Employment law

Public Transport Operators Union v Union Logistics Lemited & 3 others [2026] KEELRC 14737 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Cause E047 of 2025
Judgment date
26 October 2026
Judge(s)
Hellen Wasilwa

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Questions presented

Whether the 1st Respondent’s preliminary objection to the Interested Parties/Applicants’ motion of 17 April 2026 had merit; specifically, whether persons whose Magistrates’ Court suits had been transferred and consolidated by the Court’s order of 15 April…

Material facts

The Applicants were claimants in MCELRC Cause No. E3450 of 2025, Kenneth Gitari v Union Logistics Limited, and MCELRC Cause No. E3448 of 2025, Edwin Kinyaga v Union Logistics Limited. They said that their advocates were not served with the 1st Respondent’s…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC CAUSE NO. E047 OF 2025

(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)

PUBLIC TRANSPORT OPERATORS UNION.....……….….CLAIMANT

VERSUS

UNION LOGISTICS LEMITED.............................1ST RESPONDENT

KENYA NATIONAL POLICE

SERVICE COMMISSION……………………………..2ND RESPONDENT

AND

KENNETH GITARI................1ST INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT

EDWIN KINYAGA……….......2ND INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT

RULING

1 The Interested Parties/Applicants filed a Notice of Motion dated 17th April 2026 under Section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rules 61, 68(b) and 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Rules, and all other enabling provisions of the law, seeking the following orders:

1. Spent

2. THAT this court be pleased to review and set aside the orders and directions issued by this court on the 15th of April 2026.

3. THAT the applicant be awarded costs.

2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and on the supporting affidavit of Willis Wetaba Nanjendo, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya practising as Wetaba, Were & Associate Advocates, sworn on 17th April 2026.

Interested Parties/Applicants’ Case

3 It is the Applicants' case that they specifically appointed the firm of Wetaba, Were & Associate Advocates to litigate on the termination of their employment, which is not an issue in this suit.

4 The deponent avers that the firm is on record for them in MCELRC Cause No. E3450 of 2025, Kenneth Gitari v Union Logistics Limited, and MCELRC Cause No. E3448 of 2025, Edwin Kinyaga v Union Logistics Limited, both filed at the Milimani Magistrates' Court in 2025.

5 He states that on 16th April 2026, the firm was served with orders transferring the two suits to this Court, although it had never been served with the application or a hearing date.

6 The deponent avers that the 1st Respondent's counsel had earlier filed a similar application before the Magistrates' Court and served it on the firm on 1st April 2026.

7 The firm responded the same day, pointing out that the Chief Magistrate's Court has no jurisdiction to transfer matters to this Court, which has the status of the High Court. It also pointed out that the prayers in the Applicants' suits form a distinct engagement that arose after the issues in this Court, and that those issues have been overtaken by events given the dismissal of the Applicants.

8 He states that the 1st Respondent's counsel took that advice on board and withdrew the application, only for it to be filed and prosecuted in this Court without any service on the firm.

9 He contends that counsel, as an officer of the Court, did so with full knowledge that the Applicants were opposed to the application.

10 The Applicants contend that the 1st Respondent deliberately failed to serve the firm despite being aware of its objection.

11 The deponent avers that although the application dated 7th April 2026 indicated that it was to be served on the firm, the affidavit of service shows that service was effected on the Claimant Union instead. He describes this as a deliberate, and successful, attempt to mislead the Court.

12 He further avers that there was misrepresentation, in that the Court proceeded on the basis that counsel for the Respondent was absent, when in fact the Union had no advocate in the matter and was represented by its officials.

13 He contends that the application was allowed by default and not on its merits, and that the affidavits of service show the firm was never served and left no room for its participation.

14 The Applicants further contend that the issues in this suit are dead, since there is no longer any employer–employee relationship following the termination of their employment.

15 The deponent avers that the employer terminated the Applicants without allowing the issues in this suit to be ventilated, thereby rendering the suit stale, so the insistence on consolidation is difficult to understand.

16 It is the Applicants’ case that since the issues affect matters in the Magistrates' Court, where the advocate on record is not on record in this suit, the proper course would have been to file a miscellaneous application covering the lower court matters, or to join the parties to those suits as interested parties and serve their advocate.

17 He avers that consolidation is not logical given the issues, but that if it must happen, a proper hearing ought to be conducted only after service on the authorized representatives of the affected parties.

