Employment law

Wabwoba v Vigilmax Security Services Limited [2026] KEELRC 14773 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E063 of 2026
Judgment date
23 October 2026
Judge(s)
Anna Ngibuini Mwaure

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Background

The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the judgment and Decree of the Principal Magistrate Hon. Tom Mark Orlando, filed this appeal vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated 24th February, 2026, on the following grounds that:

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Question before the court

Having considered the record of appeal, the memorandum of appeal and the rival submissions by the parties, the central issue for determination is whether the Appellant’s employment was terminated unfairly on account of the alleged desertion of duty.

Paragraph 44 →

Reasoning passage

This Court is thus, unable to agree with the trial Court’s conclusion that the Appellant’s employment was not unfairly terminated. Instead, this court finds that the cessation of the employment relationship amounted to a termination initiated by the Respondent, and that the Respondent failed to demonstrate that the termination was both substantively justified and procedurally fair.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E063 OF 2026

(Before Hon. Lady Justice Anna Ngibuini Mwaure)

PAUL SIFUNA WABWOBA…………………….....……..APPELLANT

-VERSUS-

VIGILMAX SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED……….…RESPONDENT

(Being an Appeal from the judgment of Hon. Tom Mark Orlando delivered on the 3rd day of February, 2026 at Milimani Commercial Chief Magistrate’s Court at Nairobi, in Employment and Labour Relations Case No. E1709 of 2021)

JUDGMENT

1. The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the judgment and Decree of the Principal Magistrate Hon. Tom Mark Orlando, filed this appeal vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated 24th February, 2026, on the following grounds that:

1) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider the statement of claim, testimony, evidence, and submissions of the Appellant in support of his claim and/ or the submissions of the Appellant in support of this claim and/or the submissions of the learned counsel for the Appellant by finding in favour of the Respondent.

2) That the trial magistrate erred in fact and in law by relying on his opinion, assumptions and speculations to find that the failure by the Appellant to report the Respondent to the labour office or the union office was proof of absconding from work by the Appellant and ultimately arriving at the conclusion that the Appellant absconded from work.

3) That the learned Magistrate erred in law by finding that the Appellant was not terminated from employment and was thus not entitled to damages despite the Respondent having admitted that no Notice to Show Cause letter had been issued to the Appellant demanding an explanation for the alleged absenteeism and no minutes of any disciplinary hearing were filed and produced before the Court.

4) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by relying on an alleged letter to the labour office dated 6th July, 2021 as proof of abscondment, yet there was no evidence that the said letter had not been issued and/or received by the Appellant.

5) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by holding that the Appellant absconded from duty without requiring the Respondent to prove the essential elements of abscondment.

6) That the learned Magistrate erred in law by failing to find that the Respondent did not demonstrate a valid reason for termination nor follow a fair procedure as mandatorily required under sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act.

7) That the learned magistrate erred in law by placing an excessive and unlawful burden on the Appellant to prove termination, contrary to section 47(5) of the Employment Act, which places the burden of justifying the grounds for termination of employment on the employer.

8) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the appellant did not prove that he was worked overtime despite the fact that the Respondent herein had admitted that the Appellant worked 6.00 p.m t0 6:00 a.m.

9) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Appellant did not prove that he was underpaid despite the fact that the Appellant had produced his Bank statement and the same was corroborated by DW1 who testified that he received a gross salary of Kshs.10,000.00.

10) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to take unto account that the Regulations of wages (General Amendment) Order 2018) which had been produced, provided for the minimum wage of a night security guard within Nairobi as Kshs.15,141.95 yet the Appellant was paid a gross salary of Kshs.10,000.00 only.

11) That the learned Magistrate erred in law and was extremely biased against the Appellant by holding that the Appellant did not prove that he was not paid housing allowance in total disregard of the provisions of Section 74(1)(f) of the Employment Act, 2007, which mandate an employer to keep written records of all employees containing particulars of employment. The onus of proving that housing allowance was paid was thus on the Respondent and not the Appellant.

