Employment law

Njeru v County Labour Officer- Nairobi City County (The Returning Officer-Kenyatta University Branch, Kenya Universities Staff Union (KUSU)) & 2 others [2026] KEELRC 14803 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
27 October 2026
Judge(s)
Dr. Jacob Gakeri

Case research

Open case research →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

the application is statute barred and thus incurably and fatally defective for having been filed outside the mandatory seven (7) days period under the Trade Union Election (Election Petition) rules.

Paragraph 1 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

JR NO. E026 OF 2026

(Before Hon. Justice Dr. Jacob Gakeri)

CATHERINE WANJA NJERU………………………….....…. PETITIONER

-VERSUS-

COUNTY LABOUR OFFICER-NAIROBI CITY COUNTY

(The returning Officer-Kenyatta university Branch, Kenya Universities Staff Union (KUSU)…………………………………………….1ST RESPONDENT

AND

ISAAC LOKERIS…………………………………………2ND RESPONDENT

GIDEON OMONDI………………………………………..3RD RESPONDENT

RULING

The instant suit was initially filed on 9th March, 2026 together with a Notice of Motion dated 7th March 2026 seeking various orders and directions on service were issued and inter partes hearing on 24th March 2026, but a subsequent motion was filed on 10th March 2025 for the court to review its orders and when the matter came up on 11th March 2026, directions on service and inter partes hearing were issued. The two applications were compromised by counsels on 12th March 2026.

On 14th April 2026 during a mention to confirm the filing and exchange of responses and submissions, counsel for the petitioner sought leave to amend the application.

On 4th May 2026, only Dr. Kemolo for the 2nd, and 3rd Respondents and the applicant (in person) were present and a further mentions date was given and on 20th May 2026 only Dr. Kemolo was present.

On 16th June 2026 counsel for the applicant was present but had not filed the amended Application and was directed to file a formal application to amend the application. The amended application was served on 6th July 2026 and on 29th July 2026, counsel for the applicant informed the court that he had received a Notice of Preliminary Objection and directions on its canvassing were issued.

The applicant is challenging the election of the 2nd Respondent as the Branch Secretary Kenya Universities Staff Union (KUSU) Kenyatta University allegedly for inequalities and seeks the orders of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus among others.

The 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 28th July 2026 challenges the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant application on the premises that;

1. the application is statute barred and thus incurably and fatally defective for having been filed outside the mandatory seven (7) days period under the Trade Union Election (Election Petition) rules.

2. Timelines for challenging trade union elections results are strict and implicated the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.

3. the court had no jurisdiction by dint of Rule 3 of the Rules.

Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents submitted that Rule 3 of the Trade Union Elections (Election Petitions) Rules prescribed the duration within which an election petition had to be filed and since the Amended Petition was filed on 1st July 2026 it was statute barred.

Reliance was placed on Lemanken Aramat v Harun Meitamel Lempaka & 2 others (2014) eKLR on the hearing and determination of electoral disputes within prescribed timelines. Other decisions cited to reinforce the submission are Owners of Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (K) Ltd (1989) KLR 1, Sammuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 others (2012) Eklr, to urge that the Trade Union election rules had no provision for enlargement of time or amendment of election petitions after expiry of the statutory period.

Reliance was placed on the decisions in Sakwa v Kenya National Private Security Workers Union & 3 others (2026) KEELRC 632 (KLR) and Nicholus Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v IEBC & 7 others for the proposition that constitutional provisions cannot be relied upon to circumvent statutory timelines.

Reliance was further placed on the decision in Mweresa & 6 others v Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union & 13 others (2026) KEELRC 1681 (KLR) to urge that the instant petition could not derive legitimacy on accord of being described as amended.

Applicant’s submissions

As to whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection meets the threshold of a Preliminary Objection, counsel submitted since the objection was anchored on a contested question of fact namely date the suit was filed, it did not meet the threshold.

On whether the suit complied wit Rule 3 of the Trade Union Elections (Election Petition) Rules, counsel submitted that it did in that it was received by the Registry on 9th March 2026, the 4th day after the election and the date was determinative as the date of institution of the suit.

Reliance was placed on Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 others (2012) KESC 8 (KLR) on jurisdiction.

Reliance was further placed on Order 8 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 on amendment of pleadings and the Court of Appeal decision in Elijah Kipngeno Arap Bii v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd (2013) eKLR.

Finally, reliance was placed on the decision in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 7 others (2013) eKLR on substantial justice and Deynes Muriithi & 4 others v Law Society of Kenya & another (2016) eKLR on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to do justice.

Analysis

It is trite law that whenever a Preliminary Objection is raised, it ought to be disposed at the earliest possible opportunity on account of its potential to dispose the sit at that stage.

The most widely cited rendition of what constitutes a Preliminary Objection are the sentiments of Law JA and Sir Charles Newbold P in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) E.A. 696 where Law JA stated;

“So far as I am aware, a Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a Preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”

Sir Charles Newbold P. added

“A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.”

