REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO E685 OF 2026
PINK & PERL WAXING AND NAIL BAR LIMITED…….….CLAIMANT
VERSUS
JOSEPHINE WANZA MUTUKU……………………………RESPONDENT
RULING
Background
1. The Claimant instituted this suit against the Respondent alleging that the two had an employment contract which had a non-compete clause. The Claimant further states that the parties also had a bonding agreement under which it (the Claimant) was to facilitate the Respondent’s professional training on the understanding that she will offer it (the Claimant) her services for a period of at least three years in default of which, she was to refund the training fees. The Claimant avers that the Respondent breached the two agreements by leaving its employment before the lapse of the bonding period and by taking up employment and or associating with a competitor and soliciting for its (the Claimant’s) clients within the non-compete period.
2. The Claimant alleges that during the course of her service, the Respondent got access to information relating to, inter alia, its clients’ contacts and preferences, marketing strategies, pricing and commission structures, supplier relationships, internal operations and hygiene procedures, goodwill and trade connections. The Claimant asserts that this information comprises confidential data which was shared with the Respondent purely on account and for purposes of her employment with it (the Claimant).
3. The Claimant avers that the Respondent left employment in December 2025 after committing acts of insubordination. It contends that the post-employment obligations on the Respondent crystalized the moment the contract of service between the parties came to a close.
4. The Claimant avers that the Respondent has breached the aforesaid post-employment obligations by, inter alia, engaging in competing business and diverting its (the Claimant’s) clients within the non-compete period and failing to reimburse it (the Claimant) the fees which was paid towards her professional training. The Claimant contends that the Respondent’s actions have caused it loss and damage. Hence this suit.
5. Together with the Statement of Claim, the Claimant filed the application dated 27th June 2026 seeking, inter alia, the following orders:-
a) Spent.
b) That pending the hearing and determination of the application and the suit, the court issues an order of temporary injunction to retrain the Respondent and or her agents and or servants and or her nominees from soliciting, canvassing, contacting dealing with, receiving, servicing or otherwise interfering with any of its (the Claimant’s) clients with whom the Respondent had material professional dealings during the twelve months preceding 15th December 2025.
c) That pending the hearing and determination of the application and the suit, the court issues an order of temporary injunction to retrain the Respondent and or her agents and or servants and or her nominees from carrying on, being engaged in, employed by, associated with or otherwise interested in any business in direct competition with the Claimant’s waxing services within Nairobi County and in particular from continuing to operate, work at or hold herself out as associated with the enterprise trading under the name and style of Serene Wax Bar at Elysee Plaza, 2nd Floor, Kilimani, Nairobi.
d) That pending the hearing and determination of the application and the suit, the court issues an order of temporary injunction to retrain the Respondent from disclosing, exploiting or otherwise dealing with any of the Claimant’s confidential information acquired by reason of her employment with the Claimant including but not limited to client contact details, treatment histories and preferences, pricing structures and internal operating procedures.
e) That the court directs the Respondent to remove from her WhatsApp Business profile linked to phone number 0713767412 and from all other platforms within her control all references, advertisements, catalogues, price lists and representations associating her with the enterprise trading as Serene Wax Bar pending hearing and determination of the application.
f) That the court grants an order for an expedited trial of the suit.
6. The application is premised on the grounds set out on the face thereof. It is also supported by the affidavit and further affidavit sworn by one Tabitha Waithera Karanja.
7. Apart from the matters raised in the further affidavit relating to different proceedings between the parties, the affidavits largely reiterate the averments in the Statement of Claim which have, in part, been highlighted earlier in this ruling. I will therefore not reproduce them here.
8. The Respondent has opposed the application. She has filed the affidavit dated 14th July 2026 to anchor her objection to the motion.
9. In brief, she denies that she has breached the contract between the parties. Instead, she alleges that it is the Claimant who breached the contract by demanding that she takes up responsibilities which were meant to be handled by other employees and subjecting her to differential treatment at the workplace.
10. The Respondent admits that she is currently in the employment of Serene Wax Bar. However, she avers that the Claimant’s actions pushed her out of its (the Claimant’s) employment forcing her to take up her new assignment with Serene Wax Bar.
11. The Respondent alleges that the Claimant’s management asked her not to report to work on 5th December 2025. She further alleges that when she sought to resume duty on 6th December 2025, she found out that her workstation and duties had been allocated to someone else. She contends that she understood this to mean that she had been constructively dismissed from service.
12. The Respondent avers that the Claimant cannot seek to enforce the non-compete clauses in the contract of employment after it (the Claimant) unlawfully terminated the contract. She avers that the Claimant should not be allowed to benefit from its unlawful acts by depriving her the right to earn a livelihood.
13. The Respondent asserts that the non-compete clauses in the contract are, in any event, not enforceable because: the Claimant unfairly terminated her services; the law does not allow an employer who is in breach of a contract of service to enforce a non-compete clause in the contract; the non-compete clauses are unreasonable and too broad and will, if implemented, deprive her of the right to earn a living; and the non-compete clauses seek to bar her from utilizing her general knowledge and skills which she acquired through learning and professional development rather than to protect legitimate trade secrets.
14. The Respondent contends that the fact that the suit was filed six months after her contract was terminated is evidence of the reality that it is an afterthought. She avers that the request for injunctive orders is intended to frustrate her right to earn a living.
15. The Respondent disputes the Claimant’s assertion that she has improperly accessed information which is exclusively for its (the Claimant’s) business. She asserts that the Claimant has not presented evidence to demonstrate that the information in question is peculiar to its business.
16. The Respondent denies having poached the Claimant’s clients. She asserts that the clients she deals with are persons she has developed a business relationship with over a long period of time during her career.
Analysis
17. The law which governs contracts in restraint of trade in Kenya is encapsulated in the Contracts in Restraint of Trade Act Cap 24 Laws of Kenya. This legislation is quite restrictive in the sense that it seeks to limit the use of these kind of contracts unless it is demonstrated that their terms are reasonable and not contrary to public good. Further, the law suggests that such agreement cannot be enforced by an employer who is guilty of breach of the contract which contains the restraint of trade clause.
18. The general position in law is that a contract in restraint of trade will not be enforced unless the restriction imposed by it is reasonable. Speaking to this matter in the case of Craft Silicon Limited v Niladri Sekhar Roy [2018] KEELRC 1059 (KLR), the learned Judge stated as follows:-
‘’Courts have generally held that contracts in restraint of trade are generally unenforceable unless they are reasonable.’’
19. However, the fact that the law restricts enforcement of these contracts does not mean that they are unlawful (see Excel Global Limited v Kithinji & another [2025] KEELRC 1687 (KLR)). This fact is self-evident from section two (2) of the Contracts in Restraint of Trade Act which states that a contract does not become void merely because it contains a clause on restraint of trade.
20. In the instant case, the court is asked to issue orders to retrain the Respondent from: working for the Claimant’s competitor, Serene Wax Bar; engaging in similar business with the Claimant; and sharing confidential information relating to the Claimant’s business. The prayers are based on a non-compete clause in the employment contract between the Claimant and the Respondent which seeks to restrain the Respondent from engaging in similar business with the Claimant within a period of one year after the contract between the parties terminates.
21. As mentioned earlier in the ruling, the Respondent filed an affidavit to oppose the request. She contends that the Claimant pushed her out of employment and is thus not entitled to benefit from the non-compete clause. However, the Claimant has denied this assertion. It contends that the Respondent left employment of her own volition.
22. In view of the contrasting positions expressed by the parties regarding the circumstances under which they severed their employment relationship, the court cannot determine, at this interlocutory stage, whether the separation was voluntary or forced. It can only conclude that the circumstances informing the separation of the parties are contested and will require interrogation at the right time and in the right forum.
23. The court notes that the non-compete clause in the contract between the parties restrains the Respondent from engaging in competing business with the Claimant for a period of one year from the date of closure of their contract. In the court’s view, the timeframe imposed for the restriction is neither inordinate nor unreasonable.
24. The non-compete clause in the contract is silent on the geographical reach of the restriction. However, it is apparent from the Claimant’s pleadings that it is aggrieved by the Respondent’s decision to undertake her business venture and or join a competitor who is in close proximity of its (the Claimant’s) business within Nairobi County. In the premises, the court understands the Claimant as conceding that the clause can only be enforced within the geographical limits of Nairobi County. As such, the clause is capable of being enforced with this limitation in mind.
25. As was stated in the South African case of Den Braven S.A. (Pty) Limited v Pillay and Another (2899/2008) [2008] ZAKZHC 22; 2008 (6) SA 229 (D); [2008] 3 All SA 518 (D) (27 March 2008), the court can still implement a non-compete agreement whose terms are perceived as unreasonably wide once it places limitations on the broad portions of the agreement using the blue pencil principle. The court quoted with approval texts on the subject in the following terms:-
‘’... [W]hen a restraint according to its terms as agreed upon is found to be unreasonably wide in its scope of operation, the Court can, in a proper case, enforce the restraint partially, by issuing an order incorporating the addition of such limiting words to the restraint as agreed upon as are appropriate to restrict its scope of operation to what is found to be reasonable.’’
26. The court rejected the notion that by doing so, it will be rewriting the contract between the parties. It held that such intervention was meant to align the agreement with the requirements of public policy as opposed to rewriting it. It expressed itself on the subject as follows:-
‘’In Magna Alloys not only did the Court hold that the onus of proving that a restraint was unreasonable rested upon the party bound by the restraint, but in regard to the proper approach to the enforceability of a restraint its judgment can only be read as an endorsement of the views of Botha J. In particular the Court expressly endorsed the approach of Botha J that in general the enforceability of a restraint of trade agreement in the light of public policy is to be considered at the time at which enforcement is sought and it approved the notion of the Court having a general discretionary power to enforce a restraint partially in accordance with what it considers to be reasonable as a matter of substance and without the need to resort to formal rules relating to severability. Like Botha J, the Court rejected the proposition that this involved a rewriting of the agreement as opposed to the Court determining in accordance with principles of public policy when it should lend its aid to the enforcement of all or part of a restraint of trade agreement.’’
