Employment law

Lumiti v Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company Ltd [2026] KEELRC 14747 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Petition E134 of 2026
Judgment date
19 October 2026
Judge(s)
Dr. Jacob Gakeri

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REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

PETITION NO. E134 OF 2026

(Before Hon. Justice Dr. Jacob Gakeri)

OSCAR ISUTSA LUMITI……………………………..…...…. PETITIONER

-VERSUS-

NAIROBI WATER AND SEWERAGE COMPANY LTD….. RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

The Petitioner commenced the instant suit on 16th March 2026 vide Petition of even date seeking various orders including declarations, reinstatement, damages for loss of future earning capacity, accrued benefits, pension or gratuity, costs of the petition and certificate of service among other remedies.

The Petitioner averred that he was employed by the Respondent on 3rd March 2010 as an Artisan and served diligently for 13 years. He averred that on 29th November 2023, he received a notice to show cause issued pursuant to a Public Service Commission (PSC) Circular Ref: PSC/ADM/13 dated 9th October 2022 which directed public institutions to audit academic and professional certificates of employees. The notice to show cause indicated that the Kenya National Examinations Council (KNEC)had verified the petitioner’s KSCE certificate and confirmed that;

(a) He did not sit for the KCSE examination in 2001 at Kimilili Secondary School under number 603108/017; and

(b) An examination centre known as Kimilili Secondary School under Centre Code, 603108/017 did not exist in 2001.

That the foregoing constituted gross misconduct as it violated the Human Resource Policies and Procedure Manual and required the petitioner to show cause why disciplinary action, including summary dismissal could not be taken against him.

The Petitioner averred that he denied the allegation of the alleged forgery and clarified that his KCSE certificate was serial number 947142 having sat the KCSE Examination at Kimilili Boys Secondary School under Index number 602610/117 and attained a mean grade of B minus (B-) and denied having presented the fraudulent certificate to the Respondent.

That he was suspended on 18th December 2023, notwithstanding his resignation dated 20th December 2023, which the respondent rejected was invited for a hearing and attended with a union representative who made representations, and was summarily dismissed vide letter dated 4th March 2024, appealed the decision but the dismissal was affirmed.

The petitioner faulted the dismissal on the grounds of failure to conduct impartial investigations, relying on KNEC report, denial of access to information, constructive, dismissal, disregarding, union representations and summary dismissal without valid and fair reason.

The petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Articles 27, 28, 41, 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya and prayed for declaration that:

(i) his constitutional rights were violated.

(ii) the summary dismissal was unconstitutional, unlawful unfair and void

(iii) he was constructively dismissed.

Respondent’s case

By a Replying Affidavit sworn by Lucas Gor, in opposition to the petition Mr. Gor deponed that the petitioner’s employment was dependent upon possession of the KCSE certificate and the petitioner submitted the impugned certificate serial number 1962246, Index Number 603108/017 to the Respondent’s Human Resource Office.

That the KNEC established that the petitioner neither registered nor sat the KCSE examination at Kimilili Secondary School under Index Number 603108/017 and its database had no such centre in 2001.

According to the affiant, the petitioners personnel Record Form dated 25th October 2021 indicated that he sat the KCSE at Kimilili Secondary School in 2001 and attained a mean grade of B- while the petition indicated that he sat the KCSE at Kimilili Secondary School under Index Number 602610/117 and attained a mean grade of B- and was issued with a KNEC certificate serial number 947142. That entry 14 of the Supporting Affidavit showed that the KNEC Certificate Index No. 602601/117 was issued in 1995.

According to the respondent, the petitioner was guilty of gross misconduct and was in breach of its Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual and thus liable for summary dismissal;

That he had not complained of any intimidation or harassment, was invited for a hearing, attended, was heard but his request for access his personal file was not honoured as he had the document in his possession. According to the respondent the petitioner was accorded a fair hearing and the dismissal was fair.