12) That the learned Magistrate further erred in law and was extremely biased against the Appellant by holding that the Appellant did not prove that he had not taken leave in total disregard of the provisions of section 74(1)(f) of the Employment Act, which mandates an employer to keep written records of all employees containing particulars of employment. The onus of proving that the appellant was issued with his leave days was thus on the Respondent and not the Appellant.

13) That the learned Magistrate was extremely biased against the Appellant and disregarded the submissions made by the Appellant.

2. The Appellant prays that:

1) This Appeal be allowed.

2) That this Honourable Court do partly set aside the judgment delivered on 3rd February, 2026 in the Milimani Commercial Chief Magistrate’s Court in MCELRC No. E1709 of 2021 and be substitute with the orders sought in the Statement of claim dated 29th September, 2021 filed in the trial Court.

3. The appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions.

Appellant’s Submissions

4. The Appellant identified six issues for determination being; Whether the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the Claimant absconded work and that the Claimant did not prove his case on a balance of probabilities on unlawful termination, whether the Appellant is entitled to damages for wrongful dismissal and one month’s salary in lieu of notice, whether the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the Claimant did not prove that he worked overtime, whether the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the Claimant did not prove that he was underpaid, whether the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the Claimant did not prove that he was not paid house allowance and whether the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the Claimant did not prove that he had not taken leave.

5. On the first issue of abscondment/desertion, the Appellant submitted that the court erred in finding he absconded. He argued that the letter dated 6th July 2021, was never served on him. He stated also that no labour office summons was produced; in any event, section 86(1) of the Employment Act gives a party the choice of complaining to a labour officer or going to court, which he chose the latter and thus was not obliged to go to the labour office first.

6. He relied on sections 43 and 47(5) of the Employment Act, which mandates the employer to prove the reason for termination and justify it, failing which the termination is considered unfair. In support of his case, he cited several cases including, the case of Ayub Kombe Ziro v Umoja Rubber Products Limited [2022] eKLR, where Manani J. at paragraph 37 stated that the law on absconding is fairly settled. An employer cannot simply plead abandonment as evidence that the contract ended. It must show it took reasonable steps to find out where the employee was and required him to resume duty, and where possible that it addressed the unexplained absence through internal disciplinary channels.

7. The Appellant argued that desertion is a unilateral act that cannot end the contract until the employer acts on it by formally requiring the employee to resume work and warning of disciplinary action, then issue a notice to show cause if the absence persists. The employer may terminate only if the employee fails to resume or respond, cannot be traced despite diligent effort, or gives unjustifiable reasons. Without this procedure, the employer cannot plead abandonment as a way of closing the relationship. In this, he relied on the case of James Okeyo v Maskant Flower Limited [2015] eKLR, in which Radido J observed that an employee who deserts does not dismiss himself, so to speak, and that the decision to formally end the relationship should come from the innocent party.

8. He also cited the case of Nyabiba v Apack Company Limited (Cause 2005 of 2017) [2023] KEELRC 672 (KLR), where the court opined that desertion is a deliberate act that typically catches the employer unprepared and could disrupt operations, so the employer should take reasonable steps to contact the employee and learn his whereabouts so he can resume, and must show it ensured he was asked to resume but failed. These efforts at the very least should include issuing a notice that termination for desertion is being considered.

9. Further, reliance was placed on Muthai Muli v Trailink Fabricators [2018] eKLR, where the court held that desertion is a serious offence making an employee liable to dismissal, but it must be proved. The employer must show it reached out to the employee and put him on notice that termination for desertion was being considered.

10. From these authorities the Appellant concludes that the evidential burden of proving abscondment lies on the employer and the magistrate wrongly shifted it to him, when DW1 admitted there was no follow-up evidence, no notice to show cause, and no disciplinary minutes were produced. On that basis, he argued that the Respondent breached section 41 of the Employment Act and Articles 41 and 47 of the Constitution.

11. On award of damages for wrongful dismissal and notice pay, the Appellant submitted that since the termination was unlawful, he claims damages of Kshs.181,703.40, being twelve months salary at the rate of Kshs.15,141.95, and one month’s salary in lieu of notice of Kshs.15,141.95.