Since the 2nd and 3rd respondents are challenging the courts jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit on account of limitation of time, the Notice of Preliminary Objection raises a competent Preliminary Objection.

The only issue for determination is whether the Applicant’s application is statute barred.

The 2nd and 3rd respondent’s counsel contended that since the Amended Petition was filed on 1st July 2026 and the doctrine of relation was not absolute the petition was not absolute the petition was statute barred by dint of Rule 3 of the Trade Unions Elections (Election Petition) Rules, 2014 which provides-

“A petition to question the validity of an election under the Act shall be filed within seven days after the date of the declaration of the results of the election.

Under Directive 5 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Trade Union Election Disputes) Procedure and Practice Directions, 2026,

1. …

2. …

3. An election Petition shall be-

(a)filed within twenty-one days from the day of declaration of results of a trade union election;

Under Directive 3(2) a petition on a trade union election “shall be instituted in accordance with the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedom) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 (Mutunga Rules).

Under Rule 10 of the Mutunga Rules

“A party that wishes to amend its pleadings at any state of the proceedings may do so with leave of the court”

Clearly, a trade union election petition is amenable to amendment.

In the instant case, the petitioner applicant was accorded leave to amend the petition on 14th April 2026 but did so almost three (3) months later on 1st July 2026.

Concerning the doctrine of relation back, in Mohan Meakn (K) Ltd v Attorney General (2014) KECA 97 9KLR) the Court of Appeal stated thus:

“As Russel Ag J. observed in Epaito v Uganda Commercial Bank (1971) EA 185 an authority relied upon by counsel for the appellant, the principle of relation back in amended pleadings is a rule of practice not founded on any statutory provision. The principle is that an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date that pleading was originally filed. This is clear from the English Court of Appeal decision in Sneade v Wotherton Baryes and Lead Mining Co. (1901) I.K.B. 295 where Collins MR stated at page 297 that upon an amendment being allowed “the writ as amended becomes the origin of the action and the claim thereon indorsed is substituted for the claim originally indorsed”

In East Africa, the principle appears to have first arisen in the case of Eastern Radio v Patel (1962) EA 818 where Gould JA relying on the above English decision held that an amendment of a pleading related back to the date it was filed. Newbold JA (as he then was) held a contrary view, while Sir Ronald Sinclair preferred to leave the issue open. Newbodl JA’s view was that “Logic and common sense requires that an amendment should not automatically be treated as if it and nothing else had ever existed.

The application of the principle again arose before the predecessor of this court in the case of South British Insurance Co. Ltd v Samiullah (1967) EA 659 in which Law JA expressed no definite opinion on it but observed that “even if an amended plaint does relate back to the date of the original plaint for same purposes, such relation back cannot in my view operate so as to preclude a judge from taking notice of the date of the amendment, if such date is material to the issue for election as it undoubtedly was in this case…”

The principle of relation back in amended pleadings is no doubt as sound one and there is no reason why it should not apply in our jurisdiction in appropriate cases. We endorse Hodson L J’s statement in Warner v Sampson (1959) 2 WLR 109 at page 123 -124 that “once pleadings are amended, what stood before the amendment is no longer material before the Court.” After amendment, the case is determined on the basis of the amended pleadings. In our view however, the principle should not be applied generally to all amended pleadings. Each case should be considered on its merits …”

Similarly, in Agbahomovo v Eduyegbe (1999) 3 NWLR (pt 594) 170 at 185 – 187 HC the Supreme Court of Nigeria stated:

“Once pleadings are duly amended by the order of court, what stood before amendment is no longer material before the court and no longer defines the issues to be tried before the court. This, however, is as far as that proposition of the law goes.

…The clear principles of law establish is that such original pleading which has been duly amended is no longer material before the court in the sense that it no longer determines or defines the live issues to be tried before the court. Not that it no longer exists. It does certainly exist and is before the court. It is however totally immaterial in the determination of the issues to be tried in the proceedings. Thus, it cannot be considered as the basis of ones case on any action. Nor may court of law rely on any such pleading which has been duly amended as the basis for its judgment in the suit.”

See also Dhanji Ramji v Malde Timber (1970) E.A. 427

In the court’s view, since the instant suit was filed within the prescribed 7 days and similarly withing the 21 days prescribed by the Directive 2026 the court is not persuaded that the amendment effected by the petitioner with leave of the court signified that the petitioner was filing a new suit altogether. Having complied with the provisions of the Trade Unions Elections Election Petition) Rules 2014 and the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Trade Union Election Disputes) Procedure and Practice Directions 2024, striking out the suit at this stage for want of jurisdiction would be tantamount to removing the petitioner from the seat of justice for effecting a justifiable amendment as mandated by the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of rights and Fundamental Freedoms)practice and Procedure Rules, 2013.

In the upshot, the 2nd and 3rd respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 28th July 2026 lacks merit and it is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 27TH OCTOBER, 2026.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder