Background
Before this court for determination are the Petitioners Notices of Motion dated 20th February, 2026 and 15th April, 2026. In the Notice of Motion dated 20th February, 2026.
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
Before this court for determination are the Petitioners Notices of Motion dated 20th February, 2026 and 15th April, 2026. In the Notice of Motion dated 20th February, 2026.
Paragraph 1 →In the end, the court finds the Motions to be merited and directs as follows:
Paragraph 71 →Beginning with the aspect of knowledge of the orders, when the matter came up first on 24th February, 2026, it was at the ex-parte stage and the orders issued in the absence of the parties. The same were however served upon the Respondents as evinced by the affidavit of service dated 2nd March, 2026. When the matter next came up on 10th March, 2026, the orders were extended. Here the 1st Respondent was represented by one Mr Achola.…
Paragraph 43 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
EP PETITION E008 OF 2026
KHALIB MOHAMMED………………………………………..PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAIROBI ......1st RESPONDENT
SOUTH C BB CENTRE LIMITED...................... 2nd RESPONDENT
RULING
Background
1. Before this court for determination are the Petitioners Notices of Motion dated 20th February, 2026 and 15th April, 2026. In the Notice of Motion dated 20th February, 2026.
2. Vide the Notice of Motion dated 20th February, 2026 brought pursuant to the provisions of Article 2, 10, 22, 23(3), 40, 42, 47, 69, 70 and 162(2)(b) of the Constitution as read with Section 4(1) of the Environment and Land Court, the Petitioner/Applicant seeks the following reliefs:
a) A conservatory order of temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the 2nd Respondent, its servants, agents, employees, contractors, or any person acting under its authority from continuing, undertaking, or permitting any construction, commercial activity, development, or interference on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R. No. 209/11646), as described in the Temporary Occupation Licence (T.O.L.) dated 5th November 2024 (Ref: VAL. 752/SG/1/0/NNI/pww), pending the hearing and determination of the petition.
b) A conservatory order of temporary injunction be and is hereby issued compelling the 1st Respondent to take immediate measures to stop, prevent and discontinue any development or omission deleterious to the environment on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R. No. 209/11646), as described in the T.O.L. dated 5th November 2024 (Ref: VAL. 752/SG/1/0/NNI/pww), pending the hearing and determination of the petition.
c) This Honourable Court do give any further orders and/or directions deemed just, fair and necessary.
d) The costs of the application be provided for.
2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Khalib Mohammed, a resident of Parkview Apartments, South C, Nairobi County, situated on L.R. No. 209/11646. He deponed that, through a Temporary Occupation Licence dated 5th November 2024, the 1st Respondent authorized the 2nd Respondent to operate a football pitch on the parcel of land adjacent to Parkview Apartments along Muhoho Road.
3. The licence was subject to several conditions, including that the property be used strictly as a football pitch, that no permanent structures be erected, that its use should not conflict with neighbouring properties, that the requisite approvals and licences be obtained, and that no trees be cut without the authority of the Director of Environment.
4. In breach of those conditions, he stated, the 2nd Respondent constructed commercial shops and a basketball court on the property, neither of which was contemplated under the licence. It also laid a concrete slab that interfered with, and compromised the public sewer infrastructure, thereby exposing residents and the public to environmental, sanitation and public-health risks.
5. He further alleged that the 2nd Respondent and its agents trespassed onto the premises of Parkview Apartments, damaged fencing and vegetation, and cleared bushes, thereby interfering with private property and neighbouring institutions, including Kinderworld Academy and a nearby madrassa.
6. Mr. Mohammed contended that the developments are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact; that they were undertaken without an Environmental Impact Assessment licence, contrary to Section 58 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act and that no stakeholder engagement or public participation preceded the change of use of the property, contrary to Article 10 of the Constitution and the principles of sustainable development under the Act.
7. By a letter dated 10th February 2026, he explained, he lodged a formal complaint with the 1st Respondent seeking the revocation of the Temporary Occupation Licence, the issuance of a stop order and the commencement of enforcement proceedings against the 2nd Respondent. Despite service of the complaint, the 1st Respondent failed to respond or take enforcement action.
