Employment law

Masila v Athi Water Works Development Agency & another [2026] KEELRC 14689 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Cause E576 of 2020
Judgment date
19 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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Background

The court do make a declaration that the termination of the Claimant was unlawful, wrongful, unfair and/or in breach of the contract and therefore, do issue an order for general damages in respect thereof equivalent to the Claimant’s 12 month’s salary or as it may deem fit.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC CAUSE NO. E576 OF 2020

(Before D. K. N. Marete.)

BETWEEN

SAMSON NYAMAI MASILA ……………………………………….……… CLAIMANT

VERSUS

ATHI WATER WORKS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY …………… 1ST RESPONDENT

EMILY MUTHIO M. KYALO ……………………………………… 2ND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Statement of Claim dated 23rd September, 2020. It does not disclose any issues in dispute on its face.

The 1st Respondent in a reply to Statement of Claim dated 16th August, 2021 denies the claim and prays that it be dismissed with costs. This is equally the prayer for the 2nd Respondent in their Response to Statement of Claim dated 21st May, 2021.

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The Claimant’s case is that he is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya who, following a public advertisement and a negotiation meeting on 17th November, 2016 was engaged by the 1st Respondent, then Athi Water Services Board, to provide legal services on land acquisition, wayleaves and succession matters affecting its projects. He reported to work on 1st December, 2016 ahead of the formal Contract for Consultant’s Services dated 15th January, 2017 at Kshs. 250,000.00 per month for one year, renewable subject to the remaining workload. He resigned his position as an Associate Advocate on the understanding that it would be renewed. He avers that he was required to work every day from the 1st Respondent’s offices under the supervision of the 2nd Respondent, that he performed diligently, and that his work was frustrated by the Respondents’ failure to avail reports, transport, a surveyor and filing fees and by the withholding of his monthly payments for months on end.

The Claimant further case is that the 2nd Respondent subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, night calls and requests for night meetings and that his refusal led to dress-downs, abuse and threats of termination. He relies on text messages, including one of 6th December, 2016 in which she wrote, I think I have been harassing you for some time which has not been for both. A cease and desist notice issued by his advocates on 20th April, 2017 was, he says, met with renewed hostility and upon her return from leave she procured his termination by a letter dated 15th August 2017, confirmed on 26th September, 2017 without notice of default or a hearing, contrary to Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007.

In his submissions, the Claimant urges that the relationship, taken in its totality, was a contract of service; that the law does not permit a hybrid contract; and that an employer who drafts a contract one way and conducts itself another is estopped from relying on the text, any ambiguity being resolved in favour of the weaker party. He relies on the control, integration and economic reality tests and on comparative decisions, including Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41 and Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, for the proposition that the written terms do not conclude the question of status. He points to the negotiation minutes describing the 1st Respondent as the Employer, his office, laptop, email address and transport, the assignment to him of departmental work outside his contract, and the emails of 25th and 26th April, 2017 and 10th May, 2017 requiring him to account for his whereabouts and describing him as a sit-in consultant. On termination, he submits that the minutes of 10th July, 2017 relied on by the Respondents are fabricated, there being two sets of minutes of the same committee on the same day reaching different resolutions.

He prays as follows;

1. The court do make a declaration that the termination of the Claimant was unlawful, wrongful, unfair and/or in breach of the contract and therefore, do issue an order for general damages in respect thereof equivalent to the Claimant’s 12 month’s salary or as it may deem fit.

2. A declaration that the failure by the 1st Respondent to institute, maintain, issue or avail to the Claimant a policy statement on sexual harassment or incorporate the same in the contract of service is a gross violation of Section 6 of the Employment Act, 2007.

3. General damages for sexual harassment.

4. Unpaid salaries for 3 months worked (December, 2016, July and August 2017)

5. One months salary in lieu of notice.

6. Leave days accrued and unpaid.

7. Certificate of service.

8. Cost of this suit.

9. Interest on damages and costs at prevailing commercial rates until payment in full.

The 1st Respondent’s case is that the Claimant was engaged under Contract No. AWSB/WASSIP-AF/Comp.1/CS-13/2016, which made it explicit that he was a consultant. Further, the Kshs. 250,000.00 was a monthly portion of the contract price paid subject to withholding tax and not a salary and that the 2nd Respondent co-ordinated the contract and accepted deliverables without supervising him. Its witness, Martha Wanjiku, states that the Claimant failed to meet his monthly targets, that the Land Acquisition Committee on 10th July, 2017 recommended termination and that the contract was terminated by a seven-day notice under clause 14.1(c). The 1st Respondent pleads the arbitration clause at clause 19 and submits that, there being no employment relationship, this court lacks jurisdiction to preside on or determine the issues in dispute.

