REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MILIMANI
ELC LC NO. E095 OF 2026
JANRED PROPERTIES LIMITED............................PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
WILLIAM JOHN WANGA.................................1st DEFENDANT GODFREY JUMA ............................................2nd DEFENDANT MICHAEL MUREITHI MUTHII.......................3rd DEFENDANT
RULING
1. Before this court for determination is the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 11th March, 2026 brought pursuant to the provisions Article 40 of the Constitution, Sections, 1A, 1B & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and Section 13 (7) (i) of the Environment and Land Court Act. It seeks the following reliefs:
a) That pending the hearing and determination of this suit:
i. A temporary injunction restraining the Defendants/Respondents, whether by themselves, their agents, servants, employees, contractors or any persons acting under their instructions or authority, from entering upon, dumping debris, waste construction rubble on, carrying out any other unauthorized activity on, or in any other manner interfering with the Plaintiff/Applicant’s quiet possession or degrading the parcel of land known as Nairobi/Block 8/219 (formerly L.R. No. 209/20299, previously L.R. No. 209/11136);
ii. An Order be and is hereby issued directing the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) Gigiri Police Division, to ensure compliance with and provide security for the enforcement of any orders issued by this Honourable Court pursuant to the foregoing prayers.
b) THAT the Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other relief it deems fit and just in the circumstances.
c) THAT the costs of this Application be provided for.
2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Sudhirchandra Gajendra Pathak sworn on even date. He deponed that he is a Director of the Plaintiff/Applicant, conversant with the facts of the case and duly authorised to swear the affidavit, as evidenced by the annexed company resolution.
3. He averred that the Plaintiff/Applicant is the absolute and registered proprietor of Nairobi/Block 8/219, formerly L.R. No. 209/20299 and previously L.R. No. 209/11136, measuring approximately 0.4051 hectares; that it acquired the property through a transfer from its holding company, Edifice Limited, registered on 13th October 2017 and that it has been in actual, open, continuous and undisturbed possession of the suit property.
4. The Plaintiff maintained that since its registration as proprietor, the Applicant has enjoyed actual, open, continuous and undisturbed possession of the property and exercised its rights of ownership, including paying land rent and rates and obtaining development approvals. He further asserted that, throughout the period of ownership by the Plaintiff/Applicant and its predecessors, no person had raised any claim, caveat, objection or challenge to their ownership or possession.
5. The Plaintiff’s Director stated that he is aware that the chain of title of the suit property is unimpeachable. He explained that the suit property had previously been transferred to Serenity Homes Limited and subsequently to Northern Trading Limited, now known as Edifice Limited, through a transfer registered on 12th October 2012.
6. Northern Trading Limited had changed its name to Edifice Limited pursuant to a special resolution, as evidenced by the Certificate of Change of Name issued on 19th May 2011. Following a corporate restructuring in which Edifice Limited became the sole shareholder of the Plaintiff/Applicant, it transferred the property to the latter, with the transfer being registered on 13th October 2017.
7. It was deposed that in furtherance of its statutory development approvals, the prior proprietors and subsequently the Applicant obtained all requisite consents and approvals for the proposed Butterfly Valley Development and that on or about 12th October 2009, while the property was registered in the name of Serenity Homes Limited, an application was submitted to the then Nairobi City Council for a change of user from residential to commercial.
8. He stated that the previous proprietors and, subsequently, the Plaintiff/Applicant obtained all requisite statutory consents and approvals to facilitate the commencement and completion of the development.
9. The aforesaid approvals included a change of user approval from the Ministry of Lands dated 22nd July 2011, an Environmental Impact Assessment Licence and approval from NEMA issued on 26th January 2012, comments from the Water Resources Management Authority dated 27th July 2015 confirming compliance with the twenty-metre buffer zone requirement, and the relevant planning and development approvals from the Nairobi City Council and Nairobi City County. He maintained that no objection concerning ownership or possession arose during the approval process, which, in his view, supported the legitimacy of the proprietors’ title.
10. According to Mr Pathak, when the Applicant subsequently sought to transfer the property to a purchaser, it discovered that the deed file had been misplaced, necessitating the commencement of the process of reconstructing the land register.