8. He subsequently made a formal request for information by a letter dated 12th February 2026, pursuant to Article 35 of the Constitution and Section 4 of the Access to Information Act, 2016 and that he sought for copies of the Temporary Occupation Licence, planning approvals, Environmental Impact Assessment licences, change-of-use approvals and records of public participation, but none was forthcoming.
9. According to the Petitioner, the Respondents’ acts and omissions violated his constitutional rights under Articles 10, 35, 40, 42, 47, 69 and 70 of the Constitution. He asserted that unless the court intervened, he and the wider public would continue to suffer violations of their rights to a clean and healthy environment, protection of private property, access to information and fair administrative action, thereby rendering the proceedings nugatory.
10. No response was filed to this Motion.
11. The Notice of Motion dated 15th April, 2026 was filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of the Environment and Land Court Act, Order 40 Rules 1 (a), 2, 4 and 10, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It seeks the following reliefs:
a) The County Secretary of Nairobi City County Government and the Chief Executive Officer for Built Environment and Urban Planning, being officers of the 1st Respondent with statutory responsibility to enforce court orders, be cited for contempt of court and committed to civil jail for a period of six (6) months and/or be ordered to purge the contempt on such terms as this Honourable Court shall deem just, for willful disobedience of the orders issued on 10th March 2026.
b) The 2nd Respondent, South C BB Centre Limited, together with its directors, Abdifatah Ibrahim Adan, Dahir Hussein Mohamed and Ali Aden Omar be cited for contempt of court and committed to civil jail for a period of six (6) months and/or be ordered to purge the contempt on such terms as this Honourable Court shall deem just, for willful disobedience of the orders issued on 10th March 2026.
c) Summons to issue against the contemnors to appear before this Honourable Court and show cause why they should not be committed to civil jail for such term as the court may deem fit.
d) The costs of this application be awarded to the Applicant.
12. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Khalib Mohammed, the Petitioner of an even date. He stated that on 24th February 2026, this court issued ex parte conservatory orders restraining the 2nd Respondent, its servants, agents, employees, contractors and any person acting under its authority from continuing or permitting any construction, commercial activity, development or interference with the suit property and that the orders were to remain in force until 10th March 2026, when the matter was scheduled for hearing, and were duly served upon the Respondents.
13. According to Mr. Mohamed, when the matter came before the court on 10th March 2026, the interim orders restraining the 2nd Respondent from undertaking further construction were extended until 20th May 2026. The court also directed the 1st Respondent to take immediate measures to stop, prevent and discontinue any development or omission deleterious to the environment on the suit property. According to him, those orders were issued in the presence of counsel for the 1st Respondent and were subsequently served upon both Respondents.
14. Mr. Mohammed contended that despite having been served with or otherwise being aware of the orders, the Respondents willfully and deliberately disobeyed them. He stated that, in a letter dated 30th March 2026 addressed to the Chairman of South C Management Limited, the 2nd Respondent’s director, Mr. Abdifatah Adan, expressly acknowledged the ongoing construction and undertook to halt it while pursuing an amicable resolution of the dispute. Notwithstanding that acknowledgment and undertaking, the 2nd Respondent continued undertaking construction works on the suit property in open violation of the court’s orders.
15. He further deponed that officers of the 1st Respondent visited the suit property and observed that construction was continuing in breach of the court’s orders. The 1st Respondent nevertheless failed, refused or neglected to take enforcement action, thereby acquiescing in and facilitating the continued disobedience.
16. Mr. Mohammed also deponed that agents of the 2nd Respondent engaged in acts of intimidation intended to deter him from pursuing enforcement of the orders, including issuing threats against him. Those acts caused him to fear for his safety and occasioned him considerable stress, anxiety and mental anguish. He consequently reported the matter at South C Police Station.
17. He maintained that the Respondents’ conduct constituted deliberate and flagrant defiance of the court’s orders, undermined the rule of law and amounted to a direct affront to the court’s authority and the administration of justice. He asserted that, unless the court intervened and cited the Respondents for contempt, its authority would continue to be eroded and its orders rendered nugatory.
18. No response was filed to this Motion.
Submissions
19. In support of the Motion dated 20th February, 2026, the Petitioner’s counsel filed submissions on 19th May 2026. Counsel submitted that, as held by the Supreme Court in Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others [2014] eKLR, conservatory orders are public-law remedies intended to facilitate the orderly functioning of public bodies and uphold the court’s adjudicatory authority in the public interest.
