Background
The court’s constitutional jurisdiction was improperly invoked as the dispute fell for determination under the Employment Act.
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The court’s constitutional jurisdiction was improperly invoked as the dispute fell for determination under the Employment Act.
Paragraph 1 →Whether the Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 24 July 2026 was merited, including whether the Petitioner could pursue alleged constitutional violations in a petition where the pleaded grievance arose from redundancy and could be addressed…
Maryanne Wangui Muhoro filed a petition on 2 June 2026 against Eleven Degrees Consulting Limited, alleging violations of Articles 41 and 47 of the Constitution. She sought, among other remedies, compensation for unlawful termination, general and aggravated…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT NAIROBI
PETITION NO. E177 OF 2026
(Before Hon. Justice Dr. Jacob Gakeri)
MARYANNE WANGUI MUHORO................................. PETITIONER
VERSUS
ELEVEN DEGREES CONSULTING LIMITED…………...RESPONDENT
RULING
The Petitioner filed the instant petition on 2nd June 2026 seeking various reliefs and cites the provisions of Articles 41 and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya as allegedly violated by the Respondent. Among the reliefs sought is compensation, for unlawful termination of employment, general and aggravated damages and several declarations.
On 24th July 2026, the Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection of even dated contending that;
1. The court’s constitutional jurisdiction was improperly invoked as the dispute fell for determination under the Employment Act.
2. The facts pleaded and the alleged violations did not disclose infringement of rights or fundamental freedom under the Bill of rights.
3. The petition offends the doctrine of ripeness and constitutional avoidance.
4. The petition invoked the provisions of the Constitution for enforcement of contractual and statutory employment rights.
5. The Petition raises no genuine questions concerning interpretation of the Constitution. Vide Grounds of Objection dated 27th August 2026, the petitioner urged that the Notice of Preliminary Objection was vexations, incompetent null and void, the courts’ constitutional jurisdiction was properly invoked, did not offend the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and the Preliminary Objection was for dismissal.
Respondent’s submissions
As to whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection was merited, counsel submitted that a plain reading of the petition showed that its gravamen was redundancy and no issue of constitutionality of the provisions of the Employment Act had been raised.
Reliance was placed on the sentiments of the court in Faraj & 3 others v Police & 2 others 92022) KEHC 287 (KLR) on the doctrine of ripeness and constitutional avoidance, Sumayya Athman Hassan v Paul Masinde Simidi & another (2019) eKLR and Gabriel Mutava & 2 Others v Managing Director, Kenya Ports Authority & another (2016) eKLR, to urge that the petitioner ought to have instituted the suit in accordance with the operative legislative framework.
Finally, reliance was placed on the court’s rendition in Odoyo v Mozilla Foundation & 2 Others (2026) KEELRC 160 (KLR). Counsel urged the court to allow the Preliminary Objection and award costs.
Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the sentiments of the court in Prof. Dr. Moni Wekesa v Mt Kenya University (2018) KEELRC 2038 (KLR) to urge that the issues raised by the Respondent could suitably be raised by way of defence rather than by way of a Preliminary Objection to urge that the Respondents Notice of Preliminary Objection was unmerited and the court’s constitutional jurisdiction was properly invoked.
Counsel submitted that the doctrine of ripeness was concerned with whether the dispute had matured into a controversy capable of resolution by the court citing Sharma v Attorney general & 3 others (2025) KECA 1470 (KLR), as well as the decisions in Judicial Service Commission v Shollei & another cited in Muli v Kenya Water Institute & 2 others (2023) KEERLC 942 (KLR) as well as Public Service Commission & 4 Others v Cheruiyot & 2 others (2022) KECA 15 (KLR), to urge that that petitioner had raised a constitutional question arising from an employment dispute. Counsel submitted that the petition did offend the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Citing Wekesa v Mt. Kenya University (supra) and Oboya Bagaka v Kenya School of Governance (2021) KEELRC 2271 (KLR), for inter alia the proposition that the Employment Act had no provision for damages for constitutional jurisdiction, supplemented statutory reliefs and the petitioner had the right to claim constitutional remedies in the employment dispute citing Oboge vs Judicial Service Commission (2022), KEELRC 321 (KLR) and JWN V Securex Agencies (K) Ltd (2018) KEELRC 1908 (KLR) to urge that all conceivable relief were available under a single legal process.
The principles that govern preliminary objections are well settled, including that once a preliminary objection is raised by a party, it ought to disposed of at the earliest possible instance owing to its potential to terminate the case at that particular stage.
