Background
THAT the learned Magistrate erred in fact and in law by finding that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was unfair.
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Appeal partially allowed. The dismissal remained unfair, but for want of a valid and fair reason rather than because the Respondent was hurried through an unfair procedure. The compensation award of Kshs. 481,504 was set aside and substituted with Kshs. 361,080 (six months’ gross salary), with interest at court rates from 24 July 2025. The Appellant must pay Kshs. 32,570 terminal net pay to the extent unpaid; the certificate-of-service and trial-costs orders remain. Each party bears its own appeal costs.
I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;
Conclusion and orders →
(ii) In its place, the Respondent’s summary dismissal on 12th April, 2023 is found unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act, 2007 for want of a valid and fair reason(s) and on this the declaration that the dismissal was unfair stands on that basis.
Passage 70 →
(iii) The award of Kshs. 481,504.00 is set aside and substituted with six months’ gross salary as compensation for unfair termination, being 6 × Kshs. 60,180 = Kshs. 361,080.00.
Passage 71 →
Held. The appeal was competent. Written submissions were not required components of the record, which contained all materials required by the governing rule. Referring to the High Court in the memorandum was a non-prejudicial slip, and paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions merely particularized existing quantum grounds; the striking-out application was declined.
Ratio. Under Rule 15(1), written submissions are argument rather than evidence and are not mandatory record components. The court must prefer substance over a clerical error where the appeal’s proper forum and character are clear, and particulars within pleaded appeal grounds causing no prejudice are not new grounds.
Issue
1. Whether the appeal is competent, having regard to the objection that the Record of Appeal is incomplete, the description of the appeal in the Memorandum as one to the High Court and the application to strike out paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions.
Passage 29 →
Held
The Record has everything the rule lists: the pleadings, the witness statements, the documents each side produced (pages 30 to 66), the proceedings in all thirteen pages with a certification (pages 83 to 95), the whole judgment (pages 96 to 104) and the decree (page 105). The Respondent does not say that any pleading, proceeding, exhibit or order is missing and he has answered the Appellant’s complaints page by page. The Record is sufficient for this first appeal.
Passage 36 →
The third is the application to strike out paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions. Grounds 2 and 4 of the Memorandum complain of the award of Kshs. 481,504.00 and the matters in paragraph 32 are particulars of those grounds, not new ones. The Respondent has answered them and suffered no prejudice. The application, made in submissions and not by motion, is declined. The appeal is competent and I find as such.
Passage 40 →
Ratio
On the 1st issue for determination, the Respondent raises three objections. The first is that the Record of Appeal is incomplete because it lacks the written submissions the Appellant filed in the court below. Rule 15(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 (the Rules), which govern this appeal, requires a record comprising a certified copy of pleadings, the proceedings, any documentary evidence relied on and the judgment, ruling, decision, order, decree or award appealed against. Written submissions are argument, not evidence, and are not on that list.
Passage 35 →
The second objection is that the Memorandum speaks of an appeal to the High Court. That is a slip of the pen. The Memorandum is headed in this Court, it challenges a decision of a magistrate in an employment cause, and both parties have treated it as an appeal to this Court. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution requires me to look to substance. It is dated 21st August 2025 (page 4), within thirty days of the judgment as rule 12(2) requires.
Passage 39 →
The third is the application to strike out paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions. Grounds 2 and 4 of the Memorandum complain of the award of Kshs. 481,504.00 and the matters in paragraph 32 are particulars of those grounds, not new ones. The Respondent has answered them and suffered no prejudice. The application, made in submissions and not by motion, is declined. The appeal is competent and I find as such.
Passage 40 →
Held. No. The Appellant did not prove on a balance of probabilities that its stated reason—careless and improper performance connected with fuel loss and parking—was valid or genuinely believed on reasonable grounds. The fuel concern was real, but the Appellant lacked reasonable grounds to attribute the loss to the Respondent: it had no proven parking rule, inadequate and inconsistent distance evidence, no linkage of the loss to him despite other users of the vehicle, and did not exclude a mechanical cause. The summary dismissal was disproportionate. The termination was unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b).
Ratio. The employer bears the burden to prove a valid and fair reason and that it genuinely believed it existed on reasonable grounds. Although a court does not substitute its own view for the employer’s, the reasonableness of the employer’s belief depends on the material before it and whether it properly investigated the matter.
Issue
2. Whether the Appellant proved a valid and fair reason for the Respondent’s dismissal.
Passage 30 →
Held
I find that the Appellant has not proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the reason for which it dismissed the Respondent was valid and genuinely believed to exist on reasonable grounds. The concern about the fuel was real, but the grounds for attributing the loss to the Respondent were not reasonable. Summary dismissal after almost eleven years of service, with no record of earlier discipline before the court below, was also out of proportion to what the Appellant had shown and did not meet the justice and equity required by section 45(4)(b). The termination was unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. The 2nd issue is resolved against the Appellant.
