REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
PETITION NO. E031 OF 2023
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 1,2,3,10,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,27, 28,35, 41, 48, 50,52,159,160, 161,162, 165, 258, 259 AND 260 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA AND SECTION 7(1) OF THE SCHEDULE 6 OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND
IN THE MATTER OF VIOLATION AND THREATENED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 1,2, 6(3), 10, 19, 20,21,23,24, 25, 27,28,35,40,41,4348,49, 50(1), 159, 160, 161, 162,165,258,259 AND 260 OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 5 OF THE UNIVERSITIES ACT, 2012
AND
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 4 AND 5 OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACT NO. 4 OF 2015
AND
IN THE MATTER OF A DETERMINATION ON THE ACADEMIC WORKLOAD AND PART-TIME TEACHING POLICY FOR THE ACADEMIC STAFF OF KIRINYAGA UNIVERSITY
BETWEEN
KIRINYAGA UNIVERSITY UASU CHAPTER …………….…… PETITIONER
AND
KIRINYAGA UNIVERSITY ………...………..……………...1ST RESPONDENT VICE CHANCELLOR ………………………...........……...… 2ND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
1. There exists a recognized and registered recognition Agreement between the Petitioner and public universities. The agreement outlines items to be negotiated at national and chapter levels; with workload being one of the items to be negotiated at the chapter level. That in April 2021, the Respondent interfered with its staff’s terms of employment by introduction of Academic Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy (the Policy), formulated without the Petitioner’s involvement. That on 28th January 2022, the Respondent emailed the revised workload policy to the Departments Chairmen without notifying the academic staff, or their participation through the Petitioner. That there was need for the Petitioner’s involvement as the issue touches on the terms and condition of service. The conduct was termed as a violation of the existing Recognition Agreement, and its implementation therefore was unconstitutional and in violation of Article 30(2) of the Constitution; and ought to be, quashed and restrained. That the policy further curtails the Union’s right to represent and bargain for its members and in violation of the right of association and to belong to a trade union. That the policy formulation offended the constitutional requirement for stakeholder’s participation in policy formulation under Article 10(2)(a) of the Constitution. It was averred that the Respondent has refused to facilitate negotiation of an internal CBA.
The Petitioner prays for:
a) A DECLARATION that making of Academic Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy is inconsistent with the Constitution of Kenya and the Employment Act; and thus void and of no legal effect;
b) An Order of CERTIORARI calling into this Court, the Respondent's Academic Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy of April 2021 for purposes of being quashed;
c) An Order of Permanent INJUNCTION be issued against the Respondents from continued implementation of Academic Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy;
d) An order directing the Respondents to invite Petitioner for negotiations and formulation of Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy.
e) Cost of this Petition;
f) Any other befitting relief under Article 23(3) of the Constitution of Kenya.
2. The Respondents relied on the Affidavit sworn by Prof. Charles Omwandho, the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academic Research and Students Affairs), sworn in opposition of the Notice of Motion dated 21st February 2023. He deposed that the 2nd respondent is not a legal entity capable of being sued, and there being no indication that the Policy was done by her in her capacity, and sought that suit against her be struck out. He added that the Petition falsely described the Petitioner as it lacks legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
3. He further stated that full-time academic staff taught a maximum of 40 hours per week under Commission of University Education Guidelines, and Clause 10.0 of the employment contracts stipulated no more than 40 hours over five days. He stated that there is no structured formula equating workload units to 40 hours and the employer retains the decisional discretion. He added that the workload allocation was the sole preserve of management, neither a matter to be negotiated with UASU, nor does the Petitioner have any role in the allocation of duties. He stated that before the policy, staff taught five classes of three hours each totaling to 15 hours per week without complaint. While relying on the workload allocation for September to December 2019, he stated that the Policy neither increased units nor the agreed working hours.