In his Further Affidavit sworn on 31st July 2026, the petitioner deponed that the respondent had not shown when he submitted the impugned KNEC certificate and was unaware of it but the employer was at liberty the submit the same to KNEC for verification. The petitioner denied having represented that he sat the KNEC in the year 2001 as he sat the KNEC examination in 1995 and the annexture of the impugned KNEC certificate to his personnel form was not an admission that he sat the examination in 2001 and was not charged for any offence.

The petitioner deponed that the respondent had not demonstrated the provision of the manual violated and had failed to prove that it had a valid and fair reason to terminate the petitioner’s employment and the same was unfair.

The petitioner admitted having been accorded sufficient time to respond to the notice to show cause and prepare for the hearing but the respondent refused to avail documents in his personal file.

Petitioner’s submissions

As to whether the respondent had established a valid and fair reason for terminating the petitioner’s employment, reliance was placed on the sentiments of the Court of Appeal in Kenya Revenues Authority v Reuwell Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others (2019) KECA 300 (KLR) on the burden of proof, to urge that the respondent had by producing the impugned certificate not discharged the burden of proof.

Reliance was further placed on Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission (2013) eKLR, on the need to establish a substantive justification for the termination of employment and procedural fairness,s to submit that the petitioner denied having submitted the impugned certificate and that he produced the genuine certificate Counsel submitted that the genuine belief under section 43 (2) of the Employment Act requires a rational basis and the respondent had not demonstrated who received the certificate, who submitted it and acknowledgement Counsel submitted that no inquiry was demonstrated.

Reliance was placed on the decision in Mugambi v Kenya Revenue Authority (2026) KEELRC 503 (KLR).

On the procedure used by the respondent, counsel submitted that it was unfair citing the decision in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui (2019) KECA 489 (KLR) to urge that the petitioner was not accorded a meaningful opportunity to defend himself as relevant material was withheld and the union representative raised the concerns.

Counsel further submitted that the respondent failed the test under section 45(2)(c) of the Employment Act.

Reliance was also placed on the decisions in Kibusion v Board of Management, Kimng’orom Girls High School (2023) KEELRC 2586 (KLR) and Kimeu v Paramount Bank Ltd (2025) KEELRC 2336 (KLR).

Counsel submitted that the petitioner’s constitutional claim was properly before the court and met the test in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (1979) KLR 154.

Counsel conceded that the petitioner was not constructively dismissed by the respondent but was terminated from employment unlawfully. Finally, counsel submitted that the petitioner was seeking reinstatement after having served the respondent for over 13 years or award of maximum compensation.

Respondent’s Submissions

As to whether the petitioner was unfairly terminated from employment, counsel cited the provisions of section 45(2) (a) of the Employment Act and section 47 (5) to submit that on the petitioners burden of proof that the termination of employment was unfair or wrongful citing the decision in Isindu v Lavington Security Guards Ltd (2017) KECA 225 (KLR) counsel urgent that the petitioner submitted two (2) KSSE certificates submitted at different times to submits that the termination of employment was justified.

Reliance was placed on Section 116 of the Evidence Act on the burden of proof of disproving ownership. Counsel submitted that the respondent’s investigation was limited to the KNEC’s response and further investigations rested on the EACC the DCI or the ODPP.

Reliance was further placed on Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission (2013) KEELRC 386 (KLR) and Mugambi v Kenya Revenue Authority (2026) KEELRC 503 (KLR) to urge that the latter was distinguishable.

On procedural fairness, reliance was placed on the provisions of section 45(2) (c) and 41 of the Employment Act as was the decision in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui (2019) KECA 489 (KLR) to urge that the provisions of the Employment Act were complied with as the petitioner was heard and was afforded an opportunity to appeal. Counsel urged the court to disregard the decision in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui (Supra).

