Employment law

Pariyo v Mcbuilders Limited & another [2026] KEELRC 14724 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Nairobi Elrc Petition E091 of 2022
Judgment date
22 October 2026
Judge(s)
Dr. Jacob Gakeri

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Background

The instant Application dated 6th June 2026 is premised on Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 9 Rule 9, Order 22 Rule 51(2) and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and seeks orders that:

Paragraph 1 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT

NAIROBI ELRC PETITION NO E091 OF 2022

(Before Hon. Justice Dr. Jacob Gakeri)

WILLIAM PARIYO ..……………………….………..….…… DECREE HOLDER

VERSUS

MCBUILDERS LIMITED …….…………………..….. JUDGEMENT DEBTOR

NACKY CREDIT LIMITED ………………….……………………… OBJECTOR

RULING

1. The instant Application dated 6th June 2026 is premised on Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 9 Rule 9, Order 22 Rule 51(2) and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and seeks orders that:

a. Spent

b. THAT this court be pleased to enter appearance for the firm of Mugo & Associates Advocates to come on record for the Objector.

c. THAT pending the inter partes hearing of this application, this Honourable Court do issue a temporary injunction restraining CRATER VIEW AUCTIONEERS, their agents, servants, or any person acting under their authority from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of the attached motor vehicles registration numbers KCG 139N and KHMA094K.

d. THAT the attachment and sale of the said motor vehicles be set aside on the ground that the vehicles belong to the objector by virtue of an existing hire purchase agreement.

e. THAT this Honourable Court does declare that the objector is the lawful owner of motor vehicles KCG 139N and KHMA 094K under the hire purchase facility, and that the judgment debtor has no attachable interest therein.

f. THAT this Honourable court does order the immediate release of motor vehicles Registration No. KCG 139N and KHMA 094K from attachment;

g. The Costs of this application be provided for.

2. The Application is premised on the Supporting Affidavit of CHIRAG SHAH and based on the grounds that: The objector herein, Nacky Credit Limited, is a licensed financial lender that advanced a loan of Kshs. 8,363,354 together with hire purchase charges of Kshs. 3,763,509, all totaling to Kshs. 12, 126,863 to the judgment debtor; the objector entered into a hire purchase agreement with the judgment debtor for a sum of Kshs. 12,126,863, comprising a principal of Kshs. 8,363,354 and hire purchase charges of Kshs. 3,763,509; that under the Hire Purchase Act, Cap 507, the ownership of the goods in a hire purchase agreement, does not pass to the hirer until the full and complete payment of all instalments and the exercise of the option to purchase; that the judgment debtor has not cleared the total hire purchase amount; consequently, the judgment debtor has no proprietary interest that can be attached; that the objector is still in possession of the logbooks, and the judgment debtor cannot transfer or dispose of the vehicles without the objector’s consent; the attached motor vehicles are therefore not the free property of the judgment debtor available for attachment and sale in satisfaction of the decree; if the vehicles are sold, the objector will lose its security and be forced to pursue the judgment debtor who is likely unable to repay; it is just and equitable that the objector’s interest be protected; that unless the application is heard and orders issued, the objector will stand to suffer irreparable harm.

3. The Decree Holder opposed the Application vide his Replying Affidavit sworn on 9th July 2026. He deposed that the application is fatally defective, misconceived, incompetent, bad in law, made in bad faith, inept, lacks merit and amounts to an abuse of the Court process, and ought to be dismissed with costs. He added that the Application does not meet the threshold and the applicable legal principles set up by law to warrant the prayers sought for. He deponed that the Objector previously moved this Court by a Notice of Motion dated 4th June 2025 seeking, inter alia, orders restraining the sale of motor vehicles registration numbers KCG 139N and KHMA 094K, setting aside their attachment and securing their release from execution. That this Court dismissed the motion vide its Ruling of 27th July 2026.

4. The deponent further stated that the instant Application was between the same parties, arose from the same execution proceedings, concerned the same subject matter, sought the same reliefs, and was founded on the same alleged proprietary interest over motor vehicles registration numbers KCG 139N and KHMA 094K, all of which had been conclusively determined by the Court in its earlier Ruling.

5. The affiant deponed that the Ruling remained valid and binding, as it had neither been reviewed, varied or set aside, nor had an appeal been preferred. He urged that the Application was res judicata, and sought to have the Court sit on appeal of its own decision, and was liable to being struck out with costs.

6. He stated that following the dismissal of the Objector's previous application, execution lawfully proceeded. He added that he was informed by the Auctioneer, Philip M. Kamuya, that pursuant to the Warrants of Attachment and Sale issued by the Court, Crater View Auctioneers proceeded with the sale of motor vehicles KCG 139N and KHMA 094K by public auction on 9th June 2026. He added that the motor vehicles were sold to the successful bidders, Joash Ong'ondo Nchore and Windsor Fu Kai Jixie Equipment Limited, who paid the full purchase price and were duly issued with the requisite auction sale documents.

