Employment law

Magu v Imperial College of Medical and Health Sciences [2026] KEELRC 14976 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E267 of 2025
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The appeal was dismissed. The 16 July 2025 ruling setting aside the ex parte judgment remained in force. Time for the Respondent to file its response and for the auctioneers to deposit the decretal sum ran afresh from this judgment until full compliance. Each party was to bear its own appeal costs.

Supporting judgment passages

I am therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal and order as follows;

Conclusion and orders →

(i) The Ruling of 16th July, 2025 in MCELRC No. E007 of 2024 stands.

Passage 75 →

(ii) Time under the orders requiring the Respondent to file their response and the auctioneers to deposit the decretal sum runs from the date of this judgment of court till compliance in full.

Passage 76 →
Issue 1Whether the ex-parte judgment of 27th November, 2024 was irregular for want of proper service of summons on the Respondent.

Held. Yes. Summons and the claim were not properly served. The process server served an unnamed receptionist without showing that the secretary, director, or principal officer could not be found; the prescribed alternative modes were not satisfied and no leave was obtained for another mode. Email and WhatsApp notices did not validly serve the summons. The judgment was therefore irregular and had to be set aside; grounds 1 and 3 failed.

Ratio. A default judgment entered without proper service of summons is irregular and must be set aside as of right, without regard to delay or merits of the intended defence. Under the applicable Rules, corporate service was to be on the secretary, director, or other principal officer, subject to specified alternatives or leave for another method. Knowledge of the dispute does not cure defective service.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

1. Whether the ex-parte judgment of 27th November, 2024 was irregular for want of proper service of summons on the Respondent.

Passage 35 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

The affidavit does not say that he asked for the secretary, a director or the principal, or that they could not be found. It does not name the receptionist or say that she was authorised to accept service. The gate pass records the office visited as reception and leaves the line for the visited officer blank. A receptionist is not a secretary, director or principal officer. On the Appellant's own return, service was not made in the mode that rule 12(1)(a) prescribes. Nothing shows that the conditions for the alternatives in rule 12(1)(b) were met, and no leave was sought under rule 12(2). Summons was not properly served.

Passage 46 →

The Respondent's evidence is thin. Mr. Ikenye's affidavit is a bare denial of service, and it speaks of an Amended Memorandum of Claim that is not in the record. I do not rest the decision on it. The irregularity appears from the Appellant's return of service. The Ruling gives the date of service as 28th February, 2024. The return says 29th February, 2024. The slip is immaterial. The summons and claim were not properly served, the judgment of 27th November, 2024 was irregular and the trial court had no discretion but to set it aside. Grounds 1 and 3 therefore fail.

Passage 54 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

A default judgment entered where the defendant was not served, or not properly served, with summons is irregular. It is set aside ex debito justitiae, as of right and the court may act on its own motion. Delay and the merits of the intended defence do not count, because the defendant was condemned without notice of the case against it.

Passage 42 →

Summons was served on 29th February, 2024. The Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 came into force on 16th August, 2024, so the 2016 Rules govern, as the trial court rightly held. The Respondent cites rule 28 of the 2024 Rules, which had not commenced. Even if it applied, the Appellant has not argued that a receptionist qualifies under it. Rule 12(1) of the 2016 Rules requires service on a corporate body to be made on its secretary, director or other principal officer. Only if none of them can be found may the process server leave the documents at a conspicuous place at the registered office or place of business, or send them by registered courier or post. Rule 12(2) allows any other method only with leave of the court.

Passage 44 →
Issue 2Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside a judgment entered by another magistrate of the same court.

Held. Yes. The magistrate could determine the setting-aside application. No earlier ruling had finally determined service; the identified entries were only case-management endorsements made in the Respondent's absence. The application was properly made to the court that entered the default judgment, and grounds 2 and 4 failed.

Ratio. The rule against reviewing or sitting on appeal over a coordinate court does not apply where the matter was not previously heard and finally decided. A court that entered a default judgment may set it aside, and an irregular judgment is set aside as of right irrespective of the label or specific procedural rule invoked.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

2. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside a judgment entered by another magistrate of the same court.

Passage 36 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

On the 2nd issue for determination, I accept the general rule that a court does not review, or sit on appeal over, the decision of a court of concurrent jurisdiction. It does not help the Appellant. This is for three reasons. Firstly, there was no earlier decision on service to overturn. As found under the 1st issue, the file holds only case management endorsements made in the Respondent's absence. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, which the Appellant also invokes, concerns matters heard and finally decided. Service was never heard and decided. Secondly, an application to set aside a default judgment is made to the court that entered it, and is decided by the magistrate who sits on it. The Appellant's argument would mean that a litigant condemned unheard could never return to the court that condemned it.

Passage 55 →

Thirdly, the label on the motion does not matter. It asked the court to review and set aside the judgment for want of service. Whatever it was called, that is the court's function. Grounds 2 and 4 fail.

Passage 57 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

On the 2nd issue for determination, I accept the general rule that a court does not review, or sit on appeal over, the decision of a court of concurrent jurisdiction. It does not help the Appellant. This is for three reasons. Firstly, there was no earlier decision on service to overturn. As found under the 1st issue, the file holds only case management endorsements made in the Respondent's absence. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, which the Appellant also invokes, concerns matters heard and finally decided. Service was never heard and decided. Secondly, an application to set aside a default judgment is made to the court that entered it, and is decided by the magistrate who sits on it. The Appellant's argument would mean that a litigant condemned unheard could never return to the court that condemned it.

Passage 55 →

The 2016 Rules provide for formal proof where no response is filed (rule 15(3)) but have no express provision for setting aside the resulting judgment. Both sides argued the motion under Order 10 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules and neither questions that. In any case, Ghikas holds that an irregular judgment is set aside as of right, so the power does not depend on a particular rule.

Passage 56 →
Issue 3Whether the motion was overtaken by events, or defeated by payment and delay, and whether the proclamation was properly lifted.

Held. No. The motion was not defeated by payment or delay. The Kshs 300,000 paid to auctioneers after proclamation was payment under execution to stop removal of goods, not acceptance of the judgment; the alleged settlement did not compromise this claim or become a consent order. Delay was immaterial to an irregular judgment, and no evidence proved any auction sale. Lifting the proclamation was proper because the judgment, decree and warrants fell, and independently because execution lacked the required ten-day notice. Grounds 7, 8 and 9 failed.

Ratio. Payment under execution cannot regularize an irregular judgment, and delay does not bar setting aside such a judgment. Execution based on a judgment that has been set aside cannot stand. In addition, attachment following a default judgment requires the prescribed prior notice, and the party executing must establish a lawful basis for the execution.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

3. Whether the motion was overtaken by events, or defeated by payment and delay, and whether the proclamation was properly lifted.

Passage 37 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

Second, the payment. A sum paid to auctioneers four days after proclamation, to stop them removing the Respondent's goods, is a payment under execution. It is not an election to accept the judgment. And no payment can make an irregular judgment regular.

Passage 60 →

The proclamation was lifted for two reasons. The first is that the judgment fell, and with it the decree and the warrants. The second is that execution issued without the notice required by Order 22 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, to which rule 32(2) of the 2016 Rules makes or refers to execution subject. This rule requires not less than ten days' notice of the entry of a default judgment before execution by attachment, with a copy filed with the first application for execution. The Appellant does not dispute its text. The record has no application for execution and no such notice.

Passage 66 →

The Appellant compiled and certified the record. She exhibits only the letter of 11th February, 2025 enclosing the decree, sent by email with no proof of delivery, and the warrants. The burden of showing a lawful basis for execution was theirs. This second reason is alternative support. The first is enough. Grounds 7, 8 and 9 again fail.

Passage 67 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

Second, the payment. A sum paid to auctioneers four days after proclamation, to stop them removing the Respondent's goods, is a payment under execution. It is not an election to accept the judgment. And no payment can make an irregular judgment regular.

