Employment law

Orenge v Judicial Service Commission [2026] KEELRC 14957 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Constitutional Petition E215 of 2025
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
Jemimah Keli

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Case at a glance

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Background

The Petitioner was at all material times a serving judicial officer at the rank of Principal Magistrate. He was subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the respondent following charges by the Chief Magistrate leading to his dismissal from service vide letter dated 8th August 2025. He was aggrieved by the decision and alleged violation of his constitutional rights. He filed a Petition against the respondent dated 21st August 2025…

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

During the Respondent’s impugned proceedings, a merit review of the Petitioner’s judicial rulings was undertaken, and the Petitioner complains that the Respondent exceeded its mandate under Article 172(1)(c) and failed to uphold judicial independence under Article 160(5), in doing so. In particular, he takes issue with the JSC’s review of the legal correctness of the Petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction, since the JSC effectively…

Paragraph 15 →

Reasoning passage

The court finds that since the basis of the ex parte proceedings was on a defective affidavit of service, which defect was apparent without much scrutiny and any diligent judicial officer would have established that , the employer proved on a balance of probabilities that the reason for dismissal met the test of "genuinely believed to exist" causing it to terminate the service of the petitioner(Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v…

Paragraph 88 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. E215 OF 2025

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LABOUR RIGHTS DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2, 3, 10, 25, 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, 50, 73, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163(7), 164, 165, 171, 172, 236, 249, 252, 259 OF THE CONSTITUTION

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 3, 4, 12 OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS ACT, NO.4 OF 2015

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 15, 32 AND THIRD SCHEDULE OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE ACT, NO.1 OF 2011

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 12 OF THE ELRC ACT, NO. 20 OF AND THE ELRC (PROCEDURE) RULES, 2024.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF RULES 3(4), 4, 11, 13, 19, 23 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS & FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES, 2013

BETWEEN

ISAAC ORENGE………….………………………………………………………………………………………...PETITIONER

-VERSUS-

THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION………………………………………………………………RESPONDENT

CORAM

Before Lady Justice Jemimah Keli

C/A Otieno

JUDGMENT

1. The Petitioner was at all material times a serving judicial officer at the rank of Principal Magistrate. He was subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the respondent following charges by the Chief Magistrate leading to his dismissal from service vide letter dated 8th August 2025. He was aggrieved by the decision and alleged violation of his constitutional rights. He filed a Petition against the respondent dated 21st August 2025 seeking:-

a) A Declaration that the charge relating to CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 concerned a lawful judicial act protected under Article 160(5) of the Constitution, and that the Respondent’s disciplinary action amounted to an unlawful review of a judicial decision, contrary to Dina Management Ltd v County Government of Mombasa [2023] KESC 30 and Bellevue Development Co. Ltd v Gikonyo [2020] KESC 43.

b) A Declaration that the Respondent’s reliance on the Judiciary Ombudsman’s referral usurped the Chief Justice’s mandate, violating Articles 10, 47, 50, 161(2)(a), 249, and 252 and Rule 25(1) of the Third Schedule, rendering the proceedings unconstitutional and void consistent with Judiciary & 2 others v LMN [2025] KESC 53 (KLR).

c) A Declaration that by disregarding the rulings of Justice Kossy Bor (25 February 2019) and Justice Mboya (16 January 2025), the Respondent unlawfully conducted a merit review of concluded judicial decisions, in violation of Articles 10, 47, 160(5), and 236 of the Constitution.

d) A Declaration that by allowing the complainant to prosecute the disciplinary process without independent investigation, the Respondent breached Articles 25(c), 47, 50, 249, and 252, and violated the principles of natural justice and fair administrative action.

e) An Order quashing the charge, disciplinary proceedings, and dismissal, and an Order of Mandamus directing the Respondent to reinstate the Petitioner as Senior Principal Magistrate with full rank, benefits, and all withheld salaries from 30 January 2024, with interest.

f) A Declaration that the Respondent violated the Petitioner’s constitutional rights under Articles 25(c), 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, and 50, and an Order for compensation.

g) A Declaration that the Respondent’s cumulative actions contravened Articles 2(4), 3, 10, 67, 73, 159, 160(1) & (5), 161(2)(a), 162(2)(a), 163(7), 164, 171, 172(1)(c), 232(1)(e)–(f), 236, 249, 252, and 259 of the Constitution.

h) Costs of the Petition.

2. In support of the Petition, the Petitioner filed a Supporting Affidavit sworn on 21st October 2025, and the documents attached thereto.

3. In response to the said Petition, the Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by WINFRIDAH B. MOKAYA on 9th March 2026.

4. To counter the response, the Petitioner filed a Further Affidavit sworn on 10th March 2026.

The Petitioners’ case in summary

5. The Petitioners case is that he is a former employee of the Respondent, having joined the Judiciary in 2008 as a Resident Magistrate, and rising through the ranks to Senior Principal Magistrate, last serving in Nakuru.

6. The present dispute was sparked by the assignment to the Petitioner in February 2018, while he was stationed at the Milimani Commercial Courts, of Milimani CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 (Nilestar Holdings Ltd v. Millennium Plastics (2008) Ltd & Others). On 23rd February 2018, during an inter partes hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit of service confirming the defendant’s notification. With no appearance entered, the Petitioner states that he lawfully issued eviction orders under Order 12 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Section 10 of the Distress for Rent Act, and Section 7 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 2015, because he was unaware of an undisclosed injunction in ELC No. 1549 of 2013. He relies on the Civil Procedure Rules, which prescribe the consequences of non-attendance, and avers that the burden of disproving service lies with the litigant, not the court.

7. It is averred that on 6th March 2018, the Respondent in Milimani CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 applied to set aside the order relying on the injunction issued in ELC No. 1549 of 2013. After hearing arguments on 7th March 2018, the Petitioner discharged the order vide a Ruling delivered on 12th March 2018 under Sections 99 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 due to the plaintiff's non-disclosure. He directed the parties to the Environment and Land Court (ELC) in line with the doctrine of materiality. The Petitioner emphasizes that he was not biased against or for the Respondent who applied to set aside the Court’s earlier order, as he did not know him or his counsel personally. Instead, applying the test for setting aside orders under the Civil Procedure Rules, the promptly self-corrected, which he considers evidence of his good faith.

8. Following the setting aside of the earlier order by the Petitioner, the Respondent in Milimani CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 filed a contempt application in the ELC, and on 25th February 2019, Justice K. Bor found Nilestar Holdings and Green Valley's directors in contempt of court for disregarding the ELC injunction. She ordered that compensation be paid to the Respondent, but the Respondent failed to pursue the same by filing a valuation report. The judge, however, did not find the Advocate for the Plaintiff/Applicant in Milimani CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 to be blameworthy, stating that: "The Court cannot find Mr. Nyang'au Advocate to have disobeyed the ELC injunction, as there is no evidence he was served or knew about it." The Petitioner states that the Advocate testified that he relied on his client, the Plaintiff/Applicant’s affidavit which claimed that there were no pending suits between the parties. He thereafter recused himself upon learning of the ELC injunction. He has since worked for the Respondent herein for 7 years without interruption, raising a legitimate expectation that he will be treated fairly and with finality.

9. The Petitioner contends that his original decision in CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 was reviewed by his employer, the Respondent herein during his promotion interview in 2018. On the basis of the same, he was initially denied promotion under Rule 19 of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act, 2011, a professional and financial sanction for the same. However, on 17th December 2020, the Petitioner was promoted to Senior Principal Magistrate, which he considers an affirmation of his competence and integrity.

10. It is averred that in a turn of events, on 24th March 2023, five years and twelve days after the Petitioner’s original ruling of 12th March 2018 in CMCC No. 1111 of 2018, Mr. Suleiman Murunga, the Defendant/Respondent in that case, lodged a malicious complaint with the Judiciary Ombudsman alleging collusion with Masore, the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Advocate in the same case. In his complaint, the Petitioner states, he deliberately withheld material facts that were central to the dispute, namely: that Justice Bor’s 2019 ruling directed the filing of a valuation report to assist the Court assess losses suffered as a result of the contemnors’ non-compliance, an order that remains unchallenged, but which has also never been complied with; that there existed ELC No. 1549 of 2013, then pending, causing the Ombudsman to act ultra vires by entertaining a matter that was sub judice; that his alleged ownership of L.R. No. 209/918 was based on a revoked allotment letter (Ref. No. GL/11/29941, 3 November 2011), annulled by the National Land Commission on 18 February 2016, as acknowledged in Paragraph 5(v) of his Amended Plaint dated 19th December 2016 and confirmed in testimony; and that the Court declared the allotment letter as void ab initio as it was issued contrary to Sections 12–14 of the Government Lands Act, and upheld the NLC’s revocation under Articles 62 and 67 of the Constitution. The latter two matters were express findings of the ELC Court (Justice J.O. Mboya) in his judgment delivered on 16th January 2025 in Murunga v Green Valley Ltd & 3 Others [2025] KEELC 15. Being aware that the letter of allotment which formed the basis of his claim had been annulled by the National Land Commission on 18 February 2016, Murunga’s 2023 complaint to the Judiciary Ombudsman, according to the Petitioner herein, was therefore illegal ab initio and an abuse of disciplinary process, especially since the documents Murunga submitted to the Ombudsman, including the allotment letters and correspondence, were the same ones he relied on in his ELC case. They were later declared void by the ELC, after noting that the National Land Commission (NLC) had already dismissed his claims, declared them void. The JSC had no authority to reopen or relitigate matters that had been conclusively determined by the NLC.

11. The Petitioner takes issue with the Judiciary Ombudsman, for unlawfully accessing his record, including a complaint by one Veronica Maina Njeri, which was dismissed by the Hon. Chief Justice Emeritus David Maraga on 18th February 2020 and disclosing the same to Murunga.