It is trite that the renditions of Law JA and Sir Charles Newbold P, in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd V West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696, constitute the Locus classicus exposition of what constitutes a preliminary objection, reproduced in many decisions of superior courts, including Attorney General & another V Githinji & another (2016) KECA 187 (KLR) were the court added as follows:-
“The test to be applied in determining whether the appellant’s preliminary objection met the threshold or not is what Sir Charles Newbold set out above in the Mukisa Case (Supra). That is first, that the Preliminary Objection raises a pure point of law, second, that there is demonstration that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct; and third, that there is no fact that needs to be ascertained.”
The only issue for determination is whether the Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection is merited.
The Respondent raises issues ranging from the legal regime applicable to the instant petition, alleged and pleaded violations, question s raised by the Petition and its competency. Also raised is the twin doctrine of constitutional avoidance and ripeness. In Southlake Panorama Ltd v Kenya Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd & 3 others (2026) KECA 1764 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated;
“A useful starting point in this determination is to underscore that constitutional avoidance has been defined a preference of deciding a case on any other basis other than the one which involves a constitutional issue being resolved. (See the High Court decision in Kajar Kishor Bhundia v Sawan Chimanlal Mandalia & others (2022) KEHC 7822 (KLR), Constitution Petition No. E 014 of 2020). As a principle, constitutional avoidance has been linked to the doctrine of justiciability. In board terms doctrine of justiciability. Governs the limitations on the constitutional arguments that the courts will entertain. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance was fortified by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in Sports and Recreation Commission Vs Sagitarrius Wrestling Club & another (2) ZLR 501(S) in which Ibrahim JA stated;
“Courts will not normally consider a constitutional question unless the existence of a remedy depends upon it; if a remedy is available to an applicant under some other legislative provisions or some other basis, whether legal or factual a court will usually decline to determine whether there has been in addition, a breach of the Declaration of rights.
In S V Mhlungu (1995) (3) SA 867 (cc) 59 the Constitutional Court of South Africa in a refined manner laid down constitutional avoidance as a general principle stating;
“…that where it is possible to decide any case, criminal or Civil without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.”. Decided cases are in agreement that the doctrince of constitutional avoidance is primarily viewed by courts from the position that although a court could take up a matter and hear it, it would still decline to do so through which the dispute could be resolved…”
It is also important for us to underscore that every legal dispute is capable of either direct or indirect application of the Bill of rights…. Where there are alternative remedies the preferred route is to apply such remedies before resorting to the constitution. The possibility of elevating any dispute to a constitutional issue is what is sought to be averted by the doctrines of ripeness and constitutional avoidance. It is borne out of a realization that all legislative or common law remedies are part of the legal system.
As authorities suggest the doctrine of constitutional avoidance dictates that courts should shun dealing with a constitutional issue where there exists another legal course which can give the litigant the relief he seeks. In other words, a constitutional issue is not ripe for determination until the determination of the constitutional issue is the only course that can given the litigant the remedy he seeks. There are exceptions to the application of the doctrine of Constitutional avoidance. These are;
(a) where the Constitutional violation is so clear and of direct reference to the matter.
(b) in the absence of an apparent alternative form of ordinary relief, and
(c) where it is found that it would be a waste of effort to seek a non-constitutional resolution of the dispute….”
In the forgoing decision, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court had properly invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and dismissed the petition. The court dismissed the appeal for want of merit.
From the facts deponded and pleaded by the petitioner, it is discernible that the petitioner’s grievance is a separation by way of redundancy, an ordinary termination of employment.
Guided by the Court of Appeal decision in Southlake Panorama Ltd V Kenya Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd (Supra), as well as the decisions in Faraj & 3 other V Police & 2 others, on constitutional avoidance, the court is satisfied and finds that the instant suit can be effectively and comprehensively litigated as a cause pursuant to the provisions of the Employment Act, which prescribes adequate reliefs for the grievance.
Relatedly, the court is in agreement with the sentiments of the court of Appeal in Gabriel Mutava & 2 others V Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority & another (Supra), Samayya Athman Hassan V Paul Masinde Simidi & another (Supra) and the Employment and Labour Relations Court (ELRC) decision in Odoyo V Mozilla Foundation & 2 others (Supra), that the operative statutory framework is sufficient to resolve the dispute effectively without invoking the Constitution of Kenya.
In the end it is discernible that the Respondents Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 24th July 2026 has merit and it is allowed.
Consequently, the petition dated 2nd June 2026 is hereby struck out with no orders as to costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 21ST OCTOBER, 2026.
DR. JACOB GAKERI
JUDGE
ORDER
In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.
DR. JACOB GAKERI
JUDGE