Employment law

Nyamwaya & 3 others v Kenya National Trading Corporation [2026] KEELRC 14951 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Constitutional Petition E095 of 2024
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
Jemimah Keli

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Background

In the instant case, the 4 petitioners were members of an ad hoc evaluation committee appointed to evaluate 31 quotations, which the respondent stated were not solicited and whose receipt is unknown. One of the quotations was by a company based in Dubai and not incorporated in Kenya. It was awarded a tender to supply cooking oil. The respondent's mandate included, among others, implementing a government policy to stabilise the prices…

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Question before the court

In their submissions dated 5th March 2026, the Petitioners identified the following issues for determination:

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Reasoning passage

On whether the suit was bad for want of exhaustion and lack of jurisdiction-I find it is not in dispute that the petitioners, being public officers were subject to the jurisdiction under section 74 of the Public Service Commission Act to wit –

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. E095 OF 2024

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LABOUR RIGHTS DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2, 10, 12, 19, 20,21, 22, 23, 41, 47, 159 (e), 232 AND 236 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLES 10, 19, 20, 21, 28, 41, 47, 50 AND 236 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES, 2013

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE UNLAWFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF JESCA NYAMWAYA, BERNARD LUCHELI, LAWRENCE BENGAT AND ANTONY NALIANYA

BETWEEN

JESCA NYAMWAYA ………………………………………………………………………………………..1ST PETITIONER

BERNARD LUCHELI ………………………………………………………………………………………..2ND PETITIONER

LAWRENCE BENGAT………………………………………………………………………………..……..3RD PETITIONER

ANTONY NALIANYA ……………………………………………………………………………………...4TH PETITIONER

-VERSUS-

KENYA NATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION………………..…………………………………RESPONDENT

CORAM

Before Lady Justice Jemimah Keli

C/A Otieno

JUDGMENT

1. In the instant case, the 4 petitioners were members of an ad hoc evaluation committee appointed to evaluate 31 quotations, which the respondent stated were not solicited and whose receipt is unknown. One of the quotations was by a company based in Dubai and not incorporated in Kenya. It was awarded a tender to supply cooking oil. The respondent's mandate included, among others, implementing a government policy to stabilise the prices of essential household food items vide bulk import and distribution to the local market. The respondent obtained a loan from KCB for that purpose in the instant case. The Petitioners were accused, among other things, of negligence of duty. The Petitioners faced disciplinary proceedings together with others, that led to termination of employment. The Petitioners alleged unfair labour practice in the termination of their employment by the Respondent in this suit vide a Petition dated 26th June 2024 and sought the following relief-

a) A Declaration that the decision by the Respondent to subject the Petitioners to disciplinary processes and eventually dismissing them from employment was unreasonable, unfair, unlawful and violated the Petitioners' constitutional right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and the right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution.

b) A Declaration that by introducing and dismissing the Petitioners on account of committing a total of ten (10) acts of misconduct outside the three (3) charges cited in the Show Cause letters, the Respondent contravened the Constitutional values and principles of respect for the rule of law and good governance as enshrined under of Article 10 (2) of the Constitution as well as the public service value and principle of professionalism as provided for under Article 232 of the Constitution.

c) A Declaration that by subjecting the Petitioners to a disciplinary process and eventually dismissing them from employment after discharging their lawful duties as members of the ad hoc evaluation committee, the Respondent violated Article 236 of the Constitution.

d) An Order directing the Respondent to compensate the Petitioners for violation of their constitutional rights.

e) An Order directing the Respondent to reinstate the Petitioners to their positions without loss of rank and benefits.

f) An Order directing the Respondent to pay the Petitioners all their accrued salaries and benefits from the date of termination of their employment.

2. The Petition was filed alongside the Supporting Affidavit of the Petitioner sworn on 26th June 2024, and the documents attached thereto.

3. In response to the said Petition, the Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th July 2024.

Hearing and evidence

4. On 28th October 2024, the Attorney General State Counsel, Odukenya, informed the Court that they would cross-examine the 1st Petitioner, Jesca Nyamweya. The cross-examination proceeded on 12th October 2025. The case was adjourned, and a date of 9th February 2026 for re-examination was taken. Justice Nduma Nderi was appointed to the Court of Appeal before the next date.

5. The matter was before me on the 9th February 2026 when Brian Khaemba took the PW1 through re-examination.

6. On the same date and on 24th February 2026, the respondent's witness was Kevin Murithi, who told the court that he was the respondent's audit and risk assurance officer. He adopted his witness statement dated 18th October 2024, with the annexures. He was cross-examined by counsel for the petitioners, Brian Khaemba. He was re-examined by Ms. Akuno, State Counsel.

The Petitioner’s case in summary

7. The Petitioners state that on 14th January 2020, a Presidential Directive was issued designating the Respondent as an anchor agency to accumulate excess Kenyan rice for distribution to MDA's and the general public. The project was intended to enhance market access for Kenyan rice and to ring-fence the domestic market against an influx of imported rice and promote "Buy Kenya - Build Kenya" strategy. Subsequently, on 10th November 2022, the Cabinet approved a framework to position KNTC as the anchor of State initiatives to create a price stabiliser for essential household food items. The Respondent, as a trading company, would supplement other State initiatives by creating Strategic Reserves for staple and essential food items, vital farm inputs including fertilizer and any other goods necessary for ensuring stability in the prices of core goods consumed by Kenyans, especially where price swings of essential items are abnormal and against the public interest.

8. As part of the aforesaid project and mandate, the respondent procured goods for trading purposes, but the said procurement did not constitute procurement within the meaning of Section 2 of the Public Procurement and Assets Disposal Act, 2015. Indeed, the respondent through the Parent Ministry sought for approval from the National Treasury to utilize the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure (SPPP) in accordance with the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2015 (revised 2022), and after reviewing the Corporation's business operation model, the National Treasury confirmed that procuring commodities for normal trading business does not constitute procurement under section 2 of the Act. Further, the Respondent was advised that being a Trading entity, it should undertake trading in line with its Internal Trading Policy; and that the Respondent had two sets of procurement i.e. procurement for trading items which is done in line with the Respondent's Internal Trading Policy and procurement for non-trading items which is done in line with Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2015 (Revised 2022).

9. It is averred that the Managing Director of the Respondent appointed the Petitioners/Applicants and one Jack Oyieke to an ad hoc evaluation committee on 15th November 2022 to evaluate thirty-one (31) unsolicited quotations, which the committee was informed had been received by the Supply Chain Department. On 18th November 2022, the committee convened and evaluated the thirty-one (31) unsolicited quotations in two parts, namely the mandatory requirements and the financials. The mandatory requirements included: a copy of the Certificate of Registration/Incorporation; a copy of the Valid Tax Compliance Certificate; CR12; and a company profile. Of the 31 quotations, fourteen (14) companies were recommended for onboarding for consideration for the supply of various commodities. That was the end of the ad hoc committee's mandate.

10. The Petitioners aver that their troubles with the Respondent began on 24th January 2024 when they were served with show cause letters why disciplinary action should not be taken against them, on charges of irregularly awarding tenders, making false statements and records, and negligence of duty, in respect of the tender evaluation exercise carried out on 18th November 2022. The letter stated that:-

a) There was no evidence whether the suppliers (Makram, Standard Petroleum and Multi Commerce) were competitively sourced as required by the Public Procurement & Assets Disposal Regulations, 2022. Notably, a tender evaluation report dated 18th November 2022 was availed, however, there was no evidence on the mode the tender documents were shared/transmitted to the suppliers and received by the corporation. In view of this, the report signed by yourself as a member of the said committee is not truthful that you evaluated tenders that had been submitted hence this amounts to irregular awarding tenders.

b) The Internal Audit Report also notes that the procurement process precisely the evaluation of bids was fabricated and conducted without following due process since the Evaluation Committee was not able to avail documents such as bid documents sent by various bidders. The signing of the Bidders Evaluation Report by yourself therefore amounted to making false statements and records.

c) As part of the Committee, you failed to ensure that bid documents as shared by bidders are availed to yourself and the committee for proper scrutiny and evaluation as guided by the Public Procurement and Assets Disposal Act, 2015. This amounted to Negligence of Duty.