12. The complaint was escalated on 7th September 2023, when the Hon. Chief Justice issued a Notice to Show Cause to the Petitioner alleging bad faith in CMCC No. 1111 of 2018. He avers that he filed a response to the show cause letter on 27th September 2023, explaining that his original orders were based on an unchallenged affidavit of service under Order 5 Rule 15. They were later discharged promptly. His conduct fell within the purview of protected acts under Article 160(5) of the Constitution. The Petitioner contends that on 8th January 2024, the Judiciary Ombudsman declared the Petitioner’s response non-exculpatory and directed the Hon. Chief Justice to refer the matter to the JSC. It is the Petitioner’s case that this was a usurpation of powers under Rule 25(1) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act and a violation of Articles 2(2), 10, 161(2)(a), 172(1)(c), and 259(11) of the Constitution, as the Ombudsman's office lacks constitutional or statutory recognition. The Hon. Chief Justice's reliance on this direction was therefore a gross violation of Article 259(11) of the Constitution.

13. Subsequently, on 30th January 2024, the Petitioner was interdicted on half salary vide a letter bearing the same date, and remained on interdiction for 18 months and 21 days, an unexplained delay that he considers prejudicial to his rights. Some of his complaints against the Respondent are that that it unlawfully shifted the burden of disproving service to the Court, distorting the law and impeding fair adjudication; and that it focused on his initial error of issuing eviction orders against the Respondent, made without knowledge of the injunction issued by the ELC Court. The Petitioner further argues that the ELC’s (Justice K. Bor) Ruling of 25th February 2019, where it expressly discharged the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Advocate from liability, dismantles the complainants’ allegations of collusion between the Petitioner and the Plaintiff’s Advocate, which according to him have no basis, and confirm that the Court originally relied on the Plaintiff's representations alone. The Petitioner also states that the Respondent violated the principle of non-bis-in-idem (not twice for the same) when it denied his promotion in 2018. This principle applies to prevent repeated penalties for the same conduct, even in an administrative context. His later promotion in the year 2020 affirmed his integrity, undermining later disciplinary action. He takes the position that the JSC proceedings, founded on the void claim for ownership which is premised on an annulled allotment letter, are themselves null ab initio under Macfoy v U.A.C. Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169.

14. It is the Petitioner’/s case that he was subjected to JSC proceedings between January and November 2024, which, being administrative and quasi-judicial, required independent evidence and Secretariat investigations per Articles 172(1)(c), 249, and 252 of the Constitution. However, the Petitioner contends that the Respondent allowed Murunga to prosecute his case, with his counsel conducting examination-in-chief, adopting witnesses, relying on annulled allotment letters, framing issues, and making submissions. The Petitioner terms this an unconstitutional arrangement where the complainant also acted as prosecutor, leading to collapse of the impartiality of the inquisitorial model, and a blatant violation of natural justice as enshrined in Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. It further violated Article 172 (1) (c) on the Respondent’s non-delegable powers, as well as Articles 249 and 252 which mandate independent investigation.

15. During the Respondent’s impugned proceedings, a merit review of the Petitioner’s judicial rulings was undertaken, and the Petitioner complains that the Respondent exceeded its mandate under Article 172(1)(c) and failed to uphold judicial independence under Article 160(5), in doing so. In particular, he takes issue with the JSC’s review of the legal correctness of the Petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction, since the JSC effectively acted as an appellate court rather than a disciplinary body. The Petitioner explains that the alleged jurisdictional issue was a legal question that was never pleaded or argued before him as counsel for the Applicant at the time, one Counsel Masore, framed the pleadings to avoid that issue. The Petitioner states that the JSC’s vilification of the Petitioner for not raising the issue of jurisdiction suo moto is misplaced. Further, the Petitioner accuses JSC of re-evaluating discretionary judicial decisions, claiming that “good sense” required adjournment and that the eviction orders were “punitive.” These are subjective assessments of judicial discretion, not evidence of ethical breach, especially since no proof of corruption or bad faith was shown. He states that by collapsing the distinction between error and misconduct, the JSC acted illegally and imposed a new, extrajudicial standard of judicial conduct unknown to law.

16. The Petitioner indicates that the Respondent's conduct during the disciplinary process revealed actual bias or, at minimum, a reasonable apprehension of bias, and was in violation of the principles of impartiality and natural justice under Articles 47 and 50 (1) of the Constitution. This is because after the Petitioner's hearing, JSC panel members retired to have tea with the complainant, Mr. Murunga, and his advocates and entourage in the JSC boardroom, after the Petitioner and his counsel had left. A similar incident occurred involving Mrs. Murunga where she remained with the panel after the hearing. This information was posted on social media (Facebook) by the Counsel for Murunga, Mr. Khaemba. Additionally, the Petitioner points to one Commissioner’s failed to disclose her prior interest and contact with Murunga; and the panel's hostile cross-examination of the Petitioner's witnesses and reliance on inadmissible and unverified material, which he feels indicate a predetermined effort to condemn.

17. It is averred that on 31st October 2024, Mr. Suleiman Murunga died, and no substitution was effected, rendering the proceedings void for lack of a complainant. Mr. Khaemba, the new counsel for the complainant, appeared with an unidentified person named Wambui, but the Respondent nonetheless proceeded in the absence of proof that she was the widow or a substituted party, and of formal substitution proceedings. The Petitioner decries the Respondent’s grant of permission to continue the proceedings in this manner as being contrary to Articles 22(2) and 252(2) of the Constitution.

18. After the hearing, the Respondents made findings that the Petitioner issued final eviction orders ex parte without confirming service; that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; that the Petitioner signed the Affidavit of Service; and that the Petitioner acted in bad faith. The Petitioner respond to these findings by stating that: JSC ignored the ELC judgment which voided Murunga’s allotment letter and dismissed Murunga's claims as fraudulent, and failed to analyze Justice Mboya's findings; the original eviction orders were lawfully issued under Section 7 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act and Orders 5 and 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, based on a valid, unchallenged affidavit of service, and upon discovery of non-disclosure of the ELC case, the Petitioner set the same aside within 17 days, demonstrating good faith and adherence to Article 10; expecting a magistrate to investigate service imposes an impossible standard unknown to law; and the Respondent relied on matters that were not raised in the original charges against the Petitioner, namely, pecuniary jurisdiction, BPRT competence, and affidavit propriety, contrary to Rule 26(1) of the Third Schedule. Further, the Petitioner argues that the dispute before him was over ownership, not rent, as Murunga had ceased paying rent five years before the suit and unlawfully transferred his landlord’s property, which was confirmed by Justice Mboya in the final ELC Judgment. Even if one considers the rental value of the property, which was held to be Kshs. 11 Million as per the finding of Justice Mboya J, the matter fell within the Petitioner’s pecuniary jurisdiction as Principal Magistrate, especially since the BPRT had earlier dismissed the complainant’s tenancy claim. On the finding that the Petitioner signed the Affidavit, he states that to imagine that an advocate would present an affidavit for a Magistrate to sign is irrational. He also states that this was not one of the charges that were originally brought against the Petitioner by the Hon. Chief Justice, but it was introduced mid-hearing. The document examination report relied upon was unsigned, unverified, and based on unauthenticated photocopies contrary to Sections 64–68 of the Evidence Act. The Petitioner relies on Counsel Masore Nyang’au’s unchallenged evidence before the JSC which confirmed the affidavit was prepared and signed by the process server Mr. Omambia, not by the Petitioner. In any event, Justice Bor had already found Mr. Masore not culpable of collusion, making the issue res judicata, such that reopening the same showed bias, bad faith, and disregard of due process. The Petitioner states that the Respondent breached its duty to act fairly and rationally by disregarding relevant and persuasive evidence without any justification. The final response on the findings was that the finding of bad faith lacked independent evidence and an investigation procedure. No collusion, personal benefit, or prior relationship was established between the Petitioner and any of the parties. According to the Petitioner, minor clerical errors cannot, in law, constitute bad faith.

19. The Petitioner contends that he was terminated from employment vide a letter dated 8th August 2025, which, instead of being sent to the Petitioner, was posted on Facebook by the complainant's counsel with disparaging remarks, in a manner intended to cause deliberate humiliation. The Petitioner only received a hard copy of the letter on 20th August 2025 when he protested, despite the letters being backdated to 25th July and 8th August 2025. The Petitioner avers that the Respondent failed to provide the determination and proceedings despite multiple requests to do so, hampering his ability to lodge an appeal against the decision.

20. On August 20, 2025, September 16, 2025, and under the Access to Information Act, 2016, violating Articles 35 (access to information), 47(2) (written reasons), 10(2)(a) & (c) (rule of law and transparency), and 232(1)(e) & (f) (public service accountability). This denial and provision within the statutory required timeframe hindered his ability to challenge the decision, further evidencing the JSC's disregard for due process (Request for documents, 20 August 2025, Doc. 21; Reminder for copy of determination and proceedings, 16 September 2025, Doc. 22; Request under the Access to Information Act, 2025, Doc. 23).

21. The Petitioner brings a claim under the doctrine of legitimate expectation stating that he had a legitimate expectation that the JSC would apply the law impartially and in accordance with the principles of fairness and due process, the Petitioner having served for seven years without a single complaint and delivering hundreds of rulings and judgments with integrity. Having already punished the Petitioner in 2018 under the Judicial Service Act by denying him a promotion, he reasonably expected that the Respondent would not revisit the same facts to impose a second punishment. He states that he was subjected to double jeopardy.

22. The Petitioner’s case is that through its wholesome conduct during the Petitioner’s disciplinary process, the Respondent violated his Constitutional rights under Articles 2(2), 3, 10, 22(2), 25(c), 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, 50, 53, 67, 73, 159, 160(5), 161(2)(a), 162(2)(a), 163(7), 164, 165, 171, 172(1)(c), 232(1)(e), 232(1)(f), 236, 249, 252, and 259. The Petitioner seeks reinstatement as a Judicial Officer, back pay, and compensation for the violation of his rights.