7. He deponed that following completion of the auction sale, the successful purchasers acquired a lawful interest in the motor vehicles, and had since commenced the process of having them transferred to their names. He stated that although the public auction was lawfully concluded and the successful purchasers paid the full purchase price, the Objector and the Judgment Debtor had resorted to the proceedings and interim orders to unlawfully impede and delay the transfer of the motor vehicles. He stated that the present Application had therefore been overtaken by events, was being improperly used as a vehicle to defeat the completion of a lawful judicial sale and to deprive both the successful purchasers and himself, as the Decree Holder, of the fruits of the execution process.

8. The affiant further deponed that, without prejudice to the foregoing, the Objector's claim was riddled with material contradictions and inconsistencies which exposed the fraudulent nature of the application, fundamentally undermined its credibility, and demonstrated that the application was devoid of merit. He stated that in the Objector's Motion dated 4th June 2025, its Managing Director, Kevan Krishan, deposed that the Objector was merely a "co-owner and financier" of the subject motor vehicles, whereas in the present Application the Objector, through Chirag Shah, had abandoned its earlier position and now asserted that it was the legal owner under an alleged hire purchase agreement. He added that at paragraph 3 of the Affidavit, the Objector expressly stated that the financial facility advanced to the Judgment Debtor was "secured by the log books" of the motor vehicles, which was wholly inconsistent with a hire purchase transaction and instead described a loan secured by movable property.

9. He further stated that the Objector's own pleadings of 4th June 2025, specifically paragraph 1 of the grounds and paragraph 4 of the Supporting Affidavit, expressly acknowledged that the claim was grounded upon a charge, and not upon title or ownership. He added that the Copy of records for the motor vehicles dated 14th May 2025, annexed by the Objector as annexures KK1–KK6, were the most current documentation and unambiguously designated the Objector as a chargor, not as a legal or beneficial owner. He stated that the terms of the purported Hire Purchase Agreement dated 7th April 2022 further confirmed that the Objector's interest was merely that of a secured lender, as the Judgment Debtor was required to transfer the motor vehicles into the joint names of the parties and deposit the original logbooks with the Objector as security until repayment of the facility. He added that this requirement was wholly inconsistent with the Objector's present assertion that it was the legal owner, and instead demonstrated that ownership vested in the Judgment Debtor, with the Objector retaining only an alleged security interest.

10. He reiterated that this position was further confirmed by the official NTSA copies of Records, which described the Objector's interest as a "charge" and not a hire purchase interest. He stated that the Objector had therefore deliberately conflated a loan transaction secured by motor vehicle logbooks with a hire purchase agreement, notwithstanding that the two were legally distinct. He stated that in the premises, the Objector had failed to place before the Court any credible evidence establishing that the alleged transaction was, in law, a valid hire purchase agreement capable of conferring upon it the proprietary rights now claimed.

11. On whether the Objector's alleged interest was characterized as a hire purchase agreement or a security interest, he stated that it was incumbent upon the Objector to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory registration requirements pursuant to Section 889(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2015, Section 5 of the Hire Purchase Act (Cap. 507) of Kenya, and Section 15 of the Movable Property Security Rights Act; and that any unregistered interest was void as against creditors, including himself. He further stated that the Objector had neither alleged nor demonstrated that the debenture it purported to rely on had crystallized. He contended that in the absence of crystallization, the debenture remained dormant and could not form the basis for asserting a superior claim over the attached assets. He added that the Objector, having taken no prior steps to enforce or perfect its security interest, could not now, after the fact of execution, step forward to obstruct his rights.

12. He deposed that the averments contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Supporting Affidavit were false and intended to mislead the Court. He added that contrary to the Objector's assertion that it was unaware of the decree and execution proceedings, the Objector had actively participated in the proceedings by first filing a Notice of Motion dated 22nd May 2025, which it subsequently withdrew on 4th June 2025, and thereafter filing a fresh Notice of Motion of even date challenging the attachment and intended sale of the subject motor vehicles, which application was heard and determined. He stated that having actively participated in the objection proceedings culminating in that Ruling, the Objector could not now truthfully contend that it was unaware of the decree, the execution proceedings, or the attachment of the subject motor vehicles.

13. He deponed that following the dismissal of the Objector's application on 27th April 2026, execution lawfully proceeded in accordance with the decree and warrants of attachment. He added that there was no legal obligation upon the Decree Holder or the Auctioneer to recommence the execution process or to serve the Objector afresh after its objection had been conclusively determined, particularly as the Objector had no legal interest in the attached property. He added that in any event, the Objector had not disclosed that the intended sale of the attached motor vehicles was publicly advertised in the Standard Newspaper on 28th May 2026, before the public auction conducted on 9th June 2026, despite having had full knowledge of the execution proceedings and ample opportunity to seek relief before the sale was concluded.