12. On overtime pay, it was submitted that the learned Magistrate’s finding that overtime was not proved is an error, because the Respondent’s own witness confirmed the 6:00 pm to 6:00 am shift. The Appellant referred to Regulation 5 of the Regulation of Wages (General) Order, under which the normal week is 52 hours over six days, and Regulation 6, under which overtime is paid at one and a half times the normal hourly rate. He then argued that since he worked 84 hours a week, he earned 32 hours of overtime weekly. The hourly rate is Kshs.15,141.95 divided by 208 hours, which is Kshs.72.80 per hour. Overtime is therefore 1.5 × 72.80 × 32 × 4 weeks × 17 months, which he puts at Kshs.237,619.20.

13. On the claim for underpayment, the Appellant submitted that that DW1 confirmed a gross salary of Kshs.10,000.00, and he produced the Wages Order and its 2018 amendment setting the Nairobi night-guard minimum at Kshs.15,141.95. Hence, he has discharged the burden under this claim and prays to be awarded Kshs.100,829.15, built up from the monthly shortfalls against the minimum.

14. On house allowance, he relies on Section 31(1) of the Employment Act, section 112 of the Evidence Act (a fact especially within a party’s knowledge must be proved by that party) and section 74(1)(i), which requires employers to keep records of housing particulars and of any house allowance paid where wages are deconsolidated. He submitted that the burden of showing allowance was paid lay on the Respondent, which in this case was ascertained when the Respondent’s witness, DW1, admitted there was no payslip showing how the money was paid and thus nothing was produced to show house allowance was paid. To support his case, reliance was placed on the case of Trevar Marambe v For You Chinese Restaurant [2021] eKLR where Baari J, noted that section 31(2) allows consolidation but held that nothing was produced to show the salary was consolidated. Further that since a pay slip or payment instruction belongs to the employer, they Employer could easily have produced the same. The Court concluded that a plain unsupported statement did not convince the court, and held that no house allowance was paid.

15. The Appellant also relied on the Court of Appeal case of Chemelil Sugar Company v Ebrahim Ochieng Otuon & 2 Others [2015] KECA 202 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal at Kisumu held that where the employer asserts that salaries were consolidated to include house allowance, the burden lay on it to demonstrate this.

16. On leave pay, resting on section 112 of the Evidence Act and section 74(1)(f) of the Employment Act, which requires records of leave entitlement, days taken and days due to be kept by the Employer. The Appellant cites Trevar Marambe case (Supra), where the court stated that keeping employee records is a legal requirement and includes leave rosters or request forms, and that the employer’s failure to produce leave evidence confirmed that the claimant worked five years without leave, with no evidence of payment in lieu and awarded the employee leave pay.

17. On costs of suit, he submitted that the Respondent was served with a notice of intention to sue and refused to make good the claim in its letter of 13th September 2021, which led to the suit. And because, costs follow the event, he asks for costs in the trial court and on this appeal, with interest at court rates, and urges that the appeal be allowed as prayed in the Memorandum of Appeal.

Respondent’s Submissions

18. On the role of a first appellate Court, the Respondent accepts that this court must re-evaluate the evidence and reach its own conclusions, but argued that it must remember that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. They cites Kema Investment Ltd v Oroo [2023] KEELRC 264 (KLR) at paragraph 10, which in turn relies on Gitobu Imanyara & 2 Others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR and Abok James Odera t/a AJ Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co Advocates [2013] eKLR.

19. The Respondent also cites Kimani v Warugongo & another [2026] KEELC 3220 (KLR), which quotes Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424, which Court held that an appellate court should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. Rather that it must identify a misdirection, a misapprehension of the evidence, consideration of irrelevant matters or a failure to consider material evidence. The Respondent argues that the Appellant has shown none of these.

20. On whether the termination was proved, the Respondent argues that the real question is whether there was a termination at all, not whether a notice to show cause or disciplinary hearing took place.

