Employment law

Mmosi & another v Registrar of Trade Unions & another [2026] KEELRC 14872 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E045 of 2026
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
Abuodha Nelson Jorum

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Background

The application before me is a Notice of Motion dated 16th February, 2026 brought under Section 13 (3)(i) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Order 42 rule 6, Order 43 rule 1, Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The application seeks orders inter alia that:

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Question before the court

On the issue of whether the 2nd Respondent’s objection is a proper preliminary objection, this Court takes cognizance of the definition of a preliminary objection as adopted in the classic and celebrated case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd Civil Appeal No. 9 of [1969 EA 696] where the court held that: -

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Reasoning passage

The court notes that these facts were not contested by the applicants. The objection can therefore be considered on the assumption that those facts are correct, the question being whether, as a matter of law, they affect the Applicants’ locus standi to institute the present Appeal. Consequently, this court finds that it falls within the threshold of a pure point of law and was properly taken in limine.

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SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the 2nd Respondent’s objection, asserting that the Applicants’ former electoral mandate had expired and they therefore lacked standing, raised a proper preliminary objection; and whether the Applicants were persons aggrieved with locus standi to…

Material facts

The Applicants challenged the Registrar’s acceptance and registration of officials allegedly elected by the Transport Workers Union on 18 January 2026. They alleged that the elections were premature, contrary to the Union Constitution and the Registrar’s…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E045 OF 2026

WILLIAM MMOSI….….………...………. INTENDED APPELLANT/APPLICANT

WILLIAM NGARI….….…………...…..…. INTENDED APPELLANT/APPLICANT

-VERSUS-

REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS……………………………...1st RESPONDENT

THE TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION………………………...2nd RESPONDENT

(Before Hon. Justice Abuodha Jorum Nelson)

RULING

1. The application before me is a Notice of Motion dated 16th February, 2026 brought under Section 13 (3)(i) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Order 42 rule 6, Order 43 rule 1, Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The application seeks orders inter alia that:

1. spent.

2. THAT an interim order of stay be and is hereby issued staying the implementation of the 1st Respondent’s decision issued through the extract dated 20th January, 2026 and having an effective date of 18th January, 2026 pending hearing and determination of this Application.

3. THAT an interim order of stay be and is hereby issued staying the implementation of the 1st Respondent’s decision issued through the extract dated 20th January, 2026 and having an effective date of 18th January 2026 pending hearing and determination of this Appeal.

4. THAT costs be borne by the Respondents.

2. The Intended Appellant/Applicant’s application is premised on grounds that:

(a) On 20th January, 2026, the 1st Respondent accepted and registered changes in the register of officials of the 2nd Respondent pertaining to elections allegedly held on 18th January, 2026.

(b) That the manner in which the purported elections were conducted violated the provisions of the 2nd Respondent’s Constitution as detailed below.

(c) That the 2nd Respondent’s last elections were held on 20th February, 2021 for a period of 5 years which lapses on 20th February, 2026.

(d) That the purported elections held on 18th January, 2026 were therefore contrary to Rule 14(a) of the 2nd Respondent’s Constitution which provides that national officials shall be elected after every 5 years.

(e) Further, Rule 14(d) of the 2nd Respondent’s Constitution provides that every national official of the Union shall vacate office during the Delegates Conference upon the expiry of 5 years but shall be eligible for re-election.

(f) That the elections held on 18th January, 2026 were therefore premature and in violation of the Union’s Constitution.

(g) That on 25th September, 2025, the 1st Respondent released a circular referenced “Notification of Trade Union Elections – 2026 Cycle”, which provided that branch elections were to be conducted between 5th January, 2026 and 31st March, 2026, while national elections were to be conducted between 1st April, 2026 and 30th June, 2026.

(h) That the 2nd Respondent’s impugned national elections were conducted on 18th January, 2026, more than two months earlier than the timelines issued by the 1st Respondent and were thus invalid.

(i) That the Union’s branches were required to conduct their elections before the national elections. After the election of new branch officials, the General Secretary was mandated under Rule 8(d) to convene the Delegates Conference by giving 4 weeks’ written notice to each branch for the election of national officials.

(j) That this requirement was violated as the impugned elections of 18th January, 2026 were conducted without the required 4 weeks’ notice to the branches.

(k) That some branches, including Mombasa Branch, had not conducted their elections, while Nairobi Branch conducted its elections on 17th January, 2026. Before the newly elected officials could settle in and receive the required 4 weeks’ notice, the purported national elections were conducted.

(l) That the convening of the elections of 18th January, 2026 was also contrary to the Union’s Constitution. Under Rules 8 and 9, the General Secretary could not decide the venue and time of the elections, as this was the role of the National Executive Committee under Rule 8(a). The General Secretary could only convene the Delegates Conference by giving the required 4 weeks’ notice to the branches under Rule 8(d).

