Employment law

Wanjogu v Zheng Hong (K) Ltd [2026] KEELRC 14977 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E161 of 2025
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

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REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E161 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

NICHOLAS NGURE WANJOGU APPELLANT

VERSUS

ZHENG HONG (K) LIMITED RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the Judgment of Hon. Tom Mark Orlando, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 9th May 2025 at Nairobi in MCELRC No. E1294 of 2023: Nicholas Ngure Wanjogu v Zheng Hong (K) Limited)

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Notice of Appeal dated 22nd May, 2025 and an Amended Memorandum of Appeal of the same date. It arises from a judgment delivered on 9th May, 2025 in MC.ELRC No. E1294 of 2023.

By a Memorandum of Claim dated 21st June, 2023 the Appellant pleaded that the Respondent employed him as a guard on or about June, 2016 at a gross salary that rose from Kshs 18,000.00 to Kshs 23,100.00 in 2020. He pleaded that he asked for leave on 28th December, 2020 and that on reporting back on 4th January, 2021 he was told that his employment was terminated. He pleaded that he had never been warned in five years of service.

He claimed one month’s salary in lieu of notice Kshs 23,100.00; twelve months’ compensation Kshs 277,200.00; leave arrears Kshs 74,112.50; housing allowance; overtime Kshs 1,683,412.50; rest days worked Kshs 338,800; a certificate of service; costs; and interest. He put the total at Kshs 2,587,200.00.

The Respondent’s Memorandum of Defence dated 15th November, 2024 pleaded a fixed one-year contract from 1st May, 2020. It pleaded that the Appellant was terminated for gross misconduct, by a notice dated 4th January, 2021 after several warnings and suspensions, and that clause 13(c) of the contract allowed summary dismissal. It pleaded that he was given off days and paid his leave and any overtime.

The Appellant testified as PW1 and produced four exhibits. The Respondent called its Manager, Martin Wachira King’ori, as DW1, who produced six exhibits: the contract, a warning letter of 15th September, 2019 a suspension letter of 16th March, 2020 minutes of a disciplinary meeting of 3rd January, 2021 the notice of termination of 4th January, 2021 and the Appellant’s leave forms.

The trial court recorded that it was not disputed that the Appellant was an employee terminated on 4th January, 2021. He found that the claimant was called for a disciplinary hearing and given the opportunity to be heard and that the termination was lawful on account of gross misconduct. On the reason for dismissal he wrote:

“Though the defence witness stated that there was no document to confirm that the claimant drove the company vehicle and caused an accident, I have no reason to doubt the evidence since he has consistent and I do not see any document that the employer would have keep in that regard if the claimant was never charged in court.”

He rejected notice pay because the termination was lawful. He held that the Appellant did not prove that he never took leave, that house allowance was included in the gross pay and that overtime and rest days were not proved. He dismissed the suit, save for a certificate of service, with each party to bear its own costs.

The copy of the judgment in the Record of Appeal as filed omits its second page, which carries most of the reasoning. A fuller record with the complete judgment was however, also before me, and court has used it. The typed proceedings in the record are pages 1, 3 and 5 only. This court draws no inference from the missing pages. It may not be necessary, or at all.

The Amended Memorandum of Appeal comes out thus;

1. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the termination was lawful on the grounds of misconduct.

2. THAT the learned magistrate failed to consider the appellant’s right to notice pay, despite the circumstances surrounding the termination.

3. THAT the learned magistrate failed to acknowledge the appellant’s accrued leave days and placed undue burden of proof on the appellant.

4. THAT the learned magistrate wrongly appreciated that the house allowances are included in gross consolidated salary.

5. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by overlooking the substantive elements of unfair termination as per the applicable statutory and case laws.

6. THAT the learned magistrate erred in fact and in law by dismissing the claim of overtime and rest days worked without considering the employee’s rights to be compensated for work done overtime.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) The judgment of the trial court MCELRC Case No. E1294 of 2024 be set aside.

b) Judgment be entered in favour of the applicant for the amount KSH. 74,112.50

c) Costs of this appeal and the cost of the lower court to be awarded to the appellant.