23. On the doctrines of Constitutional avoidance and exhaustion, the Petitioner emphasizes that he is properly before the Court as the violations attributed to the Respondent are Constitutional in nature and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, the remedies sought for the violations can only be granted by the Court. He argues that there is no provision within the Constitution or the Judicial Service Act that compels an officer who has been unfairly terminated from employment to submit himself to the internal review mechanism of the Respondent. He invokes exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion, namely: where the administrative body lacked jurisdiction, where the remedy is futile or inadequate, where there is clear violation of fundamental rights or exceptional circumstances including gross constitutional violations, bias, arbitrariness or malice. The Petitioner considers it that the review would be considered by the same body that terminated him from employment, with the review process amounting to a body sitting on appeal on its own decision. He points out that the Respondent’s review decisions disclose that it has an almost 100% rejection rate for reviews under the guise of “no new facts”.

24. The Petitioner further avers that the doctrine of Constitutional avoidance is a doctrine of judicial restraint, rather than a procedural hurdle barring a litigant from invoking the Constitution directly Articles 22 and 258. As the Constitution is the supreme law binding every person and organ including the Respondent, it may be invoked by way of Constitutional Petition where there are clear violations of its provisions.

Respondents’ case in brief

25. The Respondent challenges the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Petition on the premise that the Petitioner has failed to exhaust the Respondent’s internal appeal/review mechanism, and invokes the doctrines of Constitutional avoidance and exhaustion.

26. They explain their mandate to appoint, receive complaints against, investigate and remove or otherwise disciplining judges, magistrates and other judicial officers under Article 172(1)(c) of the Constitution; and to constitute a Committee or Panel constituting of three persons for purposes of disciplining and removing judicial officers and staff under Section 32(1) of the Judicial Service Act. The procedure governing the conduct of a constituted Committee or Panel is as set out in the Third Schedule per Section 32(3) and (4) of the Act. Specifically, Paragraph 15 of the Third Schedule to the Act states that the Commission’s powers to interdict an officer under paragraph 17, to suspend an officer under paragraph·18, and to administer a severe reprimand or a reprimand to an officer, may be delegated to the Chief Justice, who is to be guided by the provisions of the Third Schedule when exercising the powers delegated.

27. The Respondent agrees with the Petitioner’s narration of the facts, in that a complaint was filed by the late Hon. Suleiman Murunga (hereinafter referred to as the Complainant) vide a letter dated 24th March 2023, alleging that the Petitioner issued orders without jurisdiction, failed to take into consideration the fact that there was another related case in the Environment and Land Court and had failed to ascertain service of court process before issuing the impugned eviction orders.

28. In accordance with Paragraph 25 of the Third Schedule to the Act which empowers the Chief Justice to carry out an inquiry against an officer, thereafter frame charges which are then forwarded to him, followed by institution of disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground of misconduct, the Hon. Chief Justice conducted an inquiry by issuing the Petitioner with a Notice to Show Cause dated 7th September 2023. The Petitioner is confirmed to have responded to the Notice to Show Cause on 27th September 2023. He was subsequently issued with a charge dated 9th November 2023, informing him that among others, he had issued orders of eviction, had failed to ascertain service of court process and later revised the orders claiming lack of jurisdiction after the complainant had been evicted and the premises demolished. The Petitioner was directed to respond to the charges within twenty-one (21) days.

29. It is stated that the Petitioner responded to this charge vide his response of 11th November 2023, where he explained that he had been satisfied with the service as stated in an affidavit of service and thereby exercised judicial discretion in proceeding with the hearing of the application that was before him in the absence of the complainant. This discretion, the Petitioner argued, was conferred on him by law. He also argued that, having been promoted around December 2020, raising the matter again nearly five (5) years later was a violation of his rights to equal protection of the law, fair administrative action, and labour practices, as protected under Articles 27, 47, and 41 of the Constitution, respectively.

30. It is averred that on 8ᵗʰ January 2024, the Office of the Judiciary Ombudsman published a report concerning the Petitioner which referred to the documents exchanged between the Petitioner and the Chief Justice. The Report concluded that the response by the Petitioner was not exculpatory, and recommended that the Chief Justice forwards the matter to the Respondent for disciplinary proceedings. The Respondent denies that the Ombudsman’s referral of the matter to the Chief Justice for disciplinary proceedings, amounted to a usurpation of the power or authority of the Respondent. They state that the Office of the Judiciary Ombudsman is an administrative office under the Office of the Chief Justice whose purpose is to rebuild confidence in the Judiciary among the general public, and to assess the institution’s performance from the public point of view. It does so by obtaining feedback from the public against Judicial officers and judicial staff. They emphasize, however, that the Complainant was the late Suleiman Murunga and not the Chief Justice or the Office of the Judiciary Ombudsman. Further, they insist that the Office of the Judiciary Ombudsman did not in any way exercise any disciplinary powers over the Petitioner.

31. On 30th January 2024, the Petitioner was interdicted by the Chief Justice under Paragraph 16 of the Third Schedule to the Act. The Respondent avers that they complied with the procedure of disciplinary proceedings under Paragraph 25 of the Third Schedule to the Act which provides that if it is decided that the disciplinary proceedings should continue, the Respondent is to appoint a Committee or Panel consisting of at least three persons who shall be persons to whom the Respondent may, by virtue of the Constitution, delegate its powers to investigate the matter. The Chief Justice shall not be a member of the Committee or Panel, but if puisne judges of the High Court have been designated as members of the Commission under the Constitution, they may be members of the Committee or Panel. It adds that the Committee or Panel shall give the officer a written notice of not less than fourteen days specifying the day on which they may be required to appear before it to answer to the charges made against them, and if witnesses are examined by the Committee or Panel, the officer shall be given an opportunity of being present and of putting questions on their own behalf to the witnesses. Finally, and no documentary evidence shall be used against the officer unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto.

32. It is the Respondent’s case that the Petitioner was given adequate notice for the disciplinary hearing through a letter dated 11th March 2024, and granted access to all documents that were to be relied on at the disciplinary hearing. At no point during the disciplinary hearing did the Petitioner allege prejudice or non-service of any document. The Respondent, however admits, that by a letter dated 16th March 2024, the Petitioner objected to the disciplinary hearing on the premise that subjecting the Petitioner to the disciplinary process amounted to double jeopardy and res judicata, as he had already been punished by being denied a promotion as a result of the impugned order. It is the Respondent’s case that, contrary to this earlier position, however, the Petitioner has admitted that denial of promotion was not a disciplinary decision or form of punishment under the Judicial Service Act; and that he lacked jurisdiction to determine the subject suit as the matter was a landlord-tenant dispute falling within the purview of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal.

33. The Respondent contends that in line Paragraph 25(11) of the Third Schedule to the Act which requires that the Panel or Committee to table its report with the Respondent for purposes of consideration of the same and determination of the punishment, if any, which should be inflicted on the officer including retirement in the public interest, the report by the Committee was adopted by the Respondent in its meeting of 30ᵗʰ July 2025. On sanctions, in accordance with Paragraph 19 of the Third Schedule which sets out sanctions including but not limited to dismissal, the Respondent dismissed the Petitioner from employment through the dismissal letter dated 8th August 2025. The Petitioner was informed that his dismissal was on account of gross misconduct, specifically issuance of ex parte orders against the complainant and the later review of the same for want of jurisdiction. He was further informed that his explanation on the issue of the affidavit of service which he relied on to issue the impugned orders was unsatisfactory as he failed to properly and adequately evaluate the alleged affidavit of service. In particular: the affidavit of service purported that individuals who were alleged directors of the 4ᵗʰ Defendant/Complainant namely Suleiman Murunga T/A Simmers Bar & Restaurant had been served whereas the said entity was incapable of having directors, being an unincorporated

entity. Had the Petitioner critically evaluated the purported affidavit of service, he would not have blindly confirmed that service was properly effected. Additionally, a forensic report showed that the signature on the affidavit of service was the same signature on the impugned orders inferring that the affidavit of service had been crafted, drafted and signed by the Petitioner, hence disproving the reliance on the affidavit of service. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the Respondent noted in the dismissal letter, that the Petitioner entertained the suit and granted the impugned orders while having knowledge that the matter ought to have been before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal, the Magistrate Court lacking jurisdiction to entertain an eviction dispute premised on alleged non-payment of rent. With regard to pecuniary jurisdiction, the Petitioner proceeded with the matter in full knowledge that the suit was situate in the Central Business District and, therefore, the Magistracy lacked jurisdiction.

34. The Respondent is adamant that the dismissal letter dated 8th August 2025 complied with Paragraph 24 of the Third Schedule to the Act provides by informing the Petitioner herein of the findings on each charge which had been preferred against him and of the punishment inflicted upon him.

35. It is the Respondent’s case that the actions that it took against the Petitioner were justified as he disregarded the complainant’s right to be heard, displayed poor professional judgement as a judicial officer, failed to exercise due diligence, care and attention, and fell short of the standards required under the Judicial Service Code of Conduct and Ethics. He also acted in a

dishonest manner as established by the evidence of the forensic examiner.

36. While the dismissal letter dated 8th August 2025 informed the Petitioner that he had a right to challenge the decision within thirty (30) days, it is averred that he never sought to review the decision to dismiss him, under the mechanism provided for by law.

37. The Respondent denies that the judgement of the Environment and Land Court (ELC) dismissing the complainant's suit bound the Respondent having been rendered on 16th January 2025 while the complaint was lodged on 24th March 2023; that the charge lacked specificity, pointing out that the Petitioner responded to the same without complaint; and that the Respondent introduced new issues of jurisdiction namely, pecuniary jurisdiction and the Business Premises Rent Tribunal, stating that this issues were central to the complaint, and responded to by the Petitioner.

38. On the issue of discretion, the Respondent argues that discretion does not apply to questions of jurisdiction. They state that a judicial officer must, on the basis of the facts before them, ascertain jurisdiction as a matter of course. On the Petitioner’s challenge on reliance by the Respondent on the forensic examiners report, the Respondent contends that the report demonstrated that the signature on the impugned orders was similar to that on the affidavit of service relied on by the Petitioner to issue the original orders. They also state that the Petitioner did not object to production of the report before the Committee, and had adequate opportunity to cross-examine the document examiner during the disciplinary hearing, which he did.