21. Quoting section 47(5) of the Employment Act, it was argued that, under this section, the employee must first prove that an unfair termination or wrongful dismissal occurred, and only then does the employer carry the burden of justifying the grounds. In this, reliance was placed in the case of Dungani v West Kenya Sugar Company Limited [2024] KEELRC 172 (KLR) at paragraph 15, which affirms that the employee must first establish a prima facie case before the burden shifts. Accordingly, that in the current case, the Appellant stated that he reported on 28th June 2021 and the HR Officer told him to write down his mistakes and go home. However, that the Appellant did not produce any letter, text, email or other document of termination, so the alleged verbal termination was a disputed assertion which the trial court was entitled to weigh against the Respondent’s evidence. The Respondent avers that merely being told to go home does not presume termination.

22. The Respondent concedes that the Appellant was not barred from suing without first going to the Labour Office, and that section 86(1) allows an aggrieved employee go to either forum. But they argue that the letter dated 6th July 2021, copied to the Labour Office was produced as evidence of the Respondent’s contemporaneous position that the Appellant had stopped reporting to work, and that the fact that it was not served on him does not make it incapable of showing that. They added that the Appellant’s failure to present himself to the Labour Office, after the Respondent had reported his absence, was something the trial court could consider alongside the rest of the evidence, because section 86 does not create a presumption that an employee who stops reporting has been terminated.

23. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s reliance on the missing notice to show cause, hearing and valid reason puts the cart before the horse. It was argued that sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, govern how an employer terminates a contract, so they are inapplicable until termination is established. it was argued that the Appellant was never terminated, so it could not be expected to produce a notice to show cause preceding a termination that never occurred.

24. it was argued that accepting the Appellant’s argument would oblige employers to start disciplinary proceedings whenever an employee simply stops attending work, which is not the effect of those sections.

25. The Respondent cites Ayub Kombe Ziro v Umoja Rubber Products Limited [2022] KEELRC 141 (KLR) cited by the Appellant and argues that it supports the proposition that desertion does not by itself end the contract and that an employer ordinarily should take reasonable steps to find the employee and require him to resume. However, he argued that the case is not helpful to the Appellant as that Court there found there was no evidence that the employer terminated the employee and held that the relationship had not been terminated, which supports the Respondent’s position that mere absence does not establish termination.

26. Citing, Nyabiba v Apack Company Limited [2023] KEELRC 672 (KLR), Muthai Muli v Trailink Fabricators [2018] eKLR and James Okeyo v Maskant Flower Limited [2015] eKLR, which the Appellant relied on, the Respondent concedes that an employer who wishes to terminate for unauthorized absence should follow the disciplinary procedure.

27. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant confuses admissibility with evidential weight. He argued that the letter to the labour office was not offered to prove he received it but to show the Respondent’s conduct after he failed to report which did not in any way ascertain any dismissal. It cites Musyoka t/a Jana Pestcon v Mnyika (Appeal E186 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 376 (KLR) at paragraph 25, which states that where an employee fails to attend work after a notice to show cause, the employer must terminate and serve notice, and where the employee cannot be traced, the employer is required to issue notice to the Labour Office. The circuit of the employment relationship must be brought to an end by the employer in those circumstances. It was argued therefore that the letter is consistent with its case that the Appellant failed to resume duty.

28. On compensation for unfair termination of Kshs.181,703.40, the Respondent submitted that the compensation under section 49 is available only where unfair termination is proved, which was not done in this case, and even when it had been, he argues that twelve months is not automatic as section 49(1)(c) gives the court discretion up to a maximum of twelve months.

29. The Respondent cited Lavington Security Guards Ltd v Omambia [2024] KEELRC 566 (KLR) at paragraphs 52 and 53, which in turn refers to Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti (2016) eKLR, where the Supreme Court stated that a judge has discretion over the remedies under section 49.

30. Reference was also made to the case of Kenya Broadcasting Corporation v Geoffrey Wakio [2019] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that the maximum award must rest on sound judicial principles and the judge must explain why it is justified. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant simply multiplied 15,141.95 by twelve.