20. Counsel submitted that the impugned construction is taking place over public sewer infrastructure serving residents and institutions within South C; that any interference with that infrastructure poses a serious threat to sanitation, public health, environmental integrity and the right to a clean and healthy environment and that the threatened prejudice is therefore neither private nor merely commercial, but extends to neighbouring residents, public infrastructure and the wider public.
21. Counsel argued that environmental degradation, destruction of vegetation and interference with sewer infrastructure cannot be adequately remedied if allowed to continue pending the determination of the Petition.
22. Further, it was submitted, unless restrained, the development will be completed before the Petition is determined, thereby altering the property, compromising the sewer infrastructure and rendering the proceedings nugatory. Conservatory relief is therefore necessary to preserve the subject matter and uphold constitutional, environmental and planning-law principles. It was urged that public interest favors the preservation of the property rather than the continuation of the impugned works.
23. Submissions in support of the contempt application were filed on an even date. Counsel submitted that the Petitioner has established all the elements necessary to found contempt arising from the disobedience of a court order. Relying on Wanjigi vs Inspector General of Police & 2 others (Petition E396 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 2755 (KLR), counsel identified those elements as the existence of a clear and unambiguous court order, service of, or actual knowledge of the order by the alleged contemnor, disobedience of the order and proof that the disobedience was willful rather than accidental or inadvertent.
24. Counsel submitted that the Respondents had actual and unequivocal knowledge of the interim conservatory orders issued on 24th February 2026, and extended on 10th March 2026 and that the initial orders were personally served upon the office of the County Attorney on the date of their issuance, while counsel for the 1st Respondent was present in court when they were extended.
25. It was submitted that the extended orders were also served by email on 2nd April 2026. As regards the 2nd Respondent, its director, Mr. Dahir Hussein Mohamed, was personally served on 26th February 2026, and all three directors were subsequently served through WhatsApp on 2nd March 2026.
26. Counsel further relied on a letter dated 30th March 2026, addressed by the 2nd Respondent’s director, Mr. Abdifatah Ibrahim Adan, to the Chairman of South C Management Limited. In that letter, the director allegedly acknowledged the ongoing construction, apologized for proceeding without consulting the community and undertook to halt all construction activities. Counsel contended that the letter constituted an unequivocal admission of the 2nd Respondent’s knowledge of the orders and its breach thereof.
27. On disobedience, counsel submitted that the photographs and video recordings captured between 25th February and 8th April 2026 demonstrated that substantial construction continued on the suit property after the orders had been issued. Although officers of the 1st Respondent visited the site and witnessed the ongoing works, it was submitted that the 1st Respondent failed to take any enforcement action. Counsel maintained that the Respondents’ non-compliance resulted from deliberate choice rather than incapacity and, accordingly, amounted to willful defiance of the court’s orders.
28. Regarding liability, counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent was bound by the mandatory order requiring it to take immediate measures to stop, prevent and discontinue the impugned construction. Its failure to do so constituted deliberate disobedience.
29. As regards the 2nd Respondent, counsel submitted that it was directly bound by the restraining orders and that its continuation of the construction works after service and with knowledge of the orders constituted contempt. Counsel further argued that its directors were personally liable because they had each been served with the orders and were the directing minds of the company. Particular reliance was placed on Mr. Adan’s letter acknowledging the construction and undertaking to halt it, an undertaking which was allegedly disregarded.
Analysis and Determination
30. Upon consideration of the Motions, and submissions thereto, the issues that arises for determination is:
i. Whether the named Respondents are in contempt of the Court Orders of 24th February 2026, extended on 10th March, 2026?
ii. Whether the Petitioner/Applicant is entitled to the conservatory orders sought?
31. The Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) defines contempt of court as:
“Conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a Court. Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable usually by fine or imprisonment.”