4. He noted that the CBA between UASU and Inter-Public Universities Council Consultative Forum (IPUCCF) of FKE restricts the Petitioner’s mandate to only cover matters on basic salary and housing allowance, excluding workload allocation. He added that there is no existing standard workload formula for public universities and each university is left to decide, thus the impugned Policy. He deponed that the policy only consolidated the previous manuals and practices on the subject. He further added that section 34 of the Universities Act provides that universities are governed by their Charters and Statutes. He deposed that the 1st Respondent’s workload is allocated at departmental level by sub-committees, and it is allocated by considering various parameters.
5. He deponed that following the award of Charter, it was mutually agreed in the consultative meetings with staff in 2018 that academic staff would teach five units per week for degree courses. He added that staff taught five units weekly without dispute since 2018, as per the workload for full time lecturers. He deposed that during Policy review, heads of departments and staff gave input on the Policies including the impugned Policy; and the policy was published on the university website. He emphasized that the Petitioner’s members' views were considered prior to the publication. He stated that the lecturers could voluntarily take one, two, or exceptionally three additional units with management approval for extra pay in accordance with clause 2.6 of the Policy.
6. He stated that UASU’s sole issue concerned a memo dated 6th January 2022 requiring a minimum of two internal part-time units. That as a result, UASU filed ELRC Petition No. E012 of 2022 UASU vs Kirinyaga University & Another, arguing that members already taught five units and adding two would make seven per semester. He urged that the issues in the said suit and the present matter were similar, amounting to an abuse of court process. He concluded that the petition was based on misapprehension of the Constitution, disclosing no precise violation of enumerated Articles, and thus, an abuse of court process.
7. In rejoinder, the Petitioner denied the Respondents' assertions contained in Replying Affidavit dated 9th March 2023 vide its Further Affidavit sworn by Dr. Robert Gitau Muigai, its Secretary General of the Kirinyaga University UASU Chapter on 17th March 2023. He denied the Respondents' assertion regarding the 2nd Respondent, stating that the Vice Chancellor is sued in her capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Respondent; mandated to ensure the day-to-day running of the University. He added that she is a central figure in formulating and implementing policies, and receives and responds to all correspondence on behalf of the 1st Respondent. He deponed that in addition to her silence on all served correspondence on the issue, she approved the policy, despite that being the function of the University Council under section 35(1)(a)(iii) of the Universities Act of 2012.
8. Citing Milimani Cause No. E073 of 2021: KU UASU Chapter v Kenyatta University, he asserted that the Petitioner has legal right to sue as a registered branch of UASU with validly elected and registered officials, recognized to represent the University's academic staff on labour issues. He stated that the Respondents' assertion on paragraph 7 was false and misleading, because Guideline PROG/STD/17(7) of the Commission of University Education provides for a maximum of 40 working hours per week including: teaching, preparation of examination papers, marking scripts, tutorials, preparation of teaching, supervision of academic work, administrative work, laboratory and laboratory preparation, and research/research assignments; therefore impossible for academic staff to teach for 40 hours in a week as alleged.
9. He added that upon signing the employment contract and subscribing to union membership, the terms and conditions of employment, including workload, are regulated by collective bargaining undertaken by the Union, within the existing Recognition Agreement. He accused the Respondents of frustrating all efforts to negotiate and sign a local CBA addressing academic workload. He deponed that the academic workload being a key component of terms and conditions of service, the distribution of the 40 hours prescribed by the Commission of University Education and domesticated in the policy should have been negotiated. He urged that the employer cannot arrogate to itself the sole right to determine it single-handedly.
10. He described the Respondents' continuous imposition of workload without a negotiated policy as self-defeatist and a violation of the Charter; which requires academic programmes to be administered by policies duly approved by the University Council. He noted that before the Recognition Agreement was signed on 28th October 2019, the Petitioner had no basis to negotiate academic workload, and the Respondents used that gap to impose 5 units. He added that after 28th October 2019, there was a legitimate expectation that workload issues would be negotiated.
