Employment law

Simiyu v Born Free Foundation Kenya [2026] KEELRC 14831 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Cause E520 of 2026
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
C. N. Baari

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Background

This ruling relates to the Claimant/Applicant’s two Notice of Motion applications, one dated 13th May, 2026 and another dated 20th May, 2026. The application dated 13th May, 2026, which is brought pursuant to Article 41 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Sections 12 & 17 of the ELRC Act, and Rule 16 of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules 2024, seeks orders that: -

Paragraph 1 →

Decision / orders

Accordingly, I dismiss the applications dated 13th May, 2026 and 20th May, 2026 in their entirety.

Paragraph 41 →

Reasoning passage

In whole, I find and hold that the Applicant has not established the requisite conditions for the interlocutory reliefs sought.

Paragraph 40 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

CAUSE NO. E520 OF 2026.

 

NEWTON MUSE SIMIYU…...…..............................................CLAIMANT

VERSUS

BORN FREE FOUNDATION KENYA………………………..RESPONDENT

RULING

1. This ruling relates to the Claimant/Applicant’s two Notice of Motion applications, one dated 13th May, 2026 and another dated 20th May, 2026. The application dated 13th May, 2026, which is brought pursuant to Article 41 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Sections 12 & 17 of the ELRC Act, and Rule 16 of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules 2024, seeks orders that: -

i. Spent

ii. Spent

iii. THAT this Court be pleased to issue an order compelling the Respondent to maintain the status quo ante pending the hearing of the main Suit;

iv. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order staying the operation of the "Notice of Intended Redundancy" dated 16th April, 2026, pending the hearing and determination of this Suit;

v. THAT this Honourable Court do issue an order compelling the Respondent to allow the Applicant access to the workplace and to continue paying his salary pending the hearing of the main Cause, as the redundancy is procedurally null and void; and

vi. THAT the costs of this application be provided for

2. In his Motion dated 20th May, 2026, the Claimant/Applicant further seeks the following reliefs: -

i. Spent

ii. Spent

iii. THAT this Court be pleased to issue an order compelling the Respondent to reinstate the Applicant to his position pending hearing of the main Suit;

iv. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order compelling the Respondent to reinstate the status quo ante prevailing prior to 10th April, 2026 pending the hearing and determination of this Suit;

v. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order staying the operation of the “Notice of Intended Redundancy” dated 10th April, 2026 and the purported termination letter dated 20th May, 2026 pending the hearing and determination of the main Suit;

vi. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order restraining the Respondent from conducting any interviews, making any offers, or executing any contracts for the positions advertised on 23rd April, 2026 or any replacement positions, until the Court determines the legality of the redundancy process.

vii. THAT the costs of this application be provided for.

3. The applications are supported by grounds on the face thereof and the affidavits sworn by NEWTON MUSE SIMIYU, the Claimant/Applicant, on 13th & 20th May, 2026.

4. The Claimant/Applicant contends that the Respondent’s intended redundancy process, which has now been effected, is unlawful and predetermined. He states that although he was issued with a notice of intended redundancy on 16th April, 2026, the Respondent advertised new coordinator positions on 23rd April, 2026 before conducting the promised consultations.

5. He avers that despite his request for a meeting to discuss redeployment and seniority, the Respondent has not scheduled consultations and has instead directed him to compete for his current or other positions through interviews scheduled for 15th May, 2026. He further states that the Respondent failed to notify the Labour Officer as required under Section 40 of the Employment Act, rendering the redundancy process unlawful.

6. The Applicant further alleges that the redundancy process is a sham and was intended to target him individually, noting that the Respondent is retaining the Landscape Manager position. He reiterates that the Labour Officer was not notified as required by law and contends that, without the Court’s intervention, he faces imminent unlawful termination, resulting in irreparable financial and psychological harm.

7. He maintains that the matter raises a prima facie case warranting the Court’s urgent intervention and the grant of the orders sought.

8. The Claimant/Applicant in his latter application of 20th May, 2026, goes on to state that the Respondent was served with the Court’s directions on 14th May, 2026, fixing an inter partes hearing for the application dated 13th May, 2026 on 17th June, 2026, but nevertheless it proceeded to terminate his employment with immediate effect on 20th May, 2026.

9. He contends that the termination occurred before the expiry of the mandatory 30-day consultation period under Section 40(1)(b) of the Employment Act, and while his application for injunctive relief was pending.

10. He further argues that allowing the Respondent to complete the recruitment process and fill his position would render the main claim nugatory, as reinstating his institutional position and restoring his career progression would be difficult even if he succeeds at trial.

11. The Applicant states that his loss of employment during the pendency of this suit will cause irreparable psychological, professional, and financial harm. It is his argument that the orders sought would preserve the status quo and allow the Respondent to undertake a lawful, transparent, and consultative redundancy process while he remains ready and willing to work.

12. He maintains that denying the injunction would result in irreversible prejudice by allowing the Respondent to fill his position externally, leaving him with a claim for damages that cannot adequately compensate for the loss of a career spanning over a decade.

13. The Claimant/Applicant therefore asserts that he has established a prima facie case warranting the Court’s intervention.

14. The Respondent opposed both motions vide grounds of opposition dated 17th June, 2026. In respect of the Motion dated 13th May, 2026, the Respondent argues that the motion has been overtaken by events following the termination of the Claimant’s employment, rendering the prayers for injunctive relief academic and incapable of effective enforcement.

15. It argues that the application as drawn requires the Court to determine substantive issues concerning the legality and procedural fairness of the redundancy prematurely.

16. It further contends that the Claimant has adequate statutory remedies if the termination is ultimately found unfair, that the alleged injury is compensable by damages, and that the application fails to meet the threshold for interlocutory injunctive relief.

17. It is the Respondent’s position that the orders sought will improperly interfere with its managerial prerogative, particularly in the absence of an order preserving the employment relationship before termination.

18. On the motion dated 20th May, 2026, the Respondent contends that the application is misconceived and incompetent in so far as it seeks final reliefs at an interlocutory stage, such as reinstatement and restoration of the status quo ante following a completed redundancy. It argues that the orders sought are mandatory in nature and would substantially determine the main claim without a full hearing.

19. The Respondent maintains that reinstatement is an exceptional final remedy and that the Claimant has not satisfied the heightened threshold for a mandatory injunction. It further submits that the alleged loss is compensable through statutory and monetary remedies, including notice pay, severance pay, accrued benefits and compensation for unfair termination, should the Claimant succeed at trial.

20. The Respondent further argues that the application improperly seeks to interfere with its managerial prerogative to restructure its operations and recruit according to operational needs before the legality of the redundancy is determined.

21. It maintains that the Court’s directions of 14th May, 2026 merely required service and the filing of responses and did not restrain it from proceeding with the redundancy. The Respondent therefore argues that the application is an abuse of the court process and seeks its dismissal with costs.

22. Parties’ submissions on both motions have been duly considered.

Analysis and Determination

23. The issues for my determination are: -

i. Whether the Claimant/Applicant has established a basis for interlocutory injunctive relief in respect of the redundancy process; and

ii. Whether the Court can properly order his reinstatement before the substantive claim is heard.

24. I will proceed to consider the two applications together as they arise from the same redundancy process.

25. In Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358, it is settled that for an applicant to qualify for injunctive reliefs, he/she must establish:

i. A prima facie case with a probability of success;

ii. A likelihood of suffering irreparable injury that cannot adequately be compensated by damages; and

iii. Where the Court is in doubt, a balance of convenience favouring the grant of an injunction.

26. The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others [2013] KECA 347 (KLR) emphasized that failure to establish a prima facie case is sufficient to defeat the application without proceeding to the remaining conditions set out in Giella v. Cassman brown (Supra).

27. A glance at the Claimant/Applicant’s first application, dated 13th May, 2026, makes it clear that what he sought was to preserve the employment relationship and restrain implementation of the intended redundancy. It is, however, evident that the Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment on 20th May, 2026. For this reason, the prayers seeking to prevent the threatened termination have, to that extent, been overtaken by events, and so I hold.

28. Further, the Applicant asserts that the Respondent proceeded with termination despite service of the Court’s directions on 14th May, 2026. It is, in my view, important to distinguish service of directions fixing an inter partes hearing from service of an injunction restraining termination.

29. The directions as drawn merely required service and the filing of responses, and did not expressly prohibit the Respondent from implementing the redundancy.

30. The Respondent’s decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment while the application was pending therefore cannot, without more, be treated as disobedience of a court order. Nevertheless, the timing of the termination is relevant to the assessment of the Applicant’s allegation that the redundancy was predetermined.

31. Further, the Applicant’s contention that the Respondent advertised coordinator positions on 23rd April, 2026, while requiring him to compete for his current or other positions, raises a legitimate question about the genuineness of the redundancy. However, at this interlocutory stage, the Court cannot conclude, without examining the relevant job descriptions, organizational structure, and evidence of consultation, that the process was necessarily a sham.

32. What the Applicant has therefore raised are, in my view, issues deserving determination at the full trial.

33. As regards irreparable injury, the Applicant relies on the loss of a career spanning more than a decade, as well as psychological, professional and financial harm. These no doubt are understandable concerns. The Employment Act, however, provides remedies for unfair termination, including compensation under Section 49, while Section 12(3) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act empowers the Court to grant appropriate relief, including reinstatement where legally justified.

34. This is not to say that the existence of these remedies automatically defeats an application for injunction, but the Applicant needed to demonstrate why the remedies listed would be inadequate in the circumstances of his case. The asserted loss of career progression, without further evidence of a particular injury that monetary relief or an appropriate final remedy cannot adequately address, does not by itself establish irreparable harm.

35. Further, the prayer for reinstatement that the Applicant seeks at this stage will without a doubt compel the Respondent to restore an employment relationship that has already been terminated, and which will amount to granting a principal remedy before trial.

36. The Applicant has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant that course.

37. In the circumstances, the balance of convenience favours allowing the substantive claim to proceed expeditiously rather than granting interlocutory reinstatement.

38. The same conclusion applies to the prayer for restoration of the status quo ante and continued payment of salary. The orders, if granted, will in substance reverse the completed termination and restore the employment relationship. They are not merely preservatory orders and have not been justified.

39. Finally, on the Claimant/Applicant’s prayer for an order restraining interviews, offers and contracts for the advertised positions, the Applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that recruitment into the advertised positions would necessarily defeat the main claim or that damages and other final remedies would be inadequate.

40. In whole, I find and hold that the Applicant has not established the requisite conditions for the interlocutory reliefs sought.

41. Accordingly, I dismiss the applications dated 13th May, 2026 and 20th May, 2026 in their entirety.

42. The costs of the applications shall be in the cause.

43. Orders of the Court.

SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED BY VIDEO-LINK AND IN COURT AT NAIROBI THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

C. N. BAARI

JUDGE

Appearance:

Mr. Wesonga present for the Claimant/Applicant

Ms. Oriendo h/b for Mr. Karanja for the Respondent

Ms. Esther S - C/A

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