As to whether the respondent violated the petitioner’s right to fair labour practices, counsel relied on the sentiments of the court in George Onyango Akufi v G4S Security Services (Kenya) Ltd (2013) eKLR, National Entitled Workers Union v COMA (2003) 24 IL 2335 (LC) (South Africas Labour Court) to urge the court to consider the peculiar circumstance of the case.

Counsel submitted that the decision in Kibussion v Board of Management Kimng’orem Girls High School (Supra) was distinguishable. As to whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed reliance was placed o the decision in Coca Cola East & Central Africa v Maria Kagai Ligaga (Supra) on the requirements of constructive dismissal to urge that the prayer ought to be dismissed. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the petition with costs.

It is common ground that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent vide a written contract dated 3rd March 2010 and served until 4th March 2024 when his employment was terminated for alleged forgery. The petitioner faults the summary dismissal both substantively and procedurally.

The issues for determination are:

(i) whether termination of the petitioner’s employment by the respondent was unlawful and unfair

(ii) (ii) whether the petitioner’s resignation constituted a constructive dismissal.

(iii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for.

Concerning the first issue, it is trite law that for a termination of employment to pass muster, it must be proved that the employer had a valid and fair reason relating to the employee’s conduct, capacity or compatibility or operational requirements of the employer and the termination of employment was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. In other words, there must have been a substantive justification for the termination of the employee’s employment and procedural fairness, as held in Naima Khamis v Oxford University Press EA Ltd (2017) eKLR.

See also Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission (2013) eKLR where Ndolo J (as she then was) stated

“…However, for a termination to pass the fairness test it must be shown that there was not only substantive justification for the termination but also procedural fairness.”

These authorities demonstrate that a termination of employment may be substantively and procedurally unfair or either substantively or procedurally unfair in the context of the provisions of Section 41, 43, 44, 45, and 47 (5) of the Employment Act.

In the instance case, while the respondent averred and submitted that it had a justification to terminate the petitioner’s employment, the petitioner contended that the respondent did not undertake any investigation of its own, relied on disputed findings of the KNEC and thus had no valid and fair reason to terminate the petitioner’s employment.

The notice to show cause accused the petitioner of having committed the offence of forgery in violation of clause 8.23.2(Viii) of the Respondent’s Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual, by submitting a KCSE certificate allegedly for an examination he did not register for and the examination centre did not exist in 2001. The letter of summary dismissal dated 4th March 2024 cited the same reason.

Section 44 (4) of the Employment Act provides that;

(g) an employee commits, or on reasonable and sufficient grounds is suspected of having committed a criminal offence against or to be substantial detriment of his employer or his employer’s property.

It is common ground that vide letter Ref. PSC/ADM/13 dated 19th October 2022, the PSC required all public bodies under its jurisdiction to audit academic and professional certificates of employees and the respondent submitted 2211 copies of academic certificates and result slip of its employees to the KNEC vide letters dated 8th May 2023 and 31st May 2023 and the KNEC vide letter dated 30th October 2023 reported that out of the 2211 certificates and result slips, 76 were not genuine.

In the case of the petitioner, the Chief Executive Officer of the KNEC, Dr. David Njengere stated “37.1 A Candidate by the name Lumiti Oscar did not register nor sit for the year 2001 KCSE examination at Kimilili Secondary School under index No. 603108?017.

37.2 An examination centre by the name Kimili Secondary School under Code 603108 did not exist during the year 2001 KCSE examination.”

According to KNEC, the KCSE certificate by the name Lumiti Oscar No. 603108/017 Kimilili Secondary School, November/December 2001 examination was a forged document. Documentary evidence produced by the respondent reveal that on 25th October 2021, the petitioner wrote to the Human Resource Department of the Respondent updating his personnel records.

In his Personnel Record Form, the Petitioner indicated by hand that his O-level qualification of B- was attained at Kimilili Boys High School.

