REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT
NAIROBI
(O N Makau J on 14th October 2026)
CAUSE NO. E859 OF 2025
RUTH GATWIRI KINOTI .………..…………………………..…….. CLAIMANT
VERSUS
JACARANDA HOTEL LIMITED ……………………………..…..RESPONDENT
RULING
Introduction
1. The Claimant was initially employed by the Respondent, Jacaranda Hotel Limited, as a waitress. Vide a letter dated 30th September 2019, the Claimant was appointed to act in the position of Food and Beverages Cashier for a period of three (3) months pending evaluation of her performance and communication of the Respondent's decision on the said role.
2. Upon lapse of the said three (3) months, the Respondent failed to conduct any evaluation or communicate its decision to the Claimant. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant continued discharging duties of a Food and Beverages Cashier continuously and without interruption.
3. The Claimant alleges that from 1st January 2020, the Respondent continuously paid her a basic salary of Kshs. 16,432/= applicable to a waitress instead of the prescribed basic salary of Kshs. 30,627/= payable to a cashier under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2018. The Respondent therefore continuously underpaid the Claimant using the wrong job designation despite assigning and retaining her in the position of Food and Beverages Cashier.
4. The Claimant resigned from her employment with the Respondent on 23rd April 2022 and thereafter received a letter dated 26th April 2022 from the respondent inaccurately computing her terminal using the salary of a Waitress instead of the salary for Food and Beverages Cashier, a position she had not held in two years.
5. The Claimant made various repeated requests for clarifications and correction, and she subsequently received another erroneously revised calculation of her terminal dues vide an amended letter dated 7th June 2024. After a year, she filed this suit vide a Memorandum of Claim dated 28th August 2025 seeking the following reliefs:
(a) A declaration that the Respondent subjected the Claimant to unfair labour practices and its under compensation of the Claimant by paying her as a waitress yet she worked as a cashier was unlawful.
(b) A declaration that the Respondent has unlawfully and illegally withheld terminal dues owed to the Claimant.
(c) A declaration that the Claimant has suffered loss and damage.
(d) An order directing the Respondent to compensate the Claimant the basic pay payable to the Claimant for her role as a cashier from the 1st of January 2020 to 14th September 2021 calculated according to the appropriate wage rate.
(e) An order directing the Respondent to compensate the Claimant the terminal dues payable to the Claimant for her role as a cashier from the 1st of January 2020 to 14th September 2021 calculated according to the appropriate wage rate.
(f) Damages for the violation of the Claimant’s statutory rights as enshrined under Section 48 The Labour Institutions Act, 2007 and Section 26 of the Employment Act.
(g) The Costs of this Suit.
(h) Interest on (d), (e) and (f) above at Court rates until payment in full.
(i) Any other relief that this Court may deem mete and just.
6. The Respondent filed the instant Notice of Preliminary Objection to the Memorandum of Claim dated 28th October 2025 on the following grounds:
a) That the Claimant's suit is fatally defective as it offends the express provisions of Section 89 of the Employment Act Cap 226, having been brought four (4) years after 14th September 2021, when terminal dues allegedly became due.
b) That the suit is therefore time-barred and ought to be struck out with costs to the Respondent.
7. In response to the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the Claimant filed a Replying Affidavit dated 17th November 2025. The Respondent was granted leave to file a Further Affidavit in response to the Replying Affidavit, and hence filed a Further Affidavit dated 11th February 2026. Thereafter the objection was disposed of by written submissions.
The Respondent's Written Submissions
8. The Respondent submitted on three issues, namely, whether the Respondent's Notice of Preliminary Objection meets the threshold for a valid Preliminary Objection; whether the Claimant can successfully claim that an error in the calculation of her terminal dues constitutes a continuing injury; and whether the suit is statute-barred under Section 89 of the Employment Act, Cap 226.
9. On the first issue, the Respondent relied on the decision in Amollo v Mitsumi Distribution FZ Company & 40 Others (Cause E041 of 2025) [2025] among others where the Court, dealt with similar Notice of Preliminary Objection. In the said decision, the legal principle established by Law J in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 was upheld, that is, a preliminary objection must consist of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a Preliminary point may dispose of the suit.
10. The Respondent submitted that since it is challenging the court's jurisdiction on account of limitation of time, the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 28th October 2025 meets the threshold of a Preliminary Objection.
11. On the second issue, the Respondent relies on the Court of Appeal decision in G4S Security Services (K) Limited v Joseph Kamau & 468 Others (Civil Appeal No 158 of 2015) to urge that unpaid terminal dues do not constitute a continuing injury as contemplated under the proviso to Section 89 of the Employment Act. It further averred that even if the injury constituted 'a continuing injury', suit ought to have been filed within one year failing which it was time barred.