14. He deposed further that the inconsistencies, the Objector's silence on crystallization, and the suspicious timing of its intervention reinforced the inference of collusion with the Judgment Debtor, calculated to defeat the lawful execution process. He added that the conduct of both the Judgment Debtor and the Objector smacked of deliberate deception and misuse of judicial process, which was a clear abuse of the court process. He stated that consequently, in the absence of any substantiating evidence supporting the Objector's claims, the Applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

15. He termed the instant application as having been brought in manifest bad faith, constituting a gross abuse of the court process designed solely to delay the satisfaction of the decree and to frustrate him from realizing the fruits of his lawful judgment. He urged the Court not to condone such conduct, as the application was a calculated attempt to frustrate the successful purchasers from effectuating the legal transfer of the property. He therefore urged the Court to protect the integrity of its own execution process by dismissing the application with costs in his favour.

16. He added that the present Application had been filed by the firm of Mugo & Associates Advocates, which firm was not properly on record for the Objector, and that consequently the Application was incompetent and liable to be struck out.

17. I have considered the rival submissions by both parties.

18. The issues that arise for determination are (i) whether the instant application is res judicata; (ii) whether there exists a valid hire purchase agreement; and whether the same impeaches the Decree Holder’s right to execute against the Judgement Debtor.

19. On the first issue, it is trite law that the principles that govern res judicata are well settled as emplified by Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act. The court is further guided by the Supreme Court in John Florence Maritime Services Ltd & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR) which outlined the instances under which res judicata may be invoked as follows:

“59. For res judicata to be invoked in a civil matter the following elements must be demonstrated:

a) There is a former judgment or order which was final;

b) The judgment or order was on merit;

c) The judgment or order was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

d) There must be between the first and the second action identical parties, subject matter and cause of action.”

20. The Decree holder urges that the Application is res judicata, the issues herein having been determined by the Court in its Ruling delivered on 27th April 2026. Having perused the Ruling, it is clear that the Court dispensed with the Applicant’s motion dated 4th June 2025 which was premised on Order 22 Rules 51and 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules and section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and sought orders that:

i. Spent

ii. That Nacky Credit Limited be joined in these proceedings as an objector.

iii. That pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-parties, the Claimant through Crater View Auctioneers be restrained from selling in execution motor vehicles registration numbers KHMA 094K and KCG 139N.

iv. That pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-parties, this Honourable Court be pleased to stay any further execution of the decree herein.

v. That this Honourable Court be pleased to set aside and void the attachment and order the unconditional release of motor vehicles registration numbers KHMA 094K and KCG 139N forthwith.

vi. That the costs of this application be provided for.

21. The Application was grounded on the supporting affidavit by Kevan Krishan and the grounds that the objector was the co-owner of the motor vehicles, as it was owed Kshs. 12,514,000/= by the Respondent; being the balance of the secured loan and therefore the attachment and sale would defeat its interests.

22. In its ruling, the court appreciated the tenor of the said proceedings and returned as follows:

“55. Consistent with section 107 of the Evidence Act which ordains that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist, it is the finding of this court that the objection herein lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed”

23. In this regard, the court borrow from the holding of the Court of Appeal in Uhuru Highway Development Limited v Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others [1996] KECA 102 (KLR) on applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to applications within a main suit, where the Court observed thus:

“What is before us is: can a matter of interlocutory nature decided in one suit be subject of another similar application in the same suit? Does the principle of res judicata apply to an application heard and determined in the same suit? We would like to refer to the decision in the case of RAM KIRPAL VS RUP KUARI reported in I.L.R. Vol. VI 1883 Allahabad series. The Privy Council sitting on appeal from a decision of the full bench of Allahabad High Court said:

“The questions, if the term “res judicata” was intended, as it doubtless was, and was understood by the full Bench, to refer to a matter decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former suit, was irrelevant and inapplicable to the case (emphasis ours). The matter decided by Mr. Probyn was not decided in a former suit, but in a proceeding of which the application, in which the orders reversed by the High Court were made, was reversed by the High Court were made, was merely a continuation. It was as binding between the parties and those claiming under them as an interlocutory judgement in a suit is binding upon the parties in every proceeding in that suit, or as a final judgement in a suit is binding upon them in carrying the judgement into execution. The binding force of such a judgement depends not upon S.13, Act I of 1877 but upon general principles of law. If it were not binding, there would be no end to litigation.”

What did the Privy Council say in RAM KIRPAL’s case? Their Lordships clearly were concerned about the desirability of bringing an end to litigation and went on to say that Section 13 of act I of the 1877 which is equivalent to Section 7 of our Civil Procedure Act, was not exhaustive, really; and that the law of “res judicata” did apply to a matter decided in the same suit and that upon its general principles it applied to interlocutory proceedings in the same suit.”

The foregoing rendition applies with equal force to the circumstances of this case.

See also John Florence Maritime Services Ltd & another v Cabinet Secretary for Transport & Infrastructures & 3 others (Supra)

24. The court is in agreement with the Decree Holder that the Applicant seeks to have this Court to sit on appeal over of its judgement which is not in order. The appropriate approach would have been to file for review of judgement, which did not happen.

25. Flowing from the foregoing, it is the finding of the court that the instant Application is res judicata and must therefore fail, and it is hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 22ND OCTOBER, 2026.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

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