39. The Respondent is emphatic that under Section 32 of the Judicial Service Act, it has authority to determine its rules of procedure, and is not bound by the strict rules of evidence. It rebuts the Petitioner’s argument that the proceedings were a nullity as the Complainant had died, by stating that the Complainant had testified and been cross-examined by the Petitioner, prior to his death; there is no provision providing that proceedings the Committee cease upon the death of a complainant; and in any event, the complainant’s widow, Rose Polyne Nyambura, was issued with a Special Limited Grant of Letters of Administration by the Kadhi's Court in KCSUCC/E002/2025 which permitted her to attend the remainder of the hearing as an Administrator.

40. In conclusion, the Respondent states that it acted within the law and followed due process; hence, the purported contraventions of the Petitioner’s constitutional rights have not been proved.

DETERMINATION

41. Following directions by the court that it would determine the Petition through written submissions, the Petitioners and Respondent filed their respective submissions.

Issues for determination

42. The Petitioner and Respondent submitted generally on the Petition in their submissions dated 13th May 2026, and 5th June 2026, respectively. The Petitioner later filed amended submissions in rejoinder dated 26th June 2026. In the parties’ joint list of issues for determination dated 30th April 2026, they identified the following issues for determination:

a) Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition and grant the reliefs sought.

b) What the role of the Judiciary Ombudsman was in the dispute and whether there was any violation of the law in its dispensing of the role.

c) Whether the JSC had jurisdiction to entertain and determine the disciplinary matter against the Petitioner, and whether it complied with constitutional mandate under Articles 160(1) &5, 161(2)(a), 162(2)(b), 172(1)(c), 249, 252(1)(a) & (2) read with Article 22(2); and 259(11) of the Constitution, and the disciplinary rules under the Judicial Service Act and the Third Schedule thereto.

d) Whether the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner were procedurally fair and substantively justified and in accordance with Articles 10, 47 and 50(1)(2) of the Constitution.

e) What is the legal effect, if any, on the death of the complainant on the disciplinary proceedings.

f) Whether the Petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 25(c), 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, 50(1)(2), and 236 (a)(b) of the Constitution were violated.

g) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.

The law

43. Articles 160(1) &5, 161(2)(a), 162(2)(b), 172(1)(c), 249, 252(1)(a) & (2) read with Article 22(2); and 259(11) of the Constitution.

44. Articles 10, 47 and 50(1)(2) of the Constitution.

45. Articles 25(c), 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, 50(1)(2), and 236 of the Constitution.

46. The Judicial Service Commission Act, Third Schedule, Rule 25 –

‘25. Proceedings for dismissal

(1)Where the Chief Justice, after such inquiry as they may think fit to make, considers it necessary to institute disciplinary proceedings against an officer on the ground of misconduct which, if proved, would in the Chief Justice‘s opinion, justify dismissal, he shall frame a charge or charges against the officer and shall forward a statement of the said charge or charges to the officer together with a brief statement of the allegations, in so far as they are not clear from the charges themselves, on which each charge is based, and shall invite the officer to state, in writing should he so desire, before a day to be specified, any grounds on which he relies to exculpate themselves.

(2)If the officer does not furnish a reply to the charge or charges within the period specified, or if in the opinion of the Chief Justice he fails to exculpate themselves, the Chief Justice shall cause copies of the statement of the charge, or charges, and the reply, if any, of the officer to be laid before the Commission, and the Commission shall decide whether the disciplinary proceedings should continue or not.

(3)If it is decided that the disciplinary proceedings should continue, the Commission shall appoint a Committee or Panel to investigate the matter consisting of at least three persons who shall be persons to whom the Commission may, by virtue of the Constitution, delegate its powers:

Provided that the Chief Justice shall not be a member of the Committee or Panel, but if puisne judge of the High Court have been designated as members of the Commission under the Constitution, they may be members of the Committee or Panel.

(4)The Committee or Panel shall give the officer a written notice of not less than fourteen days specifying the day on which they may be required to appear before it to answer to the charges made against them.

(5)If witnesses are examined by the Committee or Panel, the officer shall be given an opportunity of being present and of putting questions on their own behalf to the witnesses, and no documentary evidence shall be used against the officer unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto.

(6)The Director of Public Prosecutions shall, if requested by the Commission, direct a legally qualified officer from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to present to the Committee or Panel the case against the officer concerned.

(7)The Committee or Panel shall permit the accused officer to be represented by an advocate.

(8)If during the course of the investigation, grounds for the framing of additional charges are disclosed, the Chief Justice shall follow the same procedure adopted in framing the original charges.

(9)The Committee or Panel, having investigated the matter, shall forward its report thereon to the Commission together with the record of the charges framed, the evidence led, the defence and other proceedings relevant to the investigation; and the report of the Committee or Panel shall include—

(a)a statement whether in the Committee or Panel’s judgement the charge or charges against the officer have been proved and the reasons therefor;

(b)details of any matters which, in the Committee or Panel’s opinion, aggravate or alleviate the gravity of the case; and

(c)a summing up and such general comments as will indicate clearly the opinion of the Committee or Panel on the matter being investigated, but the Committee or Panel shall not make any recommendation regarding the form of punishment to be inflicted on the officer.

(10)The Commission, after consideration of the report of the Committee or Panel, shall, if it is of the opinion that the report should be amplified in any way or that further investigation is desirable, refer the matter back to the Committee or Panel which shall conduct the investigation for a further report.

(11)The Commission shall consider the report and shall decide on the punishment, if any, which should be inflicted on the officer or whether he should be required to retire in the public interest.’

Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition and grant the reliefs sought

47. On this issue, the Respondent takes the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Petition on the basis that the Petitioner has failed to exhaust the Respondent’s internal appeal/review mechanism. They invoke the doctrines of constitutional avoidance and exhaustion.

48. In response, the Petitioner argues that the doctrine of Constitutional avoidance is a doctrine of judicial restraint, rather than a procedural hurdle that bars a litigant from invoking the Constitution directly under Articles 22 and 258. On exhaustion, he states that the present suit contains claims of infringement of rights under the Bill of Rights and of violations of other Constitutional provisions, hence the Court is the proper forum to hear and determine the case. Further, he emphasizes that the remedies sought can only be granted by the Court.

49. The Supreme Court stated thus on the doctrine of Constitutional avoidance in the case of Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others (Petition 14, 14A, 14B & 14C of 2014 (Consolidated)) [2014] KESC 53 (KLR):

“[256]. The Appellants in this are seeking to invoke the “Principle of avoidance.” Also known as “Constitutional avoidance”: The Principle of avoidance entails that a court will not determine a constitutional issue, when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. In South Africa, in S. v Mhlungu, [1905] [3] S.A. 867 [CC], the Constitutional Court Kentridge A.J articulated the Principle of avoidance in his minority Judgment as follows [at paragraph 59]:

“I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, Civil or Criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.”

[257]. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it would not decide a constitutional question which was properly before it, if there was also some other basis upon which the case could have been disposed of [Ashwander -vs- Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 [1936].”

50. Upon perusal of the Petitioner’s case, it is evident that his complaints relate to the Ombudsman usurping the Constitutional and Statutory mandate of the Chief Justice. The Respondent’s disciplinary process is challenged for being conducted in a manner that violated various Constitutional rights. Further, he complains about the unlawfulness of the Respondent’s disciplinary process, the same being pegged on judicial decisions which the Petitioner considers to be protected under Article 160 (5) of the Constitution, which provides that:

“A member of the Judiciary is not liable in an action or suit in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the lawful performance of a judicial function.”

51. Whether the impugned judicial decision made by the Petitioner on 23rd February 2018 is protected from scrutiny of the Respondent under Article 160 (5) or not, and whether the Respondent’s disciplinary process infringed on the Petitioner’s rights as claimed, are matters that may only be determined by the Court, as mandated by Article 23 of the Constitution. It provides that:

“The High Court has jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 165, to hear and determine applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights.”

52. It is trite law, as was held in the case of Judicial Service Commission v Shollei & another (Civil Appeal 50 of 2014) [2014] KECA 334 (KLR) that the ELRC has jurisdiction to hear constitutional petitions claiming breach of fundamental rights ancillary and incidental to employment and labour relations matters.

53. Further, the remedies that are sought, which comprise of mostly declarations that the actions of the Respondent and the Judiciary Ombudsman violated the Constitutional rights claimed, can only be granted by the Court pursuant to Article 23 (3) of the Constitution.

54. Tuning to the doctrine of exhaustion, the Court of Appeal in the case of Mutanga Tea & Coffee Company Ltd v Shikara Ltd & another (Civil Appeal 54 of 2014) [2015] KECA 469 (KLR) reaffirmed it as follows:

“However, we entertain no doubt in our minds that the reasoning of the Court must apply with equal force to require an aggrieved party, where a specific dispute resolution mechanism is prescribed by the Constitution or a statute, to resort to that mechanism first before purporting to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

37.The basis for that view is first that Article 159 (2) (c) of the Constitution has expressly recognized alternative forms of dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. The use of the word “including” leaves no doubt that Article (159(2)(c) is not a closed catalogue. To the extent that the Constitution requires these forms of dispute resolution mechanisms to be promoted, usurpation of their jurisdiction by the High Court would not be promoting, but rather, undermining a clear constitutional objective. A holistic and purposive reading of the Constitution would therefore entail construing the unlimited original jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Article 165(3)(a) of the Constitution in a way that will accommodate the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

38.Secondly, such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms normally have the advantage of ensuring that the issues in dispute are heard and determined by experts in the area; and that the dispute is resolved much more expeditiously and in a more cost effective manner. In Rich Productions Ltd. v Kenya Pipeline Company & Another, Petition No. 173 of 2014, the High Court explained why it must be slow to undermine prescribed alternative dispute resolution mechanisms thus:

“The reason why the Constitution and the law establish different institutions and mechanism for dispute resolution in different sectors is to ensure that such disputes as may arise are resolved by those with the technical competence and the jurisdiction to deal with them. While the Court retains the inherent and wide jurisdiction under Article 165 to supervise bodies such as the 2nd respondent, such supervision is limited in various respects, which I need, not go into here. Suffice to say that it (the court) cannot exercise such jurisdiction in circumstances where parties before it seek to avoid mechanisms and processes provided by law, and convert the issues in dispute into constitutional issues when it is not.”

39.On the same reasoning, this Court, in Republic v The National Environmental Management Authority, CA No. 84 of 2010 upheld a decision of the High Court, which declined to entertain a judicial review application by a party who had a remedy, which he had not utilized, under the National Environment Tribunal. The Court reiterated that where Parliament has provided an alternative remedy in the form of a statutory appeal procedure, it is only in exceptional circumstances that an order of judicial review will be granted. More recently in Vania Investment Pool Ltd. v Capital Markets Authority & 8 Others, CA No. 92 of 2014 this Court also upheld a decision of the High Court in which the court declined to entertain a judicial review application by an applicant who had failed to first refer its dispute to the Capital Markets Appeals Tribunal established by the Capital Markets Act.”

55. The doctrine applies differently to employment matters, nonetheless, as the ELRC has held conclusively that under Rule 56 (5) of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules 2024, the doctrine of exhaustion does not oust the Court’s jurisdiction to determine Constitutional Petitions including in the cases of Wamukoto v Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited & 2 others (Petition E185 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 3174 (KLR) (13 November 2025) (Ruling); and Nyamira County Public Service Board & 2 others v Mageto (Appeal E001 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 1753 (KLR) (17 June 2025) (Judgment).

56. Rule 56 (5) provides that:

“(5) Where the Constitution, a written law, collective bargaining agreement, contract of service, policy, or other instrument provides for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms—

(a) a person being party to a dispute may file a suit and seek appropriate interlocutory relief pending exhaustion of such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or pending determination of the suit;

(b) want of exhaustion of such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms shall not operate as a bar to a suit for application for interim orders or alleging unconstitutionality or unlawfulness of the action, omission, decision or other matter in dispute pending such exhaustion; and

(c)a suit filed prior to exhaustion of such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms may be stayed and not struck out on account of such exhaustion.”

57. The Respondent’s argument is that the Petitioner had a right to apply for review against it’s decision to terminate him from employment, which was communicated to him in his termination letter dated 8th August 2025. He was granted 30 days to lodge his review application, but did not do so. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner’s failure to apply for review of the termination decision first, prior to approaching the Court, deprives the Court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. For the reasons set out hereinabove, specifically the provisions of Rule 56 (5) of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules, I take the contrary view that the failure to exhaust internal review cannot take away the court's jurisdiction to decide on the allegations of constitutional violations. I hold that the petition is properly before the court.

What the role of the Judiciary Ombudsman was in the dispute and whether there was any violation of the law in its dispensing of the role.

58. The extent of the Judiciary Ombudsman’s involvement in this matter was that he received a complaint from the Complainant, Murunga, dated 24th March 2023. He later forwarded a Report dated 8th January 2024 to the Hon. Chief Justice, after the Petitioner had been issued with the Notice to Show Cause dated 7th September 2023 and Statement of Charges dated 9th November 2023 by the Hon. Chief Justice. The Judiciary Ombudsman, in his Report, particularized the nature of the Complaint, the Petitioner’s response to the Notice to Show Cause and Charge, and provided his opinion that the Petitioner’s response was not exculpatory. The Judiciary Ombudsman’s recommendation was that the matter be forwarded to the JSC for disciplinary action.

59. The Respondent explains that the Office of the Judiciary Ombudsman is an administrative office under the Office of the Hon. Chief Justice created to receive complaints from members of the public against officers in the Judiciary, investigate maladministration, and to restore public confidence in the Judiciary.

60. I note that the Judiciary Ombudsman was moved by the letter dated 24th March 2023 from Murunga, complaining against the Petitioner’s conduct in Milimani CMCC No. 1111 of 2018. He did not purport to summon the Petitioner herein or call upon him to answer to the matters raised in the complaint, but rather, appears to have forwarded the same to the Chief Justice for her further action, namely, issuance of a Notice to Show Cause and later a Statement of Charges. In my view, the Judiciary Ombudsman did not act unlawfully as he did not purport to perform any functions or take any actions that are constitutionally and statutorily reserved for the Hon. Chief Justice or the Judicial Service Commission.

Whether the JSC had jurisdiction to entertain and determine the disciplinary matter against the Petitioner, and whether it complied with constitutional mandate under Articles 160(1) &5, 161(2)(a), 162(2)(b), 172(1)(c), 249, 252(1)(a) & (2) read with Article 22(2); and 259(11) of the Constitution, and the disciplinary rules under the Judicial Service Act and the Third Schedule thereto.

61. The Petitioner explains that the decision that the Complainant before the respondent was aggrieved with was the Ruling delivered on 23rd February 2018 where the Petitioner granted ex-parte eviction orders against the Complainant. He argues that he relied on an Affidavit of Service filed by the Plaintiff as sufficient proof of service, and with no appearance by the Respondent, he lawfully issued eviction orders under Order 12 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Section 10 of the Distress for Rent Act, and Section 7 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 2015, since the application sought eviction for failure to pay rent. He relies on the Civil Procedure Rules which prescribe the consequences of non-attendance.

62. On 6th March 2018, 13 days later, the Respondent in Milimani CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 (Complainant before the JSC) applied to set aside the eviction order relying on an injunction issued in ELC No. 1549 of 2013. After hearing arguments on 7th March 2018, the Petitioner discharged the order vide a Ruling delivered on 12th March 2018 under Sections 99 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010.

63. The Petitioner insists that he exercised judicial discretion correctly and properly in issuing the original eviction orders, and in setting them aside on 12th March 2018 and his conduct is therefore protected under Article 160 (5) of the Constitution.

64. The Respondent, after receiving the subject Complaint, charged the Petitioner with issuing the original eviction orders and later setting them aside, after the Complainant had already been evicted from his premises in the Nairobi CBD. They take the position that the Petitioner’s two decisions were made in bad faith, and amounted to gross misconduct. The charges were listed in the Notice to Show Cause dated 7th September 2023.

65. It is not in dispute that Article 160 (5) of the Constitution provides that:

“A member of the Judiciary is not liable in an action or suit in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the lawful performance of a judicial function.”

66. In the case of Mboya & another v Judicial Service Commission & another; Rawal and 5 others (Interested Parties) (2020) KEHC 9225 (KLR), the content of Article 160 (5) was analyzed as follows:

“Of the three sub-issues, the final one is whether the JSC can conduct a merit review of a judgment or ruling in order to determine whether there was misconduct on the part of a Judge or a Judicial Officer. The JSC appears to agree with Justices Ibrahim Ojwang and Njoki Ndung’u that it does not have powers to conduct a merit review of the decision of a Judge or Judicial Officer. I won’t find any difficulty in agreeing with that position.

Whenever a party is aggrieved by the decision of a Judge or Judicial Officer the way to go is to file an appeal or seek review. This position of the law was clearly enunciated by Ibrahim SCJ, in Yusuf Gitau Abdalla v Building Centre (K) Ltd & 4 others [2014] eKLR as cited by Dr Mutunga in Salat case as follows:

…Courts of justice have the jurisdiction to do justice and not injustice. However, the law acknowledges that judges are human and are fallible hence the judicial remedies of appeal and review.

It cannot be said, as suggested by Justices Ojwang and Njoki Ndungu, that judgments and rulings are entirely a no-go-zone for the JSC. Nevertheless, the JSC should avoid complaints which invite it to analyse a judgment or ruling in order to determine alleged incompetence of the Judge or Judicial Officer who authored the decision…

It is appreciated that the JSC cannot block anybody from complaining about the merits of the decision of Judges and Judicial Officers. However, once the JSC determines that the complaint is about merits of the decision, it should drop such a complaint like a hot potato without even bothering to ask the Judge or Judicial Officer to respond to the complaint…”

67. Similarly, in Bellevue Development Company Ltd v Gikonyo & 3 others (2020) KESC 43 (KLR), the Supreme Court stated:

“A Judge, in our view, thus remains unquestionably immune as long as he does not take actions that intentionally and plainly prevent litigants from enjoying their constitutional and statutory rights. The duty imposed on a Judge then, is only to recognize that his own decisions may sometimes be in error and to ensure that orders affecting important constitutional rights can be reviewed or appealed in another court. But the conduct of a Judge who acts mala fides or unlawfully may thus trigger proceedings before the Judicial Service Commission and may ultimately lead to his removal thus the need for extreme care in the enjoyment of immunity…

Suing a Judge or Judicial Officer for rendering an unfavourable decision rather than appeal or seek a review was in our opinion a misconception and a step in the wrong direction on the part of the petitioner. As a court, we are cognizant of the fact that at times litigants may feel aggrieved by some of the decisions that Judges and Judicial Officers make…”

68. The question that the Court must answer, therefore, is whether the incident that birthed the Complaint before the JSC constituted a merit decision or not.

69. As stated herein, the Notice to Show Cause dated 7th September 2023 set out the following charges:

“It has been brought to the attention of my office that in Milimani Commercial Suit CMCC 1111 of 2018 Nilestar Holdings·Ltd & another Vs- Millennium Plastics (2008) Ltd & 3 others, you issued ex-parte eviction orders on 23rd February 2018 against the Defendant/Respondent. The orders were to be executed by Siuma Auctioneers under the supervision of the OCS Central Police Station. On 12th March, 2018 you discharged the exparte orders by which time the Defendant/Respondent had already been evicted from the suit premises. Your actions resulted in the eviction of the Defendant/Respondent form the suit premises exparte. You acted in bad faith and denied the Defendant/Respondent the right to be heard and/or a fair trial.”

70. The Petitioner explains the circumstances that birthed the Complaint in that: an application was filed before the Court in Milimani Commercial Suit CMCC 1111 of 2018 Nilestar Holdings·Ltd & another Vs- Millennium Plastics (2008) Ltd & 3 others seeking eviction orders against the Respondent; an Affidavit of Service was filed prior to the date of inter partes hearing on 23rd February 2018; on 23rd February 2018 the Respondent failed to attend Court, and having seen the Affidavit of Service, the Court exercised its discretion and allowed the application for eviction orders. On 6th March 2018, the Respondent filed an application to set aside the eviction orders issued on 23rd February 2018, pointing out that an injunction was issued by the ELC. The Petitioner states that he, having been notified of the ELC injunction whose existence had not been disclosed during the original application, exercised his powers to correct errors under Section 99 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010, allowed the application to set aside the eviction orders. This narration is not challenged by the Respondent, save to challenge the validity of the Affidavit of Service.

71. In my view, the very fact that the Respondent filed an application to set aside the original orders on 6th March 2018, which was allowed, demonstrates that the original decision of 23rd February 2018 was a merit decision. The next question that the Court must ask, therefore, is whether the decision was made in bad faith, in order to oust the immunity provided to judicial officers for their merit good-faith decisions by Article 160 (5) of the Constitution.

72. Bad faith was defined in the case of Khalifa & another v Principal Secretary, Ministry of Transport & 6 others (Constitutional Petition E032 of 2019) [2022] KEHC 368 (KLR) at paragraph 60-64 as follows:-

“60. I now turn to the other ground cited by the respondents. They argued that the suit against the 4th and 5th respondents is unsustainable because section 22 of the National Government Co-ordination Act protects public officers from personal liability. The section reads: -

“ 22. Protection from personal liability Nothing done by a public officer appointed

under this Act shall, if done in good faith for the purpose of executing the

functions of the office, render such officer personally liable for any action,

claim or demand."

61. As was held in R v Commissioner for Co-operatives ex parte Kirinyaga Tea Growers Co-operatives Savings and Credit Society Ltd no statute ever allows anyone on whom it confers a power to exercise such a power arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith. Bad faith has been defined rarely, but an Australian case defined it as ‘‘a lack of honest or genuine attempt to undertake the task and involves a personal attack on the honesty of the decision-maker.” Even though "Bad faith" has not been given a precise definition, it has been frequently associated with actions involving malice, fraud, collusion, illegal conduct, dishonesty, abuse of power, discrimination, unreasonable conduct, ill-motivated conduct or procedural unfairness. Justice Southin in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Galiano Island Trust Committee articulated the concept of bad faith as follows: -

“The words bad faith have been used in municipal and administrative case law to cover a wide range of conduct in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority. Bad faith has been held to include dishonesty, fraud, bias, conflict of interest, discrimination, abuse of power, corruption, oppression, unfairness, and conduct that is unreasonable. The words have also been held to include conduct based on an improper motive, or undertaken for an improper, indirect or ulterior purpose. In all these senses, bad faith describes the exercise of delegated authority that is illegal, and renders the consequential act void. And in all these senses bad faith must be proven by evidence of illegal conduct, adequate to support the finding of fact.”(Emphasis added)

62. The Supreme Court of Canada in Chaput v Romain 58 described the "honest belief" distinction as follows: -

“ What is required in order to bring the defendant within the terms of such a statute as this is a bona fide belief in the existence of a state of facts which, had they existed, would have justified him in acting as he did.”

63. The contrast is with an act of such a nature that it is wholly unauthorized and where there exists no colour for supposing that it could have been an authorized one. In such a case there can be no question of good faith or honest motive. The words "good faith" must be read in the context in which they are found. Acting in good faith presumes exercising a judgment which is either made in good faith or in bad faith. If it is made in good faith, the statutory immunity applies. If it is made in bad faith, the statutory immunity does not apply.

64. Bad faith is a serious allegation which attracts a heavy burden of proof. The allegation that the 4th and 5th respondents acted other than in good faith in declining to divulge the information sought is a serious allegation and not one lightly to be made. This view resonates with observations made in several cases world over, that "proof of bad faith necessitates proof of extreme circumstances."

73. It is instructive to note that the Respondent in the lower court case, who was also the Complainant before the JSC, does not rebut the averment that he failed to file a response to the application and to attend court on 23rd February 2018. It is not unheard of, or unreasonable, for a Court faced with a missing Respondent/opposing party, to allow an application ex parte. Indeed, Order 12 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 provides that:-

“When only plaintiff attends [Order 12, rule 2]

If on the day fixed for hearing, after the suit has been called on for hearing outside the court, only the plaintiff attends, if the court is satisfied—

(a)that notice of hearing was duly served, it may proceed ex parte;

(b)that notice of hearing was not duly served, it shall direct a second notice to be served; or

(c)that notice was not served in sufficient time for the defendant to attend or that for other sufficient cause the defendant was unable to attend, it shall postpone the hearing.”

74. The issues of pecuniary jurisdiction and issuance of final orders ex-parte had been raised by the Complainant in his complaint to the Judiciary Ombudsman dated 24th March 2023 (Exhibit “WM-1” attached to the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit dated 9th March 2026); the issue of purported lack of jurisdiction was again raised in the Report of the Judiciary Ombudsman to the Hon. Chief Justice dated 8th January 2024 (Exhibit “WM-6” attached to the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit dated 9th March 2026); and during the hearing before the Respondent (Exhibit “WM-8” attached to the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit dated 9th March 2026, at pages 5), a forensic expert was presented as a witness to support the charge of authoring/faking the Affidavit of Service, and the issue of lack of jurisdiction was also addressed. On pages 51-52 of the proceedings before the JSC, reference was made to a Further Affidavit filed by the Complainant, Mr. Murunga, stating that the Petitioner herein filed the Affidavit of Service under a fictitious name and signed it. The proceedings where the forensic document examiner and the Petitioner herein presented their oral evidence are not included in the documents produced before the Court. The affidavit of service was produced by the petitioner.

75. However, on page 13 of the proceedings before the JSC, the Complainant challenged service of summons and the application on the premise that he was in Busia on 20th April 2023 when service was alleged to have been effected. On pages 30-39 of the proceedings, during the Complainant’s cross-examination by counsel for the Petitioner herein, it was made clear that the existence of the ELC case and the injunctive orders issued therein were not disclosed to the Magistrate/Petitioner in the application dated 20th February 2023.

76. The charge against the petitioner was dated 9th November 2023 of having issued ex parte orders on 23rd February 2018 against the respondent and later discharged by the same petitioner on account of lack of jurisdiction (page 137 of the response was the charge).

77. In response, the petitioner justified the ex parte proceedings under Order 12, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and stated he did not deny the complainant's right to be heard. He relied on the affidavit of service filed by the applicants.

78. The petitioner produced the affidavit of service in defence of the ex parte proceedings. (at page 114 of his bundle ). The respondent analysed the same at pages 46-48 of its report and found the affidavit of service wanting.

79. Order 12 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules states-

‘ When only plaintiff attends [Order 12, rule 2]

If on the day fixed for hearing, after the suit has been called on for hearing outside the court, only the plaintiff attends, if the court is satisfied—

(a)that notice of hearing was duly served, it may proceed ex parte;

(b)that notice of hearing was not duly served, it shall direct a second notice to be served;

or

(c)that notice was not served in sufficient time for the defendant to attend or that for other sufficient cause the defendant was unable to attend, it shall postpone the hearing.’

80. The respondent produced its report on the disciplinary proceedings. The respondent found that paragraph 2 of the affidavit of service, the process server indicated that he received copies of the documents on the 20th February 2018 at 2.35pm and served the same at 1.30pm on the same date. The respondent established that his affidavit of service did not indicate the specific persons to whom the documents were served.

81. The report indicates that upon cross-examination Hon Orenge acknowledged that the affidavit of service made reference to directors of the defendant while the application listed Sulemain Murunga T/A Simmers Restaurant as the 4th defendant. That this alone ought to have informed Hon Orenge that the affidavit was defective, as Simmers was not an incorporated company and therefore did not have directors capable of being served. That in the absence of certainty of proper service, the matter ought not to have proceeded ex parte.

82. The respondent’s report further stated that the court record also indicated that the hearing date was fixed ‘by consent’, yet the same record noted that only one clerk was present in court. At paragraph 224 of the respondent’s report is the finding of the committee-

‘ the committee made a determination that Hon Orenge acted in bad faith in decision of 23rd February 2018 for granting final orders at interlocutory stage ex parte and for proceeding to hear the matter in the absence of service of the motion to the compliant.’

83. The petitioner produced the impugned affidavit of service at page 114 of his bundle. The court confirmed the finding of the Respondent’s committee that the process server was alleged to have been instructed on 20th February 2018 at 2.35 pm, yet he went to serve at 1.30 pm. This tainted the credibility of the service. It is an apparent error which Hon Orenge could not have missed if he had read the affidavit of service before proceeding ex parte. The court also found that the affidavit of service did not disclose any names of the alleged directors and, most importantly, did not state that the 4th defendant, Suleiman Murunga T/A Simmers Bar and Restaurant, was served. Murunga was sued personally as a trader and there was no indication that he was served. The Petitioner could only justify the ex parte proceedings under Order 12 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. He did not comply with the rule. The ex parte proceedings were an illegality.

84. At the end of the day, this was an employment dispute, and the right to fair labour practice under Article 41 and the rights of public officers under Article 236 are actualised under sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act. It has been held by the Court of Appeal in Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v Aggrey Lukorito Wasike [2017] eKLR that-

"Under Section 43 of the Act, the onus is on the employer to prove the reason or reasons for the termination, failing which the termination shall be deemed to be unfair. The test is, however, a partly subjective one in that all an employer is required to prove are the reasons that he "genuinely believed to exist" causing him to terminate the employee's services,"

85. The court found that the charges and the letter of dismissal were premised on gross misconduct in issuing ex parte eviction orders, thereby denying the complainant the right to be heard. The court also found that the affidavit of service relied on was defective and incredible, due to timing, failure to serve the complaint, and failure to disclose the names of the persons alleged to have been served and specifically the complainant, the 4th defendant. The affidavit only mentions the 1, 2 and 3rd defendants in paragraph 8 (see page 114 of the petitioner’s bundle).The employer in this case called an expert who stated that the signature on the affidavit resembled the petitioner's. The employer did not have the expert obtain signature samples. An advocate, Masore, was found to have drawn a defective application seeking a final order of eviction (page 119 of the petitioner’s bundle) and for defective service, among other things, and was convicted of professional misconduct.

86. The court is alive to the protection of the petitioner as a judicial officer under Article 160(5) of the Constitution to wit-

‘A member of the Judiciary is not liable in an action or suit in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the lawful performance of a judicial function.’

87. The foregoing inquiry is to establish whether the ex parte order was issued in good faith. The petitioner relied solely on the affidavit of service to justify the ex parte proceedings. The court found the affidavit of service not credible. It failed to disclose service on the 4th defendant, who, as indicated on the face of the application, was a sole proprietor rather than a director of a company. Paragraph 8 of the impugned affidavit of service stated that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd defendants were served. There was no mention of service on the 4th defendant, the complainant.

88. The court finds that since the basis of the ex parte proceedings was on a defective affidavit of service, which defect was apparent without much scrutiny and any diligent judicial officer would have established that , the employer proved on a balance of probabilities that the reason for dismissal met the test of "genuinely believed to exist" causing it to terminate the service of the petitioner(Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v Aggrey Lukorito Wasike [2017] eKLR). The ex parte order was final in nature, leaving the complainant without a remedy. The court, digressing, noted the short period between service and the hearing date, less than 3 days. The affidavit of service indicates the copies of the application were given to the process server on 20th February 2018, coming for hearing on 23rd February 2018. Order 12, rule 2 (c ) of the Civil Procedure Rules envisages in case of lack of sufficient notice, the court may postpone the proceedings –

‘(c)that notice was not served in sufficient time for the defendant to attend or that for other sufficient cause the defendant was unable to attend, it shall postpone the hearing.’

89. The court agreed with the respondent that the ex parte proceedings were a gross misconduct and violated the right to fair hearing and was against the expectations of the act of good faith by a judicial officer. The dismissal was not on the merits of the decision but on the petitioner's misconduct in failing to act in good faith. Good faith in the court's mind includes acting in accordance with the law and upholding the Constitution in judicial proceedings. Having failed to comply, the court agreed with the respondent that the petitioner acted in bad faith. ( On Bad faith the court applied decision in Khalifa & another v Principal Secretary, Ministry of Transport & 6 others (Constitutional Petition E032 of 2019) [2022] KEHC 368 (KLR), supra)

Whether the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner were procedurally fair and substantively justified and in accordance with Articles 10, 47 and 50(1)(2) of the Constitution.

90. Article 47 of the Constitution provides that:

“Fair administrative action

(1) Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.

(2) If a right or fundamental freedom of a person has been or is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action.

(3) Parliament shall enact legislation to give effect to the rights in clause (1) and that legislation shall—

(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, if appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; and

(b) promote efficient administration.”

91. Article 50 (1) and (2) provides that:

“Fair hearing

(1) Every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body.

(2) Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right—

(a) to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;

(b) to be informed of the charge, with sufficient detail to answer it;

(c) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;

(d) to a public trial before a court established under this Constitution;

(e) to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;

(f) to be present when being tried, unless the conduct of the accused person makes it impossible for the trial to proceed;

(g) to choose, and be represented by, an advocate, and to be informed of this right promptly;

(h) to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;

(i) to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings;

(j) to be informed in advance of the evidence the prosecution intends to rely on, and to have reasonable access to that evidence;

(k) to adduce and challenge evidence;

(l) to refuse to give self-incriminating evidence;

(m) to have the assistance of an interpreter without payment if the accused person cannot understand the language used at the trial;

(n) not to be convicted for an act or omission that at the time it was committed or omitted was not—

(i) an offence in Kenya; or

(ii) a crime under international law;

(o) not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which the accused person has previously been either acquitted or convicted;

(p) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments for an offence, if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing; and

(q) if convicted, to appeal to, or apply for review by, a higher court as prescribed by law.”

92. The right to administrative action that is fair and lawful, requires a court faced with allegations that administrative action was unfair to delve into what the law provides on the procedure of the tribunal or body involved. The procedure for disciplinary hearings before the JSC involving judicial officers is governed by the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act. Paragraphs 23-25 provide that:

“23. Copies of proceedings

(1) An officer in respect of whom disciplinary proceedings are to be held under this Part shall be entitled to receive a free copy of any documentary evidence relied on for the purpose of the proceedings, or to be allowed access to it.

(2) The officer may also be given a copy of the evidence (including documents tendered in evidence) after the proceedings are closed, on payment of five shillings per page of each document tendered in evidence:

Provided that they shall not be entitled to copies of office orders, minutes, reports or recorded reasons for decisions.

24. Officer to be informed of decision

Where proceedings have been taken against an officer, the officer shall be informed of the findings on each charge which has been preferred against them and of the punishment (if any) to be inflicted upon them.

25. Proceedings for dismissal

(1) Where the Chief Justice, after such inquiry as they may think fit to make, considers it necessary to institute disciplinary proceedings against an officer on the ground of misconduct which, if proved, would in the Chief Justice‘s opinion, justify dismissal, he shall frame a charge or charges against the officer and shall forward a statement of the said charge or charges to the officer together with a brief statement of the allegations, in so far as they are not clear from the charges themselves, on which each charge is based, and shall invite the officer to state, in writing should he so desire, before a day to be specified, any grounds on which he relies to exculpate themselves.

(2) If the officer does not furnish a reply to the charge or charges within the period specified, or if in the opinion of the Chief Justice he fails to exculpate themselves, the Chief Justice shall cause copies of the statement of the charge, or charges, and the reply, if any, of the officer to be laid before the Commission, and the Commission shall decide whether the disciplinary proceedings should continue or not.

(3) If it is decided that the disciplinary proceedings should continue, the Commission shall appoint a Committee or Panel to investigate the matter consisting of at least three persons who shall be persons to whom the Commission may, by virtue of the Constitution, delegate its powers:

Provided that the Chief Justice shall not be a member of the Committee or Panel, but if puisne judge of the High Court have been designated as members of the Commission under the Constitution, they may be members of the Committee or Panel.

(4) The Committee or Panel shall give the officer a written notice of not less than fourteen days specifying the day on which they may be required to appear before it to answer to the charges made against them.

(5) If witnesses are examined by the Committee or Panel, the officer shall be given an opportunity of being present and of putting questions on their own behalf to the witnesses, and no documentary evidence shall be used against the officer unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto.

(6) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall, if requested by the Commission, direct a legally qualified officer from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to present to the Committee or Panel the case against the officer concerned.

(7) The Committee or Panel shall permit the accused officer to be represented by an advocate.

(8) If during the course of the investigation, grounds for the framing of additional charges are disclosed, the Chief Justice shall follow the same procedure adopted in framing the original charges.

(9) The Committee or Panel, having investigated the matter, shall forward its report thereon to the Commission together with the record of the charges framed, the evidence led, the defence and other proceedings relevant to the investigation; and the report of the Committee or Panel shall include—

(a) a statement whether in the Committee or Panel’s judgement the charge or charges against the officer have been proved and the reasons therefor;

(b) details of any matters which, in the Committee or Panel’s opinion, aggravate or alleviate the gravity of the case; and

(c) a summing up and such general comments as will indicate clearly the opinion of the Committee or Panel on the matter being investigated, but the Committee or Panel shall not make any recommendation regarding the form of punishment to be inflicted on the officer.

(10) The Commission, after consideration of the report of the Committee or Panel, shall, if it is of the opinion that the report should be amplified in any way or that further investigation is desirable, refer the matter back to the Committee or Panel which shall conduct the investigation for a further report.

(11) The Commission shall consider the report and shall decide on the punishment, if any, which should be inflicted on the officer or whether he should be required to retire in the public interest.”

93. After the disciplinary proceedings are concluded, paragraph 19 of the Third Schedule provides that:

“Punishments

(1)The following are the sanctions which may be inflicted on an officer as a result of disciplinary proceedings under this Part—

(a) dismissal;

(b) stoppage of increment of pay;

(c) withholding of increment;

(d) deferment of increment;

(e) severe reprimand and reprimand;

(f) recovery of the cost or part of the cost of any loss or breakage caused by default or negligence, provided no such cost has been recovered by surcharge action under the appropriate financial instructions or regulations.

(2) Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the powers conferred by this Schedule to require an officer to retire from the public service on the grounds of public interest.

(3) No punishment shall be inflicted on any officer which would be contrary to any law for the time being in force.”

94. Having reviewed the documents produced by the parties, I take the view that the Respondent herein complied with the procedure prescribed by the Third Schedule of the Judicial Service Act by providing the Petitioner with a Statement of Charges dated 9th November 2023 issued by the Hon. Chief Justice and inviting him to respond to the same; constituting a Committee/Panel to hear the disciplinary case comprising of at least three members; informing him of the date set for disciplinary hearing; providing him with the documentary evidence that was relied on during the disciplinary hearing; permitting him to be present during the examining of witnesses and permitting him and/or his advocate to cross examine them; permitting him to be represented by an advocate during the heating; and informing him of the decision of the JSC after consideration of the Report submitted by the disciplinary Committee/Panel.

95. Further to the foregoing, it is well established that every termination of contract of employment within the Republic of Kenya is subject to Sections 41 and 45 of the Employment Act which provide that:

“41. Notification and hearing before termination on grounds of misconduct

(1) Subject to section 42(1), an employer shall, before terminating the employment of an employee, on the grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity explain to the employee, in a language the employee understands, the reason for which the employer is considering termination and the employee shall be entitled to have another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice present during this explanation.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Part, an employer shall, before terminating the employment of an employee or summarily dismissing an employee under section 44(3) or (4) hear and consider any representations which the employee may on the grounds of misconduct or poor performance, and the person, if any, chosen by the employee within subsection (1) make.