11. In response to the said letter, on 30th January 2024, each of the Petitioners submitted detailed letters, explaining their role in the procurement process, as a committee. By this time, the Petitioners had been locked out of the Respondent's offices, email addresses and Enterprise Resource Planning System hence denying them an opportunity to effectively and exhaustively respond to the allegations levelled against them. The Petitioners responded that they were not involved in the process of transmitting tender documents to the supplier, as no tender documents were sent to any supplier for the reason that the Respondent was not procuring the subject goods using the open tender process. Rather, they relied on the list of unsolicited quotations provided to the committee by the Respondent's Accounting Officer. The Petitioners state that the committee's role per Section 46 of the Act was limited to evaluating the quotations in terms of the mandatory requirements and financial ability.

12. Additionally, the Petitioners state that they explained that the procurement in question was not subject to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act because the Respondent was buying goods for sale at a profit, and that this had been affirmed by the National Treasury in a letter dated 1st December 2023. While the Petitioners were accused of an "irregular award of tenders", they state that they did not award tenders in their capacity as members of the ad hoc evaluation committee. This was the role of the Respondent's accounting officer. Regarding the charge of making false statements in the internal audit report, it was alleged that this stemmed from the evaluation committee failing to provide documents, such as bid documents sent by various bidders. The Petitioners respond that, at no point, were any of them asked for any document during the purported audit exercise. They state that they were, in fact, unaware of the exercise until they were given copies of the report after they had been served with show cause letters upon requesting the same. They further state that, although they were supplied with bid documents for all 31 bidders, copies of the same were stored in their respective offices, which they did not have access to at the time of being served with show cause letters.

13. The Petitioners complain that the Respondent dismissed them from employment by letters dated 6th March 2024, in which the Respondent cited ten (10) acts of misconduct that the Petitioners had purportedly committed, even though the show cause letters, which were comprehensively responded to, contained only three (3) charges. The ten (10) charges listed in the dismissal letters were new, and the Petitioners had not been afforded an opportunity to respond to them before their dismissals. The Petitioners contend that the Respondent, through its actions, violated their Constitutional rights under Articles 10, 19, 20, 21, 28, 41, 47, 50 and 236.

Respondent’s case in brief

14. The Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th July 2024 and a Replying Affidavit sworn on 18th October 2024 in opposition to the Petitioners’ claim. The Respondent denied that it had violated or breached all the provisions of law stated in the Petition.

15. In the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the Respondent raised a preliminary objection seeking to have the entire suit struck out on grounds that; the Honorable Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit in view of the doctrine of exhaustion of internal dispute resolution mechanisms as the Petitioners had not exhausted alternative dispute resolution mechanisms pursuant to Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution, Provision 11.23 of the Kenya National Trading Corporation Ltd Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual 2018; the Honorable Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter pursuant to Section 74 of the Public Service Commission Act Cap. 185 and Regulation 68(1) of the Public Service Commission Regulations 2020, and; that the matters raised are res judicata since they have already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in Nairobi ELRCPET No. E059 of 2024, Bernard Lucheli and 3 Others v Kenya National Trading Corporation Ltd.

16. In the Replying Affidavit sworn by Kelvin Micheni, the Respondent denied the allegation that it was procuring goods for trading purposes which would amount to making a profit. To the contrary, the Respondent was procuring goods to stabilize prices and not for trading. The Petitioners, together with the former Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Ms. Pamela Mutua, commenced procuring of goods and commodities for public interest and not for profit as alleged. Therefore, the procurement of public goods was in line with its mandate to stabilise the price of essential food commodities in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of PPADA 2015. The Petitioners together with the former CEO, through the Parent Ministry, sought approval from the National Treasury to utilize the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure (SPPP) under PPADA 2015. However, the approval sought from the National Treasury was based on untrue facts that the Corporation had a Trading and Non-trading Policy. The Trading and Non-trading Policy is only in draft form and up to now has not been approved. The Petitioners together with the former CEO intentionally mislead the National Treasury of the existence of a Trading and Non-trading Policy whilst they knew it was unavailable at the time. The approval of the National Treasury to utilize the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure (SPPP) under PPADA 2015 as sought was a sham and with a view to fabricate procurement documents towards compliance with the PPADA as the Petitioners had predetermined successful bidders to be awarded tenders.

17. The Respondent’s former CEO appointed the Petitioners to an ad-hoc evaluation committee allegedly to evaluate thirty-one (31) unsolicited quotations yet the Petitioners had not adduced evidence to show how the unsolicited quotations were received. The Supply Chain Management denied ever receiving the unsolicited quotations. The Respondent stated that the Petitioner’s appointment to the committee was irregular as there was no request from the Sales Department through the Procurement Department to appoint the Petitioners to the Evaluation Committee, the Tender Opening Committee and the Evaluation Committee was the same, and therefore irregular and contrary to the provisions of law. The Respondent brought to the attention of this Honorable Court the following sequence of events; that the Cabinet dispatch granting the Respondent the mandate for price stabilization was issued on 10th November 2022, and the National Treasury approval to use Specially Permitted Procurement (SPP) was given on 1st December 2022. Despite this the tender evaluation was conducted earlier. For instance, on 4th November 2022, the former CEO sent a due diligence letter to Standard Petroleum and received a response on 7th November 2022, way before the Cabinet dispatch and approval from the National Treasury.

18. The Evaluation Report is dated 18th November 2022, and the Professional Opinion is dated 21st November 2022 (the same is annexed in the Replying Affidavit of the Respondent). This clearly shows that procurement activities commenced before the necessary approvals were in place. The tender evaluation report dated 18th November 2022 indicated that the date of invitation to tender was 8th November 2022, two days before the Cabinet dispatch dated 10th November 2022, thus indicating that the Corporation had invited bidders before the Cabinet had sat and issued the Respondent the mandate of price stabilization. The invitation to tender was consequently issued two days before the Cabinet had issued the mandate to the Respondent for price stabilization, which clearly shows that the Petitioners and former CEO were prematurely engaging in procurement activities, and this amounted to gross misconduct.

19. Further, the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure (SPPP) was not authorized until 1st December 2022 and therefore the entire process was undertaken without the necessary legal authority. Through a Special Audit Report by the Auditor General dated 29th July 2024, the Report clearly outlined multiple discrepancies, including the use of differing procurement methods and a failure to comply with the prescribed regulations under PPADA 2015. Notably, the Evaluation Report dated 18th November 2022 stated that the Direct Procurement Method was used, while the tender documents dated 21st November 2022 indicated that an Expression of Interest (EOI) was used. The Special Audit Report also indicated that the Petitioners received oral instructions from the former CEO to proceed with the tender evaluation, contrary to Section 78(1) of PPADA 2015, which mandates that tender opening and evaluation should be conducted by separate committees. These inconsistencies clearly prove that the procurement process was not transparent and lawful. It is due to these irregularities and anomalies that the Petitioners were served with show cause letters all dated 23rd January 2024 together with the internal audit report and given adequate time to respond. To facilitate their responses to the show cause letters, none of the Petitioners was denied access to any material in the office or elsewhere. The Respondent allowed the Petitioners access to their emails and the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) System in order for them to retrieve any evidence to be adduced at the hearing.

20. Upon receipt of the Petitioners responses to the show cause letters, the Respondent’s Board constituted an ad-hoc committee to hear and indeed the Petitioners were heard in a hearing conducted on 22nd February 2024. After the hearing, it was determined that the charges outlined in the show cause letters were sufficiently proven. Upon receipt of the ad-hoc disciplinary committee’s report and findings, the Respondent implemented the same through the termination letters dated 6th March 2024. The Petitioners were granted an opportunity to lodge appeals against their dismissal within 6 weeks which lapsed without any appeals. The Petitioners chose not to exhaust the internal dispute disciplinary resolution mechanism or lodge any appeals with the Public Service Commission. The Petitioners had also lodged a Petition before Hon. Byram Ongaya in Nairobi ELRC Petition No. E059 of 2024 between the same parties herein, and have since withdrawn that Petition without complying with the orders therein.