11. Notwithstanding the foregoing, he averred that the Respondents have, from time to time and without any right, authority or consent, entered the property and deposited debris, waste materials and construction rubble thereon. These acts have altered the natural condition of the land, interfered with the Applicant’s quiet possession and threatened its approved development plans.
12. He stated that the basis upon which the Respondents purported to justify their actions is unknown. Consequently, a Director of the Applicant lodged a complaint at Parklands Police Station, recorded as O.B. No. 52 of 20th December 2025.
13. As advised by counsel, he stated, the continued dumping constitutes unlawful trespass and interferes with the Applicant’s possession, use and ability to derive economic benefit from the property. He maintained that the resulting alteration of the land and interference with its intended development occasioned continuing and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages.
14. He expressed apprehension that, unless restrained, the Respondents will continue depositing waste on the property, causing further degradation and prejudice to the Applicant’s proprietary interests. He therefore urged the court to grant the temporary injunctive orders sought to preserve the property and prevent further interference, contending that such relief was in the interests of justice and equity.
15. In opposition to the Motion, the 3rd Defendant/Respondent, Michael Mureithi Muthii, swore a replying affidavit dated 16th April 2026. He deponed the Applicant has failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, particularly that the Respondents had been lawfully granted occupation rights over the suit property by the then Nairobi City Council under a Temporary Occupation Licence.
16. He pointed out that the licence referred to L.R. No. 209/11136, the same historical parcel identified in the Applicant’s pleadings. He therefore disputed the assertion that his entry and occupation were without any colour of right and maintained that the Applicant’s account misrepresented the true position concerning the property.
17. According to Mr Muthii, pursuant to the allocation, he had lawfully entered the property and remained in open, peaceful and continuous occupation for several years. He stated that the existing structures and ongoing carwash operations demonstrated his longstanding possession and annexed photographs of the carwash in support.
18. He averred that, despite this visible occupation, the Applicant had taken no action within a reasonable time and had instituted the proceedings only after an inordinate delay. In his view, that conduct amounted to implied acceptance of the Defendants/Respondents’ occupation, waiver of any objection and bad faith. He maintained that, had the Plaintiff/Applicant been the lawful proprietor, it would have challenged their possession earlier.
19. In any event, he urged, the property belongs to the Nairobi City County and has never been allocated to the Applicant. He contended that the title had been procured fraudulently through a questionable process intended to deprive him and the other Respondents of their lawful possession.
20. He further stated that neither he nor the other Respondents had been served with any lawful notice terminating the Temporary Occupation Licence, notwithstanding its express provision for notice before termination. He maintained that their occupation remained lawful unless and until the issuing authority terminated the licence through the prescribed process, and that the Applicant could not properly characterise them as trespassers in the meantime.
21. The 3rd Respondent specifically denied depositing debris, waste materials or construction rubble on the property and asserted that the Applicant had produced no evidence identifying him as responsible for the alleged acts. He further contended that no police report, County report, NEMA report, witness statement or other independent evidence had been produced linking him to the alleged dumping. He accordingly characterised the allegations as malicious and misleading.
22. The 3rd Respondent maintained that the Applicant’s claim to ownership cannot be accepted at face value and that granting interim orders on the basis of disputed ownership and acts he did not commit will prejudice him. He further asserted that the Applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success or demonstrate irreparable harm, including why any loss suffered could not be adequately compensated by damages.
23. Conversely, the 3rd Respondent averred that the orders sought will disrupt his longstanding occupation and the livelihood derived from the carwash operations. He therefore contended that the balance of convenience favours preserving the prevailing status quo pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
24. He urged the court to dismiss the Motion with costs, maintaining that it was misconceived and an abuse of the court process, intended to interfere with his rights of occupation and possession through a misleading account of the material facts.
Submissions
25. The Applicant’s counsel filed submissions on 28th May 2026. Counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had filed no substantive response to the Motion and as such, guided by Order 51 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Daniel Kibet Mutai & 9 Others vs Attorney General [2019] eKLR, the factual allegations in the supporting affidavit remain uncontroverted as against them.