In his response to the notice to show cause, the petitioner stated that he had on several occasions presented academic certificates on demand at the regional level to prove his qualifications. However, he did not indicate that he submitted copies when he was employed or when he was called upon to prove his qualifications and by whom.

That he had presented certified copies of KNEC Certificate No. 947 142 having sat the KCSE examination at Kimilili Boys Secondary school and attained a mean grade of B- minus. He disowned certificate No. 1962246.

During the disciplinary hearing, the petitioners stated that when he was offered employment by the Respondent, he was requested to avail copies of certificates, and submitted the same.

The crux of the matter is how the respondent obtained the KNEC Certificate No. 1962246 in the name of Lumiti Oscar for the examination sat in 2001 as opposed to KNEC Certificate No. 947142 for the 1995 examination, which the petitioner states was his certificate. The two certificates are remarkably different to the naked eye, in relating to the font used, name of the school, name of the candidate, spacing of the sentences and watermark. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention and averment that the respondent had failed to prove that he submitted Certificate No. 1962246, it was his duty to prove that he submitted Certificate No. 947142 to the respondent and when. This is because he who alleges must prove the allegations as ordained by the provisions of section 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act.

Section 107 provides;

(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.

(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

Section 109 provides;

The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.

See Omulele & Tollo Advocates v Mount Holdings Ltd (2016) KECA 523 (KLR) and Ansazi Gambo Tinga & another v Nicholas Patrice Tabunde (2019) KECA 803 (KLR). In the latter case, the Court of Appeal stated:

“…Under Section 107-109 of the Evidence Act the burden is always upon a party who alleges a fact to prove it,”

While the respondent was in possession of Certificate No. 1962246, which the KNEC had found not genuine, the petitioner provided no evidence to demonstrate that he submitted certificate No. 947142 when the respondent offered him employment in 2010 or at any other time when he was requested to demonstrate his qualifications as he alleged.

It is trite that academic and professional certificates are personal and the person to whom they are issued remains the custodian unless otherwise proved. The claimant neither alleged nor demonstrated that there were two our more persons in the respondent’s employ with similar names or that the certificate was not his.

Other than copies of letters issued to an employee at the instance of the employer such as employment contract, warning letters, promotion letters, recognition, transfer letters among others, all other documents in an employees file held by the employer comprises documents availed directly by the employee. Academic and professional certificates, result slips, school leaving certificates, certificate of recognition or honour are provided by the employee. The court is at a loss as to how the respondent could have been in possession of a certificate under the petitioner’s name if the petitioner had not submitted it to the respondent.

Having admitted that he forwarded his certificates to the respondent more than once, it is highly probable that he submitted Certificate Number 1962246 and the court so finds.

Under section 43 (2) of the Employment Act,

The reason or reasons for termination of a contract are the matter that the employer at the time of termination of the contract genuinely believed to exist and which caused the employer to terminate the services of the employee. This provision has been construed as follows.

In Kenya Revenue Authority v Gitahi & 2 others (2019) KECA 300 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held;

“The standard of proof is on a balance of probability not beyond reasonable doubt, and all the employer is required to prove are the reasons that it “genuinely believed to exist” causing it to terminate the employee’s services. This is a partly subjective test.”

Similarly, in Galgalo Jarso Jillo v Agricultural Finance Corporation (2021) eKLR, Agricultural Finance Corporation (2021) eKLR, B.O.M. Manani J expressed himself as follows:

“All that is required is for the employer to have a reasonable basis for genuinely believing that the grounds exist even if it later turns put that it in fact did not. In my view what the law is concerned with have is whether the circumstance surrounding the decision to terminate wouldjustify a reasonable man on the street, standing in the same position as the employer, to reach a similar decision as him/her regarding the termination.”

The courts in both cases cited the guidelines in Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edition Vol 16 (1B) para 642 on the range of reasonable responses test.

