of Phase I retrenched employees were not paid as the Respondent did not extend the benefit to all affected employees and the Petitioners were part of that category comprising 432 individuals.

That the instant suit was intended to ensure that the petitioners received their dues. The petitioners cited the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 10, 19, 20(1), 21, 22(1), 23, 27, 28, 57 and 259 of the Constitution of Kenya as the legal foundation of the Petition. They averred that their right to human dignity and equal treatment were violated by dint of the differential treatment based on age.

The petitioners pray for:

a) A declaration that the exclusion or omission of the petitioners as Phase I retrenched employees of the Respondent from the improved severance Package accorded to Phase 2 employees is unconstitutional, unlawful and discriminatory.

b) A declaration that all former Telkom Kenya employees retrenched under Phase I (including the 432 individuals who were not paid the enhanced benefits, among them the 40 Petitioners herein) are entitled as a constitutional right to the same severance pay terms and "golden handshake" that were given to the Phase II employees and that any denial of such equal treatment amounts to a violation of Articles 27, 28 and 57 of the Constitution.

c) An order compelling the Respondent to calculate and pay the petitioners (and all other affected Phase I retrenchees who have not received the same) the full difference in severance benefits due to them, so as to equate their package to that of Phase II including the recalculation of severance pay at 2 ½ months' salary for each year of service completed (less any severance already paid under the one month per year remaining formula), payment of Kshs.150,000 "golden handshake" to each individual and any other terminal benefits that were awarded to Phase II but withheld from Phase I together with interest thereon at court rates from the date of retrenchment (May 2006) or such other date as the court may deem just until full payment to compensate for the lengthy delay and loss of use of funds.

d) Compensation for the violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights, in particular the mental anguish, loss of dignity and other suffering occasioned by the Respondent's discriminatory treatment over the years.

e) Any other relief that the court may deem fit and just to grant in the interest of justice

f) Costs of this Petition.

Respondent's Case

Vide a Replying Affidavit sworn on 27th April 2026 in opposition to the petition, Stella Wawira the Respondent's Legal Officer deponed that the petition was fatally defective, misconceived and untenable and was for dismissal on account of laches and inordinate delay since the cause of action accrued in 2006 almost 20 years ago and the attempted explanation of paragraph 39 of the petition was speculative and conjectural, old age, names removed by Counsel, waited for dues in good faith, and Mr. Casper Kinyua Njue provided different reasons.

The affiant deponed that the prolonged delay was inexcusable as the six (6) year limitation period had lapsed, and the delay was fatal as it was occasioned by indolence as there were notices issued and published in local dairies to all affected persons to join the suit on 2nd March 2007 and 30th July 2009 by Visram J. (as he then was) and Waweru J. respectively.

That the Respondent stood to suffer prejudice on account of the delay and thus impair the right to fair hearing a constitutional imperative.

That they could have sought leave to join the John Ochanda suit and the Respondent had disposed of old records which would affect its defence thus unfair to it and its right to legitimate expectation that all claims from the retrenchment would be conclusively settled.

The affiant deponed that re-litigating the same issues twenty (20) years later would offend the principle of finality and predictability. The affiant further deponed that the issues raised in the instant petition were similar to those raised in the earlier suits and the petition would impose unforeseen and unjust financial burden on the Respondent as there had been a settlement and Consent Order dated 1st December 2015 adopted by the Court on 14th December 2015 which remains binding.

That the Parties in the John Ochanda Case entered into a Deed of Settlement on 8th August 2014 and the compromise or consent was akin to res judicata.

That the Decision in the John Ochanda Case was not in rem but one in Personam binding the parties thereto exclusively and non-parties could not rely on it as their cause of action arose in 2006 and no continuing violation arose.

The affiant further deponed that the retrenchment differentiation was based on contract and retirement eligibility criteria and no relief were available to the petitioners.

Petitioners’ submissions

As to whether the Petition is properly before this court as a constitutional claim, counsel submitted that the substance of the petition was the violation of rights, citing the decisions in Daniel N. Mugendi v Kenyatta University & 3 others (2013) eKLR on the jurisdiction of the ELRC to entertain constitutional petitions on matters ancillary to employment, R v Karisa Chengo & 2 other (2017) KESC 15 (KLR) and Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v Mwangi Stephen Muriithi & another on enforcement of Bill of rights against all persons, to urge that the instant suit was a constitutional petition.