26. Regarding the 3rd Respondent, counsel contended that his claim to lawful occupation rested on an alleged Temporary Occupation Licence from the then Nairobi City Council which had not been exhibited. Citing Section 67 of the Evidence Act, Counsel argued that merely referring to a document cannot substitute for its production and urged the court to disregard the averments founded thereon.
27. Counsel argued that the 3rd Respondent’s entry onto the property and deposition of debris, waste materials and construction rubble constituted an unlawful interference with the Applicant’s proprietary rights. Counsel relied on the photographs annexed to the supporting affidavit and the complaint recorded at Parklands Police Station under O.B. No. 52 of 20th December 2025.
28. Invoking Article 40 of the Constitution and Section 24 of the Land Registration Act, Counsel submitted that the Applicant had demonstrated a right deserving protection and a material invasion of that right sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
29. On irreparable harm, counsel submitted that continued dumping would contaminate and physically alter the property in ways damages could not adequately remedy. Counsel further argued that interference with its development threatened the Applicant’s substantial investment and time-sensitive approvals, while the ongoing carwash operations and existing structures would make restoration increasingly difficult and costly, warranting injunctive relief.
30. Concerning the balance of convenience, counsel relied on Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR and submitted that the comparative prejudice favoured granting the injunction, as it would restrain conduct for which the Respondents had demonstrated no lawful authority, whereas withholding relief would expose the Applicant to continued degradation of its land, delayed development, possible lapse of approvals and escalating losses.
31. It was urged that the Temporary Occupation Licence, even if it had been produced, does not confer ownership or defeat the Applicant’s registered title. It constitutes a licence as a temporary and personal permission to use land, conferring no estate or proprietary interest.
32. Further, it was submitted that the Nairobi City Council lacks authority to grant occupation rights over the property privately owned. More still, the alleged licence was expressly limited to operating a carwash and a modern kiosk and could not authorise the dumping of debris, waste materials or construction rubble complained of in the application.
33. Cited in support was Mohansons (Kenya) Limited v Registrar of Titles & 2 Others [2017] KEELC 2730 (KLR). Counsel also invoked Sections 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act and Gudka v Koitaat [2025] KEELC 724 (KLR) in support of the contention that registration vested the Applicant with ownership and the attendant rights of use, occupation and possession.
34. As to the allegations of fraud, Counsel submitted that the 3rd Respondent had neither particularised the alleged fraudulent acts nor produced evidence identifying any unlawful transaction, misrepresentation or defect in the process through which the Applicant acquired title.
35. Relying on Vijay Morjaria vs Nanubhai Shivabhai Masrani & Another [2000] eKLR, Counsel argued that fraud required specific pleading and strict proof, and that unsupported allegations could not defeat the application for injunctive relief.
36. The 3rd Respondent filed submissions on 20th August 2026. Counsel asserted that the 3rd Respondent’s longstanding occupation originated from a Temporary Occupation Licence issued by the then Nairobi City Council for a carwash and modern kiosk on L.R. No. 209/11136, which corresponded with the historical description of the Applicant’s property.
37. The licence is evidence of authorised entry and occupation rather than a competing title, and counsel contended that the Council’s authority to issue it, its continued validity and its relationship with the Applicant’s proprietary rights required determination at trial before the 3rd Respondent could be treated as a bare trespasser.
38. Counsel submitted that the occupied area lies between a road and a river, requiring survey and cadastral evidence to establish its relationship with the Applicant’s registered boundaries and any road or riparian reserve, including the twenty-metre buffer zone identified in the Applicant’s evidence.
39. Counsel clarified that the 3rd Respondent did not claim that a fixed thirty-metre strip automatically constituted Government land and disputed the Applicant’s asserted uninterrupted possession, citing its acknowledgment of his longstanding carwash operations.
40. Counsel therefore submitted that the burden of establishing a prima facie case remained with the Applicant, while the basis and legality of occupation, the boundaries of the occupied area, the Applicant’s claim to exclusive possession and responsibility for the alleged dumping remained contested. Those matters, Counsel argued, required determination upon full evidence at trial and should not be conclusively resolved through the interlocutory application.
