Background
The subject matter of the Amended Petition is purely a contractual dispute emanating from the termination of the petitioner’s Commission by the Defence Council pursuant to Section 251(1) (b) of the Kenya Defence Forces Act.
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The subject matter of the Amended Petition is purely a contractual dispute emanating from the termination of the petitioner’s Commission by the Defence Council pursuant to Section 251(1) (b) of the Kenya Defence Forces Act.
Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
PETITION NO. E133 OF 2026
[Formerly Milimani High Court Civil Case No. E132 of 2026]
LAURIAN OCTOVIAN OMBAJO …… ……PETITIONER
VERSUS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE…………… 1ST RESPONDENT
THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ………… 2ND RESPONDENT
RULING
The ruling herein relates to a Notice of Preliminary Objections filed by the respondents on the grounds:
1. The subject matter of the Amended Petition is purely a contractual dispute emanating from the termination of the petitioner’s Commission by the Defence Council pursuant to Section 251(1) (b) of the Kenya Defence Forces Act.
2. The suit is time-barred and offends the mandatory provisions of section 3(2) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act, having been filed 3 years from the date the cause of action accrued; thus, the court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition.
3. The amended petition does not raise any constitutional question and is only disguised as a constitutional matter to circumvent the mandatory provisions of section 3(2) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act.
4. The amended petition is bad in law, frivolous and amounts to gross abuse of the court process and should be struck out.
On the objections, the respondents submitted that the petition is premised on facts alleging that the termination of the petitioner’s commission of service is unconstitutional, null, and void. The petitioner is seeking an order for payment of damages and reinstatement to service and benefits. However, this is not a proper petition, and the petitioner should have filed a Memorandum of Claim. The petition does not meet the threshold in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR.
Under section 3(2) of the Public Authorities Limitations Act (PALA), no proceedings founded on contract should be filed against the government more than 3 years after the cause of action accrued. The petitioner’s commission with KDF was terminated on 28 September 2022, and under the mandatory provisions of section 3(2) of the PALA, any claim should have been filed within 3 years. The petitioner is indolent, and by filing the petition on 26 June 2026, he is out of time. In Cherono v Teachers Service Commission & 2 others [2022] KEELRC 12853 (KLR)
The court held that approaching the court through a constitutional petition, rather than an ordinary suit, to defeat the limitation period for a claim is an abuse of the court process. In Reuben Ngila Kitonyi v Central Bank of Kenya [2019] eKLR, the court held that once a matter is time-barred, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear or determine it.
The petitioner submitted that the objections are not pure points of law and therefore do not warrant determination without a full hearing. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA, the court held that a preliminary objection must be on a pure point of law and inferred from the pleadings. The facts of the case require a call for evidence; hence, the determination should be by a call for evidence.
The petitioner submitted that the alleged time bar under section 3(2) of the LALA is not correct. The cause of action is a matter of evidence. This cannot be determined preliminarily. In Gilbi Construction Company Ltd & another v Wringley Company (East Africa) Ltd; Civicon Limited (Third Party) [2023] eKLR, the court considered similar objections and dismissed them because the question of a cause of Action and when it accrued is a matter of fact.
The petitioner submitted that the cause of action arose on 19 July 2023 when the 1st respondent communicated its decision dismissing him and rejecting his appeal against the termination. Following his dismissal from service, he appealed, and the petitioner filed the petition. In Kiige v National Hospital Insurance Fund [2026] eKLR, the court settled when the cause of action accrued, including the period during which an appeal is allowed.
The objections are without merit and should be dismissed with costs.
Determination
The respondents object that the petition is improper and filed out of time, and that the court lacks jurisdiction. The petitioner asserts that the petition is proper and that he moved the court after his dismissal and appeal were rejected by the 1st respondent; hence, he is within time, and the petition should be heard on its merits.
Indeed, a preliminary objection assessed vis-à-vis the principles outlined in the Anarita Karimi Njeru Case must be on a pure point of law and should not require facts to prove the point.
The respondents have relied on the provisions of section 3(2) of the PALA that require:
No proceedings founded on contract shall be brought against the Government or a local authority after the end of three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
The petitioner has admitted that his commission with KDF was terminated on 28 September 2022. He appealed against the decision and on 19 July 2023, the appeal was dismissed. He first filed his case at the High Court, which transferred it to this court.
Indeed, under section 3(2) of PALA, a claim against the government must be addressed within 3 years from the date the cause of action accrued. This position has long been held in employment disputes under section 89 of the Employment Act, where a cause of action must be brought within 3 years. Whereas the court is allowed to hear petitions under the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act and order reinstatement in terms of section 12 of the Act, the Court of Appeal in Kiige v National Hospital Insurance Fund [2026] KECA 309 (KLR) ha held that a cause of action accrues upon the exhaustion of internal dispute resolution mechanism including the right of appeal. Where an employee exercises a contractual or internal right of appeal against termination, the limitation period for filing a suit does not begin to run until the employer has determined that internal appeal.
Therefore, where the right of appeal is embedded in the terms and conditions of service/contract, the cause of action only fully crystallises and time starts running after the employer delivers its final determination on the internal appeal. Only then did the cause of action accrue, and time tabulation should start from the date of the appeal determination, not earlier.
Thus, guided by the Court of Appeal, the procedures under which the petitioner’s commission was terminated on 28 September 2022 allowed for the right of appeal. The Court determined this appeal on 19 July 2023, and the petition was filed on 26 June 2026. This is within the time period envisaged under PALA but, more fundamentally, on the claim for reinstatement into service with back pay in salary, under section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, the court shall hear and determine the petition on the merits on that basis.
This is a proper petition that is filed within time.
Accordingly, objections dated 21 July 2026 are without merit and are hereby dismissed. Costs to the petitioner.
Delivered in open court this 22nd day of October 2026
M. MBARŨ
JUDGE