On laches, counsel submitted that the prevailing jurisprudence as espoused in decisions such as Otieno Mak Onyango v Attorney General & another (2012) eKLR, Dominic Arony Amolo v Attorney General (2003) KEHC 220 (KLR), J an mohammed & 2 others v Chelugui & another (2022) KECA 720 (KLR) and Monica Wangu Wamwere & 5 others v Attorney General, (2023) KESC 3 KLR was that limitation of actions does not apply to suits based on violations of rights and fundamental freedoms and the time taken to ventilate the claim was dependent on the time when the violation became apparent.

Reliance was placed on Vipingo Ridge Ltd v Swalehe Ngonge Mpitta (2022) KEELRC 309 (KLR), on continuing obligations and the Supreme Court of India decision in Ram Autar Singh Yadau v State of UP Civil Appeal No. 13806 of 2024 on the need to consider all relevant factors before dismissing a petition on laches.

As to whether the Deed of Settlement of 8th August 2014 and consent order adopted on 16th December 2015 extinguished the petitioners’ claim, counsel submitted that the petitioners were not privy to the Deed of Settlement or the consent order and were therefore not bound by either of them and the claim was not res judicata citing the decisions in John Florence Maritime Services Ltd & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport and Infrastructure & 3 others (2021) KESC 39(KLR) and Okiya Omtata & another v Attorney General (2014) KEHC 8157 (KLR).

Counsel submitted that the two-phase package was unlawful and discriminatory contrary to article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya and the illegality was continuing.

As to whether the public notices of 8th March 2007 and 15th October 2009 inviting affected persons to join the Ochanda Case estopped the petitioners or amounted to a waiver of rights, counsel submitted that procedural rules, as court had held were flexible, rights and fundamental freedoms could be waived by silence the right to access justice is enjoyed by all and the explanation offered by the petitioners was reasonable and the respondent stood to suffer no prejudice.

Concerning whether the differential treatment of Phase I and phase II retrenches constituted discrimination, reliance was placed on the finding of Mwera J and the Court of Appeal in Telkom Kenya Ltd v Ochanda & 996 others (2013) eKLR, to urge that it was discriminatory and the finding was binding on this court.

Reliance was further, placed on Gichuru v Package Insurance Brokers Ltd (2021) KESC 12 KLR on direct discrimination and the Respondent had not discharged the burden of proof under article 24 of the Constitution, citing the decision in Karen Njeri Kandie v Alassane Ba & another (2017) KESC 13 (KLR) to urge that equality applied to the entire class of retrenches.

On reliefs counsel submitted that the petitioner were entitled to the reliefs sought citing the Mittu-Bell Case (2021) KESC 34 (KLR), including compensation for violation of constitutional rights with interest from the date the wrong was committed.

Respondent’s Submissions

As to whether the petition is defeated by inordinate delay, counsel submitted that it was because the inordinate delay had not been explained, was inexcusable and the retrenchment took place in 2008 and no action was instituted until 9th August 2025 and no satisfactory explanation was provided.

On laches reliance was placed on the decisions in Janmohamed (SC) (Suing as the Executrix of the Estate of the late H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi & another v District Land Registrar Uasin Gishu & 4 others (2024) KESC 39(KLR), Monica Wangu Wamwere & 5 others v Attorney General (Supra), Mitei v National Social Security Fund Board of Trustees (2022) KECA 974 (KLR) and Charity Wanjiru Ndegwa & 2 others v Attorney General & another (2018) eKLR, on delay in filing of suits.

Counsel submitted that no credible explanation for the delay had been provided.

Further reliance was placed on Wellington Nzioka Kioko v Attorney General (2015) KECA 858 (KLR), on lack of finances as a cause for the delay in filing a suit and Nderitu v Attorney General (2019) KECA 1006 (KLR) to urge that the court of Appeal declined to entertain the claim for unexplained delay.

Counsel submitted that the rationale of laches was to ensure that parties urged their respective cases effectively and prolonged delay was prejudicial to the Respondent, citing Kariuki v Attorney General (2014) KECA 713 (KLR), on the right to fair hearing and urge that the petitioners had not explained the delay further citing Lewa v Mwagandi v (2015) KECA and Moses Nyadusi Osoro v National Police Service Commission & another (2022) KEELC 184 (KLR) on a delay of 8 years.

Concerning the Deed of Settlement dated 8th August 2014 and consent recorded on 16th December 2015, counsel urged that all matters relating to the retrenchment in 2006 were compromised by the Deed of Settlement and the consent order adopted in full and final settlement of the proceedings and the sum of Kshs.1.5 billion was paid, citing the decisions in Equip Agencies Ltd v I & M Bank Ltd & 2 others (2022) KEHC 13525 (KLR) and other foreign decisions, to urge that the compromise extinguished and superseded any judgment or orders made by the courts and the instant suit was misconceived and unsustainable.

