Background
Through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 3rd May 2024, the Appellant appeals against the entire Judgment of the Honourable Paul K. Rotich (MR.) SPM.The Appeal was based on the grounds that:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
Through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 3rd May 2024, the Appellant appeals against the entire Judgment of the Honourable Paul K. Rotich (MR.) SPM.The Appeal was based on the grounds that:
Paragraph 1 →The Appellant was aggrieved by the decision of the trial court. In his Memorandum of Appeal dated 3rd May, 2024, he raised eight grounds of appeal. This court will condense the grounds into two issues for determination as follows: -
Paragraph 44 →Consequently, I find that the trial Court erred in not awarding the Appellant the salaries withheld from him.
Paragraph 60 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E136 OF 2024
DAVID MWENDWA MULI...…………….…………………...APPELLANT
-VERSUS-
KENYA AEROTECH LIMITED…………………………… RESPONDENT
(Being an Appeal from the judgment of the Honourable Paul K. Rotich (MR.) SPM delivered at Nairobi on 5th April 2024)
JUDGMENT
(Before Hon. Justice Abuodha Jorum Nelson)
1. Through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 3rd May 2024, the Appellant appeals against the entire Judgment of the Honourable Paul K. Rotich (MR.) SPM.The Appeal was based on the grounds that:
i. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Appellant's claim was entirely for retirement dues which are; service dues salary arrears. pension and sacco benefits as enumerated under paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim and that it was not a claim for damages for unfair termination.
ii. That having already established that the evidence adduced was on retirement, the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in dismissing the entire claim and in particular prayers (a) and (b) of the Statement of Claim which sought payment of retirement dues.
iii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact while dismissing the entire claim failed to appreciate that the Respondent was never justified to withhold the Appellant's monthly salary and the withholding was unfair labour practice and in breach of Article 41 of the Constitution and protection of wages as provided under Section 17 of the Employment Act. 2007.
iv. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in Law and fact by denying the Appellant’s claim for salary arrears and ignoring the proven fact that the Appellant continued to be in the Respondent's workforce even in the midst of the COVID-19 virus hence is entitled to unpaid salary arrears for the period worked upon his retirement.
v. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact while dismissing the entire claim failed to appreciate that the retirement of the Appellant from employment service without payment of his retirement dues was an unfair labour practice and in breach of Article 41 of the Constitution and employers post-retirement obligations to an employee as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of the Employment Act. 2007.
vi. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in dismissing the entire claim including the claim for service pay, ignored the evidence adduced by DWl during cross examination, who admitted that service dues commensurate to the number of years of service was payable to every employee upon attaining the mandatory retirement age.
vii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by denying the Appellant's claim for service pay ignored the evidence by DWl-Respondent’s Human Resource Manager who confirmed that the claim for service pay was merited.
viii. That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate that the Respondent’s failure to settle the Appellant's retirement dues was an unlawful act, in breach of contract and legitimate expectation that his retirement dues would be paid in full upon his retirement.
2. The Appellant prayed that the judgment delivered by the learned Magistrate on 5th April 2024 be set aside and substituted with a judgment in his favour as sought under prayers (a), (b), (d) and (e) of his Statement of Claim, with the costs.
3. The Appeal was disposed of by written submissions.
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
4. The Appellant’s Advocates Mungai Kalande & Co Advocates filed written submissions dated 27th March, 2026 and on the issue of service pay, counsel submitted that the Respondent’s Human Resource Manager, Caroline Wangui Karanja, conceded during cross-examination that employees were entitled to service pay upon retirement and that the formula used by the Appellant in computing the claim was the same formula used internally by the Respondent. Counsel submitted that these concessions amounted to a clear admission of liability, which the learned trial magistrate failed to consider and give due weight. Counsel relied on Choitram v Nazari, Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1992, where the Court of Appeal held that admissions made by a party are the best evidence against that party and require no further proof, and Galaxy Paints Company Limited v Falcon Guards Limited, Civil Appeal No. 219 of 1998, where the Court held that courts are bound to determine disputes based on the issues and evidence presented by the parties.
