REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E107 OF 2026
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Anna Ngibuini Mwaure)
GALILEO INVESTMENTS LIMITED ……….…….....… APPELLANT
VERSUS
ISAAC MUTONGA MAINA…….…….…….….....1ST RESPONDENT
RICHARD ESABU UGUNA……………………….2ND RESPONDENT
BURTON AHOLI ANDIVAH………………..…...3RD RESPONDENT
BONFACE ASHIVIRA ASUGA………………...... 4TH RESPONDENT
(Being an Appeal from the judgment of the Honourable Patrick Olengo Senior Principal Magistrate delivered on 10th November 2025 in Nairobi MCELRC No. E1951 OF 2023)
JUDGMENT
1. The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the entire judgment and decree of the Senior Principal Magistrate Patrick Olengo delivered on 10th November 2025 filed this appeal vide a memorandum of appeal dated 18th March 2026 on the grounds that: -
1. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in awarding severance pay to the Claimants despite the absence of proof of redundancy.
2. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by ignoring the evidence produced by the Appellant showing that they had paid to the Respondent, all their dues under the contract.
3. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in disregarding all the evidence tendered by the Appellant in the proceedings before the lower court.
4. The learned trial Magistrate misdirected himself in law by treating severance pay as a general terminal benefit payable upon any employment dispute, contrary to the express provisions of the Employment Act.
5. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that placing the Respondents on unpaid leave amounted to redundancy and/or constructive dismissal from employment.
6. The learned trial Magistrate failed to properly evaluate the uncontroverted evidence that the Appellant’s restaurant business had ceased operations following mandatory Government directives issued during the COVID-19 pandemic.
7. The learned trial Magistrate erred in failing to consider that the Respondent were released on unpaid leave pending review of the prevailing economic situation and that the employment relationship had not been formally terminated.
8. The learned trial Magistrate failed to consider and apply the doctrine of frustration of the contract arising from supervening Government directives which rendered performance of the employment obligations commercially impossible.
2. The Appellant prays that:
a. The appeal be allowed.
b. The judgment delivered on 10th November, 2025 and any decree or execution thereto be stayed pending the hearing and determination of this appeal.
c. The cost of this appeal be awarded to the Appellant.
3. The Respondents, on the other hand, filed a cross appeal vide a Memorandum of cross appeal dated 15th April 2026 on the following grounds that:
1. The learned Magistrate erred in both in law and in fact in failing to find that the Respondents’ termination was unfair, unlawful, and wrongful, notwithstanding the Appellant’s own evidence that the Galileo Lounge, one the Respondent’s business in which the Respondents were engaged, eventually ceased operations due to the effects of COVID-19, which in substance amounted to a redundancy, yet the Appellant neither formally declared a redundancy nor complied with the mandatory procedural requirements under section 40 of the Employment Act.
2. The learned trial Magistrate further erred both in law and in fact in failing to award the Respondents compensation for unfair termination, despite the Appellant’s failure to establish a valid and fair reason for termination and/or to adhere to the mandatory procedural safeguards under the Employment Act, thereby denying the Respondents remedies to which they were lawfully entitled.
3. The learned trial Magistrate erred both in law and in fact in failing in failing to award the Respondents payment in lieu of notice, notwithstanding that such payment is a mandatory entitlement upon termination of employment, including in cases of redundancy under section 40 of the Employment Act, and in instances of unfair termination, thereby denying the Respondents their lawful dues.
4. The learned trial Magistrate erred in both in law and in fact in failing to award the Respondents their lawful terminal dues comprising accrued leaves days, overtime, work on public holidays, and salary arrears, despite the said claims having been specially pleaded, uncontroverted, and in fact expressly acknowledged by the Appellant in its own witness statement, which attributed non-payment to the effects of COVID-19; and in particular, erred in dismissing the claim for arrears on the erroneous basis that no demand had been made, thereby imposing a requirement not grounded in law and denying the Respondents their rightful entitlements.
4. The Respondent prays that the court:
a. Allow the cross-appeal and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the learned trial magistrate to the extent that it failed to award the Respondents full terminal dues and compensation.
b. Substitute therefor an order finding that the Respondents’ termination was unfair, unlawful, and wrongful.
c. Award the Respondents compensation for unfair termination in accordance with the Employment Act.
d. Award the Respondents one(1) month’s salary in lieu of notice.
e. Award the Respondents their accrued and unpaid terminal dues, including:
i. Accrued leave days;
ii. Overtime worked;
iii. Payment for work done on public holidays; and
iv. Salary arrears.
f. Uphold and/or affirm the award of severance pay.
g. Order that all monetary awards do attract interest at court rates from the date of judgment of the trial court until payment in full.
h. Award the costs of the cross-appeal and of the proceedings in the trial court to the Respondents/Cross-Appellants.
i. Grant such further or other relief as this Honourable Court may deem just and expedient in the circumstances.