21. The Petitioners were availed and received an Engagement Letter for the audit on 24th August 2023 along with a Request for Information List as shown in the Internal Audit Files Movement Register. Moreover, the Draft Audit Report was shared with the Petitioners for their comments through an email on 19th January 2024 and again in hard copy on 24th January 2024. The Petitioners in the disciplinary hearing expressed themselves fully, disclosing numerous offenses that were noted and included in the dismissal letters. No new charges were preferred as alleged. The Respondent averred that the procurement process was irregular from the onset. The Petitioners claim that they followed the proper procedure during the procurement process was false, as the Special Audit Report by the Auditor General dated 29th July 2024 clearly outlines multiple discrepancies, including the use of differing procurement methods and a failure to comply with the prescribed regulations under PPADA 2015.

22. The Respondent stated that the Petitioners had not demonstrated with precision how their fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution had been violated or threatened and had not produced any evidence to prove the alleged violations contrary to the principles espoused in the locus classicus decision of Anarita Karimi Njeru [1979] KLR 154 and Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance [2013] eKLR. The Petition is baseless, without merit and amounts to an abuse of the court process. The Respondent prayed that the Petition be dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

DETERMINATION

23. Following directions by the court that it would determine the Petition through written submissions, the Petitioner and Respondent filed their respective submissions.

Issues for determination

24. In their submissions dated 5th March 2026, the Petitioners identified the following issues for determination:

i. Whether the Preliminary Objection dated the 15th of July 2024 is merited.

ii. Whether the Petitioners' dismissal from service was unlawful and whether the same violated the Petitioners' constitutional rights.

iii. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the Petition dated 26th June 2024.

25. Conversely, the Respondent filed submissions dated 9th March 2026, where they distilled three issues for determination, namely:

i. Whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th July 2024 is merited,

hence the petition is premature before this honorable court for failure to appeal

to Public Service Commission (PSC) as required by law.

ii. Whether the Petitioners’ dismissal was unlawful and amounted to a violation

of their constitutional rights; and

iii. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the orders sought.

26. The court found consensus by parties on issues of determination to be -

a. Whether the Preliminary Objection dated the 15th of July 2024 is merited.

b. Whether the Petitioners' dismissal from service was unlawful

c. Whether the same violated the Petitioners' constitutional rights.

d. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the Petition dated 26th June 2024.

The law

27. Articles 10,19,20,21,28, 41,47,59 and 236 of the Constitution.

28. Sections 41,43 and 45 of the Employment Act.

Whether the Preliminary Objection dated the 15th of July 2024 is merited.

29. The Notice of Preliminary Objection by the respondent dated 15th July 2024 raised two main issues, namely:

a) Whether this Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter as per the doctrine of exhaustion of internal dispute resolution mechanisms; and

b) Whether the matters raised in this suit are res judicata.

30. The respondent submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion of internal dispute resolution mechanisms, also known as the principle of exhaustion of remedies, requires that a party seeking judicial intervention utilise all other available non-judicial remedies before turning to the court. This principle aims to ensure that administrative bodies and other quasi-judicial bodies have an opportunity to address and resolve issues before the same escalate to the judiciary. The doctrine is premised in the Constitution pursuant to Article 47(1) of the Constitution that provides that every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. Also pursuant to Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution that provides for the principle of alternative forms of dispute resolution mechanisms, and the same shall be promoted by the courts. The Petition is premature as the Petitioners have failed to exhaust all available Internal Remedies including appealing to PSC under Section 74 (1) of Public Service Commission Act (2017) as well as Section 68 of Public Service Commission Regulations (2020) contrary to a finding by the Court of Appeal in Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume, that employees must exhaust internal disciplinary and appeal mechanisms before approaching the court. Section 74(1) of Public Service Commission Act states that: “Any person who is dissatisfied or affected by a decision made by an authorized officer or other authority in exercise or purported exercise of disciplinary control against any public officer under this Act may appeal to the Commission.” Regulation 68 of the Public Service Commission (PSC) Regulations, 2020 (Kenya) provides for appeals and reviews in disciplinary matters.

“A public officer who is dissatisfied with a disciplinary process may appeal against the process or the decision in accordance with Section 74 of the Act.”

31. The respondent contended that from the pleadings filed before this Honourable Court, the Petitioners have failed to appeal to PSC over any grievance it may hold concerning the disciplinary process and subsequent dismissal. This doctrine is well articulated by courts in various cases. The Supreme Court of Kenya in NGOs Co-ordination Board v E.G & 4 others; Katiba Institute (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 16 of 2019) [2023] KESC 17 (KLR) stated as follows on the doctrine of exhaustion at paragraph 40, “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was settled by this court in the case of Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 others (sued on their own behalf and on behalf of predecessors and or successors in title in their capacities as the Registered Trustees of Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme) v Maurice Munyao & 148 others (suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the plaintiffs and other Members/Beneficiaries of the Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme) SC petition No 3 of 2016; [2019] eKLR. This court stated as follows at paragraph 118: “…Even where superior courts had jurisdiction to determine profound questions of law, the first opportunity had to be given to relevant persons, bodies, tribunals or any other quasi- judicial authorities and organs to deal with the dispute as provided for in the relevant parent statute". The action of the Petitioners to elevate their grievance to this Honorable Court without appealing to Public Service Commission offends a Court of Appeal finding in Secretary, County Public Service Board & another v Hulbhai Gedi Abdille (2017) eKLR where Court of Appeal held that where a statute provides a specific dispute resolution mechanism, it must be exhausted before approaching the court. The court stated that the respondent filed judicial review proceedings without first appealing to the Public Service Commission, as required by statute, making the proceedings premature. The Petition is bad in law as it goes against the settled PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT as was the finding in the Appeal decision in County Assembly of Kisumu v Kisumu County Assembly Service Board & 6 Others [ 2015] eKLR courts should avoid premature interference with ongoing internal administrative processes. In light of the above, this Honorable Court lacks Jurisdiction to entertain this suit. This is because the suit is premature, having been instituted in contravention of the mandatory preconditions prescribed under Section 74 (1) of Public Service Commission Act (2017) as well as Section 68 of Public Service Commission Regulations (2020) as which outlines the mandatory appeal procedure an employee should follow if dissatisfied with the decision of an employer before moving to court and in disregard of the settled principles of exhaustion of statutory remedies under Kenyan law. THAT this Honorable Court lacks Jurisdiction to entertain this suit by failure to comply with the internal dispute resolution mechanism provided under PSC Act and Human Resource Manual. We further submit that Kenyan jurisprudence consistently holds that where a statute provides or implies a specific procedure or remedy, that procedure must be exhausted before recourse is had to the courts — otherwise the suit is premature. The respondent relied on several authorities which the court appreciated- Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others v Samuel Munga & 1756 others [2015] eKLR the Court of Appeal underscored that the exhaustion doctrine requires litigants to utilize statutory mechanisms before instituting proceedings, given that courts are fora of last resort, and this promotes efficiency and respect for specialized frameworks provided by Parliament; Kiriro wa Ngugi & 19 Others v Attorney General & 2 others [2020) eKLR where the Court cited other cases to buttress and bring home the point that the doctrine of exhaustion deals with instances where a Constitutional Court will decline to deal with a matter because there exists another remedy provided in law which the aggrieved party is yet to utilize. This Court at Kakamega, relying on the provisions of Section 74 of the Public Service Commission Act in the case of Okero v Board of Governors Bukura Agricultural College & 2 others [2023] KEELRC 1857 (KLR), stated as follows at paragraph 18-

“The court from the foregoing holds that there exists a clear procedure of redress of the grievance of the suspension before the Public Service Commission and that procedure has not been exhausted under the doctrine of exhaustion. I say so even without the respondents raising the issue as it is a matter of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal defined with clarity the doctrine of exhaustion in Court of Appeal decision in Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR (Kwach, Cocker and Muli JJA) where the court held:- “In our view, there is considerable merit in the submission that where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed”. This decision has been upheld as the law by all superior courts in Kenya.

32. The Courts have pronounced themselves succinctly on the doctrine of Res Judicata. The Supreme Court of Kenya in John Florence Maritime Services Limited & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others (Petition 17 of 2015) [2021] KESC 39 (KLR), at paragraph 58, relied on its holding in the case of Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Muiri Coffee Estate Limited & another (Motion No 42 of 2014) [2016] eKLR (Muiri Coffee case) where it held as follows on the doctrine of res judicata-

“The doctrine of res judicata, in effect, allows a litigant only one bite at the cherry. It prevents a litigant, or persons claiming under the same title, from returning to court to claim further reliefs not claimed in the earlier action. It is a doctrine that serves the cause of order and efficacy in the adjudication process. The doctrine prevents a multiplicity of suits, which would ordinarily clog the courts, apart from occasioning unnecessary costs to the parties; and it ensures that litigation comes to an end, and the verdict duly translates into fruit for one party, and liability for another party, conclusively.”