5. Counsel further submitted that the trial court misapplied Section 35(6) of the Employment Act by holding that the Appellant was not entitled to service pay because he was a member of NSSF. It was submitted that Section 35(6) only bars statutory service-pay where an employee is a member of NSSF or a pension scheme and does not prohibit contractual or policy-based retirement benefits. Counsel relied on Kudheiha Workers v Board of Management Ng’araria Girls Secondary School, Nyeri Cause No. 42 of 2015, where the Court held that parties are free to provide additional benefits beyond statutory minimums and that Section 35(6) does not preclude parties from agreeing to retirement benefits over and above the statutory NSSF arrangement, and Kens Metal Limited v Peter Shikanga, Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2018, at paragraphs 6 and 7.
6. Counsel submitted that the Respondent’s own policy created such a benefit and that the trial magistrate fundamentally misdirected himself by conflating statutory service pay under Section 35 with contractual or policy-based retirement benefits. The Respondent had an established retirement benefit scheme, independent of statutory service pay, and once such a scheme exists, the employer becomes contractually bound to honour it. Counsel relied on Coca Cola East & Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga, Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2012, where the Court of Appeal emphasized fairness and legitimate contractual expectations in employment benefits, and Keen Kleeners Limited v Kenya Plantation & Agricultural Workers Union, Civil Appeal No. 101 of 2019 – Mombasa, where the Court recognized the doctrine of legitimate expectation in employment relationships and held that once such expectation is established, an employer cannot arbitrarily depart from it. Counsel submitted that the Appellant was therefore entitled to service pay of Kshs. 1,010,594.90/=.
7. On the issue of reduction and non-payment of salary, counsel submitted that the Respondent drastically reduced the Appellant’s salary from Kshs. 49,783/= to Kshs. 24,892/= per month without his consent, without consultation and without any written agreement demonstrating consent. Counsel relied on Symon Wairobi Gatuma v Kenya Breweries Limited & 3 Others, Petition No. E023 of 2023, where the Supreme Court emphasized that employment contracts cannot be varied unilaterally by employers and held that unilateral variation may amount to repudiation of the contract and, where it would lead to termination, constructive dismissal. The Court further held that Sections 10(5) and 13 of the Employment Act apply to remuneration and that unilateral changes without informing the employee amount to an unfair labour practice.
8. Counsel further relied on Pascal Juma Muga v SBC Kenya Limited, Cause No. 346 of 2019, where the Court affirmed that employers must consult employees before implementing measures affecting remuneration. Counsel submitted that the Respondent did not demonstrate any consultation or agreement. Although the Respondent relied on internal COVID-19 circulars to justify the reduction, counsel submitted that internal circulars cannot alter contractual obligations unless accepted by the employee, relying on Elizabeth Washeke & 62 Others v Airtel Networks Kenya Limited, Cause No. 1972 of 2012, where the Court held that employer policies cannot override contractual rights without consent.
9. Counsel submitted that Article 41 of the Constitution guarantees every worker the right to fair labour practices and that unilateral wage reduction and withholding of salary constitute unfair labour practices. Counsel relied on Coca Cola East & Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga, Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2012, which emphasized fairness and respect for contractual obligations. On COVID-19, counsel further relied on Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board T/A Jaffery Academy, Petition No. 5 of 2020, where the Court recognized that even in pandemic, measures taken must still comply with employment contracts and statutory protections, and that employers remained bound by employment law, including Section 10(5) of the Employment Act requiring consultation for changes to employment terms. Counsel submitted that the pandemic did not act as a blanket justification for ignoring statutory protections and employment contracts and could not lawfully justify extended withholding of wages or unilateral salary reduction without employee consent.
10. Counsel submitted that the Appellant worked from April 2020 to November 2020 on the reduced salary, without sufficient reasons being given for the reduction, and thereafter received no salary from December 2020 to December 2021. The Appellant was therefore entitled to withheld salary of Kshs. 174,237/= for April to November 2020 and unpaid salary of Kshs. 597,396/= for December 2020 to December 2021.
11. On the issue of evaluation of evidence and the statutory burden of proof, counsel submitted that the Employment Act places a statutory obligation on employers to keep employment records and that under Section 10(7) of the Employment Act, where an employer fails to produce employment records, the burden of proof shifts to the employer. Counsel submitted that the Respondent failed to produce payroll records, signed salary variation agreements, proof of employee consent, or proof that the Appellant was not at work during April to November 2020.
12. Counsel relied on Edith Musa v Shihungu v Mary Morrison, Cause No. E143 of 2023, where the Court held that employers must discharge the statutory burden once an employee raises a credible complaint and that the lower court erred in requiring the Appellant to meet an impossibly high evidentiary threshold while ignoring the Respondent’s statutory duty to maintain records. Counsel further relied on Kudheiha Workers v Mombasa Sports Club, Cause No. 440 of 2013 – Mombasa, where the Court held that failure to produce records allows the Court to accept the employee’s version of events. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s version ought therefore to have been accepted.
13. Counsel submitted that the trial court failed to analyse material evidence, including the HR Manager’s admission on service pay, the absence of employment records and duty rosters confirming that the Appellant was working during the COVID-19 period, and the absence of employee consent to the salary reduction. Counsel submitted that where a trial court fails to analyse material evidence, an appellate court is entitled to interfere. Counsel relied on Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Limited [1999] EWCA Civ 811, where failure to explain why evidence was rejected was held to constitute a serious error, and Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] E.A. 424, where the Court of Appeal reiterated that an appellate court is entitled to interfere where the trial court failed to properly evaluate the evidence.
14. Counsel submitted that the learned magistrate simply concluded that the Appellant had not proved his claim without addressing the critical evidentiary matters raised during trial. Such an approach fell short of the constitutional standard of judicial reasoning, which is anchored in Article 50 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to a fair hearing, including the right to have disputes determined through a transparent and reasoned judicial process.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
15. The Respondent’s Advocate Njenga Muchai & Associates Advocates filed written submissions dated 15th July, 2026. Counsel submitted on the role of the appellate court while relying on among others the case of Abok James Odera t/a A.J. Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Company Advocates [2013] KECA 208 (KLR). Counsel submitted that an appellate court cannot interfere with findings of fact merely because it may have reached a different conclusion. Relying on Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424, counsel submitted that interference is a serious step and should only occur where the trial court failed to consider material circumstances, misapprehended the evidence or acted upon an incorrect legal principle. The Appellant was therefore required to demonstrate a specific error of fact or law that materially affected the result, which he had not done. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s submissions substantially sought to reformulate the claim placed before the Trial Court.
16. On the issue of service pay, counsel submitted that the pleaded claim was for service pay under Section 35 of the Employment Act, but on appeal the same claim was variously described as a contractual retirement benefit, policy-based benefit, service dues and a benefit arising from legitimate expectation. Counsel submitted that these concepts are legally distinct and that statutory service pay under Section 35 is not synonymous with gratuity, pension, severance pay, long-service award or a contractual retirement benefit. A party cannot plead statutory service pay, fail to establish the statutory conditions for its payment and thereafter rescue the claim through submissions by describing it as an independent contractual or policy benefit.
17. Counsel relied on Dakianga Distributors (K) Limited v Kenya Seed Company Limited, where the Court of Appeal reiterated that parties are bound by their pleadings and that a court should not determine a dispute on an unpleaded case. Counsel submitted that the Appellant did not identify in his pleadings any particular clause of his contract, collective bargaining agreement, pension trust deed or Human Resource Policy which entitled him to service pay independently of Section 35 of the Employment Act. The Human Resource Policy was relied upon in relation to the mandatory retirement age, but the Appellant did not point to any provision creating an entitlement to service pay calculated at the rate claimed.
18. Counsel submitted that the Appellant could not use the appeal to introduce a contractual foundation that was neither pleaded nor proved at trial, as an appellate court re-evaluates the case presented before the trial court and does not permit a party to construct a new case after evidential deficiencies in the original case have become apparent.
19. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s claim for service pay was defeated by Section 35 of the Employment Act. Section 35(5) provides that an employee whose contract has been terminated under Section 35(1)(c) is entitled to service pay for every year worked on terms to be fixed. However, Section 35(6) expressly excludes statutory service pay where the employee is a member of a registered pension or provident fund scheme under the Retirement Benefits Act, a gratuity or service-pay scheme established under a collective agreement, any other scheme established and operated by an employer whose terms are more favourable than statutory service pay, or the National Social Security Fund.
20. Counsel submitted that the evidence established that the Appellant was a member of the Respondent’s pension scheme and that the Appellant’s own claim included a prayer for pension benefits, which the Respondent demonstrated had been processed and paid on 14th February 2023. Membership of a registered pension scheme was sufficient to invoke Section 35(6)(a), while NSSF membership provided an additional independent statutory exclusion under Section 35(6)(d).
21. Counsel relied on Kens Metal Limited v Shikanga, Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2018, where the Court of Appeal set aside an award of service pay after finding that the employee’s NSSF membership had been established and affirmed that Section 35(6) excludes an NSSF member from statutory service pay. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s reliance on the same authority did not confront its actual holding. Counsel also relied on Board of Management, Ng’araria Girls Secondary School v KUDHEIHA Workers [2017] KECA 15 (KLR), which similarly recognizes that Section 35(6) prevents double recovery of social-security benefits.
22. Counsel acknowledged that the Employment Act establishes minimum employment standards and does not prohibit parties from independently contracting for a gratuity or retirement benefit over and above NSSF or pension arrangements. However, counsel submitted that this principle did not assist the Appellant unless he first proved the existence and terms of the alleged additional benefit. The Appellant did not produce a contractual clause providing for service gratuity, a collective bargaining agreement establishing a service-pay scheme, a pension trust deed providing for an additional service benefit, a Human Resource Policy provision creating the benefit claimed, or evidence of comparable employees who retired under the same policy and were paid the alleged benefit. In the absence of such evidence, there was no legal or contractual foundation upon which the trial court could award Kshs. 1,010,594.90.
23. Counsel submitted that the alleged admissions by the Respondent’s Human Resource Manager did not establish liability. The Record of Appeal at pages 248–249 confirmed that no such admissions were made. Counsel relied on Choitram & another v Nazari, where the Court of Appeal emphasized that judgment on an admission may only be founded upon an admission that is plain and unequivocal. The evidence attributed to the Respondent’s witness had to be read in its entirety and in context, and a statement that a formula may be used in computing benefits payable to qualifying employees was not an admission that every retiring employee qualifies for service pay irrespective of Section 35(6), the pension scheme rules or the employee’s contract.
24. Counsel further submitted that the Appellant’s legitimate expectation argument was untenable because no clear, unambiguous and lawful representation was proved showing that the Respondent had promised to pay the Appellant service pay in addition to his pension and NSSF benefits. Legitimate expectation cannot arise from a generalized assertion about workplace practice; it must be founded on a definite representation or consistent practice whose terms are ascertainable. Neither the alleged practice nor its applicable terms were proved. The learned Trial Magistrate was therefore correct in finding that the Appellant had not established an entitlement to service pay.
25. On the issue of whether the Appellant proved his claim for reduced and unpaid salary arrears, counsel submitted that the Appellant sought two distinct claims: the difference between his full salary and the reduced salary allegedly paid between April and November 2020, and full salary allegedly unpaid between December 2020 and December 2021. These were liquidated monetary claims for which the Appellant bore the initial legal burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, the factual foundation of each claim and the accuracy of the amounts sought.
26. Counsel relied on Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, which place the burden of proving a fact upon the party who asks the Court to believe in its existence. Although the evidentiary burden may shift during trial, the primary legal burden of proving the claim remained with the claimant. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s reliance on Section 10(7) of the Employment Act overstated its effect. The provision places upon the employer the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment stipulated in the contract where the employer fails to produce the written contract or prescribed written particulars; it does not relieve an employee of the obligation to prove every factual element of a monetary claim.
27. Counsel submitted that the Appellant was required to prove that he worked, or was contractually entitled to salary, throughout the particular periods claimed and that the sums pleaded accurately represented unpaid wages. Under Section 17(1) of the Employment Act, an employer is required to pay wages earned by or payable to an employee in respect of work done under the contract of service. The Appellant did not produce attendance registers, duty rosters, work allocation records, correspondence reporting for duty, supervisor confirmations or other evidence demonstrating that he rendered services throughout the alleged period of total non-payment.