Passage 51 →
(ii) In its place, the Respondent’s summary dismissal on 12th April, 2023 is found unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act, 2007 for want of a valid and fair reason(s) and on this the declaration that the dismissal was unfair stands on that basis.
Passage 70 →
Ratio
Under section 45(2) a termination is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the reason is valid and fair and that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure. Section 43(1) requires the employer to prove the reason, which section 43(2) describes as the matters it genuinely believed to exist when it terminated. Under section 47(5) the employer must justify the grounds. The dismissal on 12th April, 2023 (page 58) is common ground, so the burden lay on the Appellant.
Passage 42 →
The Court of Appeal explained what is asked of the employer in Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR). The employer proves its reason on a balance of probabilities. It must show that it genuinely believed the reason existed and held that belief on reasonable grounds. A court does not substitute its own view for the employer’s. But whether the grounds were reasonable depends on what the employer had before it and on whether it looked into the matter properly.
Passage 43 →
I find that the Appellant has not proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the reason for which it dismissed the Respondent was valid and genuinely believed to exist on reasonable grounds. The concern about the fuel was real, but the grounds for attributing the loss to the Respondent were not reasonable. Summary dismissal after almost eleven years of service, with no record of earlier discipline before the court below, was also out of proportion to what the Appellant had shown and did not meet the justice and equity required by section 45(4)(b). The termination was unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. The 2nd issue is resolved against the Appellant.
Passage 51 →
Held. The Magistrate’s finding that the Respondent was hurried through the disciplinary process was set aside because it relied on an incorrect chronology. On the actual dates, the Respondent had notice, time to reply, a hearing eight days later, and did not seek an adjournment. The process complied with the form of section 41, though the employer failed substantively to address material representations and the panel’s composition raised fairness concerns. Those blemishes were considered in compensation; the dismissal’s unfairness rested on the unproved substantive reason.
Ratio. Section 41 requires that an employee facing misconduct dismissal receive an explanation of the reason, an opportunity for representation with a chosen colleague or union representative, and that the employer hear and consider those representations. Receiving representations without considering them meets the form but not the substance of the requirement.
Issue
3. Whether the Respondent was dismissed in accordance with fair procedure, and whether the learned Magistrate erred in his finding on procedure.
Passage 31 →
Held
I therefore set aside the finding that the Respondent was dismissed without procedural fairness because the Respondent was hurried through the process. It rests on a wrong chronology and on no evidence. The process followed the form of section 41 but had the blemishes this court has described, which I take into account in assessing compensation. The unfairness of the termination rests on the want of a proved reason.
Passage 58 →
The Appellant also complains that the trial court gave no real reasons. That is correct. He recited section 45(2) without applying it and reproduced the Respondent’s statement almost word for word, contrary to rule 68(4) of the Rules, which requires a concise Statement of facts and the reasons for the decision. The defect is cured on a first appeal, where I have evaluated the evidence myself. The Memorandum of Claim is plainly drafted from a template, since it speaks of redundancy and a debilitating miscarriage (pages 7 and 9), but the disciplinary process was pleaded and proved by the Appellant and the burden under section 47(5) remains on it. The 3rd issue is resolved partly in the Appellant’s favour.
Passage 59 →
(i) The finding of the trial court that the Respondent was dismissed without procedural fairness because he was hurried through the disciplinary process is set aside.
Passage 69 →
Ratio
The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Respondent was dismissed in accordance with fair procedure and whether the trial court erred in his finding on procedure. Section 41 of the Act requires an employer, before dismissing an employee on grounds of misconduct, to explain the reason to him in the presence of another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice and to hear and consider any representations he makes.
Passage 52 →
Two complaints have substance. First, section 41(2) requires the employer to hear and consider the employee’s representations. The Respondent made three that mattered: that the fuel gauge was not working (page 38), that he went where Mr. Fred and the transport office directed (pages 39 and 52), and that Mr. Michael had told him to come with the water tank (page 40). The panel’s findings mention none of them, and the dismissal letter says only that his explanations were “unsatisfactory”. A hearing at which representations are received and then left unconsidered satisfies the form of section 41 but not its substance.
Passage 56 →
Held. No. The award was reduced from eight months and Kshs. 481,504 to six months’ gross salary, Kshs. 361,080. The Magistrate misdirected himself by assuming diminished job prospects without evidence, failing to consider the Respondent’s limited contribution to the suspicion and the absence of mitigation evidence, and using contradictory and incorrect compensation figures. Nearly eleven years of service and dismissal without a proved reason justified six months, but not eight; the Respondent could not seek twelve months because he had not cross-appealed.