32. Discussing contempt, the Supreme Court in Republic vs Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & another [2019] eKLR posited thus:
“There is no doubt that an act in contempt of the Court constitutes an affront to judicial authority; and the Court has the liberty and empowerment to mete out penalty for such conduct, in a proper case. The object is, firstly, to vindicate the Court’s authority; secondly, to uphold honourable conduct among Advocates, in their standing as officers of the Court; and thirdly, to safeguard its processes for assuring compliance, so as to sustain the rule of law and the administration of justice”
33. Due to the repeal of the Contempt of Court Act, 2016, [see The Kenya Human Rights Commission vs Attorney General & Another [2018] eKLR] the substantive law governing contempt proceedings is the Judicature Act Cap. 8. Section 5 of which provides:
“(1) The High Court and the Court of Appeal shall have the same power to punish for contempt of court as is for the time being possessed by the High Court of Justice in England, and such power shall extend to upholding the authority and dignity of subordinate courts.
(2) An order of the High Court made by way of punishment for contempt of court shall be appealable as if it were a conviction and sentence made in the exercise of the ordinary original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court.”
34. Additionally, Section 29 of the Environment and Land Court Act under the title offences provides as follows;
“Any person who refuses, fails or neglects to obey an order or direction of the Court given under this Act, commits an offence, and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.”
35. It is trite that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature due to the severe consequences they attract. Consequently, the standard of proof in such proceedings is higher than the balance of probabilities in civil cases although not as high as beyond reasonable doubt. As stated by the Supreme Court in Republic vs Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & another [2018] eKLR:
“The standard of proof in cases of contempt of Court is well established. In the case of Mutitika v. Baharini Farm Limited [1985] KLR 229, 234 the Court of Appeal held that:
“In our view, the standard of proof in contempt proceedings must be higher than proof on the balance of probabilities, almost but not exactly, beyond reasonable doubt...The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt ought to be left where it belongs, to wit, in criminal cases. It is not safe to extend it to an offence which can be said to be quasi-criminal in nature.”
The rationale for this standard is that if cited for contempt, and the prayer sought is for committal to jail, the liberty of the contemnor will be affected. As such, the standard of proof is higher than the standard in civil cases. This power, to commit a person to jail, must be exercised with utmost care, and exercised only as a last resort. It is of utmost importance, therefore, for the respondents to establish that the alleged contemnor’s conduct was deliberate, in the sense that he or she willfully acted in a manner that flouted the Court Order.”
36. In order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the Applicant has to prove that the terms of the order were clear, unambiguous and binding on the Respondent; knowledge of these terms by the Respondent; failure by the Respondent to comply with the terms of the order; and deliberate conduct by the Respondent.
37. By way of brief background, vide a Motion dated 20th February, 2026, the Petitioner/Applicant sought, inter-alia, for conservatory orders restraining the 2nd Respondent from undertaking any activity on the parcel of land adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R 209/11646) and mandating the 1st Respondent to take immediate measures to stop, prevent and discontinue any developments on the same parcel.
38. The matter came before court on 24th February, 2026 whereupon the court allowed a temporary order of injunction which read as follows:
“A conservatory order of temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the 2nd Respondent, its servants, agents, employees, contractors, or any person acting under its authority from continuing, undertaking, or permitting any construction, commercial activity, development, or interference on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R. No. 209/11646), as described in the Temporary Occupation Licence (T.O.L.) dated 5th November 2024 (Ref: VAL. 752/SG/1/0/NNI/pww), pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-partes.”
39. On the 10th March, 2026, this order was consequently extended up until the 20th May, 2026. Apart from the extension, the court equally directed:
“That in the interim until 20th May 2026, a conservatory order of temporary injunction be and is hereby issued compelling the 1st Respondent to take immediate measure to stop, prevent and discontinue any development or omission deleterious to the environment on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments South C, Muhoho Road, (L.R No. 209/11646) as described in the T.O.L dated 5th November 2024 (ref VAL. 752/SG/1/0/NNI/pww).”
40. The Petitioner asserts that the Respondents breached the orders aforesaid and ask that they be found guilty of contempt.
41. Beginning with the clarity of the court’s orders, there can be no doubt that their terms were clear and unequivocal. The court expressly restrained the 2nd Respondent from permitting or undertaking any construction, commercial activity, development or interference on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R. No. 209/11646). It further directed the 1st Respondent to take immediate measures to stop, prevent and discontinue any such development or activity.