The 2nd Respondent’s case is that the Claimant voluntarily executed a contract for consultant’s services and that this court lacks jurisdiction over the claim against her. She denies the allegations of sexual harassment and avers that it was the Claimant who made unsolicited advances towards her. The Claimant’s contract was terminated for poor performance and insubordination and not for any other reasons. Their witness, Faith Norah Lukosi, states that the Claimant was frequently absent, that Project Affected Persons complained that he solicited money from them and that he admitted at a departmental meeting to having called the 2nd Respondent at about 100 hours in the early morning. She further relies on a letter from the Law Society of Kenya dated 4th August, 2025 confirming that between 2015 and 2017 the Claimant declared himself an associate at the firm of Nyachae and Ashitiva Advocates and submits that the text messages of 2nd March, 2017 show the Claimant complaining that she had been indifferent towards him.

This matter has a chequered history. Its hearing commenced on 16th June, 2025 and proceeded in camera. On 29th April, 2026 in the course of cross-examination of the 2nd Respondent, the Claimant was found to be recording the proceedings without the leave of court. By a ruling delivered on 26th May, 2026 the court found him in contempt, pardoned the contempt, expunged his oral testimony and directed that the claim be disposed of by way of written submissions. These were duly filed by the parties. The Claimant’s applications for recusal dated 30th September, 2025 and 22nd May, 2026 were heard and determined by this court, the latter as late as today. These were all dismissed in separated rulings of court.

The issues for determination therefore are;

1. Whether the Claimant was an employee of the 1st Respondent and, consequently, whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

2. Whether the termination of the Claimant was wrongful, unfair and unlawful.

3. Whether the Claimant was sexually harassed within the meaning of Section 6 of the Employment Act, 2007.

4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

5. Who bears the costs of the claim.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the Claimant was an employee of the 1st Respondent. The jurisdiction of this court under Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act is founded on employment and labour relations. A claim for unfair termination under Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 and a claim for sexual harassment under Section 6, each presuppose an employment relationship. The question of status therefore goes to the root of the court’s jurisdiction and must be answered first. As the Court of Appeal held in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR), jurisdiction is everything and a court that holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction must down its tools.

The objection founded on clause 19 of the contract does not hold. The clause obliges the parties to attempt an amicable settlement and then provides that “in the event that the parties submit to arbitration” an arbitrator shall be appointed. It is permissive and does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts. In any event, neither Respondent sought a stay of these proceedings under Section 6 of the Arbitration Act, Chapter 95, Laws of Kenya. They filed their pleadings and took part in the prosecution of the matter. The 2nd Respondent is, moreover, not a party to the contract. Equally, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the conduct of the parties, so that the Claimant’s plea of estoppel cannot supply a jurisdiction which the law does not award.

The burden of proving that he was an employee lies on the Claimant. Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80, Laws of Kenya place the burden of proving a fact on the party who asserts it. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal affirmed in the authority of Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v Mwangi Stephen Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 642 KLR. With his oral testimony expunged, the Claimant must discharge that burden on the documents on record, most of which he did produce.

There is no dispute between the parties on the approach. The label the parties attach to their relationship is not conclusive and this court must weigh the relationship in its totality. This includes the written terms, the degree of control, the extent of integration, the economic reality of the arrangement and the conduct of the parties. No one single factor is decisive on this.

Let us open this issue on the written terms of the engagement. The contract is titled, Contract for Consultant’s Services and describes the Claimant as an Individual Consultant whose registered office is in Nairobi. The 1st Respondent is the client. The Claimant is paid Kshs. 250,000.00 per month inclusive of withholding tax, upon invoices submitted monthly, against monthly reports or other agreed deliverables. Reimbursable expenses are payable on receipts. He is required to maintain adequate insurance and to indemnify the client against his negligent performance. Further he may not assign or sub-contract without the client’s consent. Again, he is disqualified from providing other services related to the assignment. Additionally, the contract may be terminated by either side on seven days notice.

The Terms of Reference under which the Claimant bid are to the same effect. They record that the 1st Respondent sought “the services of an individual consultant” to be selected under the World Bank’s Guidelines for Selection and Employment of Consultants by the method of Individual Consultant (IC). They required the consultant to have the “ability to mobilize human resource” to obtain results within the given duration, and to “submit invoices to AWSB for payments on monthly basis”. They also provided that the consultant would be stationed at the 1st Respondent’s offices for ease of monitoring of the deliverables.