Applying to the foregoing provision of the Employment Act as construed by the Court of Appeal, and the preceding analysis of the circumstance of this case, the court is satisfied and finds that the respondent had a reasonable basis to genuinely believe that it had a substantive justification to terminate the petitioner’s employment in the manner it did. Contrary to the petitioner’s averment that the respondent did not conduct investigations, the finding of the issuer of the certificates that Certificate No.1962246 was not genuine was sufficient.

On procedural fairness of the termination of the petitioner’s employment, the claimant averred that his request for information was not responded to.

After receiving the invitation to appear before the corporate disciplinary committee on 31st January 2024 at 8.00 am, the Petitioner vide letter dated 24th January 2024 informed the respondent that he would present himself for the hearing and intended to refer to his personal file No. 01335 based at the Eastern Region as the primary reference and requested for supervised access to the file to enable him prepare his defence, and it be made available during the hearing. The petitioner’s request was rejected on the premises that he had the information contained in the file and it was not availed during the hearing.

In the general scheme of things, it is prudent for an employer to avail the information requested for by the employee for purposes of a disciplinary hearing to the extent practicable, even if it is at employee’s cost. It is not for the employer to determine the information the employee requires, its relevance or importance to his case. In this case, the material had the documents requested for. The respondent could have facilitated, supervised access or avail the file at the hearing as the petitioner pleaded.

It is trite law that availment to the employee of the evidence the employer proposes to use against the employee is an integral part of fair hearing.

Fair hearing is a board concept encompassing the right to fair trial and its salient elements are opportunity to be heard and the same must be reasonable.

See Evans Odhaimbo Kidero & 4 others v Ferdinard Ndung’u Waititu & 4 others (2014) eKLR, Muruatetu & another v Republic (2017) KESC 2 (KLR).

In Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui (Supra), the Court of Appeal stated;

“…The Board had in its possession the very documents that formed the basis of the charges framed against the respondent but kept it away from him. Even in criminal trial, which are more serious in nature, an accused is entitled to the statement’s that support the charges laid against him. This is the essence of fairness even outside a judicial setting. The respondent faced serious indictment’s which could torpedo his entire career and destroy his future…”

See also Ol Pejeta Ranching Co Ltd v David Wanjau Muhoro (2017) KECA 329 (KLR) and Regent Management Co Ltd v Oundo (2018) KECA 883 (KLR). Needless to belabour, failure to avail documents or materials relied upon by the employer in a disciplinary hearing to the employee impedes the employee’s right to fair hearing which rendered the petitioner’s termination of employment procedurally flawed and unfair.

Apart from the refusal to avail the personal employment file requested by the petitioner, the respondent complied with other procedural requirements by inter alia informing the petitioner his right to appeal the summary dismissal appealed and was invited for a hearing on 6th May 2024, which he attended in the company of a union representative was heard and a decision made which he received.

As to whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed, the court is in agreement with the petitioner’s counsel that he was not for the simple reason that the resignation vide letter dated 20th December 2023 was rejected by the respondent and it thereafter terminated the petitioner’s employment vide letter dated 3rd March 2024.

Relatedly, the resignation letter was in effectual as it did not accord the respondent the requisite one (1) month’s notice or pay one months salary in lieu of notice as by law required.

The concept of constructive dismissal was explained by Lord Denning MR in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp (1978) ICR 222 or (1978) QB 761 and domesticated in Kenya by the Court of Appeal in its decision in Coco cola East & Central Africa Ltd v Ligaga (2015) KECA 394 (KLR), where the court adopted the contractual approach test which requires that party alleging to have been constructively dismissed to demonstrate the the employers conduct constituted a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment

Nothing turns on this issue.

Reliefs

Having found that termination of the petitioner’s employment by the respondent was unfair, the petitioner is entitled to appropriate relief as follows;

Declaration that termination of employment was unlawful and unfair.

Secondly, the petitioner prayed for reinstatement without loss of benefits, seniority and continuity of service. It is trite law that reinstatement is a remedy provided for under section 12 (3) (vii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act read with section 49(3) of the Employment Act and its award is discretionary.