42. Turning now to the element of knowledge, it is important at the outset to reiterate the shift in jurisprudence, that knowledge now supersedes personal service together with the penal notice. This position has been endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Shimmers Plaza Limited v National Bank of Kenya Limited (Civil Appeal 33 of 2012) [2015] KECA 945 (KLR)(Civ) (18 February 2015) (Ruling) where the court held that:
“This Court has slowly and gradually moved from the position that service of the order along with the penal notice must be personally served on a person before contempt can be proved. This is in line with the dispensations covered under 81.8 (1) (supra).
Kenya's growing jurisprudence right from the High court has reiterated that knowledge of a court order suffices to prove service and dispense with personal service for the purposes of contempt proceedings. For instance, Lenaola J in the case of Basil Criticos Vs Attorney General and 8 Others [2012] eKLR pronounced himself as follows:-
“...the law has changed and as it stands today knowledge supersedes personal service...where a party clearly acts and shows that he had knowledge of a Court Order; the strict requirement that personal service must be proved is rendered unnecessary”
43. Beginning with the aspect of knowledge of the orders, when the matter came up first on 24th February, 2026, it was at the ex-parte stage and the orders issued in the absence of the parties. The same were however served upon the Respondents as evinced by the affidavit of service dated 2nd March, 2026. When the matter next came up on 10th March, 2026, the orders were extended. Here the 1st Respondent was represented by one Mr Achola. Nonetheless, the same were served on both respondents as per the affidavit of service of 14th April, 2026. In the circumstances, the court finds that the Respondents were duly aware of the court orders.
44. Next is whether the breach has been demonstrated. The Petitioner’s uncontroverted sworn evidence is that the construction continued after service of the order. That assertion is supported by the electronic evidence captured between 25th February 2026 and 8th April, 2026. The videos and photos show active construction ongoing between the period after the orders of 24th February, 2026 and 10th March, 2026.
45. The court therefore finds that the Petitioner has established, to the required standard, the contempt alleged.
46. Moving next to whether the Respondents can be cited for contempt. The Motion names County Secretary of Nairobi City County Government and the Chief Executive Officer for Built Environment and Urban Planning, as well as the 2nd Respondent and its directors, Abdifatah Ibrahim Adan, Dahir Hussein Mohamed and Ali Aden Omar.
47. It is settled that public officers may be cited personally for contempt where they willfully disobey orders directed at the institutions they head or represent. In the present case, the County Secretary is the County’s chief administrative officer, while the County Executive Committee Member for Built Environment and Urban Planning heads the sector responsible for, among other matters, the regularization of property, approval of buildings and urban renewal. By virtue of their respective offices and the functions falling within their mandates, they bear responsibility for ensuring the County’s compliance with the orders of the court. The court finds that they may be cited for contempt.
48. The position regarding the individual directors nevertheless requires separate consideration. A company is distinct from its Directors and liability cannot be imposed upon a director merely because of his office. In Geoffrey Kathuri Kison & 10 Others vs East Africa Portland Cement Company Limited & 5 Others [2021] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held:
“We also note that the 2nd to 6th respondents cited for contempt are directors and officers of a corporate entity not cited in the application, which begs the question whether in such case the directors of a company will be personally liable for contempt committed by and in the name of the company. In the persuasive authority of Katsuri Limited v Kapurchand Depar Shah [2016]eKLR, the High Court (Mativo, J.) in considering contempt by a director of a company observed and rightly so in our view that: “The alleged contemnor is a director of the company. He is not a party to these proceedings in his personal capacity. The company is a legal entity. The proper procedure for the applicant was to apply to lift the corporate veil then go for the directors in their personal capacities.”
49. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Mukuha vs Gashwe & 14 others (Civil Application E064 of 2023) [2023] KECA 1482 (KLR) (8 December 2023) (Ruling) stated thus:
“We find that what the applicant is inviting this Court to do, is to lift the corporate veil, in order to attribute to the respondents, the actions which the applicant says have been undertaken by Naivas International, Gakiwawa Family Investment and Mambo Limited.
39.In our understanding, the applicant would be expected to first move the Court to lift the corporate veil; and if successful, that would expose the persons who might be in contempt. There is no proper application before us to lift the corporate veil.”
50. Upon consideration of the Motion, it is evident that no prayer has been sought to lift or pierce the 2nd Respondent’s corporate veil. Guided by the decision of the appellate court on the distinct legal personality of a company and the circumstances under which its directors may be personally liable, the absence of such a plea is fatal to the claim for contempt against the directors and the same fails.