28. Counsel submitted that the Respondent’s failure to produce duty rosters could not, without more, prove that the Appellant worked every day or every month between December 2020 and December 2021, as a weakness in the Respondent’s evidence could not substitute the positive evidence required from the Appellant. Counsel distinguished Shihungu v Morrison [2025] KEELRC 1901 (KLR), relied upon by the Appellant, on the basis that in that case the employer did not participate in the proceedings and the employee presented uncontroverted evidence of the employment relationship and payment arrangements, whereas in the present matter the Respondent entered appearance, filed a defence, called a witness and produced evidence explaining the employment and salary arrangements. Section 10(7) therefore could not convert disputed assertions into proved facts.
29. On the COVID-19 salary arrangements, counsel submitted that it was not disputed that the Respondent’s business was directly affected by the collapse in air travel occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Respondent informed employees of the prevailing circumstances and consequential temporary employment measures through memoranda dated 23rd April 2020 and 7th September 2020.
30. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s contention that only a written agreement bearing his signature could have legal effect was not an accurate statement of the law. Section 10(5) of the Employment Act requires consultation with the employee, revision of the contract to reflect the change and written notification of the change. Counsel relied on Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy [2020] KEELRC 574 (KLR), where the Court held that consultation under Section 10(5) does not necessarily have to result in agreement and that the absence of a signed acceptance is not, without more, conclusive.
31. Counsel further relied on Gatuma v Kenya Breweries Limited & 3 others [2024] KESC 52 (KLR), where the Supreme Court held that where an employer varies the terms of employment, there should be prior notice, consultation and written notification, and that an employee’s consent may be express, written or inferred from the circumstances. The Supreme Court further upheld the finding that an employee who accepted a new arrangement and continued working under it for a substantial period could, on the facts, be found to have acquiesced to the revised terms.
32. Counsel submitted that in the present matter the Appellant was notified of the difficulties facing the Respondent and of the temporary salary measures, remained in employment and accepted payments made under that arrangement. He did not demonstrate that he rejected the arrangement when implemented, lodged a contemporaneous grievance, treated the alleged reduction as a repudiation of his contract or terminated the employment relationship on account of constructive dismissal.
33. Counsel submitted that the authorities on constructive dismissal cited by the Appellant, including Coca-Cola East and Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga, were distinguishable because the Appellant did not resign in response to a fundamental breach but remained employed until his retirement upon attaining the mandatory retirement age. The appeal was not, on the Appellant’s own case, a claim for unfair or constructive termination, and authorities addressing compensation following constructive dismissal did not establish the pleaded liquidated claim for salary arrears.
34. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s computations were inconsistent with the periods claimed and that a claim for salary arrears must be pleaded and proved with sufficient certainty to enable the employer to know the precise case it is required to answer and the Court to determine the exact amount due. Counsel relied on Ndungu & another v Ndegwa & another, where the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved with certainty and particularity, and Capital Fish Kenya Limited v Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited [2016] eKLR, where the Court reiterated that even where monetary loss appears probable, the Court cannot award special damages in the absence of strict proof.
35. Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s inconsistent periods and computations fell below that threshold and that the trial court could not lawfully reconstruct the claim, select an unpleaded period or formulate a computation on the Appellant’s behalf. Article 41 of the Constitution does not dispense with the rules of evidence or the requirement that monetary claims be proved, and the constitutional right to fair labour practices could not substitute for evidence of work performed, wages earned and sums remaining unpaid. The learned trial Magistrate was therefore correct in declining the salary claims.
36. On the issue of whether the Appellant established any outstanding pension, SACCO or other retirement dues, counsel submitted that although the Memorandum of Appeal alleged that the trial Court failed to appreciate that the claim included pension and SACCO benefits, the Respondent’s evidence was that the Appellant’s pension benefits had been processed and paid on 14th February 2023. The Appellant had not challenged the authenticity of the transfer evidence or demonstrated that any further pension amount remained due under the pension scheme trust deed.
37. Counsel submitted that Sections 9 and 10 of the Employment Act, cited in the Memorandum of Appeal, do not create a general obligation to pay unspecified retirement dues but principally regulate the form and particulars of contracts of service. An employee claiming a pension or contractual retirement benefit must establish the governing instrument, applicable formula, accrued entitlement, payments received and balance, if any, remaining unpaid. The Appellant did not place before the Trial Court an actuarial statement, pension-scheme computation, trust deed provision or other evidence showing that the pension payment made by the Respondent was deficient.
38. As regards SACCO benefits, counsel submitted that a SACCO is ordinarily a separate legal entity whose members’ savings, shares and benefits are regulated by its by-laws and the applicable co-operative-society framework. The Appellant did not establish that the Respondent held any SACCO funds belonging to him, had failed to remit a proved deduction or was otherwise legally responsible for payment of benefits due from the SACCO. Although the Memorandum of Appeal referred generally to pension and SACCO benefits, the Appellant’s substantive written submissions focused on service pay and salary arrears, and no legal or evidentiary basis had been advanced upon which the Court could enter judgment for an unidentified pension or SACCO balance.
39. Counsel submitted that the retirement notice was not evidence of unfair treatment, as it was issued approximately six months before the effective retirement date and implemented the mandatory retirement provision governing the Appellant’s employment. The Appellant could not simultaneously maintain that his case was not concerned with unfair termination and rely on authorities addressing wrongful dismissal, constructive dismissal and compensation for unfair termination. Once it was accepted that the Appellant retired upon attaining the prescribed retirement age, the only question was whether he proved any specific contractual or statutory benefit that remained unpaid, which he did not.
40. On the issue of costs, counsel submitted that Section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act vests this Honourable Court with discretion to make such orders as to costs as it considers just, but that the discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the settled principle that costs ordinarily follow the event. Counsel relied on Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others, where the Supreme Court affirmed that the successful party should ordinarily be awarded costs unless the Court identifies a good reason for departing from that principle.
41. Counsel submitted that the Appellant instituted the appeal and had failed to establish any error warranting interference with the Trial Court’s Judgment, resulting in the Respondent incurring further expense in defending a meritless appeal. There being no exceptional circumstance justifying departure from the ordinary rule, the Respondent prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs both in this Court and in the subordinate court. Counsel further relied on Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, which similarly provides that costs shall follow the event unless the Court, for good reason, orders otherwise.
DETERMINATION
42. The court has considered the grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions filed by the parties herein and authorities relied on and states as always that it is now more or less settled law that the duty of the first appellate court is to re-evaluate the evidence in the subordinate court both on points of law and facts and come up with its own findings and conclusions as held in Abok James Odera t/a A.J Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates [2013] eKLR, the same stated with regard to the duty of the first appellate court;
“This being a first appeal, we are reminded of our primary role as a first appellate court namely, to re-evaluate, re-assess and reanalyze the extracts on the record and then determine whether the conclusions reached by the learned trial Judge are to stand or not and give reasons either way”
43. The trial court dismissed the Claimant’s suit. It found that the Claimant had not proved his claim for service pay and salary arrears. The Claimant had sought service pay of Kshs. 1,010,594.90/=. He also claimed salary arrears for the period April to November 2020 amounting to Kshs. 174,237/= and unpaid salary from December 2020 to December 2021 amounting to Kshs. 597,396/=.
44. The Appellant was aggrieved by the decision of the trial court. In his Memorandum of Appeal dated 3rd May, 2024, he raised eight grounds of appeal. This court will condense the grounds into two issues for determination as follows: -
a) Whether the Appellant was entitled to service pay; and
b) Whether the Appellant proved his claim for salary arrears arising from the reduction and non-payment of his salary.
Whether the Appellant was entitled to service pay.
45. At the heart of the Appellant’s claim of Kshs. 1,010,594.90/=, for service pay, is the assertion that he is entitled to the payment because during cross-examination, the Respondent’s Human Resources Manager allegedly admitted that retiring employees were entitled to an additional payment over and above the independent statutory service pay, that the Respondent had through its policy and practice, created a contractual retirement benefit outside of Section 35(6) of the Employment Act.
46. He believed that this admission proved that service pay had been historically paid to retiring employees and that this practice created a legitimate expectation.
47. Of course, the Respondent disagreed. It maintained that the Appellant was not entitled to the additional service pay because there was no provision for it in his contract or the company’s HR policy on record. It also pointed out that the Appellant had not produced a collective bargaining agreement, a pension trust deed providing for the same, or evidence that other employees who retired under the same policy were paid the benefit.
48. As is well established, service pay is a statutory right. Under Section 35(5) of the Employment Act: -
‘(5) An employee whose contract of service has been terminated under subsection (1)(c) shall be entitled to service pay for every year worked, the terms of which shall be fixed. “Further, as relates service pay section 35(6) reads- ‘(6) This section SHALL NOT apply where an employee is a member of—
(a) a registered pension or provident fund scheme under the Retirement Benefits Act;
(b) a gratuity or service pay scheme established under a collective agreement;
(c) any other scheme established and operated by an employer whose terms are more favourable than those of the service pay scheme established under this section; and
(d) the National Social Security Fund.’’
49. The Court in Board of Management Ngararia Girls Secondary School v KUDHEIHA Workers [2017] eKLR where the employee had other benefits held as follows;
“Section 35(6) of the Employment Act, 2007 disentitles an employee from double payment of Social Security benefit from NSSF and a service pay scheme established under clause 31 of the CBA. However, be that as it may and as rightly held by the trial Judge “… section 35 of the Employment Act 2007 does not preclude parties from entering an agreement for retirement benefits or gratuity over and above the statutory NSSF arrangement”.
50. The court has gone through the proceedings in order to see whether the Respondent’s HR Manager actually admitted to having an additional retirement benefit payable to its employees over and above the statutory service pay during cross-examination. However, I cannot find it. What I can see from the typed proceedings, is the Respondent’s witness testifying that there was “no service pay on the contract.” I agree with the Respondent that an admission capable of founding liability must be clear, unequivocal and referable to the precise fact in dispute. In the absence of such evidence the Appellant’s argument holds no weight and fails.
51. The Court therefore finds no fault in the trial magistrate failing to award service pay as the court had perused the record and found pay slips where NSSF, NHIF and pension were paid out. Meaning that the Respondent was making remittance to NHIF, NSSF and pension scheme on behalf of the Appellant. There was also evidence that after retirement a sum of Kshs. 348, 046 was paid out to the Appellant as pension benefits which the Appellant did not dispute. Accordingly, the court upholds the finding by the trial magistrate that the Appellant was not entitled to payment of service pay.
Whether the Appellant proved his claim for salary arrears arising from the reduction and non-payment of his salary.
52. In respect of the claim for salary, the Appellant sought two distinct salary claims:
i. The salary amount reduced from Kshs. 49,783 to Kshs. 24,892 paid between April and November 2020; and
ii. Full salary unpaid between December 2020 and December 2021.
53. The Appellant stated that his salary was reduced by the Respondent in 2020 without his consent. That the decision was unilaterally done by the Respondent without consulting him. That there was no written agreement demonstrating that the Appellant consented to his reduction. On the other hand, the Respondent relied on internal Covid 19 circulars to justify the wage reduction. It contended that it informed its employees of the prevailing circumstances and the consequential temporary employment measures through memoranda dated 23rd April 2020 and 7th September 2020.
54. It is well settled principle of contract law that a contract is an agreement entered through mutual consent of the parties. According to Section 10(5) of the Employment Act;
“Where any matter stipulated in sub-section (1) changes, the employer shall, in consultation with the employee, revise the contract to reflect the change and notify the employee of the change in writing.”
55. The Supreme Court in Gatuma v Kenya Breweries Ltd & 3 others [2024] KESC 52 (KLR) held that where unilateral changes are made to employment terms, such changes were tantamount to terminating the existing contract. It pronounced itself as follows:
“The Court of Appeal has made various pronouncements in relation to section 10 as read with section 13 of the Employment Act and specifically on the unilateral change in employment terms. In Board of Governors, Cardinal Otunga High School, Mosocho & 2 others v Elizabeth Kwamboka Khaemba [2016] eKLR the Court of Appeal in interpreting the provisions of section 13 of the Employment Act agreed with the trial court that the effect of the unilateral decision to change the terms of the contract of employment was tantamount to terminating the existing contract and therefore amounts to an unfair and unjustified termination. In Coca Cola East & Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga [2015] eKLR the Court of Appeal whilst setting out the principles relevant to determining constructive dismissal relied on the case of Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] ICR 222 or [1978] QB 761, where Lord Denning held as follows:
The decision in Ibrahim Kamasi Amoni v Kenital Solar Limited [2018] eKLR by ELRC court specifically dealt with an instance in unilateral change of remuneration where it held that;
“…For a reduction of salary to be valid, an employer ought to obtain the approval of an employee by communicating the reduction to an employee in a letter and causing the letter to be accepted by the employee. This is because salary is a fundamental term of employment whose reduction has negative impact on an employee’s livelihood and should not be done arbitrarily or unilaterally by an employer.”
56. The evidence on record reveals that sometime in 2020, the Respondent circulated two memoranda, the first on 23rd April 2020 and the second 7th September 2020. The relevant paragraphs stated as follows;
23rd April 2020 Internal Memo
“Coronavirus Covid 19 is a new strain of virus that has not been previously identified in humans and has had its effects across the globe.
In view of the above situation, the company will not be in a position to retain payment of salaries at 100%. We will therefore get pay cuts effective from April 2020 which may decline in the coming months.”
57. The Court understands that the salary reduction was made in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Respondent was facing difficulties in sustaining its business. However, the same was done for 7 months, without consultation or at the very least any indication that the same would be compensated in the future. More troubling still, the Respondent thereafter stopped paying the Appellant altogether and placed him on indefinite unpaid leave from December 2020 until December 2021, when he subsequently attained the retirement age.
58. The argument by the Respondent was first that the Appellant was not at work and second that it had ceased business at the time. The court notes however, that the Respondent in its retirement notice dated 28th June 2021 expressly stated that the Appellant will be paid his salary up to and including 31st December 2021. Part of the notice read;
“This therefore to give you notice that you will officially retire from service with effect from 1st January 2022. You will be paid your salary and other benefits applicable to you up to and including 31st December 2021.”
59. However, no payment was done. The Appellant produced pay lips for the year 2021 showing that he was not paid any salary. The only payment the Respondent effected was the pension. Therefore, the court agrees with the Appellant that he is entitled to recover the salary that was withheld from him as the Respondent’s actions unilaterally altered a fundamental term of his employment contract. In the case of Geoffrey Muriithi Muthee v XPLICO Insurance Co. Ltd [2022] eKLR, the court held that;
“Remuneration is undoubtedly one of the most important terms of an employment contract. In fact this court has held before that the right to remuneration is the most important right to an employee, considering the immense protection that the Employment Act, 2007 accords wages and salaries of an employee. Where an employer substantially alters (including by a significant reduction or change of the manner of payment) of an employee’s compensation without their consent such alteration may amount to a fundamental breach of the contract.”
60. Consequently, I find that the trial Court erred in not awarding the Appellant the salaries withheld from him.
61. In the upshot the Appeal partially succeeds as follows: -The Judgment by the Hon. Paul K. Rotich (Mr.) SPM delivered on 5th April 2024 at Milimani in MCELRC Cause No. E1432 of 2022 is set aside and substituted as follows;
a. The Appellant is awarded withheld salary from April 2020 to November 2020(24,891 x 7 months)…………………..Kshs. 174,237
b. The Appellant is awarded salary from December 2020 to December 2021, Kshs. 49,783 x 12months………………………. Kshs. 597,396/-
c. The award shall be subject to statutory deduction but shall attract interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.
d. Since the appeal partially succeeds each party shall bear their costs of this appeal.
62. It is so ordered.
Dated at Nairobi this 30th day of October 2026
Delivered virtually this 30th day of October .2026
Abuodha Nelson Jorum
Presiding Judge-ELRC-Mombasa