45. Unfair termination

(1) No employer shall terminate the employment of an employee unfairly.

(2) A termination of employment by an employer is unfair if the employer fails to prove—

(a) that the reason for the termination is valid;

(b) that the reason for the termination is a fair reason—

(i) related to the employees conduct, capacity or compatibility; or

(ii) based on the operational requirements of the employer; and

(c) that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure.”

96. In the opinion of the court, there was substantial compliance with procedural fairness as the petitioner was informed of charges in writing, he responded and his representations were considered, a report of the Respondent’s proceedings was produced, and he was issued with the decision of dismissal.

97. The court upheld the reason for termination was valid as captured in the Termination letter dated 8th August 2025, being issuance of final eviction orders ex-parte and later setting the same aside, forming actions not done in good faith in the lawful performance of a judicial function as stated hereinabove, which is protected under Article 160 (5) of the Constitution.

98. The court finds that employer /respondent proved it genuinely believed that the petitioner acted in bad faith in the issuance of the ex parte orders. The termination is held as lawful and fair.

What is the legal effect, if any, on the death of the complainant on the disciplinary proceedings?

99. In the Respondent’s Report dated 30th July 2025, the Respondent acknowledged that after the Complainant and his second witness had testified, he passed away and was replaced by his widow, who had obtained a Special Grant dated 13th January 2025 (Exhibit “MN-13” attached to the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit) from the Kibera Kadhi’s Court. They clarify that she did not take part in the proceedings, but only listened in.

100. According to the Petitioner, the Complainant’s death rendered the proceedings void for lack of a complainant. Mr. Khaemba, the new counsel for the Complainant, appeared with an unidentified person named Wambui, but the Respondent nonetheless proceeded in the absence of proof that she was the widow or a substituted party, and without formal substitution proceedings.

101. Indeed, Order 24 Rules 1-3 on death of a Plaintiff provides as follows:

“1. No abatement by party’s death if right survives [Order 24, rule 1]

The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the cause of action survives or continues.

2. Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives [Order 24, rule 2]

Where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any one of them dies, and where the cause of action survives or continues to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the court shall cause an entry to that effect to be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants.

3. Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff [Order 24, rule 3]

(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the cause of action does not survive or continue to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives or continues, the court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Where within one year no application is made under subrule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff:

Provided the court may, for good reason on application, extend the time.”

102. An important question, in my view, is whether the cause of action survived the Complainant's death. The complaint against the Petitioner herein to the JSC may be classified as a personal action or action in personam, grounded in tort. Per Section 2 of the Law Reform Act Cap 21 of the Laws of Kenya, the same survives the death of the Complainant. It provides:

“Effect of death on certain causes of action

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, on the death of any person after the commencement of this Act, all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate:

(2) Provided that this subsection shall not apply to causes of action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to claims for damages on the ground of adultery”

103. Under Order 24 Rule 3, therefore, the Respondent’s disciplinary Committee/Panel was under the obligation, on an application made in that behalf, to cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and to proceed with the suit. However, under Section 32 of the Judicial Service Act, the disciplinary Committee/Panel may determine its own procedures. It states:

“Appointment, discipline and removal of judicial officers and staff

(1) For the purposes of appointment, discipline and removal of judicial officers and staff, the Commission shall constitute a Committee or Panel which shall be gender representative.

(2) Notwithstanding the generality of subsection (1), a person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a magistrate by the Commission unless the person—

(a) is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya;

(b) has high moral character, integrity and impartiality;

(c) has demonstrable management skills;

(d) has proficiency in computer applications; and

(e) has no pending complaints from the Advocates Complaints Commission or the Disciplinary Committee.

(3) The procedure governing the conduct of a Committee or Panel constituted under this section shall be as set out in the Third Schedule.

(4) Members of the Committee shall elect a chairperson from amongst their number.

(5) Subject to the provisions of the Third Schedule, the Committee or Panel may determine its own procedure.”

104. No procedure in the event of the death of a Complainant is set out in the Third Schedule of the Act; hence, the Committee/Panel was well within their rights to permit the widow of the Complainant to continue the proceedings on the basis of the special grant issued to her, despite no formal substitution application having been made.

Whether the Petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 25(c), 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, 50(1)(2), and 236 (a)(b) of the Constitution were violated.

105. The petitioner was served with the charges. The charges related to the issuance of the ex parte orders and the termination were based on the same issue. I find that the employer met the threshold in sections 41 and 45 of the Employment Act, which implement Article 47 and fair labour practices under Article 41. The court holds there was proof of substantial fairness on perusal of the charges, the report on the disciplinary proceedings and the letter of dismissal.

106. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that his right to equal treatment under Article 27 of the Constitution was violated, as he has failed to provide evidence of differential treatment between himself and other employees of the Respondent in similar circumstances; hence, the Petitioner’s claim under this head fails.

107. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated the Petitioner’s right to human dignity under Article 28 and to privacy under Article 31. Despite the dismissal letter being dated 8th August 2025, it appears to have been delivered to the Petitioner on 21st August 2025. This is the date on which the Petitioner acknowledged receipt of the letter by signing it (a copy is produced on page 209 of the Petitioner’s Bundle and page 155 of the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit). Despite the letter bearing a “CONFIDENTIAL” stamp, it was forwarded to the Complainant by the Respondent on 18th August 2025, and the Petitioner states that it was circulated on social media, specifically Facebook, and that an opinion piece was even published in a daily newspaper (produced at page 214 of the Petitioner’s Bundle). This all happened before he was notified. The court finds that the complaint had an interest in the outcome of the proceedings and that the employer could not control what they did with the outcome. Whereas I find that the delay in issuing the dismissal letter may have caused anxiety to the Petitioner, and the publishing of the outcome by the Complainant may have caused him embarrassment and even violated his right to privacy; The employer had no control over the publishing. Even if the publishing by the Complainant may have violated the Petitioner’s right to privacy, compensation could not lie against the Respondent. The Respondent had no duty to protect the Petitioner against the use of the information shared with the Complainant. As stated, the Complainant was an interested party and entitled to the outcome of the proceedings. It is not the Respondent who published the outcome on social media. It has not been demonstrated to the court that the delay by a few weeks in issuing the letter of dismissal to the Petitioner violated any of his employment rights. It was not the reason he did not apply for review, and in any case he could still have asked for an extension of time. I find that the Petitioner did not prove a violation of his constitutional rights by the Respondent.

108. Paragraph 24 of the Third Schedule of the Judicial Service Act mandates the Commission:

“Where proceedings have been taken against an officer, the officer shall be informed of the findings on each charge which has been preferred against them and of the punishment (if any) to be inflicted upon them.”

109. The petitioner was notified of the findings on the charges.

110. On the right to access information under Article 35, the Petitioner requested for copies of the letter of termination; the record of proceedings before the Commission; the Hansard/verbatim record of the Commission's deliberations; and the final determination/resolution of the Commission, vide his letter dated 20th August 2025 and reminder dated 16th September 2025 (pages 219-220 of the Petitioner’s Bundle).

111. Under Paragraph 23 (2) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act, it is stated:

23. Copies of proceedings

(2)The officer may also be given a copy of the evidence (including documents tendered in evidence) after the proceedings are closed, on payment of five shillings per page of each document tendered in evidence:

Provided that they shall not be entitled to copies of office orders, minutes, reports or recorded reasons for decisions.

112. The Petitioner was therefore not entitled to a record of the proceedings/minutes before the Commission, nor to the Hansard/verbatim record of the Commission's deliberations. There is no doubt that he received the termination letter, which contained the Commission's final decision. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent did not violate the Petitioner’s right to access information.

Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.

113. The Petitioner sought for the following orders in his petition-

a) A Declaration that the charge relating to CMCC No. 1111 of 2018 concerned a lawful judicial act protected under Article 160(5) of the Constitution, and that the Respondent’s disciplinary action amounted to an unlawful review of a judicial decision, contrary to Dina Management Ltd v County Government of Mombasa [2023] KESC 30 and Bellevue Development Co. Ltd v Gikonyo [2020] KESC 43.

b) A Declaration that the Respondent’s reliance on the Judiciary Ombudsman’s referral usurped the Chief Justice’s mandate, violating Articles 10, 47, 50, 161(2)(a), 249, and 252 and Rule 25(1) of the Third Schedule, rendering the proceedings unconstitutional and void consistent with Judiciary & 2 others v LMN [2025] KESC 53 (KLR).

c) A Declaration that by disregarding the rulings of Justice Kossy Bor (25 February 2019) and Justice Mboya (16 January 2025), the Respondent unlawfully conducted a merit review of concluded judicial decisions, in violation of Articles 10, 47, 160(5), and 236 of the Constitution.

d) A Declaration that by allowing the complainant to prosecute the disciplinary process without independent investigation, the Respondent breached Articles 25(c), 47, 50, 249, and 252, and violated the principles of natural justice and fair administrative action.

e) An Order quashing the charge, disciplinary proceedings, and dismissal, and an Order of Mandamus directing the Respondent to reinstate the Petitioner as Senior Principal Magistrate with full rank, benefits, and all withheld salaries from 30 January 2024, with interest.

f) A Declaration that the Respondent violated the Petitioner’s constitutional rights under Articles 25(c), 27, 28, 31, 35, 41, 47, and 50, and an Order for compensation.

g) A Declaration that the Respondent’s cumulative actions contravened Articles 2(4), 3, 10, 67, 73, 159, 160(1) & (5), 161(2)(a), 162(2)(a), 163(7), 164, 171, 172(1)(c), 232(1)(e)–(f), 236, 249, 252, and 259 of the Constitution.

h) Costs of the Petition.

114. The court found in the negative as relates to all declarations and the order sought.

Disposition

115. In the upshot the petition is held to lack merit and is dismissed. To temper justice with mercy, I make no order as to costs in the petition.

116. It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT MACHAKOS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

JEMIMAH KELI,

JUDGE.

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Court Assistant: Otieno

Petitioner: Okemwa

Respondent: Wakwaya

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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