41. On irreparable harm, Counsel relied on Giella and Nguruman Limited and submitted that the Applicant had not demonstrated actual and substantial injury incapable of adequate compensation by damages. Although the Applicant alleged possible contamination, soil compaction and alteration of the land, no expert evidence had been identified demonstrating contamination, permanent damage or the impossibility of restoration.
42. Counsel further maintained that even if the debris could damage the property, the Applicant had not sufficiently linked its deposition to the 3rd Respondent, whose carwash operations did not establish responsibility for construction rubble. Counsel urged the court to distinguish preservation of the property from determination of possession, submitting that any necessary protection against further dumping could be granted without dispossessing the 3rd Respondent before trial.
Analysis and Determination
43. Having considered the Motion, responses and submissions, the sole issue for determination is whether the Applicant is entitled to the temporary injunctive orders sought.
44. The grant of temporary interlocutory injunctions is governed by Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The provision empowers the court to issue a temporary injunction where it is demonstrated, by affidavit or otherwise, that the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated, or where a defendant threatens to dispose of property in circumstances that may obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may ultimately be issued.
45. In determining whether a plea for injunction is merited, the court must have regard to the well-settled principles enunciated in Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely, an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate that irreparable injury would result if the injunction is not granted, and where the court is in doubt, the matter is to be determined on a balance of convenience.
46. These requirements must be satisfied sequentially. As affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the establishment of a prima facie case, proof of irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience are distinct and logical hurdles, each of which must be satisfied before the court can grant interlocutory injunctive relief.
47. Beginning with a prima facie case, as cited by the parties the same was succinctly defined in Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] eKLR thus:
“...So, what is a prima facie case? I would say that in civil cases it is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”
48. In Nguruman Limited vs Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others(supra), the Court of Appeal affirmed the definition of a prima facie case in Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd(supra) and clarified that an applicant must demonstrate a clear and identifiable right that is directly threatened by the act sought to be restrained. The invasion of the right must be substantive and that there must be urgency to prevent irreparable harm.
49. It further held that, at the interlocutory stage, the court does not conduct a mini-trial but only determines whether an applicant has shown a bona fide and arguable claim, proved on a balance of probabilities, which appears more likely than not to ultimately succeed.
50. By way of brief background, the Applicant seeks, inter alia, declarations affirming its ownership and right to peaceful and exclusive possession of Nairobi/Block 8/219, formerly L.R. No. 209/20299 and previously L.R. No. 209/11136, and that the Respondents have no lawful interest therein and their entry and dumping activities constitute trespass.
51. It also seeks a mandatory injunction compelling the Respondents to remove the deposited materials and restore the property, failing which it be authorised to undertake the removal at their expense; a permanent injunction restraining further entry, dumping or other unauthorised interference; police assistance in enforcing the orders; general damages for trespass, encroachment, loss of use and development opportunity, physical damage and consequential losses; and costs.
52. It is the Applicant’s case that it is the lawful registered proprietor of the suit property, measuring approximately 0.4051 hectares, having acquired it from its holding company, Edifice Limited, through a transfer registered on 13th October 2017. It avers that Serenity Homes Limited had previously transferred the property to Northern Trading Limited, now known as Edifice Limited, on 12th October 2012, and that the subsequent transfer to the Plaintiff followed a corporate restructuring in which Edifice Limited became its sole shareholder.
53. The Applicant maintains that it and its predecessor have enjoyed actual, open, continuous and uninterrupted possession, manifested by payment of land rent and rates, commissioning of development plans and consultancy services, procurement of statutory approvals and general oversight of the property. It further avers that no adverse claim, caveat or objection to ownership or possession arose during that period or the process of obtaining approvals for the proposed Butterfly Valley Development.
54. The Applicant alleges that, notwithstanding its title and possession, the Respondents unlawfully entered the property in or about December 2025 and have subsequently continued to dump debris, waste materials and construction rubble thereon and encroached upon it by constructing a wall. It contends that these activities have degraded and physically altered the land, interfered with its quiet possession and obstructed the implementation and completion of the approved development, thereby occasioning substantial and continuing loss.
55. In response, the 3rd Respondent maintains that he and the 1st and 2nd Respondents are lawfully on the parcel of land known as L.R No. 209/11136, pursuant to an occupation license granted to them on 17th June, 2010 which permitted them entry into the property from the year 2012. He states that he has a carwash on the property which he has been openly operating for several years. He however disputes any dumping of debris as alleged.