Ratio. Compensation under section 49 is discretionary, subject to the statutory factors. An appellate court may interfere where the lower court misdirected itself, considered an irrelevant matter, omitted a relevant matter, or was plainly wrong.
Issue
4. Whether the award of eight months’ gross salary as compensation should stand.
Passage 32 →
Held
I assess compensation at six months’ gross salary, which at Kshs. 60,180 is Kshs. 361,080. I accept that eight months was too high, but not that one month would do justice for an employee of almost eleven years dismissed without a proved reason. The 4th issue is resolved in the Appellant’s favour to that extent.
Passage 64 →
(iii) The award of Kshs. 481,504.00 is set aside and substituted with six months’ gross salary as compensation for unfair termination, being 6 × Kshs. 60,180 = Kshs. 361,080.00.
Passage 71 →
Ratio
The 4th issue for determination is whether the award of eight months’ gross salary as compensation should stand. Section 49(1)(c) of the Act allows compensation of the equivalent of a number of months’ wages or salary not exceeding twelve months based on the gross monthly wage or salary of the employee at the time of dismissal. Under section 49(4) the court weighs, among other things, the employee’s contribution to the termination, his length of service, his expectation of continued employment, his opportunities of comparable employment and any failure to mitigate. The remedy is discretionary and the authority of Kenfreight (E.A) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2019] KESC 79 (KLR) is a good guide.
Passage 60 →
This court interferes with that discretion only on the principles in Mbogo and Another v Shah [1968] EA 93, that is, where the court below misdirected itself, took into account a matter it should not have, failed to take into account one it should have, or was plainly wrong. The learned Magistrate misdirected himself in three respects. First, he took “judicial notice” that the Respondent’s chances of another job “are minimized” (page 103), when the Respondent led no evidence about his circumstances after dismissal or any search for work. Secondly, he did not weigh the Respondent’s contribution to the termination.
Passage 61 →
The Respondent served for almost eleven years, from 20th April, 2012 to 12th April, 2023 (pages 42 and 66), could reasonably have expected to continue, and was dismissed summarily without a proved reason. Against that, his failure to tell the transport officer where he left the vehicle was admitted and contributed in a limited way to the suspicion that followed, and he led no evidence on mitigation. The Appellant’s argument that the award should be reduced because only a procedural lapse was found does not arise, since I have found the want of a reason. The Respondent has not cross appealed, so his request for twelve months cannot be entertained.
Passage 63 →
Held. The Appellant must pay Kshs. 32,570 shown as net terminal pay due, to the extent unpaid, within 30 days. No order was made on the other heads because the Respondent had not cross-appealed. The conditional certificate-of-service order and trial costs remained. Interest at court rates runs on the substituted Kshs. 361,080 award from 24 July 2025 until payment. Since each party partly succeeded on appeal, each bears its own appeal costs.
Ratio. Costs are discretionary. Where each side succeeds in part, it was appropriate for each to bear its own appeal costs; absent a cross-appeal, the court made no order on the other rejected terminal heads.
Issue
5. What orders should issue, including as to the terminal dues and costs.
Paragraph 5 →
Held
The Respondent did not cross appeal on the other heads and I make no order on them. But it would be unjust to leave uncertain whether a sum the employer admits has been paid, and I direct payment to the extent it is unpaid. The certificate of service ordered below was conditional and not challenged, and it stands.
Passage 66 →
The Appellant has succeeded on the trial court’s reasoning on procedure and on quantum, and has failed on the declaration that the dismissal was unfair. The appeal is allowed in part. Costs are in the discretion of the Court under section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 2011, and rule 70(1) of the Rules directs the Court to be guided by it. Each side has succeeded in part, and each shall bear its own costs of the appeal. The order for the costs of the trial remains. Interest at court rates, as the learned Magistrate ordered, should run on the substituted award from the date of his judgment.
Passage 67 →
(iv) The sum of Kshs. 361,080.00 shall carry interest at court rates from 24th July, 2025 the date of the judgment of the court below, until payment in full.
Passage 72 →
Ratio
The Respondent did not cross appeal on the other heads and I make no order on them. But it would be unjust to leave uncertain whether a sum the employer admits has been paid, and I direct payment to the extent it is unpaid. The certificate of service ordered below was conditional and not challenged, and it stands.