Counsel submitted that the petitioners could not rely on the judgments in the John Ochanda because the case affected persons who were party to the suit as the judgment was in persona and the petitioners were not parties to the suit since they declined to join the suit.

Counsel further submitted that the petitioners had not proved that the differential treatment between the retrenchees was unlawful or discriminative, citing the decision in State of Kerala &another v N.M. Thomas and others Civil Appeal No. 1160 of 1974 on differential treatment, to submit that Phase I and Phase II of the retrenchment were justified as they were based on the Civil Service Guidelines, the human resource policy framework, other arrangements and age of retirement.

Counsel urged that the petitioners had not proved that the differential treatment was arbitrary, citing Johnstone Muthama v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs & another (2012) eKLR and Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K) & others v Attorney General 2011 eKLR, to urge that the petitioners failed pr prove that the distinction between Phase I and Phase II amounted to discrimination.

Counsel submitted that the petitioners petition was for dismissal with costs.

Analysis and determination

The facts of this case are uncontested in that the petitioners herein were part of a large group of the Respondent's employees who were retrenched in 2006 following the privatization of the Kenya Ports and Telecommunication Corporation and as adverted elsewhere in this judgment, the Respondent used a twin thronged retrenchment categorizing employees based on age and those aged fifty (50) years and above had inferior terms than those below the age of 50, in terms of the amount payable as severance pay and golden handshake. Those aged 50 and above had no "Handshake".

It is not in contest that the High Court found the differential treatment discriminatory in HCCC No. 2016 of 2007 (Consolidated with HCCC No. 219 and 255 of 2007), on behalf of 996 employees.

The High Court Ordered that:-

a) Plaintiffs be paid severance pay based on 2 ½ months salary for each year of completed service.

b) Plaintiffs be paid golden handshake on the same scale as what was paid to retrenchees in Phase II.

c) Plaintiffs get costs and interest.

It is not in dispute that the Petitioners did not join in any of the three suits and were therefore not parties to the suits and could not enforce the judgment, which was in personam.

The severance pay and golden handshake were payable to the 996 litigants.

It is unclear to the court why the petitioners excluded themselves from their colleagues who filed the three suits as no evidence was adduced that they were unaware of the cases.

The allegation by Mr. Casper Kinyua Njue that at paragraph 12 of his affidavit that an unnamed counsel and/or his representative neglected to include his name in the matter is puzzlingly, lacked supportive evidence and not credible.

First, he did not disclose which lawyer or firm of lawyers he and the 39 others had consulted or expected to include their names as there were three (3) cases filed separately.

Second, it is unclear as to whom he gave his particulars and documents for purposes of the suit.

Third, the affiant did not allege that a visit to the counsel's office led to the discovery that his name had been omitted and when.

Fourth, the law firm of Lumumba, Muma and Kaluma, vide notice dated 6th March 2007 published in the Daily Nation on 8th March 2007 invited all retrenched Telkom employees affected by the process to contact the law firm by 16th March 2007. The notice was published pursuant to a Court Order issued on 2nd March 2007 and another notice to join the suit as a plaintiff was published in the Daily Nation on 15th October 2009, pursuant to an court order made on 30th July 2009.

The second Notice invited all those in Phase I, II or III of the retrenchment who wished to join as plaintiffs to contact the law firm by 31st October 2009. Three mobile numbers, namely; 0712035008, 0720719703 and 0722552111 were provided or physically visit Room 112, First Floor, St. Ellis Colts House, Opposite the High Court.

The Notice was explicit that meetings would be held in Nakuru on 30th October 2009, at Villa Inn Hotel at 10.00am, (for those in Kericho and Nakuru) and at Hillbrow Hotel, Kisumu Sports ground at 11.00am on 31st October 2009.

The Notice was unambiguous that "only members who joined will be entitled to any eventual claim against the Respondent” undoubtedly, these court orders and notices manifested a genuine and bona fide desire on the part of the parties to the dispute to ensure that no retrenched employee of the Respondent who had a claim would be left out.

Mr. David Mulwa Titus, who swore a Supporting Affidavit on 5th August 2025 associating himself with the averments of Mr. Casper Kinyua Njue did not depone as to why he did not join in any of the three suits filed in 2007 and he relied on the Judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal as a confirmation of his entitlement to equal severance and golden handshake and the Respondent's refusal to pay had caused him immense hardship, stress and suffering.

In his Supporting Affidavit, Mr. Casper Kinyua Njue deponed that he was aware of the suit before the High Court and the Court of Appeal and was additionally aware that other retrenched employees were left out. He gave a number of approximately 432 former employees of the Respondent. However, the averment at paragraph 20 of the affidavit lacked supportive evidence. More significantly, neither of the petitioners provided evidence as to when they discovered that their names were missing on the list of the 996 plaintiffs and what they did to remedy the situation.