5. Parties canvassed the appeal by way of written submissions.
Appellant’s submissions
6. The Appellant submitted that under section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007, severance pay is only payable upon lawful redundancy, service pay under section 35(5) applies only to employees not contributing to NSSF or similar schemes, and gratuity is purely contractual, requiring express provision in a contract or collective bargaining agreement.
7. The Appellant contended that the trial magistrate erred by awarding these remedies without establishing a legal basis, citing cases such as Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 Others [2014] KECA 403 (KLR), Pathfinder International Kenya Ltd v Stephen Ndegwa Mwangi [2019] KECA 759 (KLR), Hema Hospital v Wilson Makongo Marwa [2015] KECA 190 (KLR), Ouru v Eveready Security Guards Co. Ltd [2023] KEELRC 3049 (KLR), and Newmatic Kitchen Kenya Limited v Okodero [2025] KEELRC 3572 (KLR).
8. The Appellant emphasize that redundancy presupposes termination, which was not proved since employees were only placed on unpaid leave during COVID-19 restrictions. The Appellant further invoked the doctrine of frustration, arguing that Government directives during the pandemic made performance of contracts impossible, as recognized in Five Forty Aviation Ltd v Erwan Lanoe [2019] KECA 763 eKLR and East Africa Institute of Certified Studies Ltd v Mayfair Holdings Ltd [2024] KEHC 4482 (KLR).
9. The Appellant maintains that the trial court failed to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 as a supervening event and wrongly equated unpaid leave with redundancy. The Appellant concludes that the awards were unsupported by law or evidence, urging the appellate court to set them aside.
Respondents’ submissions
10. The Respondents submitted that their separation from employment was undocumented, with the 1st and 2nd Respondents verbally told not to report to work and the 3rd and 4th Respondents were never recalled after being sent on leave from 1st May 2020. The Respondents argued that this amounted to unfair dismissal contrary to section 41 of the Employment Act, while also pointing to redundancy, reinforced by the Appellant’s own testimony that closure was due to COVID-19. The trial court relied on the Appellant’s cited case of Mwandoro v Superior Hotels Kenya [2025] KEELRC 732 (KLR), which upheld redundancy in the hospitality sector due to pandemic-related collapse.
11. The Respondents submit that the Appellant cannot evade statutory obligations under section 40 of the Employment Act by failing to formally declare redundancy. They further argue that force majeure is inapplicable absent of a contractual clause, citing the Supreme Court decision in Kwanza Estates Limited v Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology [2024] KESC 74 (KLR), and that frustration cannot override statutory safeguards. Evidence showed the Appellant’s other businesses, including Galileo Xtreme, continued operating, undermining claims of impossibility.
12. The Respondents maintain that the termination was abrupt, undocumented, and procedurally defective, with no notices, consultations, or payment of dues such as notice pay, accrued leave, overtime, salary arrears, or severance. The Respondents relied on authorities including Jane I Khalechi V Oxford University Press E.A. Ltd [2013] KEELRC 578 (KLR), Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd & another v Gladys Muthoni & 20 others [2018] KECA 718 (KLR), and Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 others [2014] KECA 403 (KLR), all affirming the mandatory nature of redundancy procedures.
13. In conclusion, the Respondents argued the appeal is devoid of merit, the termination was substantively and procedurally unfair, and they are entitled to full terminal dues and maximum compensation under section 49 of the Employment Act, urging dismissal of the appeal and allowance of the cross-appeal.
Analysis and determination
14. Being the first appeal, the court must re-evaluate the evidence and come to a conclusion since it was not present when the evidence was adduced or see the witnesses as set out in Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] 1. E.A 123 and Kenya Ports Authority v Kustron (Kenya) Limited [2011] KECA 98 (KLR).
15. Having considered the record of appeal, memorandum of appeal, cross-appeal and the rival submissions by both parties, the issues for determination are as follows:
a. Whether the Appellant’s appeal is merited in that did the trial court err in finding the Respondents were unlawfully terminated.
b. Whether the Respondents’ cross-appeal is merited.
16. In Kwanza Estates Limited v Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology(supra), the Supreme Court stated as follows:
“In summary, the doctrine of frustration releases parties from their contractual obligations when an unforeseen event fundamentally alters the nature of the contract, rendering further performance impossible or significantly different from the original agreement. Key principles include limitation to narrow circumstances, and reliance on events beyond the control or fault of the invoking party, the effect of bringing the contract to an end forthwith, without more and automatically. The final principle is the effect of fully discharging the parties from further liability under the contract from the moment the frustrating event occurs. Though accepted in civil law jurisdictions, the concept of partial discharge has been rejected in common law jurisdictions. This finds footing in the treatise Treitel on the Law of Contract, 11th edition para 50-07 it stated that:“…the contract is either frustrated or remains in force. There is no such concept as partial or temporary discharge frustration on account of partial or temporary impossibility…the concept of partial discharge in English law is restricted to obligations which are severable, whether in point of time or otherwise”
As a matter of logic, the doctrine of frustration operates to discharge a contract, bringing it to an immediate and definitive end. Once the doctrine is applied, the contract cannot be deemed suspended or temporarily inoperative; it is terminated entirely unless the parties expressly agree to revive it through a subsequent agreement.