31. As for the claim for Kshs.15,141.95 in lieu of notice under section 35, it was argued that there can be no notice pay where termination was not proved, so the trial court was right to decline it.

32. On overtime, the Respondent says that merely showing the span between reporting and leaving time does not prove every minute was compensable working time. He also argued that the Appellant’s computation uses the wrong threshold. That while Regulation 5 of the Regulation of Wages (General) Order, provides a special regime for night workers, with a normal week of not more than sixty hours over six days, Regulation 6 provides for overtime beyond the normal hours. Accordingly, the Appellant, who was working as a night guard, could not simply deduct 52 hours and claim 32 hours of overtime at one and a half times the hourly rate.

33. Further, that the Appellant did not produce attendance registers, muster rolls, occurrence books, duty rosters or other contemporaneous records, so his evidence was a broad assertion. It is also argued that he seventeen-month period does not match his salary schedule, and asks that the claim be dismissed in its entirety.

34. On underpayment, the Respondent accepts that statutory minimum wages apply to the relevant category of employee. But that it does not relieve him of proving what he was actually paid, the period claimed and the arithmetic. It was submitted that while the Appellant’s evidence showed monthly credits varying between Kshs.7,700/= and Kshs.9,400/=, DW1 stated that the gross salary was Kshs.10,000/=, so there was no consistent gross figure to work from. A bank statement shows net credits and cannot, without more, establish gross wage or the components of it. He adds that paragraph 54 computation overlaps September and October 2020, omits other months, and does not match the pleaded periods or the salary schedule.

35. Reliance was placed on the case of Lavington Security Guards Ltd v Orenge [2024] KEELRC 565 (KLR), where the court considered an underpayment claim based on the 2018 Wage Order but still examined the actual salary paid, the period claimed and the documents before fixing the amount. The trial court therefore could not be faulted for declining to award Kshs 100,829.15.

36. On the claim for House allowance, the Respondent relies on section 31(2), which recognises that a contract may consolidate an element for housing, so the question is not only whether a house was provided but what the remuneration terms were. However, it was submitted that the Appellant did not show by cogent evidence that his remuneration was not consolidated.

37. Citing Kimanthu & 3 Others v Excel Chemicals Limited [2025] KEELRC 1572 (KLR) which held that an employer’s duty to keep records does not itself shift the burden of proof in every claim. He urged the Court to treat the Kshs.15,141.95 figure with caution because the Wage Order distinguishes basic minimum monthly wages from rates inclusive of housing allowance, and Regulation 4 provides separately for housing allowance. It notes that the case law is not uniform.

38. Further reliance was placed on the case of Lavington Security Guards Ltd v Orenge (Appeal E018 of 2023) [2024] KEELRC 565 (KLR), the court treated Kshs. 15,141.95 as inclusive of house allowance in that context, while other decisions treat it as exclusive. The Appellant therefore cannot assume that the figure automatically produces a further 15% entitlement.

39. On leave, the Respondent submitted that section 74 requires employers to keep leave records but does not relieve the employee of proving the factual basis of his claim. It cites Sierra Flora Limited v Kerubo [2025] KEELRC 664 (KLR), which held that an employee still needs to prove the claim on a balance of probabilities and cannot succeed on a general assertion over the whole period of employment.

40. They also invoke section 28 of the Employment Act and referred to the case of Kema Investment Ltd v Oroo [2023] KEELRC 264 (KLR) for the point that recovery of annual leave is subject to statutory limits, including the carry-forward limitation, even where records are unavailable. Thus, the trial Court’s refusal to make the award was proper.

41. On allegations that the Trial Court was biased, the Respondent submitted that the allegation are bare assertion. He explained that an adverse finding is not bias. In any event that the Appellant identified no conduct, ruling or decision showing that the magistrate was biased or had predetermined the matter.

42. In conclusion, the Respondent submitted that the Appeal is devoid of merit and while citing section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, under which costs generally follow the event, they asked to be awarded costs of the appeal.

Analysis and Determination

43. This being a first appeal, this Court is under a duty to re-evaluate and re-assess the evidence on record and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify. The principles governing the exercise of this duty were set out in Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] 1 EA 123.