11. He stated that the Respondents misapprehended the Recognition Agreement, referring them to Schedule B which lays out items that must be negotiated by the Union at both National and Branch levels. He maintained that governance documents cannot supersede the cardinal constitutional requirement to involve stakeholders in policy formulation within the public service. He further accused the 1st Respondent of not having gazetted statutes against section 35(1)(a)(ii) of the Universities Act (2012).
12. He described the Respondents’ assertion under paragraph 13 as diversionary, because regardless of the method of allocating workload, it is done under the framework of the Academic Workload Policy formulated unilaterally by the Respondents. He stated that forming subcommittees to allocate workload does not remedy the situation because subcommittees cannot substitute the Union.
13. The affiant challenged the allegation that the Respondents had an exclusive mandate to act unilaterally; the agenda for the 2018 consultative meeting was undisclosed; the meetings did not discuss any workload matters; nowhere did academic staff resolve to teach 5 units; that any such resolutions would have been illegitimate because only the Union had the mandate to engage on behalf of unionisable employees on terms and conditions of service; and that the meetings were held in 2018, but the Workload Policy was formulated in 2021.
14. He denied the allegation that members were involved in formulation of the impugned Academic Workload Policy, stating that the Respondents clearly understood the process of engaging unionisable employees. He compared it to the formulation of the Appointment and Promotion Policy in 2021, where they collected and collated academic staff input through the Union and not directly. He urged the Respondents to stop feigning ignorance.
15. The affiant termed the alleged consultations as false on account that: no such consultations took place since the Registrar (Academics) circulated the Policy to Chairpersons of Departments and Deans with strict instructions to implement it; the statement contradicted the Respondents' earlier averment that academic staff or their representatives had no role in formulating the policy; direct consultations with academic staff would have been improper and biased because of the fiduciary nature of the employment relationship; and such consultations, if any, should have been done at the policy formulation stage, not at implementation level.
16. He averred that the assertion regarding the referenced suit was false for the suit was not related to the Academic Workload Policy, adding that when the suit was filed on 21st January 2022, the Petitioner had no prior knowledge of the policy's existence, which it learnt of on or around 28th January 2022. The affiant deponed that the Petition was filed basis on the memo issued on 6th January 2022, not the Workload Policy adding added that the Respondents withdrew the memo pending consultations with the Petitioner, which never took place. That the pending suit challenged forced part-time work through 2 mandatory part-time units, whereas the present suit challenges the formulation, adoption and continued implementation of the Academic Workload Policy in total exclusion of the Petitioner.
17. The affiant that the right of stakeholder participation in policy formulation, the right against forced labour, and the right to collective bargaining were pleaded and their violation demonstrated.
18. In their further Affidavit Prof. Charles Omwandho, in response to the Petitioner's Further Affidavit dated 17th March 2023 reiterated that the 2nd Respondent is not a legal entity capable of being sued, more so, since there is no evidence the Academic Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy was formulated by the Vice-Chancellor in her own capacity. He added that the Respondents would move the court to strike out the suit against the 2nd Respondent. He confirmed that the Policy was duly approved by the Council and signed by the 2nd Respondent as delegated by the Council. He deponed that although the Council had the mandate to employ staff under section 35(1) of the Universities Act, the letters of appointment of the Petitioner's members were all signed by the 2nd Respondent.
19. He stated that the Policy was domiciled on the 1st Respondent's website since April 2021, denying that it was secretly prepared. He added that Chairpersons of academic Departments and Deans of Schools, who are members of the Petitioner, were involved during consolidation of the various manuals. He noted that by the Petitioner's assertion that it learnt of the Policy in January 2022, while it came into force in April 2021, it evidenced that nothing new was imposed to its members' detriment. The affiant confirmed that the Policy made no changes to the particulars of employment requiring compliance with section 10(5) of the Employment Act, and that the allegation of imposing new workload allocation was false. He stated that the 2022/23 academic calendar continued after examinations since other programmes run during the semester break, as some student proceed on industrial attachment and teaching practice. He added that students sit special and supplementary examinations in July through August 2023, which the Petitioner's members administer, mark and process results.