51. It is at the onset noted that the present Motion seeks a “conservatory order of temporary injunction” to restrain the 2nd Respondents from continuing construction on the impugned property and compelling the 1st Respondent to stop any further construction on the suit property pending the hearing of the application.
52. However, this being a constitutional petition premised on alleged violations of the Petitioner’s rights under Articles 28, 40, and 42 of the Constitution, the appropriate relief is not an injunction in the traditional sense but rather a conservatory orders.
53. The court emphasizes that injunctions and conservatory orders are not synonymous and should not be used interchangeably. An injunction is a remedy available under the Civil Procedure Rules in ordinary civil litigation, while a conservatory order is a constitutional relief intended to preserve the subject matter of a Petition and ensure that constitutional rights are not rendered illusory before the Petition is heard and determined.
54. Speaking to this distinction, the Supreme Court in Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR noted as follows:
“Conservatory orders bear a more decided public-law connotation; for these are orders to facilitate ordered functioning within public agencies, as well as to uphold the adjudicatory authority of the Court, in the public interest. Conservatory stay orders therefore are not, unlike interlocutory injunctions, linked to such private party issues as “the prospects of irreparable harm’ occurring during the pendency of a case; or ‘high probability of success’ in the Applicant’s case for orders of stay. Conservatory orders consequently should be granted on the inherent merit of a case bearing in mind the public interest, the constitutional values, and the proportionate magnitudes, and priority levels attributable to the relevant causes.”
55. That said, and despite the improper framing of the relief sought as a temporary injunction, the court will nonetheless proceed to consider whether the threshold for the grant of conservatory orders has been met in the circumstances of this case.
56. In Judicial Service Commission vs Speaker of the National Assembly & Another [2013] eKLR, the court described conservatory orders thus:
“Conservatory orders in my view are not ordinary civil law remedies but are remedies provided for under the Constitution, the Supreme law of the land. They are not remedies between one individual as against another but are meant to keep the subject matter of the dispute in situ. Therefore, such remedies are remedies in rem as opposed to remedies in personam. In other words, they are remedies in respect of a particular state of affairs as opposed to injunctive orders which may only attach to a particular person.”
57. The conditions for consideration by the court in granting conservatory orders were persuasively set out in Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School vs City County Director of Education and 2 Others (2015) eKLR as follows:
“a) First, an Applicant must demonstrate an arguable prima facie case with a likelihood of success, and to show that in the absence of the conservatory orders, he/she is likely to suffer prejudice.
b) The second principle is whether the grant or denial of the conservatory relief will enhance the constitutional values and objects of a specific right or freedom in the Bill of Rights.
c) Thirdly, the Court should consider whether, if an interim conservatory orders is not granted, the Petition or its substratum will be rendered nugatory.
d) The final principle for consideration is whether the public interest will be served or prejudiced by the decision to exercise discretion to grant or deny a conservatory order.”
58. The court is also alive to the fact that in determining whether or not to grant conservatory orders, it must be careful not to make a final determination so as not to prejudice the main petition. [See Muslim for Human Rights (Milimani) & 2 Others vs Attorney General & 2 Others (2011) eKLR.]
59. The starting point is to determine whether the Petitioner/Applicant has established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success. The parameters of what constitutes a prima facie case were aptly expressed in the case of Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School vs City County Director of Education & 2 others (supra) thus:
“It is in my view not enough to merely establish a prima facie case and show that it is potentially arguable. Potential arguability is not enough to justify a conservatory order but rather there must also be evident a likelihood of success. The prima facie case ought to be beyond a speculative basis…”
60. Applying those principles to the present case, the Petitioner relies principally on the Temporary Occupation Licence dated 5th November 2024 issued by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd Respondent. A reading of the license shows that it permitted the 2nd Respondent to operate a football pitch on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments and prohibited the erection of permanent structures. It was also subject to the acquisition of the requisite statutory approvals and to the condition that the permitted use should not conflict with neighbouring properties.