44. Having considered the record of appeal, the memorandum of appeal and the rival submissions by the parties, the central issue for determination is whether the Appellant’s employment was terminated unfairly on account of the alleged desertion of duty.

45. The Appellant’s case is that he was orally terminated by the Respondent on the day he was expected to resume duty following his off days. The Respondent, on the other hand, denies having terminated the Appellant’s employment and maintains that he deserted or absconded from duty.

46. DW1 witness statement before the trial court stated that the Appellant had taken Six (6) off days commencing 21st June, 2021 and was expected to resume duty on 27th June 2021, but failed to report back to work. The Respondent’s position was further reflected in the letter dated 6th July 2021, addressed to the Appellant and copied to the Labour Office, as well as the Respondent’s advocates’ response to the demand letter dated 13th September 2021. In both instances, the Respondent maintained that the Appellant had deserted employment.

47. From the evidence on record, it is apparent that the parties are in agreement that the Appellant had proceeded on his off days and did not resume duty on the expected date. The fact that he failed to report back to work is, therefore, not in dispute. The disagreement lies in the legal characterisation of that absence: whereas the Respondent contends that the Appellant deserted employment, the Appellant maintains that his services were orally terminated.

48. The question that arises is whether the Respondent discharged its evidential burden of establishing desertion and, in particular, whether the circumstances demonstrated a voluntary abandonment of employment as opposed to an absence that the employer ought to have investigated before taking further action.

49. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, defines desertion as;-

“the wilful and unjustified abandonment of a person’s duties or obligations.”

50. The distinction was aptly captured in the South African decision of Seabolo v Belgravia Hotel (1997) 6 BLLR 829 (CCMA), where the Court observed that:-

“…desertion is distinguishable from absence without leave, in that the employee who deserts his or her post does so with the intention of not returning or, having left his or her post, subsequently formulates the intention not to return. On the other hand, an employer may deduce the intention of not returning to work from the facts of the case and should demonstrate the same. The facts may include a lack of communication from the employee, duration of absence, and attempts made to reach out or establish the whereabouts of the employee. Show cause notice to explain the absence may also be a factor to consider.”

51. It follows that an employee’s failure to report to work, without more, does not necessarily establish desertion. The employer must place before the Court evidence from which the employee’s intention to abandon employment may reasonably be inferred. Where an employer relies on desertion as defence of claim of unfair termination, it is not sufficient merely to assert that the employee failed to report to work. Rather, the employer must demonstrate reasonable efforts to establish the employee’s whereabouts and to communicate with the employee concerning the absence and the consequences that may follow. This is particularly important where the employer intends to treat the absence as an abandonment of employment and bring the employment relationship to an end.

52. This view was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Romageco Kenya Ltd v Kisigwa (Civil Appeal E025 of 2020) [2026] KECA 1132 (KLR), where the Court emphasized the need for an employer relying on desertion to demonstrate tangible efforts to reach the employee and notify them that termination on that ground was under consideration. The Court stated:-

“The critical consideration is that an employer invoking desertion as a defence to a claim of unlawful termination must demonstrate tangible efforts to reach out to the employee, with the objective of notifying them that termination on this ground is under contemplation. It is insufficient for an employer to merely invoke the term “desertion” without substantiating it through action and evidence.”

53. Applying these principles to the present appeal, the Respondent’s own evidence and correspondence are significant. By its letter dated 6th July 2021, copied to the Labour Office, the Respondent had already characterised the Appellant’s absence as desertion. It was further confirmed that the Appellant was not paid his salary for the month of June, 2021. Further, no evidence was tendered to demonstrate that before terming the Appellant as a deserter and going further to write to the Labour office, that the Respondent made reasonable efforts to ascertain the Appellant’s whereabouts, establish the circumstances of his absence or notify him that his employment was at risk of termination on account of the alleged desertion.

54. Although the Respondent alluded to telephone calls through which it allegedly attempted to reach the Appellant, no evidence was produced before the trial Court. Further, even after the demand letter was issued, the record discloses no demonstrated steps taken by the Respondent to engage the Appellant or clarify his employment status.