Passage 60 →

This in the fourth instance touches on the matter of delay. It would matter if the judgment is regular. For an irregular judgment, Ghikas observes that the court does not consider it nor does it look at the merits of the draft defence. In any event, the Respondent's managing director avers that he first learned of the suit when the auctioneers came on 2nd May, 2025 and the motion followed within a week. Knowledge of the judgment is not service of summons. At the most it goes to costs.

Passage 63 →

The proclamation was lifted for two reasons. The first is that the judgment fell, and with it the decree and the warrants. The second is that execution issued without the notice required by Order 22 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, to which rule 32(2) of the 2016 Rules makes or refers to execution subject. This rule requires not less than ten days' notice of the entry of a default judgment before execution by attachment, with a copy filed with the first application for execution. The Appellant does not dispute its text. The record has no application for execution and no such notice.

Passage 66 →
Issue 4Whether the consequential orders were unpleaded or wrong, and who should bear the costs.

Held. The consequential orders were proper. Lifting the proclamation was within the prayers to set aside execution and release attached goods; permission to file a response followed from the request for leave to defend. The court could require the auctioneers to account for money collected under the set-aside judgment, although that deposit order was not expressly sought. The Appellant, as decree holder who instructed the auctioneers, properly bore the costs of the abortive execution. Grounds 5, 6 and 10 failed. Each party bore its own costs of the appeal.

Ratio. A court setting aside a judgment may make consequential orders needed to undo execution under it, including requiring an account of funds collected. Costs of an execution that is set aside ordinarily fall on the party who instructed the auctioneer. Appeal costs are discretionary; the court made no appeal-costs order based on both parties' conduct.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

4. Whether the consequential orders were unpleaded or wrong, and who should bear the costs.

Passage 38 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

The 4th issue for determination is whether the consequential orders were unpleaded or wrong, and who should bear the costs. The Appellant submits that the trial court gave relief that was never prayed for. The motion sought to set aside the judgment, the decree, the execution orders and the release of the attached goods. Lifting the proclamation is squarely within those prayers. The order that the Respondent file its response follows from the prayer for leave to defend. Ground 5 fails on both aspects.

Passage 68 →

Ground 10 says the money was already transferred to the Appellant and spent. The record has no evidence of that. The order is also addressed to Skigate Auctioneers and not to the Appellant. It requires the auctioneers to deposit what they collected under the warrants and places no duty on herself. If the auctioneers have already remitted the money, or it cannot be separated from payments in the other matter, the trial court is the place to resolve how the order is carried out. Ground 10 fails.

Passage 70 →

On ground 6, Skigate Auctioneers acted on the Appellant's instructions as decree holder. The charges of an execution that is set aside ordinarily fall on the party who instructed the auctioneers. Section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act aforecited empowers the court to make such orders as to costs as it considers just. The earlier finding of service on which the Appellant relies fails with the 1st issue. Ground 6 also fails.

Passage 71 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

The order that Skigate Auctioneers deposit the decretal sum is not expressly prayed for. But money collected under a judgment that has been set aside must be accounted for, and a court that sets aside a judgment may make the orders needed to undo what was done under it. The Appellant's advocates submitted to the trial court that allowing the motion will mean that the Claimant/Respondent herein will have to refund the decretal sum paid to it. This cannot be denied whatsoever.

Passage 69 →

On ground 6, Skigate Auctioneers acted on the Appellant's instructions as decree holder. The charges of an execution that is set aside ordinarily fall on the party who instructed the auctioneers. Section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act aforecited empowers the court to make such orders as to costs as it considers just. The earlier finding of service on which the Appellant relies fails with the 1st issue. Ground 6 also fails.

Passage 71 →

On the costs of this appeal, section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act leaves them to the court's discretion. The Appellant enforced the judgment on a return of service she believed good, and the Respondent, on her evidence, let the decree and warrants go unanswered until its property was proclaimed. There shall be no order as to the costs of this appeal.

Passage 72 →
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Background

THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in allowing the respondent's application dated 8th day of May 2025 as prayed for, thereby setting aside the judgement of the trial court despite having an earlier ruling that acknowledged sufficient service of summons and the pleadings upon the Respondent herein.

Paragraph 1 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the ex parte judgment of 27 November 2024 was irregular because summons and the claim were not properly served on the Respondent; whether a magistrate could set aside that judgment although another magistrate had handled earlier case-management steps;…

Material facts

Alice Wangeci Magu claimed she was employed by Imperial College of Medical and Health Sciences as a trainer from 14 July 2023 and summarily dismissed on 31 October 2023. She sought Kshs 500,480. The Respondent did not file a response, and the trial court…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E267 OF 2025

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

ALICE WANGECI MAGU ………………………………………………………… APPELLANT

VERSUS

IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF MEDICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES ………… RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the Ruling of Hon. E. N. Mwenda, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 16th July, 2025 at Thika in MCELRC No. E007 of 2024: Alice Wangeci Magu v Imperial College of Medical and Health Sciences)

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 11th August, 2025. It arises from a ruling delivered on 16th July, 2025 in MCELRC No. E007 of 2024. The ruling set aside an ex-parte judgment entered on 27th November, 2024.

In this instance, the Appellant sued the Respondent, a tertiary institution, by a Memorandum of Claim dated 27th February, 2024. She pleaded that she was employed as a trainer from 14th July, 2023 and summarily dismissed by a letter dated 31st October, 2023. She claimed Kshs 500,480.00 in all.

The Respondent did not respond to the claim. It was heard on 22nd October, 2024. On 27th November, 2024 the trial court found the dismissal unfair and awarded Kshs 95,680.00 with costs and interest. That sum was one month's notice pay Kshs 36,800.00, one month's compensation Kshs 36,800.00 and house allowance Kshs 22,080.00.

A decree was issued on 5th February, 2025, with costs certified at Kshs 34,300.00. Warrants of attachment for Kshs 143,954.00 issued to Skigate Auctioneers on 24th April, 2025. The auctioneers proclaimed the Respondent's property on 2nd May, 2025 and on 6th May, 2025 the Respondent paid them Kshs 300,000.00.

By a Notice of Motion dated 8th May, 2025 the Respondent asked the trial court to review and set aside the judgment, the decree and the execution orders, and to grant it leave to defend. It also sought release of the attached goods. Its case was that it was never served with summons. The Appellant opposed the motion by a replying affidavit sworn on 27th May, 2025. The trial court allowed the motion. He held that service on a receptionist was ineffective, that the affidavits of service for the emailed notices were deficient, and that execution issued without the ten days' notice required by Order 22 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

The trial court set aside the judgment and gave the Respondent 15 days to file its response. He lifted the proclamation and attachment, and ordered Skigate Auctioneers to deposit the decretal sum collected within 14 days. The plaintiff was to pay the auctioneers' costs of the abortive execution, and the costs of the motion were left in the cause.

The Record of Appeal was filed on 16th September, 2026 and the appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions, the Appellant's dated 5th October, 2026 and the Respondent's filed on 19th October, 2026. The grounds of appeal come out thus;

1. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in allowing the respondent's application dated 8th day of May 2025 as prayed for, thereby setting aside the judgement of the trial court despite having an earlier ruling that acknowledged sufficient service of summons and the pleadings upon the Respondent herein.

2. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law by reviewing and/or overturning a judgement of the trial court which is an equal court, without proper evaluation and analysis of the evidence and the facts presented before it by the Appellant herein.

3. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by misconstruing legal precedence in regard to online service thereby arriving at an erroneous finding that service of notices via the official emails and WhatsApp numbers of the Respondent was insufficient despite clear evidence that they received the information and also did not deny they email addresses and numbers presented.

4. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in disregarding the proceedings recorded by the trial court that handled the case to its viable conclusion and instead revised the finding without jurisdiction over the matter.

5. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law by awarding orders that had not been pleaded and/or prayed for failing to appreciate and/or apply the principles governing the grant of setting aside a judgement.

6. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding the Appellant herein liable to pay the auctioneers costs disregarding the findings of the trial court which had ascertained that the Respondent was duly served but chose not to defend the suit.

7. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law in lifting an order of the proclamation and attachment granted to Skigate auctioneers disregarding the fact that the application had been overtaken by events for the auction had already taken place.

8. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law by allowing the Respondet's application dated 8th May, 2025 despite clear evidence that the Respondent had fully settled the Decretal sum willingly five days before filing the subject application.

9. THAT the Learned Magistrate erred and misdirected himself in law in failing to consider the submissions of the appellant herein and only adopting the submissions of the respondent thus leading to a ruling/order that is not in conformity with the legal principles.

10. THAT in the absence of an unequivocal prayer of a refund of the decretal sum initially paid for settlement by the Respondent herein, the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in making an order to have it deposited to court disregarding that the same had been transferred to the Appellant herein who had already utilized it.

REASONS WHEREFORE the Appellant herein prays that this Honourable Court be pleased to reverse the Ruling/Order of the learned magistrate issued on the 16th day of July, 2025 and, in its place, reinstate the judgement delivered by the trial court on 27th November, 2024 or review the decree upon terms that are just and in consonance with the evidence adduced before the trial court.

It is the Appellant's case and submission that the Respondent was properly served and chose to ignore the proceedings. She submits that physical service was effected on the school principal, who directed that only the gate pass be stamped. She adds that the Respondent also received mention notices, hearing notices, the decree and the warrants on its official email addresses and WhatsApp numbers, and never denied owning them.

She submits that Hon. Ogombe had already ruled that service was sufficient, and that a magistrate of equal jurisdiction could not overturn that finding without a review. She relies on Bellevue Development Company Ltd v Gikonyo & 3 others [2018] eKLR for the rule that a court cannot sit on appeal over a court of concurrent jurisdiction. She says a failure to defend does not make a judgment irregular.

On the consequential orders, the Appellant submits that the trial court granted reliefs that were never pleaded. On the motion being overtaken by events, she says the Respondent paid the whole decretal sum voluntarily, signed a settlement agreement, and applied to set aside five days later after months of silence. She says the auction had already taken place. She asks that the Ruling be reversed, the judgment reinstated, and costs awarded to her.

The Respondent's case and submission is that it was never served with the summons, the Memorandum of Claim or the hearing notices. It says the process server's affidavit shows that he served an unidentified receptionist, who is not a person on whom a corporate body may be served under the Rules. Such a judgment, it says, is irregular and must be set aside as of right.

It relies on the authority of Ghikas which provides that the trial court did not sit on appeal over a coordinate court, because no earlier ruling on service existed and the motion invoked Order 10 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It says the consequential orders flow from the court's inherent power.

Besides, the Respondent avers that the motion was not overtaken by events. Execution was unlawful for want of the ten days' notice under Order 22 Rule 6, the record contains no auction notice or proof of sale, and the Appellant's documents show payment only after proclamation. It asks that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

The issues for determination therefore become;

1. Whether the ex-parte judgment of 27th November, 2024 was irregular for want of proper service of summons on the Respondent.

2. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside a judgment entered by another magistrate of the same court.

3. Whether the motion was overtaken by events, or defeated by payment and delay, and whether the proclamation was properly lifted.

4. Whether the consequential orders were unpleaded or wrong, and who should bear the costs.

This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses, as was pronounced in the authority of Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123. The Ruling was made on affidavits and documents, so this court is as well placed as the trial court to assess them.

If the judgment was regular, setting it aside was a matter of discretion and this court would interfere only if that discretion was exercised on wrong principles. If it was irregular, there was no discretion to exercise, and the question is decided afresh on the record.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the ex-parte judgment of 27th November, 2024 was irregular for want of proper service of summons on the Respondent. Everything here turns on whether the judgment was regular or irregular. The Court of Appeal drew the line in James Kanyiita Nderitu & another v Marios Philotas Ghikas & another [2016] KECA 470 (KLR). A default judgment entered after proper service is regular, and the court has a discretion whether to set it aside.

A default judgment entered where the defendant was not served, or not properly served, with summons is irregular. It is set aside ex debito justitiae, as of right and the court may act on its own motion. Delay and the merits of the intended defence do not count, because the defendant was condemned without notice of the case against it.

Both sides accept the distinction. The question is therefore narrow: Were summons served on the Respondent in the manner the Rules require?

Summons was served on 29th February, 2024. The Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 came into force on 16th August, 2024, so the 2016 Rules govern, as the trial court rightly held. The Respondent cites rule 28 of the 2024 Rules, which had not commenced. Even if it applied, the Appellant has not argued that a receptionist qualifies under it. Rule 12(1) of the 2016 Rules requires service on a corporate body to be made on its secretary, director or other principal officer. Only if none of them can be found may the process server leave the documents at a conspicuous place at the registered office or place of business, or send them by registered courier or post. Rule 12(2) allows any other method only with leave of the court.

The only return of service for the summons and claim is the affidavit of Joel Maina Mwangi, sworn on 4th March, 2024. He swears that on 29th February, 2024, at about 930 hours, he served the receptionist at the Respondent's offices in Thika. She kept the copies but declined to stamp or sign. He says she explained that the principal had authorised her to stamp nothing beyond his gate pass.

The affidavit does not say that he asked for the secretary, a director or the principal, or that they could not be found. It does not name the receptionist or say that she was authorised to accept service. The gate pass records the office visited as reception and leaves the line for the visited officer blank. A receptionist is not a secretary, director or principal officer. On the Appellant's own return, service was not made in the mode that rule 12(1)(a) prescribes. Nothing shows that the conditions for the alternatives in rule 12(1)(b) were met, and no leave was sought under rule 12(2). Summons was not properly served.

The Appellant says the process server found the school principal. That is her advocates' account, not his sworn evidence, and it contradicts his return. She also says the principal is the board secretary under the Basic Education Act. The Respondent is a tertiary institution registered under the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act, as she pleaded, and the Basic Education Act, 2013 Chapter 211, Laws of Kenya has no bearing on it.

Ground 1 speaks of an earlier ruling that acknowledged sufficient service. There was none. The proceedings show case management entries only. On 28th May, 2024 the court recorded that the pre-trial notice had been served and then directed that the Respondent be served afresh. On 3rd September, 2024 the court noted that counsel's return confirms respondent was served and fixed a hearing date. The Respondent was absent each time. Nobody tested service, and no court heard the Respondent on it. These are endorsements on a file, not a ruling.

Grounds 1 and 3 rely on email and WhatsApp. The emails in the record are mention notices of 22nd May and 29th July, 2024 and a notice dated 7th October, 2024 of the hearing date, sent to admissions@icmhs.co.ke and, for the last two, also info@icmhs.co.ke. The decree was emailed on 11th February, 2025. None of this was service of the summons and claim. A notice of a mention or hearing date cannot supply the service of summons the Rules require. Summons is what calls on a respondent to enter appearance and defend. The record shows no later attempt to serve the summons and the claim.

The 2016 Rules make no provision for service by email or WhatsApp, and rule 12(2) requires leave for any other method. None was sought. The Appellant relied on Order 5 Rules 22B and 22C of the Civil Procedure Rules. Even if they could be borrowed, her own submissions say service by email or mobile messaging is complete on a delivery receipt. The affidavits exhibit only the sender's copy.

None of the affidavits explains how the process server knew these were the Respondent's confirmed and used addresses. The trial court said that proof of service by email is the read receipt report and not the print out. That may be put too absolutely, but he was right that the proof offered was deficient.

The Appellant stresses that the Respondent never denied owning the addresses and numbers. That is beside the point. Owning an address is not the same as being served at it in a manner the Rules recognise. Silence does not turn defective service into good service.

This court has considered the Appellant's strongest point, that the Respondent plainly knew of the dispute. It paid her October, 2023 salary two days after her advocates' demand letter and on her evidence, left emailed notices, the decree and the warrants unanswered. Awareness of a dispute is not service of summons. If the Respondent ignored emailed notices, that may bear on costs. It cannot make the judgment regular.

The Respondent's evidence is thin. Mr. Ikenye's affidavit is a bare denial of service, and it speaks of an Amended Memorandum of Claim that is not in the record. I do not rest the decision on it. The irregularity appears from the Appellant's return of service. The Ruling gives the date of service as 28th February, 2024. The return says 29th February, 2024. The slip is immaterial. The summons and claim were not properly served, the judgment of 27th November, 2024 was irregular and the trial court had no discretion but to set it aside. Grounds 1 and 3 therefore fail.

On the 2nd issue for determination, I accept the general rule that a court does not review, or sit on appeal over, the decision of a court of concurrent jurisdiction. It does not help the Appellant. This is for three reasons. Firstly, there was no earlier decision on service to overturn. As found under the 1st issue, the file holds only case management endorsements made in the Respondent's absence. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, which the Appellant also invokes, concerns matters heard and finally decided. Service was never heard and decided. Secondly, an application to set aside a default judgment is made to the court that entered it, and is decided by the magistrate who sits on it. The Appellant's argument would mean that a litigant condemned unheard could never return to the court that condemned it.

The 2016 Rules provide for formal proof where no response is filed (rule 15(3)) but have no express provision for setting aside the resulting judgment. Both sides argued the motion under Order 10 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules and neither questions that. In any case, Ghikas holds that an irregular judgment is set aside as of right, so the power does not depend on a particular rule.

Thirdly, the label on the motion does not matter. It asked the court to review and set aside the judgment for want of service. Whatever it was called, that is the court's function. Grounds 2 and 4 fail.

The 3rd issue for determination is whether the motion was overtaken by events, or defeated by payment and delay, and whether the proclamation was properly lifted. Ground 9 says the trial court ignored the Appellant's submissions. The Ruling summarises them at paragraphs 8 to 10 and decides the motion on service, the email affidavits and execution. A ruling is not defective because it prefers one side's argument.

The Appellant says the Respondent paid in full, signed a settlement agreement and applied to set aside five days later. The documents do not support that account. First, timing. The proclamation was on 2nd May, 2025 and payment on 6th May, 2025. The motion is dated 8th May, 2025, which is two days after payment. The Appellant's own accounts vary, with five days in ground 8 and six days in her replying affidavit.

Second, the payment. A sum paid to auctioneers four days after proclamation, to stop them removing the Respondent's goods, is a payment under execution. It is not an election to accept the judgment. And no payment can make an irregular judgment regular.

Third, the so-called settlement agreement is a handwritten note by Skigate Auctioneers, signed on 6th May, 2025 and stamped received by the Respondent's managing director. It acknowledges Kshs 300,000.00 being part payment of the Decretal Sum and Auctioneers fees for the Case numbers above. Two case numbers appear at its head. The first is ELRC 004 of 2024 and the second cannot be read with certainty. This note also provides for the release of certain computers, desks and chairs pending settlement of the balances. It is an arrangement between the Respondent and the auctioneers. The Appellant is not a party to it, it compromises no claim in this suit, and no consent order was entered on it. By its own words it is a part payment with balances outstanding.

The Respondent was also a judgment debtor in MCELRC No. E004 of 2024. The police assistance order the Appellant exhibits was made on 20th March, 2025 in Miscellaneous Case No. E094 of 2025 and concerns a decree in that other matter for Kshs. 561,460.00. How the Kshs 300,000.00 should be apportioned between the two matters is not shown, and this court makes no finding on it.

This in the fourth instance touches on the matter of delay. It would matter if the judgment is regular. For an irregular judgment, Ghikas observes that the court does not consider it nor does it look at the merits of the draft defence. In any event, the Respondent's managing director avers that he first learned of the suit when the auctioneers came on 2nd May, 2025 and the motion followed within a week. Knowledge of the judgment is not service of summons. At the most it goes to costs.

The Appellant also invokes the rule that litigation must end and the doctrine of functus officio. Neither of these prisms prevents a court from setting aside a judgment entered without service. A judgment given in the defendant's absence, without proper summons, is not and would never be a final decision reached after hearing both sides. Ground 7 says the auction had already taken place. The record has no auction notice, sale report, auctioneer's return or affidavit saying that any sale occurred. The Appellant's replying affidavit speaks of execution on 6th May and of auctioneers' fees still pending. It does not say that goods were sold. Submissions are not evidence.

The Appellant's submissions also give two different dates for the interim stay order, 13th May, 2025 and 21st July, 2025. The second falls after the Ruling and cannot be right. I cannot find that any sale took place. If one did, that is a question of restitution. It is no reason to leave an irregular judgment standing.

The proclamation was lifted for two reasons. The first is that the judgment fell, and with it the decree and the warrants. The second is that execution issued without the notice required by Order 22 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, to which rule 32(2) of the 2016 Rules makes or refers to execution subject. This rule requires not less than ten days' notice of the entry of a default judgment before execution by attachment, with a copy filed with the first application for execution. The Appellant does not dispute its text. The record has no application for execution and no such notice.

The Appellant compiled and certified the record. She exhibits only the letter of 11th February, 2025 enclosing the decree, sent by email with no proof of delivery, and the warrants. The burden of showing a lawful basis for execution was theirs. This second reason is alternative support. The first is enough. Grounds 7, 8 and 9 again fail.

The 4th issue for determination is whether the consequential orders were unpleaded or wrong, and who should bear the costs. The Appellant submits that the trial court gave relief that was never prayed for. The motion sought to set aside the judgment, the decree, the execution orders and the release of the attached goods. Lifting the proclamation is squarely within those prayers. The order that the Respondent file its response follows from the prayer for leave to defend. Ground 5 fails on both aspects.

The order that Skigate Auctioneers deposit the decretal sum is not expressly prayed for. But money collected under a judgment that has been set aside must be accounted for, and a court that sets aside a judgment may make the orders needed to undo what was done under it. The Appellant's advocates submitted to the trial court that allowing the motion will mean that the Claimant/Respondent herein will have to refund the decretal sum paid to it. This cannot be denied whatsoever.

Ground 10 says the money was already transferred to the Appellant and spent. The record has no evidence of that. The order is also addressed to Skigate Auctioneers and not to the Appellant. It requires the auctioneers to deposit what they collected under the warrants and places no duty on herself. If the auctioneers have already remitted the money, or it cannot be separated from payments in the other matter, the trial court is the place to resolve how the order is carried out. Ground 10 fails.

On ground 6, Skigate Auctioneers acted on the Appellant's instructions as decree holder. The charges of an execution that is set aside ordinarily fall on the party who instructed the auctioneers. Section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act aforecited empowers the court to make such orders as to costs as it considers just. The earlier finding of service on which the Appellant relies fails with the 1st issue. Ground 6 also fails.

On the costs of this appeal, section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act leaves them to the court's discretion. The Appellant enforced the judgment on a return of service she believed good, and the Respondent, on her evidence, let the decree and warrants go unanswered until its property was proclaimed. There shall be no order as to the costs of this appeal.

Nothing in this judgment touches the merits of the claim or of the draft defence. The trial court will now hear the claim.

I am therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The Ruling of 16th July, 2025 in MCELRC No. E007 of 2024 stands.

(ii) Time under the orders requiring the Respondent to file their response and the auctioneers to deposit the decretal sum runs from the date of this judgment of court till compliance in full.

(iii) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mr. Nandi instructed by Lucheli Musundi & Company Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Miss Macharia holding brief for Kariuki instructed by Jessee Kariuki & Company Advocates for the Respondent.

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