12. On the third issue, the Respondent submits that the Claimant terminated her employment with the Respondent upon giving notice on 23rd April 2022 and as such she should have filed the instant suit on or before 23rd April 2025. However, the suit was filed in August 2025, four months after the expiry of the time within which she should have filed the suit.
13. The Respondent further submitted that the situation is even worse for the Claimant, since she is seeking dues for the period from 1st January 2020 to 14th September 2021. Accordingly, her cause of action having accrued from 14th September 2021, this suit should have been filed on or before 14th September 2024.
14. The Respondent further submitted that even if the Court were to find that the Claimant was subject to continuing injury, then going by the Claimant's own date of 7th June 2024, the suit should have been filed by 8th June 2025.
15. The respondent submitted that whichever way this Court chooses to look at it, the Claimant has filed this case out of the statutory time-line provided under Section 89 of the Employment Act. According, it urged to find that the suit herein is time-barred and the Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the same.
The Claimant's Written Submissions
16. The Claimant submitted on two issues namely, whether the Claimant's suit amounts to a continuing injury under Section 89 of the Employment Act; and whether the question of continuing injury is capable of being disposed of by way of Preliminary Objection.
17. On the first issue, the Claimant relied on Section 89 of the Employment Act and the Court of Appeal decision in The German School Society & another v Ohany & another (Civil Appeal 325 & 342 of 2018 (Consolidated)) [2023] KECA 894 (KLR) (24 July 2023) (Judgment) to urge that service-related claim based on a continuing wrong can be granted relief even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury.
18. The Claimant submitted that she was initially employed as a waitress and was subsequently appointed to act as Food and Beverages Cashier vide a letter dated 30th September 2019 for three (3) months. Upon lapse of the said period, the Respondent failed to conduct any evaluation or communicate its decision. The Claimant continued discharging the duties of a Food and Beverages Cashier continuously and without interruption.
19. The Claimant submitted that from 1st January 2020, the Respondent continuously underpaid her by paying her a basic salary of Kshs.16,432/= applicable to a waitress instead of the prescribed basic salary of Kshs. 30,627/= payable to a cashier. The Respondent therefore continuously remunerated the Claimant under the wrong job designation despite assigning and retaining her in the position of Food and Beverages Cashier.
20. The Claimant further submits that upon computation of her terminal dues, the Respondent once again erroneously based the calculations on her former salary as a waitress instead of the salary applicable to her position as a cashier. Although the Respondent later issued amended computations on 7th June 2024, the same remained erroneous and disputed by the Claimant. Consequently, the injury had not ceased as the Respondent had neither correctly computed nor settled the Claimant's lawful dues.
21. The Claimant therefore submitted that her claim falls within the category of continuing injury claims as the breach complained of commenced during her employment and persisted even after her resignation.
22. On the second issue, the Claimant relied on the decision in Ororo v Mbaja [2005] KEHC 3182 (KLR) to urge that a preliminary objection is a point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and proved through the processes of evidence. Any assertion which claims to be a preliminary objection and yet bears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication, is not a true preliminary objection which the Court should allow to proceed.
23. The Claimant submitted that in the present case, the issues as to when the cause of action arose and whether the Respondent's conduct amounted to continuing injury are factual matters requiring evidentiary interrogation by this Honourable Court. The Respondent's Preliminary Objection therefore improperly invites the Court to determine contested factual issues without the benefit of evidence and cross-examination.
24. The Claimant also relied on the decision in Ngure v Kenya Rural Roads Authority (Cause E072 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 500 (KLR) (20 February 2025) (Ruling) where the Court in declining a Notice of Preliminary Objection held that, to determine whether or not the Claimant's claim falls under the category of "continuous injury claims" will require taking evidence from the parties and interrogation of facts. The question cannot be disposed of through the preliminary objection as the court has to hear the parties and consider evidence to determine when exactly the cause of action arose and whether or not the suit is time-barred.
25. The Claimant further submitted that the correspondence and amended computation letters filed before Court constitute evidence of continuing dispute over the Claimant's terminal dues, thereby rendering the objection unsuitable for determination as a pure point of law.
26. In conclusion, the Claimant submitted that striking out a litigant from the seat of justice without affording her an opportunity to fully ventilate her claim would offend the principles of substantive justice under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The Claimant prays that the Respondent's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 28th October 2025 be dismissed with costs and the matter be set down for hearing on merits.