18 The Applicants maintain that an injustice is being visited upon them as claimants in the lower court, and urge that the orders be vacated and the application be amended or refiled and served upon their advocates.

19 They contend that the 1st Respondent will suffer no prejudice if the orders are granted, and that they deserve costs because of the deliberate errors that locked them out of the application.

1st Respondent’s Case

20 In response to the application, the 1st Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th June 2026 on the grounds: -

1. That the Applicants’ Notice of Motion Application dated 17th April 2026 is fundamentally incompetent and improperly before this Honourable Court, as the Applicants lack the requisite locus standi to file and prosecute the same in the absence of leave of the Court to be joined in these proceedings as Interested Parties.

2. That the Application violates mandatory procedure under Order 1 rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, as the Applicants failed to seek and obtain prior leave of the Court to be joined as Interested Parties before filing a substantive application in the suit.

3. That in the absence of such leave, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the said application as the same is incompetent, defective, and an abuse of the court process.

21 The 1st Respondent therefore prays that: the application be struck out in limine for being incompetent and an abuse of the court process; the costs of the preliminary objection be awarded to the 1st Respondent; and that the Court grant any other or further relief it deems fair and just.

Claimant’s Case

22 The Claimant filed a response dated 17th July 2026, signed by its Secretary General, Fenus Okonji. It supports the Interested Parties' application dated 17th April 2026 and opposes the 1st Respondent's Preliminary Objection dated 15th June 2026.

23 On the application, the Claimant contends that it would be prejudicial for it to be dragged into proceedings in which it has no interest, and unjust for it to spend time and money on them.

24 It avers that there is no nexus between the two suits in the lower court and this suit, as their subject matter is different in substance, and that implementing the order of 15th April 2026 would only compound the prejudice to it.

25 It states that the subject matter of its own application dated 23rd January 2025 is the Respondents' violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which has left the workers' position, rights and interests vulnerable.

26 The Claimant contends that the consolidation order would force it to deal with the individual matters of workers who have not instructed it, and to spend time and money helping another party prosecute his case. It further avers that the orders it seeks in its application are for the benefit of all workers and are being properly ventilated before this Court, so implementing the consolidation order would be prejudicial and unjust to its interests.

27 The Claimant avers that under Article 50 of the Constitution, every person has the right to a fair hearing in a matter they have filed in court, and that the Interested Parties appear to have been denied that right through orders that utterly prejudice their interests. It urges that justice requires the orders to be varied or set aside and the Interested Parties allowed to file their replying affidavits.

28 The Claimant further avers that it too never participated in the proceedings that led to the consolidation order, and so had no opportunity to state how the order would affect its interests. In keeping with the right to be heard, it contends, the Court ought to vary its own orders.

29 On the Preliminary Objection, the Claimant asserts that the Constitution obliges judicial officers not to be unduly fettered by procedural technicalities, and that a technicality ought not to impede the path of justice. It avers that the Court has jurisdiction to cure any technicality by amendment without defeating the quest for justice, and that the 1st Respondent has not even particularized the technicality it relies on. It maintains that the Interested Parties' application is competent and properly before the Court, and that any technicality cannot override the constitutional requirement to consider substance over form.

30 It is the Claimant’s case that the Court can act suo moto to safeguard due process where it is threatened by technicalities, and that any defect can be cured on the floor of the Court rather than leading to the collapse of the substance of the matter.

31 The Claimant further avers that unless the order is varied or set aside, it will be implemented against the interests of parties who, though litigants in the matter, were denied a fair hearing.

32 It avers that the application leading to the order was never served on either the Claimant or the Interested Parties, who had no knowledge of the proceedings.

33 It states that no party has shown any prejudice it would suffer if the order were varied, compared with the prejudice already demonstrated if it remains.

34 The Claimant also avers that investigations by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations absolved its members of any criminal culpability and found that those involved were employees of an outsourced company, not members of the Union.

35 It is the Claimant’s case that implementing the order would therefore irreparably affect the interests of the Union and its members, despite their having been absolved.

36 The Claimant maintains that the Court has the constitutional and juridical authority to entertain the Interested Parties' application, which it considers merited and within the law, since it seeks to protect the litigants' right to be heard and to shield them from an order issued in proceedings they never took part in.