This context answers the Claimant’s reliance on the use of the word Employer in the negotiation minutes. The minutes were recorded within a procurement process for an individual consultant, in which the procuring entity is conventionally referred to as the employer. The same minutes record that the Claimant would be paid inclusive of withholding tax, that he would submit invoices to AWSB for payments on monthly basis and that payment would be made against monthly reports and other deliverables, and that he was to provide his PIN certificate. Read as a whole, the minutes describe a consultancy. The use of one word or term does not convert the relationship into something its substance does not support or purport.

For the same reason, the fact that the Claimant began work in December, 2016 under the negotiation minutes, before the formal contract was signed, does not assist him. Clause 4 of the contract itself provides that the consultant was expected to commence the services in December, 2016. The minutes on which he worked until signature were on the same consultancy terms, and the emails of February and March, 2017 show that the formal contract was delayed because the work plan, which was to form part of it, awaited project reports. There was no different relationship in the first five months.

On the issue of control, the emails of 25th and 26th April, 2017 as well as that of 10th May, 2017 show the 1st Respondent’s Legal Officer asserting a measure of supervision over the Claimant, requiring him to account for his absences and his use of the 1st Respondent’s vehicles, and describing him as a sit-in consultant. It is accepted that the Claimant was asked to give opinions on matters outside the scope of his contract. These factors weigh in the Claimant’s favour. But, as the Claimant himself submits, the control test is of limited value in the case of highly skilled professionals and the control asserted here was directed at the Claimant’s presence on site, his use of the 1st Respondent’s transport and the delivery of the outputs under his work plan. It was not control over how, as an advocate, he drew a petition or advised on a title.

Of particular weight is what the Claimant himself said at the time. Replying on 26th April, 2017 to the email of 25th April, 2017 he wrote: My understanding and construction of the consultancy contract, which if wrong can be corrected, is that supervision arises in the context of delivery and performance of my assignments so as to ensure compliance with the contract and not necessarily control over and on my day to day run of activities. Six days earlier, his advocates’ cease and desist notice of 20th April, 2017 described him as “a consultant with AWSB” and complained of challenges beyond the scope of his contract as an independent contractor, threatening recourse provided for under his contract. These are the Claimant’s own contemporaneous characterisations, made before any dispute about termination arose, and they accord with the written terms.

On integration, the Claimant had office space, a laptop issued against an asset form, an email address in the 1st Respondent’s domain, access to its transport pool and the use of its stationery. These are the facilities that the Terms of Reference and the negotiation minutes expressly undertook to provide to a consultant stationed on site for the monitoring of his deliverables. The Information Systems Policy he signed applies, on its face, to all who use or access AWSB information and computer systems, and not to staff alone. There is no evidence that he was on the 1st Respondent’s payroll or was assigned a staff number or position in its establishment. Besides, he was not appraised under its staff performance system nor was entitled to its leave, medical or pension benefits all associated with an employment relationship.

On the economic reality of the arrangement, the Claimant was paid a professional fee subject to withholding tax, upon invoices. His submission that no invoices were raised is contradicted by the minutes of the Land Committee of 10th July, 2017 chaired by Julius Serei, which he relies on as genuine and which record that the consultant has not been paid invoice number 3, 4 and 5. No PAYE, NSSF or NHIF deductions were made. The engagement was for a fixed term of one year, renewable only subject to performance and the remaining workload and terminable at the Client’s discretion on seven days’ notice. The Claimant’s own pleading measures the adequacy of his remuneration against the laws governing remuneration of Advocates which is the language of a professional fee, not a wage.

The Claimant’s practice as an advocate did not cease. In his email of 26th April, 2017 he explained that he was pursuing his practising certificate because he would be appearing in court on the succession matters. This court has considered the letter from the Law Society of Kenya relied on by the 2nd Respondent. It must, however, be read with the Claimant’s email of 21st February, 2017 to his former firm, which records that his employment there had been determined. The letter by the Law Society’s takes little weight. That the Claimant left a law firm to take up the consultancy does not, of itself, make the consultancy an employment.

The Claimant concedes that his earlier engagement of 8th February, 2016 on a similar assignment was a contract for services. His submission is that the present contract was structured differently in order to reduce its cost across fifteen projects. That submission demonstrates a change in the pricing of the engagement, from a fee per matter to a monthly fee for a defined period, and not a change in his status. The fact that a consultant is paid a fixed monthly fee rather than a fee per item of work does not make him an employee.