In Kenya Airways Ltd v Aviation and Allied workers union & 3 others (2014) KECA 404 (KLR), Maraga JA (as he then was) stated:

“The remedy of reinstatement is discretionary however; the Industrial Court is required to be guided by factors stipulated in Section 49 (4) of the Employment Act which includes the practicability of reinstatement or re-engagement and the common law principle that specific performance in a contract for employment should not be ordered except in very exceptional circumstances. The court should also balance the interest of the employee with the interest of the employer.”

The Supreme Court of Kenya expressed similar sentiment in Judicial Service Commission v LMN (2025) 53 (KLR), holding that reinstatement was not a viable remedy to grant except in “very special circumstance”

Needless to emphasize, the court’s discretion in awarding reinstatement or compensation is circumscribed by the parameters set out in section 49 (4) of the Employment Act, including, wishes of the employee, circumstances in which termination of employment took place including the extent if any, of the employee’s contribution, practicality of recommending reinstatement or re-engagement, employees length of service with the employer, the common law principle that there should be no order for specific performance in a contract for service except in very exceptional circumstances, opportunities available to the employee for securing comparable or suitable employment with another employer, value of any severance payable by law reasonable expectation of employee as to the length of time for which his employment with that employer might have continued but for the termination.

In Kenya Airways Ltd v Aviation and Allied Workers Union Kenya & others (Supra), Murgor JA addressed the issue of practicability of reinstatement as follows;

“…No evidence was tendered by the parties on the practicability or otherwise of such an Award. In New Zealand Educational Institute v Board of Trustee of Auckland Normal Intermediate School (1994) 2 ERNZ 414 (CA), the New Zealand Court of Appeal stated’

Whether…it would not be practicable to reinstate the (Employee) involves a balancing of the interests of the parties and the justices of their cases with regard not only to the future. It is no uncommon for this court or its predecessor having found a dismissal to have been unjustified to nevertheless conclude on the evidence that it would be inappropriate in the sense of being impracticable to reinstate the employment relationship. Practicability is capability of being caried out in action, feasibility or the potential for the re-imposition of the employment relationship to be done or carried out successfully. Practicability cannot be narrowly construed in the sense of being simply possible irrespective of consequences”

In the instant case, none of the parties provided evidence to demonstrate whether the position the petitioner existed or that reinstatement was the most appropriate remedy.

More significantly, the petitioner did not evidentially demonstrate that the circumstances of the case were very exceptional and warranted reinstatement or re-engagement.

Although the three (3) year period under section 12(3) (vii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act have not lapsed, the court is not persuaded that reinstatement is the most appropriate relief in the circumstances. The foregoing position is further reinforced by the fact that the court found that the respondent had a substantive justification to terminate the petitioner’s employment.

As regards compensation, having found that the summary dismissal was procedurally flawed, which rendered it unfair, the petitioner is eligible for compensation under the provisions of section 49 (1) (c) of the Employment Act, having regard to the provisions of section 49(4) of the Act. Considering that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent for about 13 years which is not too long, wished to continue in employment as exemplified by the exercise of the right of appeal and prayer for reinstatement but substantially contributed to the separation, the court is satisfied that the equivalent of 3 months salary is fair. Strangely, the petitioner neither attached a copy of his payslip nor indicate this salary and allowances as at the date of separation. The petitioner is entitled to a certificate of service by dint of section 51 of the Employment Act.

The upshot of the foregoing is that judgment is entered in favour of the petitioner against the respondent in the following terms.

(a) Declaration that termination of the petitioner’s employment by the respondent was unlawful and unfair

(b) Equivalent of three (3) month’s gross salary.

(c) Certificate of service.

(d) Costs of the suit at ½ scale.

For the avoidance of doubt all other reliefs prayed for are declined.

Orders accordingly.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 19TH OCTOBER, 2026.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

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