55. In the circumstances, the Respondent’s assertion that the Appellant deserted employment remained largely unsubstantiated. The letter to the Labour Office demonstrated the Respondent’s contemporaneous position regarding the Appellant’s absence, but it did not, on its own, establish that the Appellant had voluntarily abandoned his employment. Equally, the mere fact that the Appellant did not report to the Labour Office cannot, in itself, be treated as proof of desertion because section 86(1) of the Employment Act does not make a complaint to the Labour Office a compulsory precondition to instituting an employment claim before the Court.

56. Therefore, since the Respondent relied on desertion as its explanation for the cessation of the employment relationship and went ahead to stop his salary for June, 2021, they bore the burden of demonstrating the factual basis for that assertion.

57. Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act requires an employer to establish a valid and fair reason for termination and to demonstrate that the termination was fair in the circumstances. Further, section 41 provides the procedural safeguards applicable where an employer contemplates termination on grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity. The mere failure to resume duty, without evidence of reasonable efforts to contact the employee and address the alleged absence, does not, in the circumstances of this case, sufficiently discharge the Respondent’s burden.

58. This Court is thus, unable to agree with the trial Court’s conclusion that the Appellant’s employment was not unfairly terminated. Instead, this court finds that the cessation of the employment relationship amounted to a termination initiated by the Respondent, and that the Respondent failed to demonstrate that the termination was both substantively justified and procedurally fair.

59. Consequently, this Court finds merit in the appeal on the question of unfair termination and so overthrows the findings of the trial court.

60. Turning to the reliefs sought and pursuant to the above findings, the Court awards the Claimant Five (5) months’ salary in compensation. In arriving at this award, the Court has taken into account the Claimant’s length of service, which was 15 months, as well as the Respondent’s conduct in the termination process. The Claimant is also awarded one month’s salary in lieu of notice.

Underpayment

61. On the claim for underpayment of wages, the determination turns on the applicable minimum wage for the Appellant’s category of employment, the geographical area in which he worked, the relevant period of employment, and the wages actually paid by the Respondent. The Appellant’s case, as borne out by the record, is that he was paid a gross monthly salary of KShs.10,000.00, as reflected in the employment contract produced in evidence. The applicable minimum wage under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2018, was KShs.15,141.95 per month. Although the Appellant’s bank statements reflect varying amounts credited to his account, no payslips were produced to establish the composition of those payments or demonstrate that they represented his agreed gross monthly wages.

62. Further, the bank statements cover only eight months and, in the circumstances, do not provide a sufficient basis for determining the actual monthly wage throughout the period in question. The Respondent’s witness, on the other hand, confirmed that the Appellant earned a gross monthly salary of KShs.10,000.00. In the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that KShs.10,000.00 constitutes the most reliable ascertainable figure for purposes of calculating the alleged underpayment. Accordingly, the monthly shortfall is KShs.5,141.95, being KShs.15,141.95 less KShs.10,000.00. Hence the total underpayment for 15 months worked from March 2020 to May 2021, is KShs.5,141.95 X 15 = KShs.77,129.25.

House allowance

63. Section 31 of the Employment Act, 2007, generally obliges an employer to provide reasonable housing accommodation for an employee or to pay the employee sufficient housing allowance in addition to wages, subject to the statutory exceptions, including where the wage is consolidated to include an element for housing. The Court must therefore consider the wage order as a whole and not isolate the minimum wage figure from the conditions attached to it.

64. The contract produced in evidence, which the Appellant also alluded to, states that the Kshs.10,000.00 paid to the Appellant was an all-inclusive sum. Equally, the claim for house allowance must be considered in light of the specific wage order applicable to the Appellant. The Appellant relies on the minimum wage of KShs.15,141.95 under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2018. However, as the Court has noted, the prescribed minimum wage relied upon in this case is inclusive of house allowance. Therefore, the claim for house allowance must fail since the same has been provided in the minimum wage claim.