(m) Further, in line with the Judgment in Employment and Labour Relations Court Appeal No. E207 of 2025, Stephen Masika & Others v The Registrar of Trade Unions & Others, the alleged General Secretary at the time of the elections had obtained the position unconstitutionally and everything done by him, including convening meetings and making decisions, was therefore null and void. Consequently, the whole election of 18th January, 2026 was null and void.

(n) That the 1st Respondent thus erred by disregarding the 2nd Respondent’s Constitution and accepting and registering the changes arising from the impugned elections.

3. The application was supported by the Affidavit of William Mmosi, the Intended Appellant herein in which he reiterates the averments on the face of the motion.

4. In response, the 1st Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit dated 5th March 2026 sworn by one Ann Kanake, stating as follows;

a. I am the Acting Registrar of Trade Unions, duly appointed under the Labour Relations Act, 2007.

b. The Appeal and the Notice of Motion challenge the decision of the Registrar registering a change of officials of the Transport Workers Union (TAWU).

c. That on 25th September, 2025, the Registrar issued a circular notifying trade union of the upcoming 2026 election cycle. The said circular was purely administrative and was issued as a general guideline to assist the Registrar in planning, coordination and discharge of its statutory oversight mandate regarding trade union elections.

d. That the circular was not intended to control, micro-manage or interfere with the internal affairs of any trade union.

e. That Article 41 of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Labour Relations Act guarantee every trade union the right to determine, plan and organise its own administration and lawful activities, including the conduct of elections.

f. That the role of the Registrar in relation to elections is supervisory and facilitative and does not extend to directing how a trade union should conduct its internal electoral processes beyond compliance with the law and its Constitution.

g. That in Kenya National Union of Nurses v Registrar of Trade Unions & 8 Others, Appeal No. 6 of 2016, the High Court held that it is good practice, but not mandatory, for the Registrar to issue directions to ensure that elections are conducted in accordance with the law and the respective union Constitutions.

h. Any notice issued by a trade union regarding elections is issued pursuant to its registered Constitution and internal governance structures.

i. The Transport Workers Union conducted elections on 18th January, 2026, following which the change of officials was communicated to the Registrar through the prescribed Form Q, together with the relevant supporting documents confirming that the elections had been conducted and that the officials listed therein had been duly elected.

j. The Appellant alleges that the elections ought to have been conducted on 20th February, 2026 based on the fact that the previous elections were held on 20th February, 2021. However, 20th February occurring every five years is not a date specifically recognised or prescribed in the Constitution of TAWU as the mandatory election date.

k. Further, in the ruling delivered on 18th February, 2026 in Transport Workers Union, Trustees of Transport Workers Union & Nicholas Otieno v Dan Mihadi Daniel t/a Rakoro & Co Advocates & Lochab Brother Limited, ELRC No. E073 of 2025, the Court noted that the Judgment delivered on 28th January, 2026 in ELRCA E207 of 2025 only reinstated Mr. Mihadi, the then Secretary General, and other officials to their term of office.

l. The Court further observed that the said term of office had lapsed following the election of new officials on 18th January, 2026.

m. Upon receipt of the relevant documents notifying the change of officials and being satisfied as to the validity of the appointments, the Registrar proceeded to register the change of officials on 19th February, 2026.

n. By the time the said officials were registered, no objection had been raised before the Registrar challenging the elections or the validity of the officials listed in Form Q.

o. In the absence of any objection and upon being satisfied that the statutory requirements had been met, there was no lawful or factual basis upon which the Registrar could refuse to register the said officials.

p. The registration of the officials was therefore undertaken lawfully and in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 35 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007.

q. The issues now raised in the Memorandum of Appeal and the Notice of Motion were never brought to the attention of the Registrar prior to the registration of the officials.

r. The Appeal and the Notice of Motion are therefore misconceived, without merit and constitute an abuse of the Court process as against the Registrar.

5. In response, the 2nd Respondent filed a preliminary objection dated 25th February, 2026 to the Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal and the Notice of Motion dated 16th February, 2026, on the ground that;

(a) The Appellants have invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Honourable Court under Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007, which limits the right of appeal to any person aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions.

(b) That from the Appellants’ own pleadings, their alleged mandate and authority arose from the Union elections conducted in the year 2021 for a fixed electoral cycle of 5 years. However, by operation of law and effluxion of time, the said electoral mandate expired on 31st December, 2025, thereby extinguishing any legal authority, office or representational capacity previously enjoyed by the Appellants.

(c) Upon expiry of the said electoral term, the Appellants ceased to hold any lawful office, mandate or constitutional status capable of conferring upon them locus standi before this Honourable Court.

(d) The decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions dated 20th January, 2026 relates exclusively to a new electoral cycle commencing in 2026 and running to 2031, which is legally distinct from the expired 2021–2025 electoral mandate.

(e) The Appellants neither participated in, contested, nor presented themselves for election in the new electoral cycle and consequently have no present, subsisting or legally protectable interest capable of grounding the statutory requirement of being persons aggrieved within the meaning of Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act.

(f) Locus standi is a jurisdictional prerequisite and where a party lacks standing, the Court is deprived of the authority to entertain the matter. The Appeal is therefore fatally defective and incompetent ab initio for want of locus standi.

(g) The absence of locus standi in the present Appeal therefore extinguishes the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court at inception.

(h) The doctrine of effluxion of time operates automatically and requires no declaration, administrative action or judicial intervention for the mandate to lapse. Once the electoral term expired on 31st December, 2025, the legal authority of the Appellants was extinguished in its entirety.

(i) Without prejudice to the foregoing, disputes relating to trade union governance, election disputes and registration of officials are governed by Sections 34 and 35 of the Labour Relations Act and the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided under the Union Constitution.

(j) The present Appeal was instituted in disregard of the statutory dispute resolution framework and is therefore premature, procedurally defective and incompetent.

6. The application and Preliminary Objection were disposed of by written submissions. Only the Applicants and the 2nd Respondent complied.

APPLICANTS’ SUBMISSIONS

7. The Applicant through its Advocates Adoli & Company Advocates filed its written submissions dated 26th June, 2026 and on the issue of whether the 2nd Respondent’s Preliminary Objection meets the threshold of a proper preliminary objection, Counsel submitted that the objection was frivolous and did not raise pure points of law as required under the principles set out in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd. Counsel submitted that this Court was being asked to examine and ascertain factual issues, including the parties’ terms of office and electoral cycles, which required investigation of facts and evidence and could therefore not be determined as a preliminary point. Counsel relied on Engineer E.M. Kithimba t/a Kithimba Associates Consulting Engineers v Attorney General & another [2014] eKLR, Oraro v Mbaja and Awino & 7 Others v Inspector General of Police & 3 Others, where the Courts held that a matter requiring investigation of facts or proof by evidence does not qualify as a proper preliminary objection.

8. On the issue of whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appeal and whether the Appellants have locus standi, Counsel submitted that the 2nd Respondent conducted elections on 18th January, 2026 and that, by 20th January, 2026, the 1st Respondent had registered the new officials and issued an extract to that effect. Counsel submitted that the extract constituted a decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions and that, being aggrieved by that decision, the Appellants had a right of appeal under Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act.

9. Counsel also submitted that the Appeal was filed on 11th February, 2026, within the statutory period of 30 days prescribed under Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act. That the Appellants were persons aggrieved by the decision of the Registrar and therefore had the requisite locus standi to challenge the decision. Therefore, this Honourable Court had the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appeal.

10. In conclusion, counsel prayed that the Preliminary Objection be dismissed to pave way for the hearing and determination of the Appeal on its merits.

2nd RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

11. The Respondent through its Advocates, Kwamboka Marie &Associates Advocates, filed its written submissions on 23rd March, 2026 and on the issue of whether the Appellants have the requisite locus standi to institute this Appeal under Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act, Counsel submitted that the Appellants' alleged mandate arose from the 2021–2025 electoral cycle. That mandate was expressly time-bound and expired by effluxion of time on 31st December, 2025 and upon such expiry, their offices ceased to exist in law, their authority was extinguished and any representational capacity previously vested in them lapsed entirely.

12. Counsel submitted that in law, a time-bound mandate does not require formal revocation as it terminates automatically by operation of law. Counsel further submitted that the impugned decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions relates to a new and distinct electoral cycle running from 2026–2031, which is legally separate and independent from the expired mandate. That the Appellants cannot purport to challenge processes arising within a subsequent electoral framework in which they hold no office, no mandate and no legal status.

13. Counsel argued that the Appellants did not contest, participate in, or present themselves for election in the 2026–2031 electoral cycle. That by electing not to submit their candidature or engage in the electoral process, they voluntarily removed themselves from the very framework from which the alleged grievance arises and could not be said to be aggrieved by a process in which they neither participated nor asserted any candidature.

14. Counsel submitted that locus standi is not a procedural technicality but a jurisdictional prerequisite and must be grounded on a real, present and legally protectable interest. Reliance was placed on the case of Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR.

15. Counsel further relied on the case of Divecon Limited v Samani [1995–1998] EA 48 and submitted that rights extinguished by operation of law cannot be revived through litigation. That the Appellants' mandate having expired, and no participation having been undertaken in the impugned electoral cycle, there existed no subsisting right capable of protection and they were therefore not “persons aggrieved” within the meaning of Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act.

16. Counsel further submitted that where locus standi is absent, jurisdiction does not arise. Reliance was placed on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, where the Court held that jurisdiction is everything and without it, a Court must down its tools, as well as Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, where it was held that jurisdiction flows from statute and cannot be assumed.

17. Counsel also submitted that the Appellants' failed to utilise the prescribed dispute resolution mechanisms. Reliance was placed on Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume [1992] KLR 21 for the position that where a statute provides a procedure for redress, that procedure must be strictly followed.

18. In totality, Counsel submitted that the Appellants lacked any subsisting legal interest, had no standing under Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act and were strangers to the electoral process they sought to impugn. Counsel maintained that the Appeal was incompetent ab initio and that the Preliminary Objection raised a pure point of law going to the root of the Court’s jurisdiction and was properly determinable in limine.

DETERMINATION

19. I have considered the Preliminary Objection filed by the 2nd Respondent and the submissions therein and the issue that arises for determination are;

i. Whether or not the 2nd Respondents’ objection is properly taken as a preliminary objection.

ii. Whether the Applicants have locus standi to institute the suit.

20. On the issue of whether the 2nd Respondent’s objection is a proper preliminary objection, this Court takes cognizance of the definition of a preliminary objection as adopted in the classic and celebrated case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd Civil Appeal No. 9 of [1969 EA 696] where the court held that: -

“A Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises from a clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a Preliminary point may dispose of the suit…..It raises a pure point of law, which, if argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion”.

21. The Supreme Court in the case of Hassan Ali Joho & Another vs Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 Others [2014] eKLR re-affirmed the principle as set out in the Mukhisa Case(supra) stating as follows:

“A preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration … a preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.”

22. From the 2nd Respondent’s Preliminary Objection, it is clear that it is premised on the ground that the 2nd Respondent believed that the Applicants were not persons aggrieved within the meaning of Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007, for the reason that their 2021–2025 term had expired on 31st December, 2025, therefore, as at 2026, the Applicants no longer had any authority or subsisting locus standi to challenge the decision of the Registrar relating to the subsequent 2026–2031 electoral cycle.

23. The court notes that these facts were not contested by the applicants. The objection can therefore be considered on the assumption that those facts are correct, the question being whether, as a matter of law, they affect the Applicants’ locus standi to institute the present Appeal. Consequently, this court finds that it falls within the threshold of a pure point of law and was properly taken in limine.

24. Notwithstanding the finding by the court on the PO as above, concerning the issue of locus standi, according to the court in Aga Khan University Hospital v Kenya Private Universities Workers Union [2024] KECA 1950 (KLR), locus standi

“…. signifies a right to be heard, a person must have sufficiency of interest to sustain his standing to sue in a court of law. Therefore, locus standi means the right to appear before and be heard in a court of law. Without it, even when a party has a meritorious case, he cannot be heard. Locus standi is so important that in its absence, the party has no basis to claim anything before the court. See the Supreme Court case of Okoiti & Another v Attorney General & Another (Petition No. 29 of 2020) [2021] KESC 28 (KLR).”

25. It is common ground that the instant appeal arose from the decision of the 1st Respondent issued through the extract dated 20th January, 2026 and having an effective date of 18th January, 2026. According to Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007;

“Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar made under this Act may appeal to the Industrial Court against that decision within thirty days of the decision.”

26. It was the 2nd Respondent's position that it did not consider the Applicants to be persons aggrieved within the meaning of Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007. This was on the basis that the Applicants, having been elected in the year 2021 to serve for a term of five years, meant that they ceased to hold office as at 31st December, 2025 and, as a result, the present appeal filed in 2026 was by persons who, in its view, lacked the requisite locus standi to challenge the impugned decision of the 1st Respondent. The Court disagrees. If the Applicants had been elected in the year 2021 to serve for a period of five years, in the ordinary course, the five-year period could only come to an end in the year 2026 and not on 31st December 2025.

27. Indeed, the fact that the elections were conducted in the year 2026 is consistent with the Applicants’ position that their term was still running at the time of the elections. The Court therefore finds that the Applicants have the requisite locus standi to challenge the decision of the 1st Respondent.

28. Consequently, I find that the 2nd Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 25th February 2026 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed and the court shall proceed to determine the appeal on merit.

29. Costs of this Preliminary Objection shall abide the outcome of the appeal.

30. It is so ordered.

Dated at Nairobi this 30th day of October 2026

Delivered virtually this 30th day of October 2026

Abuodha Nelson Jorum

Presiding Judge-ELRC-Mombasa

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