20. The affiant further deponed that the full-time academic staff work a maximum of 40 hours per week under the Commission of University Education Guidelines. He disparaged the claim that academic staff cannot humanely teach 40 hours, stating that members teach a maximum of 15 hours per week, which they can consolidate into a maximum of two working days. He noted that the Petitioner does not contest that its members teach a maximum of five units per week of three hours each, totaling 15 teaching hours weekly, which constitutes only 37.5% of total work hours, leaving 25 hours per week (62.5%) outside actual teaching.
21. He stated that the CBA with IPUCCF of FKE does not alter the Petitioner's terms of service, as it is limited to negotiating basic pay and house allowance for academic staff in public universities. He denied frustrating efforts to negotiate a local CBA and put the Petitioner to strict proof. He maintained that upon joining the Union, such academic staff's terms of employment do not change in any way.
22. The affiant reiterated that besides the 40 hours guided by the CUE, there is no standard applicable formula, and that the 1st Respondent adheres to CUE guidelines. He maintained that the Petitioner has no role in allocating or assigning duties to its members, which is the sole preserve of the employer. He stated that it would be tragic for employees to assign themselves duties, which explains why assignment of duties was left out of the Recognition Agreement. He stated that prior to the Recognition Agreement in 2019 and implementation of the Policy in 2021, the Petitioner's members taught five units per week of three hours each, totaling 15 teaching hours weekly, without formal objection, and the Policy neither increased teaching units nor working hours. He added that the Academic Policy consolidates previous manuals and practices approved by the Council and made no alteration to existing terms and conditions of service.
23. He acknowledged that the 1st Respondent involved the Petitioner in formulating the Appointment and Promotion criteria, because promotions as a term of employment are expressly stated in Schedule B of the Recognition Agreement as a matter requiring negotiations prior to changes, and clause 6 of the Terms and Conditions of Service deals with promotions and upgrading, forming the basis of negotiations.
24. In his further affidavit, Dr. Robert Gitau Muigai, denied all contents of the Respondents' Supplementary Affidavit. He maintained the union's position as set out in its further affidavit dated 17 March 2023 and citing Nakuru ELRC Cause No. E016 of 2022 (UASU Egerton University Chapter v Egerton University Council & others), added that Vice Chancellors have legal capacity to be sued. He maintained that the VC usurped the Council's authority in approving the Academic Workload Policy. He added that she ought to have stated expressly that she signed for and on behalf of the Council, as happens with employment letters marked "subject to the approval of the Council".
25. The affiant denied that the policy was uploaded before the petition was filed, stating it was uploaded after filing. He added that domiciling an offending policy on the website did not make it valid since it was prepared without the Petitioner's input. He argued that Chairpersons of Departments and Deans are appointed by the Respondents and are therefore incompetent to represent unionisable staff in policy negotiations.
26. He stated that the Respondents varied workload upwards from 3 units (2014), 4 units (2015) to 5 units (2021) per semester without consulting the Petitioner. He stated that in January 2022, the Respondents attempted to vary workload to 7 units without consultation but withdrew after the Petitioner protested. He added that the Respondents had rejected, ignored, neglected and/or frustrated all efforts to resolve the impasse internally.
27. Concerning the Guideline PROG/STD/17(7) of the Commission of University Education, the affiant averred that the substance of the petition is that the Petitioner's input on the distribution of the 40 working hours across these assignments should have been considered in formulating the policy as envisaged under the Recognition Agreement.
28. He deponed that compliance with the 40-hour requirement did not discharge the Respondents from the obligation to involve the Petitioner under Articles 10(2) and 232(1) of the Constitution and Schedule B(2)(a) of the Recognition Agreement. He stated that academic workload falls under "all other terms and conditions of employment" contemplated under Schedule B(2)(a) of the Recognition Agreement and need not be expressly mentioned. He averred that if the Respondents' position was allowed to stand, Schedule B (2) would be rendered nugatory; yet many other public universities had successfully negotiated workload distribution with unions.
29. The affiant reiterated that there had never been any manual on workload; and that the teaching practice varied between 3-4-5 units, and particular practice could be distilled from the variation. He noted that the Respondents admitted the University had no published and gazetted Statutes as required legally since being chartered in 2016, implying actions based on those Statutes are invalid. He stated that the Respondents wrongly shifted blame to the Cabinet Secretary even though the law mandates the University Council to cause gazettement. He added that the Petitioner would move the Court to invalidate the Academic Workload Policy on this basis alone.
30. It is important to note that before this matter was transferred to this Court vide the order of the Court of 3rd July 2026, the parties unsuccessfully underwent Court Annexed Mediation, and Conciliation.
31. Following the recommendation in the Conciliation Report dated 5th June 2025, parties were tied up in negotiations up until 3rd July 2026, when the matter was referred for dispensation by this Court.
32. It is also notable that there was an application for transfer of the Matter to Nyeri Court given that the dispute occurred within the jurisdiction of the Court, but the Application was not pursued by the Applicant therein. There is also an Application pursued by the 2nd Respondent to be struck out from the record on account of wrongful joinder.
Submissions
33. The Petitioner raised the following issues for determination: (i) whether the Respondents, by formulating the Academic Workload and Part-time Teaching Policy without involvement of the Petitioner are in breach of the Recognition Agreement or any other agreement; (ii) whether the Respondents, by formulating the Academic Workload and Part-time Teaching policy without involvement of the Petitioner violated the Constitutional rights of the Petitioner's members or any other law; (iii)whether continued implementation of the impugned Academic Workload and Part-time Teaching Policy is injurious to the members of the Petitioner; whether the Petitioner is entitled to reliefs sought.
34. The Petitioner’s main contention is that by unilaterally formulating and implementing an Academic Workload and Part-Time Teaching Policy in April 2021 without involving the Union, the Respondents violated the Constitution, the Employment Act, the Universities Act, and a Recognition Agreement signed on 28th October 2019.
35. The Petitioner submitted that the Respondents' actions breached the Recognition Agreement and violated Articles 10(2)(a), 232(1)(d), 50(1), 41(1), 41(2)(b), and 41(5) of the Constitution, as well as Section 35(1)(a)(iii) and (ii) of the Universities Act, 2012. It argued that the policy was illegal because it was approved by the Vice Chancellor rather than the University Council, and because the University's Statutes had never been gazetted. It relied on the decisions in University Academic Staff, Maseno Chapter v Maseno University (2022) eKLR, Technical University of Mombasa v UASU TUM Chapter (2021) eKLR, and Kenei v Egerton University & Another (2023) KEELRC 918 (KLR).
36. The Petitioner contended that the continued implementation of the policy was injurious to its members, as it denied them annual leave, subjected them to forced labour contrary to Article 30(2) of the Constitution, caused stress and burnout, and interfered with their economic and social lives. It was added that the Respondents had contradicted themselves regarding consultations and had sabotaged court-ordered mediation. The petitioner urged the Court was urged to grant the reliefs sought.
37. The Respondents on the other hand urged the Court to strike out the 2nd Respondent from the proceedings, contending that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued, rather an agent of the 1st Respondent. It was contended that the Petitioner lacked the capacity to institute or continue the proceedings, as the Recognition Agreement of 28th October 2019 was signed between the Inter-Public University Councils Consultative Forum (IPUCCF) and the Universities' Academic Staff Union (UASU), not the Petitioner. Reliance was placed on the doctrine of privity of contract as articulated in Mark Otanga Otiende v Dennis Oduor Aduol [2021] eKLR, to submit that only parties to a contract may enforce it, and a Chapter of UASU cannot acquire or exercise contractual rights vested in the national union absent a demonstrated legal or constitutional basis. The Court was urged to uphold the objection.
38. On the merits, it was submitted that the only constitutional provisions allegedly violated were Articles 41 and 50(1), with the core complaint being that the Respondents imposed academic workload unilaterally without affording the Petitioner a hearing. It was argued that a trade union's right to participate in or be consulted on management matters is not open-ended and must derive from the Labour Relations Act, the Recognition Agreement, an applicable CBA, or another binding instrument; otherwise, managerial prerogative prevails. It was submitted that the 40-hour work week was already incorporated into individual employment contracts and had not been varied. It was added that the impugned policy merely concerned the formula for distributing workload units. It was argued that the workload was arrived at through consultative and participatory processes involving all academic staff, as evidenced by departmental meetings and workload allocations dating back to 2019, and that no affected staff had complained.
39. It was further submitted that the signing of the Recognition Agreement did not require the University to amend existing terms of service or revise workload from 5 units to 3 units, and that the Petitioner's claim of unilateral imposition was untrue. The Respondents objected to new grounds raised in the Petitioner's submissions—including allegations regarding Council approvals, gazettement, and leave policies under the Universities Act and Employment Act; arguing that they were not pleaded, and thus, the Respondents were denied an opportunity to respond.
40. The Respondents further distinguished the decision in Technical University of Mombasa v UASU Tum-Chapter [2021] eKLR on the basis that it involved a detrimental alteration of terms as part of cost cutting measures, which was lacking in the present matter. The Respondents argued that Schedule B Part 2 of the Recognition Agreement merely identified matters for collective bargaining and did not confer a substantive right of prior consultation or approval, nor did it surrender the 1st Respondent's managerial prerogative.
41. Reliance was placed on sections 54, 57, and 59 of the Labour Relations Act and the decision in Directorate of Personnel Management v Union of Kenya Civil Servants [2005] KEELRC 1 to submit that recognition is for purposes of collective bargaining, and that substantive terms must be concluded through a CBA. It was urged that absent a CBA containing a workload formula, there was no contractual standard to enforce, and the Recognition Agreement cannot be transformed into a co-management arrangement. It was submitted that quashing the policy or granting a permanent injunction would cause irreparable injury and throw the 1st Respondent's programmes into disarray, and that the proper avenue is collective bargaining.
42. It was submitted that the dispute did not require constitutional interpretation and that invoking the Court's constitutional jurisdiction amounted to an abuse of process. The Court was urged dismiss the Petition with costs.
Analysis and determination
43. It is not in dispute that there exists a Policy, subject matter of this dispute, and that the Petitioner was not consulted in its formulation. What is in dispute is whether there existed an obligation for the Respondents to involve the Petitioner in the process; whether the failure to involve the Petitioner was unlawful and an infringement of the Petitioner and its members’ rights; whether the 2nd Respondent was wrongly joined in the suit; whether the suit is an abuse of court process; and whether the relief sought are merited.
44. In answering the first and second issues, it is trite that the Constitution under Article 232 provides for values and principles governing public service; which include the need for inclusivity in policy making under sub-Article 1(d) as follows:
232. Values and principles of public service
(1) The values and principles of public service include—
(d) involvement of the people in the process of policy making;
45. Sub-Article 2 provides for the applicability scope to include:
(2) The values and principles of public service apply to public service in—
(a) all State organs in both levels of government; and
(b) all State corporations.
46. The 1st Respondent is a state corporation therefore governed by this provision.
47. In their defence the Respondents relied on the CUE guidelines that provide for 40 hours. The standard prescribed workload is provided for Clause 8(i) of the CUE Standards and Guidelines for University Academic Programmes which states as follows:
i. The maximum lecturer workload shall be 40 hours per week and shall include teaching; preparation of examination papers; marking of examination scripts; tutorials; preparation of teaching; supervision of academic work; administrative work; laboratory and laboratory preparation; and research/research assignments.
This guideline generally captures the tasks of academic staff and provides a reasonable basis for the formulation of a workload/hours policy or framework.
48. From the pleadings, it is clear that the Petitioner was not involved in the policy making process, rather, the Respondents involved persons not recognized as representatives of the Petitioner. It is trite law that working hours is an element of a contract of employment, whose change requires consultation and consent of the employee; and in this case, involvement of the representative trade union.
Section 10(2) of the Employment Act provides:
(2) A written contract of service shall state―
(a) the name, age, permanent address and sex of the employee;
(b) the name of the employer;
(c) the job description of the employment;
(d) the date of commencement of the employment;
(e) the form and duration of the contract;
(f) the place of work;
(g) the hours of work;
(h) the remuneration, scale or rate of remuneration, the method of calculating that remuneration and details of any other benefits;
(i) the intervals at which remuneration is paid; and
(j) the date on which the employee’s period of continuous employment began, taking into account any employment with a previous employer which counts towards that period; and
(k) any other prescribed matter (Emphasis supplied.)
49. Relatedly, section 10(5) of the Employment Act provide for the consultation and notification of an employee of any intended change to the particulars of the employee’s contract of employment as follows:
(5) Where any matter stipulated in subsection (1) changes,
the employer shall, in consultation with the employee, revise
the contract to reflect the change and notify the employee of
the change in writing.
50. It therefore goes without say that the Respondents erred and the unilateral policy formulation did not meet constitutional and statutory threshold. This position was also observed in University Academic Staff Union (Maseno Chapter) v Maseno University [2022] KEELRC 13280 (KLR) where the Court held that:
“39. Nevertheless, the court is of the view that (a) representative(s) of UASU should have been made members of the ad hoc committee which prepared the report proposing the increase in teaching load for meaningful consultation and Participation.
40. The presence of UASU’s representative during the approval seating of the senate could not have been the participation or consultations contemplated by the Constitution or section 10(5) of the Employment Act, 2007.”
51. Similarly, in Universities Academic Staff Union v Murang’a University of Technology & another [2023] KEELRC 9 (KLR) the court held as follows:
“40. It is trite law that in employment arena, consultation is paramount whether in issues of redundancy or as in this case refers to changes of terms of employment. The 1st Respondent did not discharge its burden by demonstrating it consulted the Petitioner in revising its workload for part time teaching. The Petitioner as a primary stakeholder was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate in the process within the principles set out by the Honourable Court in R vs Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock & Fisheries & 4 others Ex-Parte Council of Governors and another (2017) eKLR and in reference to the case of Robert N Gakuru & another -vs- Governor Kiambu County (2014) eKLR. In this case, court ruled that Parliament and Provincial legislature must be given a significant measure of discretion in determining how best to fulfil their duty to facilitate public participation.
This discretion will apply both in relation to the standard rules promulgated for public participation and the particular modalities appropriate for specific legislative programmes.
41. The court went further to find that public participation did not mean consent flowing from where it is imperative, the people affected by such decision of public bodies are to be involved and consultations should take place.
In the absence of such consultation, the court must find the Petitioner’s rights were infringed upon by the 1st Respondent in particular…”
The foregoing analysis leaves no doubt that contrary to the respondent’s submission and averments, working hours if not part of the managerial prerogative of an employer.
52. On the third issue, from the description of the parties, the 2nd Respondent is described as the principal agent of the 1st Respondent, in charge of its day to day operations. To counter the Respondents’ argument, the Petitioner’s argument was that the joinder was not wrongful as the 2nd Respondent acted in her own capacity, usurping the Council’s authority and therefore properly a party to the suit.
53. On joinder of the parties in pleadings, Order 1 rules 3 and 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules provide for joinder and misjoinder respectively as follows:
All persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if separate suits were brought against such persons any common question of law or fact would arise.
9. Misjoinder and non-joinder [Order 1, rule 9]
No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it.
54. Given the allegations made against the 2nd Respondent, the court is satisfied that the joinder was not wrongful as the Petitioner reasonably believed that the 2nd Respondent acted in her own capacity rather than as a representative of the Council. Order 1 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides that:
7. When plaintiff in doubt from whom redress to be sought [Order 1, rule 7]
Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from whom he is entitled to obtain redress, he may join two or more defendants in order that the question as to which of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties.
It behooved the 2nd Respondent to evidentiary demonstrate that the impugned policy was a Council document by availment of council’s approval.
It is trite that an organization’s policy is deemed valid and operational only after approval by the organization’s policy making body and in the case of a public university, the principal policy and decision-making body is the Council. The secretariat or management of a public body has not authority to operationalize a policy without express approval of the Board of Directors or Council or authority by whatever name called.
55. The foregoing is fortified by the rendition of the Court in Bakery, Confectionery, Food Manufacturing and Allied Workers Union v Norda Industries Ltd & another [2026] KEELRC 2576 (KLR) as follows:
“76. Although a court of law has powers to intervene in the
exercise of this power by for instance adding or removing
parties to the action, it must exercise restraint in this regard.
At the risk of being repetitive, I must emphasize that it is this
principle which undergirds the edict in Order 1 rule 7 of the
Civil Procedure Rules which grants a Claimant the right to
sue various individuals against whom he believes he has a
right to seek a remedy if he is in doubt as from whom, amongst the various defendants, he is entitled to seek a
remedy.
77. Speaking to this in the case of Civicon Limited v Kivuwatt
Limited & 2 others [2015] KECA 588 (KLR), the Court of
Appeal observed as follows:-
‘’The general rule of practice is that the plaintiff is
“dominus litis.” This means that he is entitled to choose
the defendants against whom he wishes to pursue his
claim for the relief or remedy he seeks, and that he
cannot be compelled to proceed against other persons
whom he has no desire to sue.’’
Nothing turns on this issue.
56. On the fourth issue, the Respondents argued that the Petition is an abuse of court process since it revolves around the same parties and subject matter. The petitioner’s contention is that the suit is unique since it challenges the policy whereas the ELRC/PET E012/2022 challenged the Memo. Perusal of the said suit reveals that it was closed before any substantive hearing took place and therefore there was no determination of the court, and in the court’s view cannot be the basis of a claim of res judicata.
In John Florence Maritime Services Ltd & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR) the Supreme Court outlined the elements of res judicata as follows:
59. For res judicata to be invoked in a civil matter the following elements must be demonstrated:
a) There is a former judgment or order which was final;
b) The judgment or order was on merit;
c) The judgment or order was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d) There must be between the first and the second action identical parties,B subject matter and cause of action.
In the court’s view nothing turns on this issue.
57. From the foregoing, it is the finding of the court that the Petition has merit and is hereby allowed as follows:
a) A declaration be and is hereby issued that the impugned Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy is invalid and with no legal effect, owing to the respondent’s failure to involve the petitioner in its formulation.
b) An Order of certiorari be and is hereby issued to bring into this Court and quash the Respondent's Academic Workload and Part Time Teaching Policy of April 2021.
c) The Respondents shall invite the Petitioner for negotiations and resolution of all issues and concerns germane to workload in the context of clause 8(i) of CUE’s Standards and Guidelines for University Academic Programmes within 60 days of this judgment.
d) In order to avoid any unnecessary disruption, the status quo shall be maintained for 60 days.
e) Each party shall bear its own costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 22ND OCTOBER, 2026.
DR. JACOB GAKERI
JUDGE
ORDER
In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.
DR. JACOB GAKERI
JUDGE