It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the Respondent offered no credible evidence that he drove the vehicle, was intoxicated, or caused an accident. He points to the lack of a police report, an Occurrence Book entry, and medical or breathalyser evidence. He says he neither drinks nor drives.

He submits that there was no show cause letter, no written invitation to a hearing and no signature of his on the minutes, and that he did not attend the meeting. He asks for compensatory damages.

His submissions say nothing about notice pay, leave, house allowance, overtime or rest days. They restate ground 5 as concerning substantive and procedural elements. The filed ground says substantive elements. Procedure is still before me, because ground 1 attacks the finding that the termination was lawful, and the trial court expressly found that due process was followed.

The Respondent’s case and submission is that the termination was lawful under clause 13(c) of the contract, that a court cannot rewrite a contract, and that the Appellant had earlier warnings. It says he admitted the allegations at the meeting of 3rd January, 2021.

It relies on sections 41, 43, 44, 45 and 47 of the Employment Act, 2007 and on the authority of Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR) for the balance of probabilities and the genuine belief test. It seeks costs on a full indemnity basis.

Those submissions bear the number E161 of 2023, describe the employment as running from 1st May to 31st May, 2021 and come with an authorities list headed with a different appeal E356 of 2025. I treat these as errors of preparation and take the facts from the record.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the termination of the Appellant’s employment was substantively and procedurally fair.

2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the claims for leave, house allowance, overtime and rest days worked.

3. What reliefs are due to the Appellant.

4. Who should bear the costs.

This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify. This is as pronounced in the authority of Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the termination of the Appellant’s employment was substantively and procedurally fair. This covers grounds 1 and 5. Section 43(1) of the Act requires the employer to prove the reason for termination. If it fails, the termination is unfair under section 45. Section 43(2) defines the reason as what the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time. Section 45(2) also requires a fair procedure.

Section 47(5) divides the burden. The employee must show that an unfair termination occurred. The employer must justify it. The Court of Appeal in Kenfreight (E.A.) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] KECA 688 (KLR) held that the employee’s burden is limited to asserting that the termination was unfair, and that the burden of showing it was fair lies on the employer. The trial court began from section 107 of the Evidence Act. That overlooks the specific allocation in sections 43 and 47(5). His remark that he saw no document that the employer would have keep reverses the burden. It excuses a gap in the employer’s proof.

The reason in the notice of termination is that on 2nd January, 2021 the Appellant took vehicle KCN 890L without authority, while unlicensed and intoxicated. The only evidence of it is DW1’s statement that he arrived at the scene of an accident and found the Appellant driving, heavily intoxicated. No other witness was called.

The Respondent produced no accident report, police abstract, photograph, repair or insurance record, medical report, or vehicle record. DW1’s cross-examination is recorded as follows:

“He was intoxicated, there is no evidence to show that he drove the vehicle. There is no evidence to show that he caused an accident. There is no evidence to show that he was intoxicated. There is no show cause letter addressed to Nicholas. He was the only Nicholas.”

The passage is unclear. Read as it stands, it is a concession by the Respondent’s only witness that there is no evidence of what its own notice alleges. Read generously, it records him repeating propositions put up by their counsel.

Either way it adds nothing to his word and sits uneasily with his statement. The trial court called him consistent but made no finding on demeanour, so I am not bound to defer to that assessment.

Two other findings cannot stand because the record contradicts them. The trial court said the Appellant never denied that he had driven the vehicle. In cross-examination the Appellant said: It is not true that I drove the vehicle. I do not know how to drive. I have never taken alcohol. The trial court also observed the Appellant was asked to show cause and gave no explanation. No witness said so, and DW1 is recorded as saying there was no show cause letter. The earlier warning and suspension letters do not fill the gap. The Appellant denies the signatures, and DW1 says the Appellant was the only Nicholas. This court does not need to resolve that. The notice cites those letters as background, and the reason is the incident of 2nd January, 2021. Earlier warnings cannot prove it. At most they go to penalty and to contribution under section 49(4)(k).