27. In the case before me, the Respondent does not contend that she was operating under any constraints at the time she entered into the contract with the non-compete clause. She does not suggest that she was standing in a position of disadvantage at the time. She does not contend that her signature on the contract was procured through misrepresentation, undue influence, duress or coercion.
28. The court appreciates the general notion that employees are usually perceived to stand in a weaker position in comparison to the employer particularly at the time of entering into the employment relationship. However, this notion can only be sustained if the employee has alluded to some disadvantage which was present at the time she/he was entering the contract of service.
29. In this case, the Respondent has not alluded to any such disadvantage. As such, the court must consider that she signed the contract voluntarily and understood the import of the restriction it imposed on her.
30. The Respondent must have understood at the time she entered into the contract that it limited her right to engage in business which is in competition with the Claimant’s business for a period of at least one year. This restriction, in the court’s view, was not unreasonable.
31. The Respondent is free to start a similar business but not within close proximity with the Claimant’s business. The essence is to ensure that she does not take undue advantage of and divert the Claimant’s business to her enterprise.
32. As I close, it is perhaps important to address an issue which was raised by the parties regarding who bears the burden of demonstrating that a contract in restraint of trade is unreasonable or contrary to public policy. Whilst the Claimant appears to labour under the belief that this obligation lies with the Respondent because it is her who asserts that the contract is unreasonable, the Respondent contends that it is the party who wishes to enforce the non-compete clause who must demonstrate that it is reasonable and not contrary to public policy.
33. This controversy was considered in the South Africa case of Den Braven S.A. (Pty) Limited v Pillay and Another (2899/2008) [2008] ZAKZHC 22; 2008 (6) SA 229 (D); [2008] 3 All SA 518 (D) (27 March 2008) where the court observed as follows:-
‘’ Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis described as a landmark decision, introduced a significant change to the approach of the courts to agreements in restraint of trade by declining to follow earlier decisions based on English precedent that an agreement in restraint of trade is prima facie invalid and unenforceable. In English law, a party seeking to enforce such agreement has to show that the restraint is reasonable as between the parties while the burden of proving that it is contrary to public policy is incumbent on the party alleging it. Magna Alloys reversed this approach and held that agreements in restraint of trade were valid and enforceable unless they are unreasonable and thus contrary to public policy, which necessarily as a consequence of their common-law validity has the effect that a party who challenges the enforceability of the agreement bears the burden of alleging and proving that it is unreasonable.’’
34. In the case before me, it is the Respondent who asserts that the non-compete clause in the contract of service is unreasonable and contrary to public policy. As such, she bears the burden of proving the assertion. Indeed, this reality is in tandem with the dictates of sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act.
Determination
35. In the final analysis, I find that it is not unreasonable to retrain the Respondent from undertaking business which is in competition with the Claimant’s business within close proximity of the Claimant’s business.
36. As such, I issue an order of temporary injunction to retrain the Respondent and or her agents and or servants and or her nominees from carrying on, being engaged in, employed by, associated with or otherwise interested in any business in direct competition with the Claimant’s waxing services within Nairobi County and in particular from continuing to operate, work at or hold herself out as associated with the enterprise trading under the name and style of Serene Wax Bar at Elysee Plaza, 2nd Floor, Kilimani, Nairobi.
37. I further find that the restriction in the non-compete clause in the contract of service which forbids the Respondent from soliciting for the Claimant’s clients is reasonable.
38. As such, I allow the Claimant’s request to bar the Respondent, whether by herself, her servants, employees, agents, partners, associates, nominees or any other person acting under her authority or on her behalf from soliciting, canvassing, contracting, dealing with, receiving, servicing or otherwise interfering with any client of the Claimant with whom the Respondent had material professional dealings during the twelve months preceding 15th December 2015.
39. I also agree with the Claimant that it is improper for the Respondent to utilize information relating to its clients and services to conduct her work with the competitor.
40. In the premises, I issue an order of temporary injunction to retrain the Respondent from disclosing, exploiting or otherwise dealing with any of the Claimant’s confidential information acquired by reason of her employment with the Claimant including but not limited to client contact details, treatment histories and preferences, pricing structures and internal operating procedures.
41. Any other interim relief which is sought in the application but which has not been expressly granted is deemed as having been declined.
42. For the avoidance of doubt, these orders shall remain in force for the duration and lifespan of the non-compete clause which runs up to 15th December 2025
43. Costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the suit.
Dated, signed and delivered on the 27th day of October, 2026
B. O. M. MANANI
JUDGE
In the presence of:
…………….for the Claimant
…………….for the Respondent
ORDER
In light of the directions issued on 12th July 2022 by her Ladyship, the Chief Justice with respect to online court proceedings, this decision has been delivered to the parties online with their consent, the parties having waived compliance with Rule 28 (3) of the ELRC Procedure Rules which requires that all judgments and rulings shall be dated, signed and delivered in the open court.
B. O. M MANANI