Passage 66 →
The Appellant has succeeded on the trial court’s reasoning on procedure and on quantum, and has failed on the declaration that the dismissal was unfair. The appeal is allowed in part. Costs are in the discretion of the Court under section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 2011, and rule 70(1) of the Rules directs the Court to be guided by it. Each side has succeeded in part, and each shall bear its own costs of the appeal. The order for the costs of the trial remains. Interest at court rates, as the learned Magistrate ordered, should run on the substituted award from the date of his judgment.
Passage 67 →
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
THAT the learned Magistrate erred in fact and in law by finding that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was unfair.
Paragraph 1 →The court considered whether the appeal was competent despite the allegedly incomplete record, an erroneous reference to the High Court, and a request to strike out part of the appellant’s submissions; whether the employer proved a valid and fair reason for…
Thomas Odhiambo Otulo was employed by H. Young & Company (E.A) Limited from 20 April 2012 as a truck mixer driver. He was summarily dismissed on 12 April 2023 after concerns over 28 litres of unaccounted fuel, excess mileage, and parking a company pickup at…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E273 OF 2025
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
H. YOUNG & COMPANY (E.A) LIMITED ……………………………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
THOMAS ODHIAMBO OTULO ………………………………………… RESPONDENT
(Being an appeal from the Judgment of Hon. D. O. Mbeja, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 24th July 2025 at Milimani in Chief Magistrate’s Court Employment and Labour Relations Cause No. E1399 of 2023: Thomas Odhiambo Otulo v H. Young & Company (E.A) Limited.)
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 21st August, 2025. It arises from a judgment and decree delivered on 24th July, 2025 in MC.ELRC No. E1399 of 2023.
The Respondent sued on a Memorandum of Claim (pages 7 to 10 of the Record of Appeal). He pleaded that the Appellant employed him on 20th April, 2012 as a truck mixer driver and unlawfully terminated his contract on 12th April, 2023 and claimed notice pay, leave pay, wages for April, 2023 severance pay and twelve months’ salary as compensation, in all Kshs. 1,320,071. The Appellant’s Statement of Response (pages 18 to 20) said that he was summarily dismissed after 28 litres of fuel went unaccounted for in a company pickup assigned to him, following a notice to show cause and a disciplinary hearing. The Respondent testified as CW1. The Appellant called Mr. Valentine Obiero, its security manager (RW1), and Mr. Duncan Nyabuto, its site administrator (RW2).
The trial court declared the dismissal unfair for want of procedural fairness. He declined the claims for notice pay, leave pay and severance pay, and awarded eight months’ gross salary as compensation, Kshs. 481,504.00 with a certificate of service, costs and interest (pages 96 to 104). The Respondent has not cross appealed.
The Record of Appeal is dated 4th March, 2026. The parties cite it by the page numbers stamped on each page, as do I. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions, the Appellant’s dated 25th August, 2026 and the Respondent’s dated 2nd October, 2026. The Memorandum of Appeal comes out as follows;
1. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in fact and in law by finding that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was unfair.
2. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in fact and in law in awarding the Claimant Kshs. 481,504 being eight months’ gross salary as compensation for the unfair termination.
3. THAT the Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Respondent had not been fairly terminated to the required standard of law.
4. THAT the Learned Magistrate erred in Law and in fact in rendering judgment in favour of the Respondent and awarding him damages for unfair termination for loss of employment.
The Appellant prays for orders thus;
a) The Appeal herein be allowed and the judgment delivered by Hon. Mbeja on 24th July 2025 in MCELRC/E1399/2023 be set aside in its entirety.
b) The costs of the Appeal be granted to the Appellant.
It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the trial court recited section 45(2) of the Employment Act, 2007 (the Act) but never applied it. He did not decide whether the Respondent had discharged his burden under section 47(5) or what reason the Appellant genuinely believed to exist under section 43 and he found the Respondent “hurriedly taken through a disciplinary process without identifying the evidence.
The Appellant submits that this finding rests on a chronology from the Respondent’s witness statement (page 15) that places the show cause notice on 3rd March, 2023 and the hearing on 11th March, 2023. That is impossible because the incident occurred on 28th and 29th March, 2023. On the true dates eight days separated the notice from the hearing, and no prejudice was pleaded, proved or found. The Respondent himself said he got notice and explained it out during hearing (page 86).
On the reason for dismissal, the Appellant invites this court to find, on its own evaluation, that the dismissal was substantively justified, on the fuel computation, the excess distance recorded on each day, the unauthorised parking and the Respondent’s admissions. They rely on the authority of Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR). It says that the faulty fuel gauge is immaterial because an average is computed from fuel dispensed and distance recorded, that failure to call witnesses or supply the investigation report does not offend section 41, and that no bias in the panel was pleaded or proved.