The Respondent argues that an employer needs only reasonable grounds to suspect misconduct. Section 44(4)(g) speaks of an employee who on reasonable and sufficient grounds is suspected of an offence against the employer’s property. The Respondent still had to show the grounds. It showed none beyond one assertion, which its own witness qualified. I find that the Respondent did not prove a valid reason. The termination is unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b). This court does not discount the allegation is untrue but only that it was not proved.

On procedure, section 41(1) requires the employer to explain to the employee the reason it is considering, in the presence of another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice. Section 41(2) requires it to hear and consider his representations. The authority of Kenfreight, above, describes the same duties.

The Respondent relies on minutes of a meeting held on Sunday 3rd January, 2021 the day after the alleged incident. The meeting started at 1000 hours and was adjourned at 1100 hours. The termination took effect the next day. The Appellant says he did not attend and did not sign the minutes. I find the Respondent’s evidence of a fair procedure inadequate, for these reasons.

First, there was no prior notice. There was no show cause letter and no letter inviting the Appellant to the meeting. The minutes say he was informed of the allegations in the opening remarks, so notice, if any, came on the spot.

Secondly, the minutes list three people: the General Manager as chairperson, the Human Resources representative, and the Appellant. They record no companion. DW1’s oral statement that He was told to come with another employee is not supported by any document.

Third, DW1 says he went to the scene and saw the Appellant driving, and the General Manager who chaired the meeting and signed the notice of termination is named Martin Wachira, as DW1 is. These are deemed and taken to be one person. The only witness to the alleged offence sat in judgment on it, and the Respondent gave no reason why no one else could chair.

Fourth, the minutes say the Appellant admitted the allegations. They do not record what he was asked, what evidence he was shown, or what he said. The only signature on them is the General Manager’s. An admission of misconduct needs more than one line in the employer’s own minutes, unsigned by the employee when he denies the facts on oath.

Clause 13(c) does not help the Respondent. It allows summary dismissal where, in the Company’s judgment, it is justified and says that the circumstances shall include those set forth in Section 44 of The Employment Act. The clause carries the Act with it. DW1’s point that the Appellant did not use the seven days offered to appeal is also no answer. The right to be heard arises before the decision.

I find that the Respondent did not prove a fair procedure. The trial court finding that the Appellant was called for a disciplinary hearing and given the opportunity to be heard rests on the minutes alone which cannot bear that weight. The termination was unfair under section 45(2)(c) as well. Grounds 1 and 5 therefore succeed.

On the 2nd issue for determination, which covers grounds 3, 4 and 6, the Appellant’s submissions do not address these grounds, and a ground not argued is ordinarily treated as abandoned. This are now considered because the only monetary prayer in the Memorandum of Appeal is the leave claim. The leave claim assumes that the Appellant took no leave in 55 months of service, as he says in his statement. The trial court held that he did not prove that he never took leave. Section 28 gives 21 working days of leave for every twelve months of service. Section 74(1)(f) requires the employer to keep a record of leave entitlement, days taken and days due. The employer holds the records, so the question is whether leave was taken. To that extent ground 3 succeeds.

The Respondent did produce leave records. Exhibit 6 is thirteen leave forms in the Appellant’s name, with the officer in charge named as Anne Njogu. For 2019 they record 5 and 8 days of annual leave and 9 days of sick leave. For 2020 they record 25 days of annual leave between January and June. The record does not show that the Appellant challenged them or denied his signature on them. Five of the thirteen forms are dated in 2021, after the agreed termination date of 4th January, 2021. No witness explained them. This court gives them no weight and hold the parties to their common case on the termination date. The 2019 and 2020 forms pre-date the dispute and disprove the claim that no leave was ever taken.