Analysis
27. Having considered the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the Memorandum of Claim, the rival Affidavits and written submissions, the main issue for determination is whether the suit is statute barred and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.
28. The Respondent contends that the Claimant's suit is statute barred as it offends the express provisions of Section 89 of the Employment Act, having been brought four (4) years after 14th September 2021, when terminal dues allegedly became due. However, the Claimant contends that her suit is founded on a continuing injury within the meaning of Section 89 of the Employment Act, and the question of continuing injury requires evidentiary interrogation to determine.
29. Section 89 of the Employment Act, Cap 226, provides as follows: -
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap. 22), no civil action or proceedings based or arising out of this Act or a contract of service in general shall lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three years next after the act, neglect or default complained or in the case of continuing injury or damage within twelve months next after the cessation thereof."
30. The law on preliminary objections is well established. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, Law J.A in the same judgment stated that:-
“…a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation or a submission that the parties are bound by contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”
31. In the same case, Sir Charles Newbold P stated that:
“A preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all facts by the other party are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion…”
32. Guided by the foregoing authority, it is clear that the respondent is objecting to the suit on a point of law, that is, limitation period under section 89 of the Employment Act. The question that begs for answer is whether the objection can be established without adduction of evidence.
33. The claimant pleaded in paragraph 17 of her Memorandum of Claim that she resigned from employment on 23rd April 2022 and the respondent computed her terminal dues on 26th April 2022 but she found the same to be erroneous. It is now settled that a claim for terminal benefits does not constitute a continuing injury. The cause action accrues immediately upon termination of the contract of employment. I gather support from the case of G4S Security Services (K) Limited v Joseph Kamau & 468 Others [2018] KECA 827 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held that:
“In the circumstances of this case we find that such ‘unpaid terminal dues’ do not constitute a continuing injury as contemplated under the proviso to section 90 of the Employment Act.”
34. In the circumstances of the instant case, the claimant’s cause of action having accrued on 23rd April 2022, she ought to have filed the suit on or before 23rd April 2025. Since she did not, the cause of action became stale from 23rd April 2025.
35. The claimant argued that the respondent computed the terminal dues payable vide second letter dated 7th June 2024 and thereby breathed new life to the stale claim. She pleaded in paragraph 20 and 21 of her Memorandum of Claim that:
“20. The Claimant made repeated requests for clarification and correction but she received yet another erroneous revised calculation of terminal dues vide an amended letter dated 7th June 2024.
21. The Respondent further affirmed the claimant’s position as a Cahier vide the amended letter above by including the acting allowance for 17 months amounting to Kenya Shillings 168,776 as part of the terminal dues.”
36. However, the acknowledgment of the debt by the respondent on 7th June 2024 did not extend the cause of action beyond the limitation period for another three years. The claimant still had almost ten months to institute suit before the limitation period lapsed but she squandered the opportunity.
37. In the case of Divecon v Samani (1995-1998) 1 EA P.48 the Court of Appeal held that: -
“…to us, the meaning of section 4(1) is clear beyond doubt. It means that no one shall have the right or power to bring, after the end of six years from the date on which a cause of action arose, an action founded on contract. The corollary to this is that no court may or shall have the right or power to entertain what cannot be done, namely, an action that is brought in contract six years after the cause of action arose or any application to extend such time for bringing of the action. A perusal of Part III shows that its provisions do not apply to actions based on contract.”
38. More recently, the Court of Appeal in Beatrice Kahai Adagala v Postal Corporation of Kenya Civil Appeal (Application) 28 of 2014) [2015] KECA 257 (KLR) held that:
“Much as we sympathize with the appellant if that is true, we cannot help her as the law ties our hands. Section 90 of the Employment Act 2007 which we have quoted verbatim herein above, is in mandatory terms. A claim based on a contract of employment must be filed within 3 years. As this Court stated in the case of Divecon Limited v Samani [1995-1998] 1 EA 48, a decision relied upon by Radido J in Josephat Ndirangu v Henkel Chemicals (EA) Limited [2013] eKLR, limitation period is never extended in matters based on contract. The period can only be extended in claims founded on tort and only when the applicant satisfies the requirements of section 27 and 28 of the Limitation of Actions Act.”
39. The above decisions are binding on me and are clear that any claim founded on a contract must be filed within the limitation period given by a statute. It is also clear that once the limitation period expires, it cannot be extended and the claim becomes stale. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the suit herein is statute barred and I strike it out but award no costs since the respondent failed to pay terminal dues to the claimant.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
ONESMUS MAKAU
JUDGE
Appearance:
Nyoike for Claimant
No appearance for Respondent