Interested Parties/Applicants’ Submissions

37 The Interested Parties/Applicants submitted that the objection is strange, as they are not before the Court willingly, but only because of the orders the 1st Respondent itself obtained. They argued that raising a preliminary objection is a precise art that must be grounded on the law applicable in the particular jurisdiction, and that this objection is founded on the Civil Procedure Rules, which, save for execution, do not govern proceedings before this Court.

38 It is the Applicants’ submission that the 1st Respondent ought simply to have filed a replying affidavit contesting the facts, which a preliminary objection cannot do, and that the objection is not based on the correct law or a correct interpretation of it, and is therefore an abuse of the court process.

39 The Applicants submitted that in their absence, the Court made the orders of 15th April 2026 transferring MCELRC Cause No. E3450 of 2025 and MCELRC Cause No. E3448 of 2025 to this Court and consolidating them with this suit, and directing that the parties in the older suits be served. They argued that it is strange for the party that brought them before this Court to now seek to muzzle them from raising any objection. They posed several questions: if the suits were consolidated, when was a change of advocates effected in the Magistrates' Court matters to oust their advocates; and if they were not meant to be heard, why the Court directed that they be served.

40 They submitted that the 1st Respondent does not appear to understand the very orders it procured, and that it was improper for the Court to grant the orders before ascertaining that their advocates had been served and allowed to represent them on the question of consolidation. They described this as an obvious mistake. They further questioned whether the claimants and prayers in the suits are the same so as to warrant consolidation.

41 On the nature of a preliminary objection, the Applicants relied on Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696, where it was held that a preliminary objection "consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit." In the same case, Sir Charles Newbold JA held that it "raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact had to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion."

42 They also relied on Avtar Singh Bhamra & another v Oriental Commercial Bank and Quick Enterprises Ltd v Kenya Railways Corporation to the effect that a preliminary objection must stem from the pleadings and be capable of disposing of the matter without ascertaining facts from elsewhere. They further relied on Oraro v Mbaja (2005) 1 KLR 141, where the Court held that a preliminary objection "must not deal with disputed facts and it must not derive its foundation from factual information which stands to be tested by rules of evidence."

43 They argued that the issues raised here are ordinarily raised through grounds of opposition or a replying affidavit, that the objection is based on the wrong law and requires evidence to ascertain its averments, and that there is in effect no preliminary objection before the Court.

44 On Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicants submitted that this Court proceeds under the Employment and Labour Relations Court Rules, save for execution. They argued that whatever they are called, whether claimants, respondents or interested parties, the Court made an order in their absence requiring them to attend Court, and that order entitles them to address the Court pending the formalities of consolidation.

45 It is the Applicants submission that consolidation would not have happened had the Court directed service before granting the orders, and asked whether they were served with the orders merely to come and spectate.

46 They further submitted that the 1st Respondent's reliance in its submissions on Rule 55(1) of this Court's Rules is an admission that the law cited in the objection cannot sustain it, and that Rule 55(1) does not sustain it either on the facts of this matter.

47 The Applicants relied on Prisca Jepngétich v Generation Career Readiness Social Initiative Limited [2021] eKLR, where Rika J. held that: “The E&LRC does not exercise transfer jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Act. Matters before the E&LRC both at the Chief Magistrate’s Court and the E&LRC, are regulated by the E&LRC Act, and the E&LRC [Procedure] Rules, 2016……… Parties must avoid citing the Civil Procedure Act on all procedural matters before the E&LRC. These are different jurisdictions.”

48 They also relied on Vincent Mwatsuma Nguma & 5 others v Kilifi Mariakani Water & Sewerage Co Ltd (KIMAWASCO) [2021] eKLR, where Manani J. held that: "…..section 27 of the ELRC Act contemplates that the Chief Justice is to make rules to guide the operations of the ELRC and to the extent that such rules have in fact been promulgated, it is to be appreciated that only these rules will be resorted to in determining how to proceed before the court. And a party can only resort to the Civil Procedure Act and Rules where the ELRC rules sanction it.” They further relied on Benedict Ojou Juma & 10 others v A. J. Pereira & Sons Limited [2016] eKLR.

49 It is the Applicants’ submission that Rule 32(2) of this Court's Rules provides that rules on execution of an order or decree shall be enforceable in accordance with civil procedure rules. They argued that the Rules deliberately borrow from the Civil Procedure Rules only on execution. They urged that because the objection is grounded on law alien to employment matters, it ought to be dismissed with costs on that ground alone.