In the alternative, it says that eight months’ salary is excessive. The trial court did not weigh the Respondent’s contribution under section 49(4)(b), took judicial notice of his job prospects without evidence, and gave no reasons for the figure, as the reference to four (8) months and the use of Kshs. 60,188.00 instead of Kshs. 60,180.00 show. It relies on Mbogo and Another v Shah [1968] EA 93 and says that about one month’s salary, Kshs. 60,180.00 would do justice.
The Respondent’s case and submission begins with an objection. It is their case that the appeal is fatally defective because the Record of Appeal does not contain the written submissions the Appellant filed in the court below. He relies on Xtreme Media Solutions Africa Limited v Jays Pyrotechnics Limited [2025] KEHC 6859 (KLR), which, as he quotes it, applied Bwana Mohamed Bwana v Silvano Buko Bonaya & 2 others [2015] eKLR and on my decision in Koinange Investment & Development Limited v Wainaina & another [2026] KEELRC 184 (KLR). He adds that on 5th March, 16th April and 20th May 2026 the Appellant’s advocate said that the Record would be amended but never moved the Court to do so.
On the merits, the Respondent supports the judgment. He says that the Appellant did not prove that he stole fuel or caused the loss, that he was not the only driver of the vehicle and the others were neither investigated nor called, that the fuel gauge was faulty, as RW1 and RW2 admitted, and that his representations, including that he acted on the instructions of a Mr. Michael, were ignored. He calls the hearing a sham with a predetermined outcome.
On the issue of quantum, he relies on Kenfreight (E.A) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2019] KESC 79 (KLR) for the discretionary nature of an award under section 49. He asks that paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions be struck out as raising grounds not in the Memorandum of Appeal, and says that the case warrants twelve months. He prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;
1. Whether the appeal is competent, having regard to the objection that the Record of Appeal is incomplete, the description of the appeal in the Memorandum as one to the High Court and the application to strike out paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions.
2. Whether the Appellant proved a valid and fair reason for the Respondent’s dismissal.
3. Whether the Respondent was dismissed in accordance with fair procedure, and whether the learned Magistrate erred in his finding on procedure.
4. Whether the award of eight months’ gross salary as compensation should stand.
5. What orders should issue, including as to the terminal dues and costs.
This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify, as in the authority of Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123. The learned Magistrate made no finding on the credibility of any witness, so no question of demeanour arises.
On the 1st issue for determination, the Respondent raises three objections. The first is that the Record of Appeal is incomplete because it lacks the written submissions the Appellant filed in the court below. Rule 15(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 (the Rules), which govern this appeal, requires a record comprising a certified copy of pleadings, the proceedings, any documentary evidence relied on and the judgment, ruling, decision, order, decree or award appealed against. Written submissions are argument, not evidence, and are not on that list.
The Record has everything the rule lists: the pleadings, the witness statements, the documents each side produced (pages 30 to 66), the proceedings in all thirteen pages with a certification (pages 83 to 95), the whole judgment (pages 96 to 104) and the decree (page 105). The Respondent does not say that any pleading, proceeding, exhibit or order is missing and he has answered the Appellant’s complaints page by page. The Record is sufficient for this first appeal.
The authorities he cites do not assist him. As he quotes them, Bwana Mohamed Bwana concerned an appeal in which the requisite bundle of documents is omitted and Xtreme Media an incomplete judgment and incomplete proceedings. In Koinange, in the passage he quotes, the appellants had adduced no documentary evidence of their employment and the payslip pleaded was absent. Here the employment is admitted and no document is shown to be missing.
The Respondent submits that the Appellant’s advocate indicated on three occasions in 2026 that the Record would be amended and did not do so. There is no evidence of those directions. Rule 19 allows a supplementary record to be lodged at any time, and an indication that a record may be supplemented is not an admission that it is incompetent. The objection fails.
The second objection is that the Memorandum speaks of an appeal to the High Court. That is a slip of the pen. The Memorandum is headed in this Court, it challenges a decision of a magistrate in an employment cause, and both parties have treated it as an appeal to this Court. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution requires me to look to substance. It is dated 21st August 2025 (page 4), within thirty days of the judgment as rule 12(2) requires.
The third is the application to strike out paragraph 32 of the Appellant’s submissions. Grounds 2 and 4 of the Memorandum complain of the award of Kshs. 481,504.00 and the matters in paragraph 32 are particulars of those grounds, not new ones. The Respondent has answered them and suffered no prejudice. The application, made in submissions and not by motion, is declined. The appeal is competent and I find as such.
On the 2nd issue for determination, the trial court recited section 45(2) of the Act but decided the case on procedure alone. He did not decide whether the Appellant proved its reason. The parties joined issue on it in the pleadings, the evidence and their submissions, and all the evidence is in. A first appellate court may decide a point the court below left undecided in those circumstances, and I do so.
Under section 45(2) a termination is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the reason is valid and fair and that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure. Section 43(1) requires the employer to prove the reason, which section 43(2) describes as the matters it genuinely believed to exist when it terminated. Under section 47(5) the employer must justify the grounds. The dismissal on 12th April, 2023 (page 58) is common ground, so the burden lay on the Appellant.
The Court of Appeal explained what is asked of the employer in Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR). The employer proves its reason on a balance of probabilities. It must show that it genuinely believed the reason existed and held that belief on reasonable grounds. A court does not substitute its own view for the employer’s. But whether the grounds were reasonable depends on what the employer had before it and on whether it looked into the matter properly.
The dismissal letter of 12th April, 2023 (page 58) says that on 28th and 29th March 2023 the Respondent was assigned the pickup and later on parked in HQ without your supervisor’s knowledge & approval and that there was over consumption of fuel for the pickup … considering the average fuel efficiency and distance covered. It dismisses him on grounds of improper performance of assigned duties, quoting section 44(4)(c). The show cause notice (page 37) cited section 44(4)(g). The letter is the best evidence of the reason that caused the termination, so I treat it as careless and improper performance of duty. My conclusion would be the same under paragraph (g), because the grounds are the same.
This court accepts that the Appellant’s security staff were genuinely concerned about the missing fuel. The incident report puts the average at 3.5 kilometres per litre, with 28 litres unaccounted for. The refuelling of 31st March on which that rests is not entered on either chart produced (pages 49 and 50), but the Respondent did not dispute it in his reply (page 38) and called the average questionable at the hearing (page 40). It is fair to proceed on the footing that it was poor. The question is whether the Appellant had reasonable grounds to attribute that to the Respondent’s careless and improper performance of his duty. It did not, for four reasons.
First, the parking. The Respondent admitted leaving the vehicle at the Head Office in the evening without telling the transport officer, Mr. Michael, saying that “it has been the norm” (pages 38 to 40). The Appellant produced no written parking policy, and RW2 said only that “Drivers are informed on parking policies” (page 93). The panel itself recommended that drivers “should be advised to always seek prior permission before parking in new areas” (page 57). That is a recommendation for a rule to be communicated, not a finding that one was broken. At its highest the failure was not telling the transport officer that day, which cannot bear the weight of a summary dismissal.
Secondly, the distance. The Appellant says the trips needed about 40 kilometres a day, yet 72 and 71 kilometres were recorded (pages 25, 28 and 46). That estimate was Mr. Mutua’s and it ignores the routes in RW2’s own statement: the embassies, an evening delivery of scaffolding materials, Mr. Fred’s residence and the Head Office on 28th March, and a collection from Mr. Fred’s residence and the same circuit on 29th March, (page 22). The Respondent’s statement of 3rd April, 2023 describes the same trips (page 52). Mr. Fred was not asked about them. The vehicle manifest and logbook on distance covered and the fuel consumed the witnesses mentioned (pages 40 and 92) were not produced. The figures do not even reconcile, since 72 and 71 make 143 and not the 162 kilometres stated (pages 25 and 28).
Thirdly, the loss was not tied to the Respondent. It is a computed shortfall over six days, from the refuelling of 25th March, to that of 31st March. There is no evidence of any tank reading when the vehicle was handed to him on 28th March or when he returned it. Others had the vehicle: Mr. Ireri drove it to Power Parts (page 53), Mr. Shadrack drove it back to the IP and Mr. Isaac moved it between gates (page 47). Mr. Ireri’s statement is in the Record and Mr. Shadrack’s was not produced (page 89), yet neither was called, nor was Mr. Mutua, who made the incident report. That the Respondent drove most of the distance is a reason to look at him first. It does not identify the cause of the loss.
Fourthly, a mechanical cause was not excluded. RW2 said that the vehicle did not have a faulty fuel gauge and then that There was a faulty fuel gauge (page 92). RW1 said both that the gauge issue was addressed and that it was not addressed, and that the gauge has been repaired (page 90). The Appellant is right that a faulty gauge cannot consume 28 litres. But an employer genuinely trying to find where fuel went would want to know whether a vehicle with a defective gauge was itself losing it. No inspection is mentioned and the panel’s findings do not mention the gauge, page 57, which the Respondent raised in his reply, see page 38 of the Record of Appeal.
The Respondent’s admissions are narrower than the Appellant says. He admitted the parking. In cross-examination he said “I was taken through the correct procedure”, but the next line is It was not well followed” (page 88), so it is no concession of fairness. The panel found that the vehicle was not authorised to park at the Head Office, that the kilometres covered are not justifiable, that the Respondent used the vehicle the most and that he did not hand it over by refuelling (page 57). It did not find that he siphoned fuel or caused the loss.
I find that the Appellant has not proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the reason for which it dismissed the Respondent was valid and genuinely believed to exist on reasonable grounds. The concern about the fuel was real, but the grounds for attributing the loss to the Respondent were not reasonable. Summary dismissal after almost eleven years of service, with no record of earlier discipline before the court below, was also out of proportion to what the Appellant had shown and did not meet the justice and equity required by section 45(4)(b). The termination was unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. The 2nd issue is resolved against the Appellant.
The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Respondent was dismissed in accordance with fair procedure and whether the trial court erred in his finding on procedure. Section 41 of the Act requires an employer, before dismissing an employee on grounds of misconduct, to explain the reason to him in the presence of another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice and to hear and consider any representations he makes.
The trial court finding that the Respondent was hurriedly taken through a disciplinary process (page 100) rests on a quotation from the Respondent’s witness statement that places the show cause notice on 3rd March, 2023 the reply on 4th March, 2023 and the hearing on 11th March 2023 (pages 99 and 100). Those dates are wrong, because the incident occurred on 28th and 29th March, 2023. The Respondent signed for the show cause notice on “3-4-2023” (page 37). His reply is dated 4th April, 2023 (page 38), the minutes 11th April, 2023 (page 39) and the dismissal letter 12th April, 2023 (page 58). The trial court on its own later accepted that the notice was dated 3rd April, 2023 (pages 101 and 102).
On the true dates the Respondent received written notice of two allegations on 3rd April, 2023 was given 48 hours to respond and replied the next day. He was invited to a hearing eight days after the notice, attended, was heard and signed the minutes (pages 39 and 40). The allegations concerned two days of his own driving. He asked for no adjournment and does not say what more time would have let him do. He himself said he got notice and explained it out during hearing (page 86). There was no hurry, and to that extent the trial court erred.
Most of the Respondent’s other complaints do not establish unfairness. Section 41 does not oblige an employer to supply the investigation report, whose substance was put to him in the notice and at the hearing, and the report was produced at the trial (pages 46 to 48). It gives no right of internal appeal. Citing paragraph (g) in the notice and paragraph (c) in the letter is a matter of label and caused no prejudice. A disciplinary hearing is not a trial, and the other drivers did not have to be called to it. The invitation at page 54 is largely unreadable, but RW2 says it reminded him of his right to be accompanied, see page 23, and he made no objection.
Two complaints have substance. First, section 41(2) requires the employer to hear and consider the employee’s representations. The Respondent made three that mattered: that the fuel gauge was not working (page 38), that he went where Mr. Fred and the transport office directed (pages 39 and 52), and that Mr. Michael had told him to come with the water tank (page 40). The panel’s findings mention none of them, and the dismissal letter says only that his explanations were “unsatisfactory”. A hearing at which representations are received and then left unconsidered satisfies the form of section 41 but not its substance.
Secondly, the panel. Mr. Mutua, who investigated and recommended discipline for “fuel siphoning”, chaired the hearing. Mr. Obiero, who says he prepared the report (page 27), sat as a member, and so did Mr. Michael, whose instruction was part of the Respondent’s explanation (page 40). Section 41 prescribes no composition and I do not hold that the overlap made the hearing a nullity, but it sits uneasily with the fairness the section is meant to secure. The Respondent protested “the impartiality of the entire process” (page 16), and the point was before the trial court.
I therefore set aside the finding that the Respondent was dismissed without procedural fairness because the Respondent was hurried through the process. It rests on a wrong chronology and on no evidence. The process followed the form of section 41 but had the blemishes this court has described, which I take into account in assessing compensation. The unfairness of the termination rests on the want of a proved reason.
The Appellant also complains that the trial court gave no real reasons. That is correct. He recited section 45(2) without applying it and reproduced the Respondent’s statement almost word for word, contrary to rule 68(4) of the Rules, which requires a concise Statement of facts and the reasons for the decision. The defect is cured on a first appeal, where I have evaluated the evidence myself. The Memorandum of Claim is plainly drafted from a template, since it speaks of redundancy and a debilitating miscarriage (pages 7 and 9), but the disciplinary process was pleaded and proved by the Appellant and the burden under section 47(5) remains on it. The 3rd issue is resolved partly in the Appellant’s favour.
The 4th issue for determination is whether the award of eight months’ gross salary as compensation should stand. Section 49(1)(c) of the Act allows compensation of the equivalent of a number of months’ wages or salary not exceeding twelve months based on the gross monthly wage or salary of the employee at the time of dismissal. Under section 49(4) the court weighs, among other things, the employee’s contribution to the termination, his length of service, his expectation of continued employment, his opportunities of comparable employment and any failure to mitigate. The remedy is discretionary and the authority of Kenfreight (E.A) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2019] KESC 79 (KLR) is a good guide.
This court interferes with that discretion only on the principles in Mbogo and Another v Shah [1968] EA 93, that is, where the court below misdirected itself, took into account a matter it should not have, failed to take into account one it should have, or was plainly wrong. The learned Magistrate misdirected himself in three respects. First, he took “judicial notice” that the Respondent’s chances of another job “are minimized” (page 103), when the Respondent led no evidence about his circumstances after dismissal or any search for work. Secondly, he did not weigh the Respondent’s contribution to the termination.
Thirdly, the judgment contradicts itself on the figure, saying that an award of four (8) months gross salary is reasonable compensation and then calculating eight months. It also uses Kshs. 60,188 as the monthly salary. The payslips show basic pay of Kshs. 47,650.00 house allowance of Kshs. 9,530.00 and travelling allowance of Kshs. 3,000.00 a total of Kshs. 60,180.00 refer to pages 34 to 36 and 64, which the Appellant pleaded and also page 18 of the record. This court takes Kshs. 60,180.00 and exercises the discretion afresh.
The Respondent served for almost eleven years, from 20th April, 2012 to 12th April, 2023 (pages 42 and 66), could reasonably have expected to continue, and was dismissed summarily without a proved reason. Against that, his failure to tell the transport officer where he left the vehicle was admitted and contributed in a limited way to the suspicion that followed, and he led no evidence on mitigation. The Appellant’s argument that the award should be reduced because only a procedural lapse was found does not arise, since I have found the want of a reason. The Respondent has not cross appealed, so his request for twelve months cannot be entertained.
I assess compensation at six months’ gross salary, which at Kshs. 60,180 is Kshs. 361,080. I accept that eight months was too high, but not that one month would do justice for an employee of almost eleven years dismissed without a proved reason. The 4th issue is resolved in the Appellant’s favour to that extent.
The 5th issue for determination is what orders should issue, including as to the terminal dues and costs. The trial court at page 102 recorded that the Respondent received payment of Kshs. 32,750.00 on 4th April 2023. I do not find any evidence of that. The terminal dues payslip shows net pay due of Kshs. 32,570.00 not Kshs. 32,750.00, see page 65. The Respondent said he had not been paid, page 87, RW1 did not know why the payment was not done as is in page 90. RW2 posited the payment has been calculated and it is ready for collection, see page 92. The Appellant on his own asks that the claim be dismissed without prejudice to his right to collect it.
The Respondent did not cross appeal on the other heads and I make no order on them. But it would be unjust to leave uncertain whether a sum the employer admits has been paid, and I direct payment to the extent it is unpaid. The certificate of service ordered below was conditional and not challenged, and it stands.
The Appellant has succeeded on the trial court’s reasoning on procedure and on quantum, and has failed on the declaration that the dismissal was unfair. The appeal is allowed in part. Costs are in the discretion of the Court under section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 2011, and rule 70(1) of the Rules directs the Court to be guided by it. Each side has succeeded in part, and each shall bear its own costs of the appeal. The order for the costs of the trial remains. Interest at court rates, as the learned Magistrate ordered, should run on the substituted award from the date of his judgment.
I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;
(i) The finding of the trial court that the Respondent was dismissed without procedural fairness because he was hurried through the disciplinary process is set aside.
(ii) In its place, the Respondent’s summary dismissal on 12th April, 2023 is found unfair under section 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act, 2007 for want of a valid and fair reason(s) and on this the declaration that the dismissal was unfair stands on that basis.
(iii) The award of Kshs. 481,504.00 is set aside and substituted with six months’ gross salary as compensation for unfair termination, being 6 × Kshs. 60,180 = Kshs. 361,080.00.
(iv) The sum of Kshs. 361,080.00 shall carry interest at court rates from 24th July, 2025 the date of the judgment of the court below, until payment in full.
(v) The Appellant shall pay the Respondent, within thirty (30) days of the date of this judgment, the sum of Kshs. 32,570.00 shown as net pay due on its terminal dues payslip, to the extent it has not already been paid.
(vi) The orders of the court below for a certificate of service, to be issued within thirty (30) days from the date of that judgment, if not already executed and for the costs of the trial stand and remain in place.
(vii) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.
Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Mr. Kariuki holding brief for Mwenda instructed by Mwenda Royford & Company Advocates for the Appellant.
2. Mr. Kandere instructed by S. K. Opiyo & Company Advocates for the Respondent.