61. The Petitioner alleges that notwithstanding those conditions, the 2nd Respondent constructed commercial shops, a basketball court and a concrete slab on the property. Photographs exhibited to the supporting affidavit depict structures which, on a prima facie assessment, extend beyond the mere operation of an open football pitch. In particular, the construction of commercial shops appears inconsistent with the use expressly permitted by the Temporary Occupation Licence.
62. The Petitioner further alleges that the development was undertaken without an Environmental Impact Assessment licence or development permission and without public participation. He also contends that the concrete slab was laid over public sewer infrastructure serving the surrounding residents and institutions. Although these allegations remain to be conclusively determined at the hearing, none of the Respondent filed a response or produced any environmental licence, development approval, change-of-use permission or other material demonstrating that the impugned works were authorized.
63. At this stage, it is sufficient that the material discloses a genuine dispute as to whether the 2nd Respondent departed from the terms of the licence, undertook development without the requisite approvals and interfered with public infrastructure. Those are neither speculative nor frivolous questions. They call for an answer from the Respondents and warrant interrogation at the substantive hearing. The Petitioner has therefore established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success.
64. The next consideration is whether the Petitioner and the public are likely to suffer prejudice if conservatory relief is withheld. The impugned works are alleged to interfere with a public sewer line serving residents and institutions within South C and to trespass onto Parkview Apartments.
65. Interference with sewer infrastructure carries an evident risk to sanitation, public health and the environment. The prejudice alleged is therefore not confined to the Petitioner or the residents of Parkview Apartments but potentially extends to the wider public.
66. If the works are allowed to continue to completion, the physical character of the property may be substantially altered and any interference with the sewer infrastructure aggravated. The court could then be confronted with a completed development and the Petition reduced to an academic exercise. Conservatory relief is intended to prevent precisely such a result by preserving the subject matter until the contested constitutional, environmental and planning questions have been determined.
67. The grant of the orders would also promote the constitutional values and objects implicated in the Petition. Articles 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution impose obligations relating to environmental protection and sustainable development, while Articles 10 and 47 require public bodies to act lawfully, transparently and in a procedurally fair manner.
68. Preserving the property pending the determination of whether the development was lawfully authorized will enhance those constitutional values. By contrast, permitting the disputed works to continue would risk undermining them before the issues are adjudicated.
69. As regards the order compelling the 1st Respondent to intervene, the court is conscious that mandatory relief at an interlocutory stage must be granted cautiously. The circumstances of this case are nevertheless exceptional. The 1st Respondent issued the Temporary Occupation Licence, retains responsibility for development control within the County and has not disputed the allegation that the works exceed the permitted use.
70. Its obligation at this stage is not to determine the dispute in favour of the Petitioner, but to take reasonable enforcement measures to preserve the property and prevent further potentially unlawful development pending the court’s determination. The court considers that relief warranted.
71. In the end, the court finds the Motions to be merited and directs as follows:
a) The court does hereby make a finding that the County Secretary of Nairobi City County Government and the County Executive Committee Member for Built Environment and Urban Planning are in breach of the court orders dated 24th February, 2026 and 10th March, 2026 and are guilty of contempt.
b) The two individuals currently holding the offices of County Secretary of Nairobi City County Government and the County Executive Committee Member for Built Environment and Urban Planning shall appear before this court on a date to be fixed by the court for mitigation and sentencing.
c) A conservatory does hereby issue restraining the 2nd Respondent, its servants, agents, employees, contractors, or any person acting under its authority from continuing, undertaking, or permitting any construction, commercial activity, development, or interference on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R. No. 209/11646), as described in the Temporary Occupation Licence (T.O.L.) dated 5th November 2024 (Ref: VAL. 752/SG/1/0/NNI/pww), pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
d) A conservatory order does hereby issue compelling the 1st Respondent to take immediate measures to stop, prevent and discontinue any development on the property adjacent to Parkview Apartments, South C, Muhoho Road (L.R. No. 209/11646), as described in the T.O.L. dated 5th November 2024 (Ref: VAL. 752/SG/1/0/NNI/pww), pending the hearing and determination of the petition.
e) Costs of the Motions to be paid by the Respondents jointly and severally.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 12th day of November, 2026.
O. A. Angote
Judge
In the presence of;
Mrs Kanyoni for Mr. Muchiri for Petitioner/Applicant
Mr. Achola for 1st Respondent
Court Assistant: Tracy