This is essential because a suit belongs to the litigant not his/her Counsel. See Rajesh Rughani v Fifty Investments Ltd & another KECA 829 (KLR), where the Court held:

"In Habo Agencies Ltd v Wilfred Odhiambo Mosingo (2015) eKLR this Court stated that it is not enough for a party in litigation to simply blame the advocate on record for all manner of transgressions in the conduct of litigation. Courts have always emphasized that the parties have a responsibility to show interest in and to follow up their cases even when they are represented by Counsel... In the instant case there is nothing on record to show what action the Appellant took between 20th October 1998 and 7th March 2005 to ensure that the suit he had filed at the High Court was Prosecuted. There is no credible explanation for the delay by the Appellant's former Advocate.”

See also Sang & 2 others v Kugun & 8 others (2025) KECA 739 (KLR), Gwaya (Suing as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mwinyi Rama Gwaya) v Kivuti & another (2020) KECA 80 (KLR)

In the instant case the petitioner provided no shred of evidence of having instructed any advocate or visited the offices of any advocate as a follow up.

It is not in dispute that the petitioners filed the instant suit on 13th August 2025 and as per the petition, paragraph E (c), retrenchment took place in May 2006 and a cause of action accrued. Thus, the right to sue arose.

However, copies of letters of termination of services on restructuring are dated in April, May, June, July and August 2006. For instance, C.A. Nkatha 14th July 2006, DMM Mugo 16th June 2006, T.M. Njagi 15th May 2006, Chege 28th Nov 2006, T.M. Kiamba 28th April 2006. Clearly the cause of action arose at different times.

In Langat v Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd (2017) KECA 152 (KLR), the Court stated:

"A cause of action is a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. See Letang v Co oper (1964) 2 All ER 929 at 934"

Accrual of a cause of action marks the genesis of the running of time.

Before 2nd June 2008, the limitation period for contractual claims was six (6) years by dint of section 4(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act and assuming that the cause of action arose in August 2006 the plaintiffs’ cause of action became statute barred at the end of July 2012 and the instant suit was filed 13 years later and almost twenty (20) years after the cause of action accrued.

The court is alive to the fact that the Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 6th November 2025 challenging the Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant suit under section 89 of the Employment Act for being statute barred.

The court found that issues arising were factual and could not be canvassed by way of Preliminary Objection and the opportune time was the hearing and determination of the petition. The rough logic is that by the time a suit is slated for hearing all parties are presumed to have provided the evidence they propose to rely on and responded to the issues raised by the other side. Such evidence may have been supplied after the ruling and issues arising at the interlocutory stage are dispensed with.

In the instant case, the Respondent filed its response on 27th April 2026 about two months after the ruling on the Preliminary Objection. Needless to emphasize at the hearing the Court has the benefit of perusing the totality of the evidence presented and adduced by the parties for a just determination of the dispute. The facts the court was unaware of on 20th February 2026, when it delivered its ruling on the Preliminary Objection are now on record.

Assuming that all the 40 petitioners had a cause of action by the end of December 2006, they all had the Constitutional right to institute a case against the Respondent for the discriminatory conduct or join any of the three (3) suits all of which were filed in 2007.

The averment that the violation was continuous is unclear. The principle of continuing injury or damage is a creation of section 89 of the Employment Act and actions that fall in this category must be commenced within 12 months of cessation thereof. An injury cannot continue after cessation of employment, the right to enforce it does. Non-Payment of terminal dues does not amount to a continuing injury.

It is trite law that enforcement of fundamental rights is not subject to the limitation period. However, the action ought to be filed within a reasonable time as held in Peter M. Kariuki v Attorney General (2014) eKLR thus:

"The Constitution did not set a time limit within which applications for enforcement of fundamental rights should be brought. Nevertheless, the Court added that like all other processes of the Court, it is in the public interest that such applications be brought promptly or within a reasonable time otherwise they may be considered an abuse of the process of the Court"

See also Wamwere & 5 others v Attorney General (2003) 26 KLR and James Kanyita Nderitu v Attorney General & another Petition No. 180 of 2011.

What is reasonable time is dependent on the circumstances of each case.

The contention that many of the petitioners are of advanced age and may not have had knowledge or means to litigate earlier is in the court’s view patently unconvincing on account that these Petitioners were retrenched when they were over 50 years which is an optimal age for managers or any profession. Their rights were violated in 2006 as opposed to 2025. They are undoubtedly older now. These petitioners had colleagues and friends who filed suits in 2007 and notices were published for others who were affected to join the suits but the Petitioners were unmoved and did nothing even after the judgment of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, which they were aware of, as admitted in their Supporting Affidavit.