56. The court has considered the evidence. The Applicant has produced title documents tracing its acquisition of the suit property from Edifice Limited and a converted Certificate of Lease identifying it as the registered proprietor of Nairobi/Block 8/219, formerly L.R. No. 209/20299 and previously L.R. No. 209/11136.
57. Conversely, the 3rd Respondent relies on a letter dated 17th June 2010 from the then Nairobi City Council concerning a Temporary Occupation Licence over L.R. No. 209/11136, which he acknowledges corresponds to the historical description of the suit property.
58. He maintains that he and the other Respondents entered and remain on the property lawfully pursuant to that licence and has adduced photographs depicting existing structures and ongoing carwash operations in support of his asserted longstanding occupation.
59. The Respondents admittedly occupy land described as L.R. No. 209/11136, which is the former description of the suit property, subsequently known as L.R. No. 209/20299 and now registered as Nairobi/Block 8/219. Their occupation therefore relates to the very property in respect of which the Applicant has produced documents establishing its registered proprietary interest.
60. Although the Respondents rely on a Temporary Occupation Licence, that instrument does not, on its face, confer ownership or displace the Applicant’s documented title. The competing positions in this regard are matters for trial. Considering the ownership documents exhibited by the Plaintiff, it is the finding of the court that the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success.
61. On the issue of whether the Applicant will suffer irreparable harm which cannot be adequately compensated by an award of damages, the Applicant must demonstrate that it is a harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms or cannot be cured. The judicial decision of Pius Kipchirchir Kogo vs Frank Kimeli Tenai (2018) eKLR provides an explanation for what is meant by irreparable injury and it states:
“Irreparable injury means that the injury must be one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages and that the existence of a prima facie case is not itself sufficient. The Applicant should further show that irreparable injury will occur to him if the injunction is not granted and there is no other remedy open to him by which he will protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury.”
62. The Applicant contends that continued dumping of debris, waste materials and construction rubble will degrade and physically alter the suit property, thereby occasioning harm that damages cannot adequately remedy. The apprehended injury thus arises principally from the alleged dumping rather than the carwash operations themselves.
63. However, the 3rd Respondent expressly denies responsibility for the dumping, and although the photographs depict rubble, they do not establish that he or the other Respondents deposited it or caused its deposition. Indeed, the OB referenced is simply a complaint against the dumping. Accordingly, the court is not satisfied that irreparable injury attributable to the Respondents has been established.
64. On the balance of convenience, the court must weigh the prejudice likely to be occasioned to either party by altering the existing position. The Applicant asserts registered ownership, while the Respondents remain in occupation and operate a carwash under an asserted Temporary Occupation Licence.
65. Orders restraining their entry or continued activities would effectively disturb that occupation before its legality is determined. In these circumstances, preserving the prevailing position would minimise prejudice to either party and safeguard the subject matter pending determination of their competing claims, making an order for maintenance of the status quo appropriate.
66. Indeed, an order for the maintenance of status quo is different from an order of injunction, both in terms of the principles for grant and the practical effect of each.
67. While the latter is a substantive equitable remedy granted upon establishment of a right, or at interlocutory stage, a prima facie case, among other principles to be considered, the former is simply an ancillary order for the preservation of the situation as it exists in relation to pending proceedings before the hearing and determination thereof. That is the most appropriate order to make in the circumstances of this court.
68. In the end, the court directs as follows:
a) Pending the hearing and determination of the suit, the prevailing status quo in respect of Nairobi/Block 8/219, formerly L.R. No. 209/20299 and previously L.R. No. 209/11136, shall be maintained pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
b) For avoidance of doubt, the Respondents shall remain in occupation of the suit property and continue the existing carwash operations without expansion or development, depositing of materials or debris or changing the character of the occupied area as it is now pending the hearing and disposal of the suit.
c) Costs of the application shall be in the cause.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 12th day of November, 2026.
O. A. Angote
Judge
In the presence of;
Ms Adoyo for 3rd Defendant
Mr. Koech for Otwal for Plaintiff/Applicant
Court Assistant: Tracy