The Appellant also has not proved service before year 2019. His account that he began as a guard in June, 2016 rests on his word alone. He had no document to show that he worked as a guard, and the only payslip he produced showing Kshs 18,000.00 bears no date.

The Respondent’s pleading that service began on 1st May, 2020 is equally contradicted by its own exhibits, since the leave forms from February, 2019 the warning letter of September, 2019 and a payslip of 29th February, 2020 pre-date it. The claim was framed on the footing that no leave was taken, and he offered no alternative computation. The trial court conclusion stands for a different reason.

On the issue of house allowance, the contract fixes a consolidated salary of Kshs 23,200.00. The Appellant pleaded and swore to a gross salary of Kshs 23,100.00 and his payslip shows a basic and gross salary of the same figure with no separate allowance. The typed proceedings in the record do not carry the admission the trial court mentions but the contract and the Appellant’s own pleading support his finding. The Appellant led no evidence that the salary was insufficient for housing or that housing was not provided. He bore that burden.

On overtime and rest days, the claim assumes a 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. day, seven days a week. The Appellant’s statement does not mention hours of work, and the pages of his oral evidence in the record do not either. He prayed for justice as per the pleadings, but a pleading is not evidence. There was no roster, no attendance record and no witness. His contract describes him as a production worker on standard 8-hour days, and his payslips show nil overtime, which proves only that none was paid. Grounds 3, 4 and 6 therefore fail in outcome.

The 3rd issue for determination is what reliefs are due to the Appellant. Ground 2 complains that the trial court did not consider notice pay. It was rejected only because he found the termination lawful, so the rejection falls. Clause 13(b) allows termination on one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu.

The Respondent dismissed the Appellant summarily without proving the grounds. The Appellant is entitled to one month’s pay (salary) in lieu under section 49(1)(a). He claimed Kshs 23,100.00 against the contract’s Kshs 23,200.00 and this court awards the lower pleaded figure.

On compensation, section 49(1)(c) allows up to twelve months’ gross salary. I have weighed the factors in section 49(4). The Appellant did not seek reinstatement. The dismissal was summary, on an unproved allegation, after a hearing that did not meet section 41.

His service is proved from early 2019, a little under two years. His claimed service from 2016 is not proved. The contract ran to 31st May, 2021 so about five months remained and renewal depended on a performance review. The earlier warnings are disputed and the incident was not proved and this court gives contribution little weight. There is no evidence on mitigation. I consider six(6) months’ gross salary fair, being Kshs 138,600.00. It is well below the maximum because the service claimed was not proved.

The order for a certificate of service was not appealed and stands. The Appellant asks for interest from 9th May, 2025 but both awards are assessed today, so interest will run from the date of this judgment.

On the 4th issue for determination, costs. The Appellant succeeded on liability and failed on the money claims. Under section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act costs are in my discretion.

The trial court ordered each party to bear its own costs. Given the mixed outcome, I see no reason to depart from that in either court. The Respondent’s request for full indemnity costs is declined.

I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The finding that the termination was lawful and the dismissal of the claims for notice pay and compensation are set aside.

(ii) A declared be and is hereby issued that the termination of the Appellant’s employment by the Respondent on 4th January, 2021 was unfair and unlawful.

(iii) The Respondent shall meet and pay the Appellant relief thus:

a) One month’s salary in lieu of notice……………………………..……...…..Kshs 23,100.00

b) Compensation (6 months at Kshs 23,100)…………………………………...Kshs 138,600

Total of award………………………………………………..…………Kshs 161,700.00

(iv) The sum in order (iv) shall carry interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.

(v) The dismissal of the claims for leave, house allowance, overtime and rest days worked is upheld, and the order for a certificate of service stands.

(vi) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the trial court.

Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Miss Chepkorir instructed by Mutonyi Mulama & Company Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Miss Musavakwa instructed by Okatch & Partners Advocates for the Respondent.

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