33. The respondent submitted that this Court in ELRCPET No. E059 of 2024, filed by the same Petitioners herein against the same Respondent herein, based on the same facts and issues as those in this Petition, was heard, determined and marked withdrawn pursuant to an Application by the Petitioners dated 28th May 2024. In the Application, the Petitioners disclosed before the Court that they had entered into a consent hence their application to withdraw the matter. Such a consent ought to have been pursued exhaustively as it bound the parties therein. Therefore, the matters raised being similar as those in ELRCPET No. E059 of 2024 amount to res judicata as the same was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, hence this suit ought to be dismissed on these grounds. From the foregoing, we submit that the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th July 2024 is of merit as the Petitioners have not exhausted internal dispute resolution mechanisms to invoke the jurisdiction of this court and the same is res judicata hence this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine this matter. We humbly submit that this Honorable Court ought to dismiss this suit on the grounds raised in the preliminary objection.

Petitioner’s submission on the preliminary objection

34. On issue of res judicata-Whether the present petition is res judicata? The Respondent contends that this Petition ought to be struck out as res judicata because the issues raised herein have already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in Nairobi ELRC Petition No. E059 of 2024 Benard Lucheli & 3 others v State Law. In addressing this issue specifically, the Petitioners filed a Further Affidavit sworn on the 20th of June, 2024 where they have produced an order issued by the Hon. Justice Byram Ongaya on the 26th of June, 2024 in Nairobi ELRC Petition No. E059 of 2024 Benard Lucheli & 3 others v State Law wherein he marked the entire suite as having been withdrawn with no orders as costs and closed the said case. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2010 addresses the issue of Res judicata and it states as follows,

"No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court."

35. Further, there is certainly no shortage of judicial decisions in which the courts have laid down the parameters or, rather, put to rest the test on how to determine whether a suit is res judicata or not. The Petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in John Florence Maritime Services Limited & Another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others (Petition 17 of 2015) [2021] KESC 39 KLR on the issue of res judicata.

36. Bearing the above in mind, it is immediately apparent that the Respondent's contention that this suit is res judicata Nairobi ELRCPET/E059/2024 (hereafter referred to as 'the former suit') is unsustainable. As is reflected in the Orders issued on the 26th of June, 2024 in the former suit, the Respondent herein was well represented by Counsel when the entire suit was withdrawn and duly marked as such with no orders as costs. The said suit was never determined on the merits of the issues raised therein. In Suleiman Said Shabhal v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 3 others [2014) eKLR, the Court of Appeal held as follows, "To constitute resjudicata, there must be adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy." As such, in view of the fact that the former suit was never determined on merit, but was otherwise withdrawn before it was heard, then this suit cannot be res judicata under section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act and we similarly urge this Honourable Court to find and hold.

37. Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this Petitioner in view of the doctrine of exhaustion of internal dispute resolution mechanisms. The Respondent further contends that this Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine this Petition in view of the doctrine of exhaustion of internal dispute resolution mechanisms. In particular, the Respondent relies on clause 11.23 of its Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual, 2018 and section 74 pf the Public Service Commission Act and Regulation 68 (1) of the Public Service Commission Regulations, 2020. 45. Although the Respondent has not provided a copy of its Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual, 2018 for the benefit of the court's perusal and that of the Petitioners, section 74 of the Public Service Commission Act stipulates as follows,

"(1) Any person who is dissatisfied or affected by a decision made by an authorized officer or other authority in exercise or purported exercise of disciplinary control against any public officer under this Act may appeal to the Commission..."

38. From the reading of the above provisions of the law, it is obvious that the Respondent contends the Petitioners herein ought to have appealed against their dismissal to the Public Service Commission rather than file the present Petition. We are, however, afraid that we couldn't disagree more with the Respondent. The Doctrine of exhaustion was well elaborated in William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 others v Attorney General & 4 others; Muslims for Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR as follows;-

"The question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises when a litigant, aggrieved by an agency's action, seeks redress from a Court of law on an action without pursuing available remedies before the agency itself. The exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts."

39. It is now a well-established legal principle in our jurisprudence that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside the courts, the same should be exhausted first before the jurisdiction of the court is invoked. However, that requirement for exhaustion is not always mandatory. It is expressly provided for by statute and further well established by case law that there are exceptional/special circumstances under which it is permissible for a litigant to move and invoke the court's jurisdiction on a particular cause of action without necessarily exhausting the available alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

40. The question that would therefore follow is what then constitutes these special circumstances that would allow a litigant to move to court without first exhausting the internal dispute resolution mechanisms/appellate processes as provided by statute. We submit that in deciding the above, it has been established by case law that courts should satisfy themselves as to whether the exhaustion requirement would serve the values enshrined in the constitution and the law and whether the alternative/internal dispute resolution mechanism, is well suited to resolve the issues raised by a litigant. In Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (I.E.B.C.) Ex parte National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others [2017] eKLR, the Honourable Court asserting that exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion requirement will be decided on a case-by-case basis, held that;

"As the Court of Appeal acknowledged in the Shikara Limited Case (supra), the High Court may, in exceptional circumstances, find that exhaustion requirement would not serve the values enshrined in the Constitution or law and permit the suit to proceed before it."

41. Further in Fleur Investments Limited v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes & another 52. [2018] eKLR the Court of Appeal while determining whether a litigant can be exempt from the doctrine of exhaustion held thus,

"Whereas courts of Law are enjoined to defer to specialized Tribunals and other Alternative Dispute Resolution Statutory bodies created by Parliament to resolve certain specific disputes, the court cannot, being a bastion of Justice, sit back and watch such institutions ride roughshod on the rights of citizens who seek refuge under the Constitution and other legislations for protection. The court is perfectly in order to intervene where there is clear abuse of discretion by such bodies, where arbitrariness, malice, capriciousness and disrespect of the Rules of natural justice are manifest. Persons charged with statutory powers and duties ought to exercise the same reasonably and fairly."

42. Therefore, on whether the exhaustion requirement in the present circumstances serves the values of the constitution and the law, we submit that this Honourable Court will find the answer to be in the negative. In this case, the Petitioners herein challenge the legality and/or constitutionality of their dismissal from the Respondent's service as it is their contention that the same was in gross violation of their constitutional rights as their dismissal was anchored on various grounds/accusations which they had never been called upon to offer any responses to and similarly the same was based on alleged violations of the provisions of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 and the regulations made thereto when the Respondent's parent ministry as well as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority had made a communication confirming that the procurement of items by the Respondent to trade for profit, was not subject to the provisions of the Procurement Act. It is the Petitioners' humble submission that an appeal can only lie to the Public Service Commission when the same is against the merits of the decision being appealed against but such an appeal cannot lie when the party is contesting the legality/constitutionality of the entire exercise or action in the first place. In Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of Kenya & Another v Bryan Mandila Khaemba [2021] eKLR, the Court of appeal weighed in on whether illegality both in procedure and substance constitute exceptional circumstances to warrant exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion. It stated as follows;

"Exhaustion of alternative remedies is now a constitutional and legal imperative under Article 159 (2) (c) of the Constitution and Section 9(2) and (3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act. ...This position notwithstanding, courts still retain the residual jurisdiction to intervene in exceptional circumstances despite the existence of an alternative remedy... It has been demonstrated and found that that the disciplinary process by the 1st Appellant against the Respondent was marred from the start with illegality and procedural irregularity. It is evident that the Chief Justice had already, in the letter dated 13th June, 2019, found that the Respondent's actions amounted to gross misconduct, and therefore, as regards the Respondent's culpability... Continuing with the disciplinary process in the circumstances would essentially have been an exercise in futility and aid in the continued violation of the Respondent's rights as was similarly noted by this Court in Judicial Service Commission & Another v Lucy Muthoni Njora [2021] eKLR."

43. It is thus the Petitioner's humble submission that the nature of their grievance before this Court, being that of the legality and/or constitutionality of the Respondent's actions, not only does it constitute the exceptional/special circumstances anticipated to warrant the intervention of this Honourable Court despite the doctrine of exhaustion, it also does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. This can still be ascertained from the type of reliefs that the Petitioners seek, which include declarations as to the legality and/or constitutionality of the Respondent's actions in dismissing them from service. It therefore falls that the Public Service Commission does not have the authority to make such a determination as the one being sought. Time and time again the courts have held that appeals to the Public Service Commission can only be grounded on the merits of the decision of the subordinate body/officer and not on the legality/constitutionality of the same. The authority/power to determine the legality/constitutionality of a particular action is vested only with the courts of law as established under the Constitution. In James Orre v Office of the Governor, County Government of Marsabit & another [2021] eKLR, the court held as follows;

"Again, the Petition is outside the limits of section 77 of the County Governments Act, 2012 in that it seeks to test the constitutionality and legality of the termination of the employment of the Petitioner. These are weighty issues touching on the validity of the actions of the Respondents in a manner advanced so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission as an arbiter of the issues in dispute in the circumstances."

44. That when determining the legality of an action, an analysis and interpretation of the relevant legal provisions is inevitable. The Public Service Commission does not, however, have the authority/jurisdiction to interpret the law in order to make a determination as to whether the Respondent was acting within its authority or whether the Respondent's actions are legal in the first place. This is the preserve of only the courts and the present suit is therefore rightly brought before this court. The petitioner relied on Thuranira Salesio Mutuma v County Public Service Board & 2 others [2019] eKLR, where the Honourable Court held that:

"The law is clear as far as appeals to PSC lie. These are discretionary. In this case, the Petitioner has moved the court instead of the of moving the PSC and that is within the remit of the law as there are notable Constitutional Imperatives that only this Court and the Superior Courts (Environment and Land Court, High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) can enforce". The petitioner further relied on decision in Abdikadir Suleiman v County Government of Isiolo & Another [20151 eKLR

Decision on the preliminary objection

45. I would begin by tackling the easy part of the preliminary objection, being whether the suit was res judicata. The Respondent contends that this Petition ought to be struck out as the same is res judicata because the issues raised herein have already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in Nairobi ELRC Petition No. E059 of 2024 Benard Lucheli & 3 others v State Law. In addressing this issue specifically, the Petitioners filed a further Affidavit sworn on the 20th of June, 2024 where they have produced an order issued by the Hon. Justice Byram Ongaya on the 26th of June, 2024 in Nairobi ELRC Petition No. E059 of 2024 Benard Lucheli & 3 others v State Law wherein he marked the entire suite as having been withdrawn with no orders as costs and closed the said case. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2010 addresses the issue of Res judicata and it states as follows,

"No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court."

46. In John Florence Maritime Services Limited & Another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others (Petition 17 of 2015) [2021] KESC 39 KLR, the Supreme Court stated as follows on the issue of res judicata,

"We restate the elements that must be proven before a court may arrive at the conclusion that a matter is res judicata. For res judicata to be invoked in a civil matter the following elements must be demonstrated:

a) There is a former Judgement or order which was final

b) The Judgement or order was on merit

c) The Judgement or order was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

d) There must be between the first and second action, identical parties, subject matter and cause of action."

47. I hold the suit is not res judicata as there is no decision of the court on the merits of the issues in the dispute.

48. On whether the suit was bad for want of exhaustion and lack of jurisdiction-I find it is not in dispute that the petitioners, being public officers were subject to the jurisdiction under section 74 of the Public Service Commission Act to wit –

‘74. Appeals

1)Any person who is dissatisfied or affected by a decision made by an authorized officer or other authority in exercise or purported exercise of disciplinary control against any public officer under this Act may appeal to the Commission.

(2)An appeal under subsection (1) shall be made in writing within ninety days from the date of the decision appealed against: Provided that the Commission may consider an appeal that was made out of time if, in the opinion of the Commission, the circumstances warrant such consideration.

(3)The Commission shall not entertain an appeal by a public officer or a representative of a public officer, in respect of a particular decision, more than once.(4)Despite the right of appeal conferred on a public officer by this section, disciplinary action shall not be deferred or suspended pending the determination of the appeal.

(5)After considering an appeal, the Commission may—

(a)uphold the decision;

(b)set the decision aside;

(c)vary the decision as it considers to be just;

(d)give such directions as it may consider appropriate with respect to the decision;

(e)direct the refund, reinstatement of remuneration or release of any withheld payments due to the public officer as it considers to be just;

(f)direct that disciplinary action be taken against any public officer who has failed to discharge a duty that was the public officer's responsibility to perform in relation to the disciplinary case and the concerned public body has suffered a loss; or

(g)make any other appropriate decision in view of the circumstances of the case.

(6)Where the Commission sets aside a decision under subsection (5)(b), the public officer shall revert to the previous status held and receive the attendant benefits as though the decision set aside was never made.’

49. The petitioners have cited several authorities to justify their non-invocation of the process, primarily because they raise constitutional issues that could not be adjudicated by the PSC. The jurisdiction of the PSC was considered by the Court of Appeal in Wajir Wasco Limited alias Wajir Water & Sewerage Company & another v Mohamed & 2 others [2024] KECA 937 (KLR)  , where at the trial court a constitutional petition (ELRC Petition No. E076 of 2023) had been filed and the court assumed jurisdiction. On appeal the court held-

‘the learned judge failed to appreciate that the germane issue before him was basically an employer employee dispute and the mere invocation of Articles of the Constitution did not bar him from addressing his mind to the question whether the respondents could get an adequate remedy at the forum provided under the statute. Consequently, the learned judge erred in dismissing the appellants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection.’

50. What is the germane issue in the instant case? From the relief sought(see paragraph 1 above) it was a case of unfair termination. Applying the decision in Wajir, above, I find I have no jurisdiction at the first instance. The Court of Appeal in above decision further held-

‘Under section 9 (3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, the ELRC was mandatorily required consider the nature of the dispute and “…if it is not satisfied that the remedies referred to in sub-section 2. have been exhausted, direct that an applicant shall first exhaust such remedy before instituting proceedings under sub- section (1).” The trial Court never addressed its mind to this provision at the earliest opportunity possible or even while determining the Preliminary Objection. It took the erroneous view that the 1st respondent was a limited liability company.

39.Notably, section 9 (2) and (3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act are couched in peremptory terms. However, Parliament in its wisdom fully aware of the strictures of the said provisions provided a safe way out at sub-section (4) which provides an exception to the parameters of subsection (2). It reads: Notwithstanding subsection (3), the High Court or a subordinate Court may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the applicant, exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any remedy if the court considers such exemption to be in the interest of justice. Two requirements flow from the above sub-section. First, the applicant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances.

40.The respondents never applied for exemption under the above provision. We say no more. The import of their failure is that the suit before the trial court was caught up by the doctrine of exhaustion. This leads us to the final definitive question, which is whether, by filing constitutional petition citing violation of fundamental rights the respondents’ petition cannot be said to offend the doctrine of exhaustion.

41.There is no dispute that the germane dispute is stoppage of salaries. This is an employer/employee dispute. We are alive to the fact that every case has a constitutional underpinning, be it a criminal case, civil or commercial. However, it is important to point out that not every dispute ought to be brought as constitutional question. A constitutional question is an issue whose resolution requires the interpretation of a constitution rather than that of a statute. The germane issue in this can case be resolved by interpreting the facts, the contract documents, (written or oral) and the relevant statutes. This discourse brings into focus the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which is defined as a preference of deciding a case on any other basis other than one which involves a constitutional. ‘

51. Under FAAA the petitioners ought to have sought for exemption from section 74 of PSC Act. They did not. The court is called upon to evaluate disciplinary process leading to the termination. The applicable is the employment act. It is truism that fair hearing in employment claims is as stated in section 41 of the Employment Act as rad with section 45. I find that this was a case of constitutional avoidance this being a claim of unfair termination. The matter was within the jurisdiction of PSC under section 74. I do hold I lack jurisdiction in the matter at first instance.

Whether the Petitioners' dismissal from service was unlawful and whether the same violated the Petitioners' constitutional rights.

52. In the event I am wrong on the issue of jurisdiction. I proceed on the merit of the case having inherited the file when it was part heard. The petitioners stated in submissions that the court -It is not in dispute that at the material time relevant to this dispute, the Petitioners were employed by the Respondent herein; the 1st Petitioner being the Company Secretary & General Manager Legal Services, the 2nd Petitioner being the Principal Accountant, the 3rd Petitioner the Manager ICT and the 4th Petitioner being the Ag. Manager Sales & Marketing & Principal Sales Officer. It is also not in dispute that the impugned procurement exercise leading up to the Petitioners' Dismissal was not to be governed by the provisions of the Public Procurement and Assets Disposals Act (hereafter 'the Act'). It is also not in dispute that the Petitioners despite being charged with three (3) offences each in their Show Cause Memos, were dismissed on the basis of ten (10) other offences to which they had not been originally charged with. What therefore remains for determination by this Honourable Court is whether the dismissal from the Respondent's service violated the Petitioners' right to fair labour practices, fair administrative action and fair hearing. In January 2024, the Petitioners were served with show cause memos based on three (3) grounds after discharging their mandate in the ad-hoc committee, which was restricted to evaluation of the quotations received. The said show cause memos were based on an internal draft audit report and the first and third grounds therein were based on allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Procurement and Asset Disposal Act as well as the regulations arising thereto whilst the second ground was based on allegations in a draft internal audit report that accused the Petitioners of fabricating the process of evaluation of bids as they allegedly failed to avail the bid documents for the various bidders. It is based on the allegations made from the draft internal audit report that the Petitioners were subjected to disciplinary proceedings and later dismissed from service. The Petitioners have proved that they only acted in accordance with the directives of the Authorities and in line with the internal procurement policies.

53. We submit that the need of a fair hearing with proper charges cannot be wished away as the Respondent herein appears to have done given as on infringement of the Constitution, Article 50(2)(b) states as follows: -

"Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right- (b) to be informed of the charge, with sufficient detail to answer it."

54. This is as it was decided in Milimani Commercial ELRCPET E203 of 2024; Amos Juma Sikuku v Kenya National Trading Corporation Limited (KNTC) by Hon. Hellen Wasilwa. The Petitioner in this matter was dismissed under similar circumstances as to the Petitioners herein, by the same employer; KNTC and having ten (10) new grounds of gross misconduct introduced against him outside of the three (3) charges in his show cause letter. The court heard this matter on merits and ruled that the petitioner was subjected to an unfair disciplinary process and found culpable of charges not presented to him and therefore his rights under the constitution were infringed upon. That whenever there is a legitimate allegation of unfair termination of employment due to either lack of a valid reason or an unfair procedure that violates constitutional provisions and the rights enshrined therein, the employer bears the responsibility of demonstrating the existence of both the valid reason and procedural fairness in arriving at the decision to the terminate an employee's employment. This position has been affirmed in numerous decisions such as Radido J in Anthony Mkala Chitavi y Malindi Water & Sewerage Company Ltd [2013] eKLR, when he observed as follows,

"And what does section 41 of the Act require. The first observation is that the responsibility established is upon the shoulders of the employer. In a claim for unfair termination or wrongful dismissal on the grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity, it is the employer to demonstrate to the Court that it has observed the dictates of procedural fairness."

55. Further Maureen Onyango J in Beatrice Nyambune v Judicial Service Commission [2019] eKLR, held,

"In employment matters, the employer has to prove both valid reason and fair procedure"

56. Similarly; the Court of Appeal in Kenfreight (E.A) Limited v Benson K Nguti [2016] eKLR held as follows,

"The employer must also prove that the termination was in accordance with fair procedure. Section 43 specifically places the burden to prove that the termination was fair on the employer...The burden on the employee is limited only to asserting that unfair termination has occurred, leaving the burden to show that the termination is fair to the employer."

57. That the Respondent has not bothered to demonstrate that the dismissal of the Petitioners was substantially and procedurally fair and that the same did not in any way violate the constitutional rights of the Petitioners. Under Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. The Petitioners dismissal from service for failure to comply with provisions of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act or the regulations therein was grossly unfair and a violation of the Petitioner's right to Fair Administrative Action and Fair Labour Practices. It is common ground between the parties that the procurement exercise, to which the Respondent was mandated to procure goods for sale at a profit in order to aid it in stabilizing market prices for essential commodities, was not a procurement process subject to the Procurement and Asset Disposal Act. This much was confirmed by the National Treasury and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority in their letters dated the 1st of December, 2022 and the 18th of November, 2022 respectively.

58. Secondly in as much the Petitioners were accused of irregularly awarding tenders, the same was totally misguided as it is common ground between the parties that the ad-hoc committee in which the Petitioners were appointed never awarded any tenders to anyone, their mandate was strictly limited to evaluation of the bids received by the Respondent through its supply chain department.

59. Thirdly the Petitioners herein were charged, subjected to disciplinary proceedings and later dismissed from service based on a draft internal audit report when they were never given an opportunity to answer to any of the questions that have been raised by the auditors. It is elementary that a complete audit report is the final audit report and not the draft report. In the auditing exercise, once a draft audit report is prepared, any person against whom the audit exercise requires further in-put or answers from is supposed to be given a fair and ample opportunity to answer to any questions that the audit exercise may have raised. It is only upon compliance with this that a final audit report can be prepared. However, the Petitioners herein were charged, subjected to disciplinary proceedings and dismissed from the Respondent's service based a draft audit report which was not only premature but also a violation of their rights to fair administrative action and fair labour practices.

60. That a mere perusal of the dismissal letters issued to the Petitioners herein immediately reveals that they were not dismissed from service based on the charges they were called upon to answer to. In the Notices to Show Cause, the Petitioners were called to answer to specific charges which were three-fold. However, when they offered they responses, their disciplinary process morphed into an entirely different creature and the Petitioners were ultimately dismissed based on a total of ten (10) charges/grounds that they had never been called upon to answer to in the first place. As if that was not enough, the Petitioners were denied their statutory right to have another employee during the disciplinary hearing contrary to the Employment Act. In Evans Nyang'wono Monda v Kenya Pipeline Company Limited [2020] eKLR, Makau J affirmed that once an employer frames a charge against an employee and subject them to a disciplinary hearing, they cannot be allowed to introduce other charges during or after the hearing of the disciplinary case as this would constitute a violation of the employee's right to a fair hearing. He specifically held as follows,

‘With the notice of the charges an employee will face the employer, the employer is not allowed to introduce new charges at the hearing or after the hearing, which were not stated in the earlier notice."

61. In National Cereals and Produce Board v. John Kirui Tongorei [2017) eKLR the Court of Appeal held that:

"When the respondent was summoned to an administrative employment meeting, allegations were made notice of which had not been served upon the respondent. This was wrong. The appellant should have adhered to fair administrative action by notifying the respondent in advance of new allegations and giving him ample opportunity as required by the law to prepare and present a response or Defence to the allegations and to be represented by a representative to the meeting if he so 19 wished. This the appellant failed to do and in the process the respondent was denied a fair hearing. By terminating respondent's service for reasons that were different from the reason given in the suspension letter, the appellant breached the respondent's right and the learned judge was right to find that termination of the respondent's employment was unfair."

62. Again, in CMC Aviation Limited v. Mohammed Nour [2015] eKLR the Court of Appeal held that: - "Further it was clear that, that purported ground of termination was introduced at the disciplinary hearing or report and then in the termination letter without prior notice to the claimant in that regard so that it was without adherence to the due process of a notice as envisaged in section 41 of the Act." In view of the foregoing binding precedent, I must return that the introduction of new allegations or reasons for dismissal at the disciplinary hearing or in the dismissal letter after the hearing amounts to violation of fair hearing as envisaged under section 41 of the Employment Act and renders the dismissal of the claimant on such new grounds unfair within the meaning of section 45 of the Act."

63. The above circumstances fall on all fours with the case at hand. The Respondent having failed to justify that the intended dismissal of the Petitioners was valid based on the three (3) charges it had framed against them, it morphed these charges into ten (10) charges. The Respondent herein thereafter proceeded to dismiss the Petitioners based on these new charges that it had never afforded them an opportunity to answer to in the first place. It is our humble contention that this was a gross violation of the Petitioners' right to fair administrative action and fair labour practices. It is thus evident that the Petitioners herein were dismissed from service for simply doing the job they had been asked to do. It is not in dispute that on the 18th of November, 2022 the Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority had issued a communication to the National Treasury confirming that the procurement exercise by the Respondent, which was sourcing for goods to sell at a profit, was not subject to the Procurement and Asset Disposal Act. It is further not in dispute that on the 18th of November, 2022, the Petitioners herein who had been appointed to an ad-hoc evaluation committee, were tasked with evaluating bids/quotations received by the Respondent which mandate they discharged and submitted their findings. Neither were the Petitioners tasked with awarding tenders nor awarding any tenders to any person and as such it is evident that the Respondent unfairly and unlawfully subjected them to disciplinary proceedings and dismissed them from service based on tasks that were not part of their mandate.

64. Further, as we have demonstrated, the Respondent called the Petitioners to answer to specific charges, which were premature in the first place as they were mounted on a draft audit report. The Respondent then went ahead to dismiss the Petitioners from service based on grounds which it had never called upon them to answer to. It is our humble submission that all the foregoing taken into account, it is immediately discernible that the dismissal of the Petitioners herein was unlawful, fueled by ulterior motive and the same was a gross violation of the constitutional values and principles as well as the Petitioners' rights to fair administrative action and fair labour practices.

Respondent’s submissions

65. On valid reasons for termination - it is well settled in statute and case law on matters of dismissal and termination of employment and the rights therein. Pursuant to Article 41(1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, every person has the right to fair labor practices, which includes the right to reasonable working conditions and thus upholding the need for fair termination based on valid reasons. Article 47(1) of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. This right applies in an administrative action to terminate employment. Article 50(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to fair hearing whereby every person has a right to have any dispute be resolved in a fair hearing before an independent and impartial body. This is also applicable in the employment context in the process of termination of employment. We are guided by the findings of the Court in Jaji v Kenya Ports Authority (Petition E009 of 2023) [2023] KEELRC 3028 (KLR), where the Court rely on the Court of Appeal case of Summaya Athman Hassan vs. Paul Masine Simidi & Another [2019] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal had this to say,

“…The Article 41 rights are enacted in the Employment Act and Labour Relations Act. The two Acts and the rules made thereunder provide adequate remedy and orderly enforcement mechanisms…”

66. Section 41 of the Employment Act 2007 provides for notification and hearing before termination. Section 43 of the Employment Act further provides for proof of reason for termination. Section 43(1) rests the burden of proof on the employer to prove the reason or reasons for termination. Section 43(2) defines what amounts to reason or reasons for termination of a contract as the matters that the employer at the time of termination of the contract genuinely believed to exist, and which caused the employer to terminate the services of the employee. In Kariuki v Board of Management, Moi Girls School, Nairobi (Cause 2291 of 2015) [2023] KEELRC 2189 (KLR), the Court at paragraph 40 detailed as follows on termination of employment, “There are numerous case laws that back employment laws that for dismissal to be fair there must be both fair procedure as provided in Section 41 of the employment act and justification as provided in Section 43 Employment Act. One such case Erick Murungi Njagi vs Clarion Hotel Limited (2022) eKLR where court stated, “an employee facing disciplinary action must be given adequate opportunity to respond to any charges before action is taken against them… It does not matter what offence the employee is charged of. If the employee is not heard the termination is ipsa lapso unfair.”

67. We are led by the findings of the courts above. We submit that there were valid reasons for terminating the employment of the Petitioners for the following reasons; i. There was no evidence whether the suppliers for importation of essential food commodities were competitively sourced as provided by Public Procurement & Assets Disposal Regulations 2020. Notably, a tender evaluation report dated 18th November, 2022 was availed, however, there was no evidence on the mode the tender documents were shared /transmitted to the suppliers and received by the Corporation. Additionally, there is no evidence that a delivery record was maintained as required by PPAD Act 2016 under section 74 (1) which provides that:

‘The accounting officer shall ensure the preparation of an invitation to tender that sets out the following— (2) All tender documents shall be sent out to eligible bidders by recorded delivery. In this foregoing, the review was unable to ascertain mode the tender documents were delivered to the supplies and received from the suppliers a strong indication of possible bid rigging. .

68. As per the professional opinion for supply delivery of bulk commodities dated 21st November, 2022, Direct procurement was used. PPAD Rev. 2016 Section 104 on Procedure for direct procurement requires an accounting officer of a procuring entity to adhere to the following procedures with respect to direct procurement— Issue a tender document which shall be the basis of tender preparation by tenderer and subsequent negotiations. Appoint an ad hoc evaluation committee pursuant to Section 46 to negotiate with a person for the supply of goods, works or non- consultancy services being provided. iii. In respect to the procurement method used (Direct Procurement method was used as indicated on the professional Opinion dated 21st November, 2022), the following weaknesses were observed: The tender documents submitted by the suppliers was a Request for Quotation (RFQ) and not a tender document. The use of request for quotation for goods is capped at Kshs. 3,000,000 per request for quotation hence irregularities were committed during tendering.

69. Section 105. of the PPAD 2016 prescribes that request for quotations may delivered to registered of suppliers for a procurement if—

(a) the estimated value of the goods, works or non-consultancy services being procured is less than or equal to the prescribed maximum value for using requests for quotations as prescribed in Regulations;’

70. Inconsistencies on the tender invitation dates for tender for supply and delivery of bulk commodities were noted. Notably, the professional opinion indicates Page 19 of 34 the invitation dates of the tender as 8th November, 2022 while the tender evaluation report indicates the tender invitation date as 18th November, 2022. There is no evidence that an adhoc tender opening committee was appointment, quotation opening register maintained and tender opening minutes prepared contrary to Section 78. of the PPAD Act 2016 Opening of tenders.

71. Part B - Legal & Practical aspects of the tender on the Professional Opinion states that-

“The prices are within the prevailing market price and the Corporation to realize profit. However, there is no evidence of market survey on International prices of food commodities had been undertaken to support this claim.”

72. There was no indication of negotiations as directed by PPAD Rev. 2016 Section 104 (b) above. (by use of a RFQ), the price was fixed hence no room for negotiations) ix) There was no indication Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) was notified within two (2) weeks as prescribed by PPAD Regulation 2020 Section 90. An accounting officer shall, within fourteen days after the notification of the award of the contract, report any direct procurement of a value exceeding five hundred thousand shillings to the Authority in a format provided by the Authority;

73. Splitting of Contracts Resulting to Non-Clearance with the Attorney General. The Corporation entered into four (4) agreements with Multi Commerce FZC, for the supply of 1,972,390 of 20-litre jerry cans cooking oil, all signed on 10 February, 2023 for a total contract sum of USD 59,171,700, approximately Kshs. 7,401,196,236 (exchange rate of Kshs.125.08 on 10 February, 2023). The total sum was split in unclear circumstances into four (4) contracts comprising of Kshs. 1,746,742,200 each for three and Kshs. 2,160,969,636 for one contract respectively. The splitting resulted to the values in each of the four agreements being lower than the Kshs.5 Billion threshold, beyond which clearance with the Attorney General prior to signing of the agreements is required in compliance with Section 134(2) of the PPAD Act, 2015. (Refer to KM 11 at page Page 154 of 293)Further there was a valid reason for termination attributed to the Petitioners for the following reason; Statutory and Fiduciary Mandate of the Board. The Board is legally obligated to ensure that all procurement activities of the Corporation strictly comply with the provisions of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2016 and the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020. Further, the Board bears fiduciary responsibility to safeguard public resources, ensure transparency, uphold accountability, and prevent financial loss or reputational damage to the Corporation. Where serious violations of procurement law occur, the Board is duty-bound to take corrective and disciplinary action. xi. From a governance, legal, and fiduciary standpoint, the lapses point to serious breaches of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2016 and the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations, 2020, exposing the Corporation to procurement irregularity, financial loss, and reputational risk.

74. The review reveals a clear absence of evidence supporting competitive sourcing as required under Section 74 of the PPAD Act. There is no proof of how tender documents were transmitted to suppliers, no delivery records, and no tender receipt register. This lack of documentation violates statutory requirements and undermines transparency, accountability, and the audit trail. Failure to maintain procurement records is not merely a procedural lapse but a direct statutory breach. xiii. There was also an irregular use of direct procurement under Section 104 of the PPAD Act 2015. The law requires issuance of formal tender documents, appointment of an ad hoc evaluation committee, and documented negotiations with the supplier. In this case, none of these requirements were met. Instead, Requests for Quotations (RFQs) were used in place of proper tender documents, and there is no evidence of any negotiations conducted by the evaluation committee. This renders the procurement process procedurally defective and unlawful. xiv. Further, there was a misapplication of the Request for Quotation method under Section 105 of the PPAD Act 2015. The RFQ method is capped at KES 3,000,000, yet it was used for bulk commodity imports that clearly exceeded this threshold. This constitutes a circumvention of procurement limits, an abuse of the procurement method, and raises the risk of financial misconduct. Such actions amount to material illegality rather than a minor technical error. xv. The process was also compromised by inconsistencies in tender dates and the absence of a formal tender opening procedure, contrary to Section 78. Conflicting invitation dates were noted, and there is no evidence of a tender opening committee, opening minutes, or an opening register. The failure to conduct a formal tender opening undermines the integrity of the procurement process and exposes it to risks such as bid manipulation, post-submission alterations, and collusion. These represent fundamental control failures. xvi. Additionally, there was a lack of market survey and non-compliance with PPAD 2020 Regulation 90. There is no evidence of international price benchmarking, no record of negotiations despite the use of direct procurement, and no proof that the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) was notified within the required 14 days. Failure to notify PPRA constitutes an independent statutory violation. xvii. Finally, the situation raises serious governance and accountability concerns. Members of the Tender Evaluation Committee have a statutory duty to ensure compliance with the PPAD Act 2015, safeguard public funds, maintain procedural integrity, and reject irregular procurement processes. In this case, the committee evaluated RFQs instead of lawful tender documents, failed to ensure proper tender opening procedures, participated in a non-compliant direct procurement process, and did not demand required statutory documentation. Under public finance and procurement law principles, such actions amount to gross negligence, procedural irregularity, and breach of statutory duty, all of which are valid grounds for disciplinary action, including termination.

Decision on the fairness of the termination

75. The standard of proof of a valid reason for termination is as per section 43 of the Employment Act-

‘1)In any claim arising out of termination of a contract, the employer shall be required to prove the reason or reasons for the termination, and where the employer fails to do so, the termination shall be deemed to have been unfair within the meaning of section 45.

(2)The reason or reasons for termination of a contract are the matters that the employer at the time of termination of the contract genuinely believed to exist, and which caused the employer to terminate the services of the employee.’

76. The court made findings on the reasons. The letter of dismissal of PW1 disclosed 3 reasons for dismissal –

There was irregular awarding of tenders, making false statements and negligence of duty. The findings at the hearing were listed as 12. The petitioners submitted that It is not in dispute that the Petitioners despite being charged with three (3) offences each in their Show Cause Memos, were dismissed on the basis of ten (10) other offences to which they had not been originally charged with. What therefore remains for determination by this Honourable Court is whether the dismissal from the Respondent's service violated the Petitioners' right to fair labour practices, fair administrative action and fair hearing. In January 2024, the Petitioners were served with show cause memos based on three (3) grounds after discharging their mandate in the ad-hoc committee, which was restricted to evaluation of the quotations received. The said show cause memos were based on an internal draft audit report and the first and third grounds therein were based on allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Procurement and Asset Disposal Act as well as the regulations arising thereto whilst the second ground was based on allegations in a draft internal audit report that accused the Petitioners of fabricating the process of evaluation of bids as they allegedly failed to avail the bid documents for the various bidders. It is based on the allegations made from the draft internal audit report that the Petitioners were subjected to disciplinary proceedings and later dismissed from service. The Petitioners have proved that they only acted in accordance with the directives of the Authorities and in line with the internal procurement policies. The petitioners relied on a decision they cited as in Milimani Commercial ELRCPET E203 of 2024; Amos Juma Sikuku v Kenya National Trading Corporation Limited (KNTC) by Hon. Hellen Wasilwa and urged that the Petitioner in this matter was dismissed under similar circumstances as to the Petitioners herein, by the same employer; KNTC and having ten (10) new grounds of gross misconduct introduced against him outside of the three (3) charges in his show cause letter. The petitioners did not avail the decision. I perused the Kenya Law where judgments by Kenyan Judges ought to be reported and did not find the judgment. I also perused the CTS and did not find the judgment. I do not doubt the decision was delivered, but I simply did not access it. Nevertheless, the decision can only be persuasive and not binding on this court.

77. The respondent contended that the reasons for termination were valid as stated in the dismissal letter. The letter of dismissal for the 1st petitioner (PW1) was dated 6th March 2024. The letter stated she committed malpractice related to the procurement process as follows-

• there was irregular awarding of tenders

• making false statements and records and

• negligence of duty

The letter further referred to the disciplinary process of show cause, response and findings after the hearing. There were 12 findings, and the letter indicated they disclosed gross misconduct. The court, on perusal of the findings, established they were all related to the said charges of malpractice in the procurement process. I find all the petitioners were dismissed on the three charges and the findings at the hearing were in support of the 3. I have no difficulty reaching the conclusion.

78. On whether the reasons were valid, the court found that the respondents placed before the court evidence to support the basis of the reasons for termination. The petitioners failed to exercise diligence in their role in the ad hoc evaluation committee. It was demonstrated to the court that the evaluation report gave life to the sham procurement process, with 31 unsolicited quotations. It was demonstrated that the petitioners awarded a foreign company, Multi Commerce FZC, that was not incorporated in the country and did not comply with procurement law on CR12 and the compliance tax certificate. The Evaluation Report dated 18th November 2022 stated that the Direct Procurement Method was used. The petitioners contended that the procurement laws were not applicable, but a perusal of the pleadings and documents does not disclose that an exemption had been given at the time of the evaluation of the said 31 quotations. The witness for the petitioners admitted that the company had not been incorporated when they sat at evaluation. The respondent’s witness was the auditor and confirmed the position. The petitioners stated the audit report relied on was a draft. The petitioners did not deny they understood the charges and were heard and their representations considered as required under section 41 of the Employment Act. The petitioners could not substantiate the procedure followed in the procurement.

79. The test for validity is of genuine belief that the reason for termination existed at termination. (section 43). It was held in Court of Appeal decision in Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v Aggrey Lukorito Wasike [2017] eKLR -

"Under Section 43 of the Act, the onus is on the employer to prove the reason or reasons for the termination, failing which the termination shall be deemed to be unfair. The test is, however, a partly subjective one in that all an employer is required to prove are the reasons that he "genuinely believed to exist" causing him to terminate the employee's services,"

80. Having considered the testimony of the parties and evaluated the documents produced, I find the employer met the test of validity under section 43 of the Employment Act, which is that it genuinely believed the petitioners were guilty of procurement malpractice as charged. That was the reason for the termination.

81. On procedural fairness, it was not in dispute that the petitioners were issued with letters of show cause dated 23rd January 2023. They responded and were heard. This was consistent with section 41 of the Employment Act. I already ruled that the dismissal was based on the 3 charges. The petitioners had the opportunity of appeal to the PSC under section 74 and failed to exercise the right.

82. It is my finding that the termination of employment of the petitioners was lawful and fair.

Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the Petition dated 26th June 2024.

83. There was no proof of constitutional violations by the employer in the termination. Further, this was a case of constitutional avoidance, and the fairness was per section 41 and 45 of the Employment Act. The court held the termination was lawful and fair. The reliefs sought related to the termination only. I find in the negative on all reliefs sought.

Disposition

84. The court held the termination was based on valid reasons and the fair procedure in accordance with section 41 and 45 of the Employment Act, and this was a case of constitutional avoidance. I find no merit in all relief sought. The petition is held to lack merit and is dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

85. The Preliminary Objection by the Respondent dated 15th July 2024 is upheld as the petitioners failed to utilise the appeal mechanism under the PSC Act, thus a premature dispute before the court. The court lacked jurisdiction in the first instance.

86. It is so Ordered,

DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT MACHAKOS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

JEMIMAH KELI,

JUDGE.

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Court Assistant: Otieno

Petitioner: Bulowa k/h Khaemba

Respondent: Muriuki h/b Akuno

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