50 The Applicants submitted that the preliminary objection is irregular, unsustainable and a waste of judicial time, and prayed that it be dismissed with costs.

1st Respondent’s Submissions

51 The 1st Respondent submitted that the Interested Parties had instituted separate suits against it in the Magistrates' Court, being MCELRC E3450 of 2025 and MCELRC E3448 of 2025. It filed an application dated 7th April 2026 seeking to transfer those suits to this Court and consolidate them with this suit, and the Court granted the orders on 15th April 2026, directing that the parties in the lower court suits be served. It argued that upon service, the Applicants filed the application dated 17th April 2026 seeking review and setting aside of those orders without first obtaining leave to be joined as Interested Parties.

52 It identified the sole issue for determination as whether the Preliminary Objection has merit.

53 The 1st Respondent relied on Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings, "either upon or without the application of either party," order that "the name of any person who ought to have been joined… or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added." It also relied on Rule 55(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, which provides that "the Court may, on its own motion where it considers it fit, or upon application by a party, serve or order service of a pleading on any person whom it is satisfied may be interested, affected or necessary for efficient and final determination of the dispute."

54 It submitted that the right to participate as an interested party does not arise automatically, and that a party wishing to join proceedings in that capacity must first obtain leave. In its view, the Applicants styled themselves as Interested Parties in disregard of this fundamental requirement.

55 The 1st Respondent relied on Zephir Holdings Limited v Mimosa Plantations Limited, Jeremiah Matagaro & Ezekiel Misango Mutisya [2014] eKLR, where the Court held that "a proceeding is not jumped into in a haphazard manner" and that, except in instances provided by law, " “Any party, who comes in a proceeding afler pleadings have been closed, will only join on application except where the court makes the joinder suo moto or the party comes as an objector o attachment of the suit property. A proceeding is not jumped into in a haphazard manner. Equally, except a proceeding in the nature of objection to attachment or any other instance provided in law, a party does not become a party untsl there is an order of joinder whether on application or suo moto by the court.”

56 It further relied on Rift Valley Railways Workers Union (K) v Rift Valley Railways (K) Limited; Kenya Railways Corporation (Interested Party) [2020] KEELRC 396 (KLR), where this Court held that joinder of an interested party is governed by Order 1 Rule 10(2), and that "having not been joined as a party to the suit, the Court would have no basis to make orders against a party who has not been formally joined." It also relied on Francis Karioki Muruatetu & another v Republic & 5 others [2016] eKLR where the Supreme Court held that a party seeking to be enjoined as an interested party "must move the Court by way of a formal application," and that "enjoinment is not as of right but is at the discretion of the Court."

57 The 1st Respondent submitted that the Court was never moved by an application to join the Applicants as Interested Parties, and did not order their joinder of its own motion. It relied on Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 7 others [2013] eKLR for the position that procedural rules are not mere technicalities but substantive safeguards of the rights of all parties to litigation.

58 It is the 1st Respondent’s submission that allowing a party who has not been properly joined to prosecute a substantive application would prejudice it, as it would be forced to respond to an application brought by a party not properly on record.

59 It further submitted that, not having been formally admitted as interested parties, the Applicants lack the standing to invoke the Court's jurisdiction or seek review of the orders of 15th April 2026, and that the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application.

60 It therefore submitted that the Applicants cannot confer locus standi upon themselves by styling themselves as Interested Parties in proceedings to which they have not been joined, and that allowing them to proceed in this manner would be an abuse of the court process and defeat the purpose of the mandatory rules on joinder.

61 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection before court in opposition to the application dated 17/4/2026 for review. The preliminary objection is to the effect that the applicants are not parties to this case and so cannot raise a preliminary objection.

62 The applicant IP’s have indicated that the joinder brought them into this matter and so they should be allowed to prosecute their case. The orders being sought to be reviewed transferred two suits before the lower court to this court and these are the suits where the applicants were claimants in the lower court.

63 By virtue of that position alone, the applicants are directly affected by the orders of court of 15/4/2026 and so cannot be barred from filing the pending application if they feel aggrieved.

64 I find the preliminary objection raised therefore not merited and I proceed to dismiss it accordingly.

Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 26th Day of October 2026.

HELLEN WASILWA

JUDGE

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