In the authority of Vitalis Oliewo K’Omudho v AAR Health Services Ltd [2016] KEELRC 526 (KLR), this court considered a claimant engaged under a written consultancy agreement, paid without statutory deductions other than withholding tax, and without the ordinary incidents of employment such as leave and medical cover. The court found that he was not an employee and that his suit could not be sustained before it. The present case bears the same essential features.

The arguments on hybrid contracts is also not persuasive. Estoppel and contra proferentem are also not persuasive. The principle in the comparative decisions cited by the Claimant, that a court must look at the reality of the relationship and is not bound by labels that do not reflect it. Those decisions concerned workers presented with standard terms that misdescribed the true arrangement. Here the written terms, the Terms of Reference and the negotiation minutes are consistent with one another and with the Claimant’s own contemporaneous account of the relationship. There is no ambiguity in the contract to attract the contra proferentem rule. The negotiation minutes show an advocate who negotiated his terms and raised his own concerns about timelines, not a vulnerable worker presented with a form he could not question. As the Court of Appeal held in National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & another [2002] 2 EA 503, a court cannot rewrite a contract between the parties unless the elements of coercion, fraud or undue influence are pleaded and proved. This is not the case in our circumstances.

Taking all these factors aboard, this court, finds that the Claimant was engaged by the 1st Respondent under a contract for services as an individual consultant and that he was not its employee within the meaning of Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007. In the absence of an employment relationship inter partes, it follows that this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain his claim, and must down its tools.

The 2nd issue for determination is whether the termination was unlawful and unfair. Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 come in to protect employees. The Claimant, not being an employee, is not covered by these provisions of law. His complaints that the contract was terminated without notice of default, that the minutes of 10th July, 2017 were fabricated, and that the reasons given for the termination are inconsistent all go to whether the 1st Respondent properly exercised its rights under clause 14 of the contract. That is a question of contract, which is not for this court to determine. This court declined to make any findings on it.

The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Claimant was sexually harassed within the meaning of Section 6 of the Employment Act, 2007. Section 6(1) defines sexual harassment by reference to conduct towards an employee by the employer of that employee or a representative of that employer or a co-worker. Section 6(2) requires an employer of twenty or more employees to issue a policy statement on sexual harassment after consulting its employees. Both subsections are concerned with persons in an employment relationship. The Claimant not being an employee, neither his claim for damages nor the declaration he seeks under Section 6 can be sustained before this court.

This court wishes to clarity that the court has made no findings on the parties’ competing allegations of sexual misconduct. Those allegations were never tested in evidence, the Claimant’s oral testimony having been expunged and the Respondents’ witnesses never having been called. Nothing in this judgment is to be read as a finding for or against either the Claimant or the 2nd Respondent on those allegations. In the absence of an employment relationship for the Claimant as against the 1st Respondent, this court’s hands are tied. It must down its tools for want of jurisdiction which it hereby does.

The 4th issue for determination is the appropriate relief. The declarations sought under Sections 6 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 the damages for unfair termination and for sexual harassment, the notice pay, the accrued leave and the certificate of service are all remedies available to employees. The Claimant is not such employee. He becomes disentitled to these. They would not be available to the Claimant in the circumstances. The claim for unpaid sums for December, 2016 and July and August, 2017 arises, if at all, under the consultancy contract and fall outside the jurisdiction of this court.

As to costs, this was a convoluted matter where the Claimant engaged the court in melodrama of all kinds including numerous unwarranted applications for recusal of the trial court which ultimately fell by the way side. The incident of 29th April, 2026 where the Claimant was involved in unauthorized and clandestine recording of the court proceedings leading to proceedings for contempt of court is all telling. The Claimant must therefore bear the costs of this cause.

I am therefore inclined to strike out the claim and order as follows:

i) A declared be and is hereby issued that the Claimant was engaged by the 1st Respondent under a contract for services.

ii) The Claimant was not an employee of the 1st Respondent, or at all.

iii) On the premises of (i) and (ii) above, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

iv) The Statement of Claim dated 23rd September, 2020 be and is hereby struck out.

v) The costs of the claim shall be borne by the Claimant.

Delivered, dated and signed this 19th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mr. Masila, the Claimant in person.

2. Mr. Kioko instructed by the State Law Office for the 1st Respondent.

3. Mr. Nyamu and Ms. Mwinzi instructed by Keli Mwinzi Advocates for the 2nd Respondent.

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