In its Notice of Preliminary Objection, the Respondent accused the Petitioner of laches and inexcusable delay on account of the almost 20 years since the cause of action arose and cited several relevant Court of Appeal decisions on delay.

In Wamwere & 5 Other v Attorney General (2023) KESC 26 (KLR), the Supreme Court expressed itself as follows:

"Claims of violation of human rights must be filed within reasonable time. Where there is delay, a Petitioner ought to explain the reasons for the delay to the satisfaction of the Court"

In Edward Akongo Oyugi & 2 others v Attorney General 2019 eKLR, Mativo J (as he then was) stated:

"80 Laches (Latches) refers to lack of diligence and activity in making a legal claim or moving forward with legal enforcement of a right, particularly in regard to equity, hence it is an unreasonable delay that can be viewed as prejudicing the opposing (defending) party. When asserted in litigation, it is an equity defense that is a defense to a claim for an equitable remedy. The person invoking laches is asserting that an opposing party has "slept on its rights" and that as a result of this delay circumstances have changed witnesses or evidence may have been lost or no longer available etc, such that it is no longer a just resolution to grant the plaintiff's claim. Laches is associated with the maxim "Equity aids the vigilant not the sleeping ones (that is those who sleep on their rights)" Put another way, failure to assert ones rights in a timely manner can result in a claim being barred by laches…

83. To invoke laches, the delay to the opposing party in initiating the lawsuit must be unreasonable and the unreasonable delay must prejudice the defendant. Examples of such prejudice include: evidence favourable to the defendant becoming lost or degraded, witnesses favourable to the defendant dying or loosing their memories, the defendant making economic decisions that it would not have done, had the lawsuit been filed earlier.

85. In considering whether delay is inordinate the court has a discretion to be exercised judicially upon consideration of all the facts; and that in essence it is a question of fairness to both sides. At this inquiry, relevant consideration today include the period of the delay, and the explanation offered and any possible prejudice to the Respondent...”

In the instant case, the petitioners cited their names not being included in the suit, or were left out or thought that the suit was representative in character or that the Respondent would equalize the packages suo motu.

However, the Petitioner provided no shred of evidence to demonstrate in which suit their names were left out and at what stage. Clearly HCCC. No. 216 of 2007, HCCC. No. 2019 of 2007 and HCCC. No. 255 of 2007 were filed at different times and involved retrenched employees of the Respondent and advocates, and as adverted to elsewhere in this judgment the Petitioner provided no evidence of the law firm they contacted, when and how the matter proceeded.

Even assuming that the action was of a representative nature, which was not case, the petitioners adduced no evidence of follow up after the two judgments or respond to the notices in the Daily Nation.

Similarly, the petitioners furnished no evidence to show that they attempted to contact the Respondent at any time after any of the two judgments in 2011 and 2013 respectively.

Finally, and as already mentioned elsewhere, none of the petitioners had attained the retirement age of 55 years and were all in the optimal age in terms of skills, experience generally, knowledge in different aspects of human endeavour and globally, for purpose decision making.

The Respondent on the other hand contended that it would suffer prejudice in terms of destroyed or degraded documents and most importantly the financial implication it would have on the company, bearing in mind it had deemed the matter closed in 2014 when the court adopted the consent.

In concluding this matter, the Court is guided by the sentiments of the Court of Appeal in Mutai & 9 others v Attorney General (2019) KECA 125 (KLR), thus:

"Delay is an anathema to fair trial which is one of the key fundamental rights provided to all litigants under Article 50 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it would be an abuse of the court process and contrary to the constitutional principles espoused in Article 159 that requires justice to be administered without delay, to allow a party who alleges violation of constitutional right to bring their action after undue inordinate delay, without any justifiable reason. For this reason, we find that the Appellant's action was properly dismissed."

Contrary to the Petitioner's averments, the duration within which a suit is filed and determined implicates the fundamental right to fair trial, and cannot be disregarded as a procedural technicality under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya. It is the epicenter of just determination of disputes.

In the end, bearing in mind that the delay in this case is undue and patently inordinate, thus unreasonable, there were no plausible reasons for the delay and the prejudice the action would subject the Respondent to owing to passage of time, the court is not persuaded that the petitioners were vigilant to deserve its discretionary favour.

Consequently, the Petition dated 8th August 2025 is for dismissal and it is accordingly dismissed.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 14TH OCTOBER, 2026.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder