Employment law

Hind Construction Company Ltd & another v Kikweo (Sued as Legal Representative of the Estate of Joyce Ndungwa Ngunzi (Deceased)) [2026] KEELRC 14729 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E397 of 2025
Judgment date
22 October 2026
Judge(s)
M. Mbarũ

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E397 OF 2025

HIND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD…..…..1ST APPELLANT

RAJINDER SINGH………………………….……..2ND APPELLANT

VERSUS

NZILANI NGUNZI KIKWEO (sued as legal representative of the estate of JOYCE NDUNGWA NGUNZI (deceased)………….………………………………..…RESPONDENT

RULING

The appellant filed applications dated 23 and 30 June 2026. The respondent filed Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 17 July 2026 on the grounds:

1. THAT the said applications are an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court; and

2. THAT the Respondent’s appeal, ELRC Appeal E397 of 2025, Hind Construction Company Limited & Rajinder Singh Vs Nguzi Kikweo Nzilani, was dismissed on 10 June 2026.

Both parties attended and agreed to address the objection through written submissions.

In support of the objection, the Respondent submitted that, despite the dismissal of the appeal on 15 June 2026, the Appellants filed multiple applications seeking a stay of execution before both the subordinate court and this Court, including applications dated 19 June 2026, 23 June 2026 and 30 June 2026. The Appellants failed to disclose the existence of the respective applications to the courts seized of the matters, resulting in duplicity of proceedings and an abuse of the court process. The Respondent argued that the Preliminary Objection dated 17 July 2026 was directed at the absence of a subsisting appeal, particularly because the principal prayer in the application dated 30 June 2026 sought stay of execution pending determination of an appeal that had already been dismissed.

The Respondent submitted that on 17 July 2026, it applied for the release of the decretal sum of Kshs. 642,412.00 deposited in Court. It contended that the Appellants opposed the application through the Replying Affidavit of Rajinder Singh dated 24 July 2026, raising various grounds but failing to address the duplicity of their applications. The Respondent challenged the Appellants’ contention that they risked double or excessive execution because auctioneers had previously attached the goods, arguing that this position was inconsistent with the conditional stay and the deposit of the decretal sum in Court.

The Respondent further submitted that the Appellants’ application dated 23 June 2026 sought to set aside the dismissal order and reinstate the appeal, admit the Supplementary Record of Appeal, and grant leave to file and serve. However, the application did not seek an extension of time within which to file the appeal or the requisite record. The Respondent contended that the omission rendered the application incurably defective because the Appellants sought to regularise a process undertaken without first obtaining the necessary leave of the Court.

In Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others (Application No. 16 of 2014) [2014] KESC 12 (KLR), the Court emphasised that where the law prescribes a period within which an appeal must be filed, a party seeking to file an appeal outside that period must first obtain an extension of time. The Respondent argued that filing an appeal out of time and subsequently seeking the Court’s intervention to validate it amounted to asking the Court to remedy an illegality. It maintained that the same principle applied to the Appellants’ application, which sought reinstatement and admission of a Supplementary Record of Appeal without a prayer for extension of time.

The Respondent submitted that the Appellants’ applications dated 23 June 2026 and 30 June 2026 were incompetent and constituted an abuse of the court process. It urged the Court to allow the preliminary objection.

The Appellants, in opposition to the objection, submitted that the Preliminary Objection did not raise a pure point of law capable of disposing of the applications. Relying on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. A preliminary objection cannot be sustained where the Court must ascertain facts or exercise judicial discretion. They contended that the circumstances surrounding the dismissal, the reasons for the incomplete Record of Appeal and the steps taken to obtain the missing proceedings required consideration of the affidavit evidence.

The Appellants maintained that treating the dismissal order as an automatic bar to reinstatement would defeat the Court’s jurisdiction to set aside its own orders. They therefore urged the Court to dismiss the Preliminary Objection with costs.

Determination

On the application, affidavit, and submissions, the sole issue for determination is whether the preliminary objection raised by the Applicants is merited. Once this is determined, the Court will address the appellant's applications.

Before delving into the issue for determination, it is necessary to provide background to the matter.

On 18 November 2025, the appellant filed this appeal. The only record filed was the Memorandum of Appeal dated 12 November 2025.

On 15 December 2025, the appellant filed an application under Certificate of Urgency seeking stay of execution of the judgment delivered before the trial court in Nairobi MCELRC Case No. 82 of 2020 on 29 October 2026. This is indeed the judgment challenged in the Memorandum of Appeal.

Various court attendances led to 22 May 2026, when the appellant’s advocates confirmed that they had not filed the full Record of Appeal despite repeated directions. The court noted that the appellant had also failed to adhere to the terms of the stay of execution by securing it with a bank guarantee. The court extended time by 14 days to file a full Record of Appeal and the Bank Guarantee, and to mention on 10 June 2026 to confirm compliance.

In the interim, the appellant filed an application dated 22 May 2026 seeking stay of execution of the judgment of the trial court delivered on 25 October 2025. The interim orders allowed a stay of execution on condition that the appellant deposit Ksh. 642,412.35 within 14 days and not later than 9 June 2026.

When the matter came up in court on 10 June 2026, the appellant had paid the security deposit, but had not filed the full Record of Appeal. The court directed the appellant to attend to show why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of a full Record of Appeal. This is a mandatory requirement under ELRC Rules 12, 15 and 16. None was demonstrated, and the court dismissed the appeal.

In the whole, from 25 October 2025, when the trial court delivered judgment, an appeal under section 17 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act and Rule 12 of the ELRC Rules, the Record of Appeal should have been filed within 30 days. A Record of Appeal should have been filed together with the appeal. Where this was not possible, under Rule 15, such record should be filed within 60 days from the date of the challenged judgment. There was no compliance.

The timelines extended by the court did not yield much. When the court dismissed the appeal on 15 June 2026, there was no Full Record of Appeal. The appellant did not invoke Rule 18 for more time.

The objection raised in the applications dated 23 and 30 June 2026 is that they were filed in an abuse of the court process. The Application dated 23 June 2026 seeks to set aside the dismissal order made on 15 June 2026, reinstate the Appeal, and grant leave to file and serve a Supplementary Record of Appeal.

The Application dated 30 June 2026 seeks a stay of execution of the lower court's judgment pending determination of the application and appeal.

The court has addressed these multiple applications and extended time, but they have not complied.

In Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v Attorney General & 5 others [2012] KESC 4 (KLR), the court defined abuse of court process to mean:

The concept of “abuse of the process of the Court” has no fixed meaning, but relates to the motives behind the guilty party’s actions and to a perceived attempt to manoeuvre the Court’s jurisdiction in a manner incompatible with the goals of justice. …

The bottom line in a case of abuse of Court process is that it “appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak as to be beyond redemption…”

In Charo v Mwashetani & 3 others [2014] KESC 41 (KLR), the court held that abuse of court process would entail filing frivolous applications.

In this case, although the appellant filed the Memorandum of Appeal on time, it did not file the full Record of Appeal on time. When this occurred, the appellant did not seek an extension of time to file the full Record of Appeal. Despite the court extending time on several occasions, including on 10 June 2026, the extension was not utilised.

This then becomes a classic case of abuse of court process. Upon filing the appeal, no record of appeal was filed; the time to file was extended, and this was not properly used.

The respondent's objections are thus with merit and are hereby allowed.

The applications dated 23 and 30 June 2026 are an abuse of court process and are hereby dismissed. The objections are allowed with costs.

Delivered in open court this 22nd day of October 2026

M. MBARŨ

JUDGE

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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