These are the principles that the Courts have applied time and again when asked to consider the plea of applying the doctrine of frustration. However, the doctrine of frustration is not absolute. The alleging party must prove that the frustrating event occurred without their fault or contribution. Self-induced frustration, where the event results from the party's own actions or breach, cannot be relied upon to terminate a contract.”
17. In National Bank of Kenya Ltd V Pipe Plastic Samkolit (K) Ltd (2002) 2 E.A. 503, (2011) eKLR, the Court of Appeal at page 507 stated as follows:
“A court of law cannot rewrite a contract between the parties. They are bound by the terms of their contract, unless coercion, fraud or undue influence are pleaded and proved.”
18. In this appeal, the Respondents were employed by the Appellant in various roles: the 1st Respondent as a messenger and repairer, the 2nd as a valet and security officer, the 3rd as a kitchen steward, and the 4th as a cleaner. During the COVID‑19 pandemic, government lockdown directives disrupted operations, and upon reopening, the Appellant selectively recalled employees, effectively terminating the Respondents. The trial magistrate held that their jobs were lost due to redundancy rather than unfair termination, a finding this Court agrees with, noting compliance with section 40(1) of the Employment Act and the principles in Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 Others(supra). Under section 40(1)(e), (f), and (g) of the Employment Act, redundancy requires payment of accrued leave in cash, one month’s notice or wages in lieu thereof, and severance pay of not less than fifteen days’ wages for each completed year of service.
19. The courts in Kenya have held that unilateral salary cuts, compulsory unpaid leave and termination via sham redundancy without mandatory prior consultation and Section 40 of Employment Act compliance were unlawful.
This was held in the case of Njoki Kamau -VS- Copy Cat Limited 2025(KEELRC 2330(KLR).
In the case of a NEWS CAFE T/A VIBE NAIROBI LTD -VS- HASSAN (2025) KEELRC 3420(KLR) the court set aside a flawed redundancy process tied to COVID-19 and substituted with unlawful termination.
20. Indeed, the provision of termination vide redundancy is well set out in Section 40 of the Employment Act. It is mandatory to follow the law and that is not optional even if in times of pandemic like COVID-19.
21. The Respondents did not declare their employee’s position redundant but their behaviour in failing to recall some to work and ordering others to leave were clear unfair labour practice. The court therefore upholds the judgment of the trial court and finds Claimants were unfairly terminated due to Respondent’s failure to comply with the set out law on redundancy.
22. As for the reliefs awarded, the severance pay for the Respondents are upheld as granted by the trial court as per the cross-appeal.
23. Further, as per the cross-appeal Respondents are awarded one month salary in lieu of notice each as follows: -
1st Respondent - Kshs.20,000/=
2nd Respondent - Kshs.20,000/=
3rd Respondent - Kshs.20,000/=
4th Respondent - Kshs.15,000/=
24. They were unfairly terminated clearly and are awarded each five (5) months equivalent of their salary-
1st Respondent - Kshs.100,000/=
2nd Respondent - Kshs.100,000/=
3rd Respondent - Kshs.100,000/=
4th Respondent - Kshs.75,000/=
25. Severance pay:-
1st Respondent - Kshs.110,000/=
2nd Respondent - Kshs.140,000/=
3rd Respondent - Kshs.100,000/=
4th Respondent - Kshs.15,000/=
26. In the cross-appeal therefore, the Magistrate failed to award one month’s notice and compensation for unfair termination, holiday pay and overtime. This court finds the Respondents entitled to one month’s notice and compensation for unfair termination but dismisses claims for overtime and holiday pay as unproven under Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act. Also declined are Accrued leave days and salary arrears for lack of proof.
27. Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed, while the cross‑appeal partially succeeds with awards as already set out on paragraph 24 hereof.
28. The Respondents shall have the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal and interest on the total award at 14% per annum from date of judgment till full payment.
It is so ordered.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nakuru this 23rd Day of October, 2026.
ANNA NGIBUINI MWAURE
JUDGE
ORDER
In view of the declaration of measures restricting Court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open Court. In permitting this course, this Court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the Court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this Court the duty of the Court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.
A signed copy will be availed to each party upon payment of Court fees.
ANNA NGIBUINI MWAURE
JUDGE