Overtime pay

65. On this claim, regulation 6 of the Wages (Protective Security Guards) Order, 1998 provides that the normal working week of all employees including day and night guards shall be 52 hours spread over six days. Regulation 7 prescribes that an employee who works in excess of those normal hours is entitled to overtime at one-and-a-half times the normal hourly rate, and at twice the normal hourly rate for any time worked on a rest day. The hourly rate is to be computed as one two-hundred-and-twenty-fifth of the employee's basic minimum monthly wage. Regulation 9 prescribes that where an employee is required to work on a public holiday, he shall be paid double the normal rate of wages per hour in addition to the ordinary daily pay. Regulation 8 entitles every employee to one rest day in every period of seven days.

66. In this case, the Appellant alleged that he used to work from 5:30pm to 6:00am, However, the Respondent disputed that fact and argued that he used to report to work at 5:45pm in order to start working from 6:00pm. It was thus undisputed that the Appellant worked from 6pm to 6am, for 7 days a week, clocking 84 hours a week.

67. Pursuant to Regulation 7 of the Wages (Protective Security Guards) Order, 1998, the normal hourly rate is calculated by dividing the monthly wage by 225, giving Kshs.67.30. The Appellant worked for 12 hours daily, seven days a week, totalling 84 hours per week against the prescribed normal working week of 52 hours. He therefore worked 20 hours of overtime during the six ordinary working days and 12 hours on the weekly rest day.

68. Having worked for 15 months, the Appellant accumulated 1,300 hours of ordinary overtime and 780 hours of rest-day work. Ordinary overtime, payable at one-and-a-half times the normal hourly rate, amounts to Kshs.131,230.32. The rest-day is however not proved at all and will be declined. Even when the Appellant’s employment came to an end he admitted he was on off duty. It is unimaginable a person can work for 7 days a week for so many years. This prayer is not proved.

Accrued leave days

69. The Appellant also claims payment for leave days earned but not taken. Section 28(1) of the Employment Act, 2007, entitles an employee to not less than 21 working days of annual leave with full pay after every 12 consecutive months of service. Where employment terminates after an employee has completed at least two consecutive months of service in a leave-earning period, the Act also provides for proportionate leave at the prescribed rate for each completed month of service in that period.

70. The Appellant alleged that he was granted leave during his period of service to the Respondent. The Respondent did not dispute this fact. The Appellant in his claim dated 29th September, 2021, only claimed for 21 days leave pay. Accordingly, The Appellant was entitled to 21 days of annual leave for one year of service. Using the minimum monthly wage of Kshs.15,141.95 and a 26-day basis, the daily rate is Kshs.582.38. Accordingly, the leave pay is calculated as 21 × Kshs.582.38, giving a total of Kshs.12,230.04.

71. The award of June 2021 salary granted by the trial court is upheld.

72. Having re-evaluated the evidence and considered the applicable law, the Court finds that the appeal succeeds to the extent set out in this judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is varied and the following orders are hereby issued:

a) A declaration is hereby issued that the termination of the Appellant’s employment was unfair.

b) Compensation for unfair termination equivalent to five (5) months’ salary at Kshs.15,141.95 per month- Kshs. 90,851.70.

c) One (1) month’s salary in lieu of notice: Kshs.15,141.95.

d) Underpayment of wages for 15 months: Kshs.77,129.25.

e) Overtime pay: Kshs.131,230.32.

f) Payment in lieu of 21 days’ accrued annual leave: Kshs. 12,230.04.

g) The award of June salary granted by the trial court is upheld- Kshs.15,141.95.

h) The claim for house allowance is dismissed for the reasons stated in this judgment.

i) The costs of this appeal are awarded to the Appellant but no costs were awarded at the trial court and so same will not be addressed in the appeal and so each party will meet their respective costs for the trial court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nakuru this 23rd Day of October, 2026.

ANNA NGIBUINI MWAURE

JUDGE

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting Court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open Court. In permitting this course, this Court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the Court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this Court the duty of the Court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.

A signed copy will be availed to each party upon payment of Court fees.

ANNA NGIBUINI MWAURE

JUDGE

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