Background
That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to find that the termination of the Appellant’s employment was unlawful and unfair for lack of Justification and due process.
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to find that the termination of the Appellant’s employment was unlawful and unfair for lack of Justification and due process.
Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E419 OF 2025
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
HESBON MACHOKA GICHANA ……………………………………………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
SANA INDUSTRIES CO. LIMITED …………………………..…..………… RESPONDENT
(Being an appeal from the Judgment and Decree of Hon. Patrick Olengo, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 4th February 2025 at Nairobi in Milimani MCELRC No. E856 of 2024: Hesbon Machoka Gichana v Sana Industries Co. Limited)
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 2nd December, 2025 and lodged in court on 4th December instant. It arises from a judgment and decree delivered on 4th February, 2025 in Milimani MCELRC No. E856 of 2024.
The Memorandum of Appeal comes out as follows;
1. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to find that the termination of the Appellant’s employment was unlawful and unfair for lack of Justification and due process.
2. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the Appellant absconded duty after causing chaos at the Respondent’s premises without any evidence.
3. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in dismissing the Appellant’s claims despite the weight of the evidence adduced.
4. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to properly analyze the evidence on record and the applicable law thereby arriving at a wrong conclusion.
5. That the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in dismissing the Appellant’s claims for notice pay, accrued leave, severance pay and compensation despite the weight of the evidence adduced.
REASONS WHEREFORE: - The Appellant prays that the Appeal be allowed and the Judgment and Decree of the Honourable Magistrate delivered on 4th February 2025 be set aside and instead judgment be entered for the Appellant in Milimani MCELRC NO. E856 OF 2024 as prayed in the suit and the Appellant be awarded costs of the Appeal.
The Appellant in the instant case was the Claimant in the trial court. By a Statement of Claim dated 20th February 2024 he sued the Respondent for one month’s salary in lieu of notice, leave days accrued at 26 days per year from 2017 to 2023, severance pay, twelve months’ salary as compensation for unlawful termination, a certificate of service, costs and interest. The money claims totalled Kshs. 474,500.00.
The Respondent denied the claim in a Memorandum of Response dated 8th June, 2024.
At trial, the Claimant testified as CW1 and the Respondent called its Human Resource Officer, Dennis Karanja Githumbi, as RW1. Both were heard on 28th October, 2024 and the parties then filed written submissions.
In its judgment the trial court held that the Claimant was not unlawfully terminated but he absconded duty. It dismissed the claims for severance pay, notice pay and compensation. It awarded the Appellant his salary for August, 2023 which it found unpaid, with the costs of the suit. The Decree orders only those two things.
It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the Respondent employed him in December, 2017 as a general worker in its mixing section at a monthly salary of Kshs. 18,980.00 and that his employment was ended without notice, reasons or a hearing. On Friday 11th August, 2023 the Respondent’s Human Resource Officer handed out data forms to be filled, signed and returned on Monday 14th August, 2023. The forms ran out before one reached him.
On Monday, the 14th August, 2023, the guards turned him and others away for want of a form. The Human Resource Officer gave them forms and told them to return the next day. On Tuesday 15th August, 2023 he returned with a filled and signed form, was refused entry again, and at about 1000 hours was told that his employment had been terminated. The Appellant further submits that the finding of abscondment had no evidence behind it. The Respondent produced no incident report, investigation report, police report or OB number and its witness admitted that no formal report was made to the police. He says an employer alleging abscondment must show reasonable efforts to reach the employee and relies on Owudu v Digital Sanitation Services Limited [2024] KEELRC 917 (KLR).
The Appellant’s further case and submission is that the Respondent proved no valid reason and followed no procedure under sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 that the show cause letter, hearing notice and termination letter were never served on him, and that a salary credit on 16th August 2023 is inconsistent with gross misconduct.
On reliefs, he claims one month’s salary in lieu of notice, accrued leave from December, 2017 twelve months’ compensation under section 49, a certificate of service, and costs with interest. He says the Respondent kept no leave records as required of section 74 of the Act and that he was not a casual employee because of section 37. His submissions do not address severance pay.
The Respondent’s case and submission is that the Appellant was a casual labourer engaged in December, 2017 on a consolidated daily wage of Kshs. 730.00 paid fortnightly according to the days worked, and that he worked intermittently as work allowed. It pleaded that on 11th August, 2023 he became rowdy and incited others to a demonstration, that property was destroyed and the police were called, and that he never returned to work.
The Respondent further pleaded that it issued a notice to show cause dated 14th August, 2023 a hearing notice dated 22nd August, 2023 and a termination notice dated 30th August, 2023. It says it served each on the labour office and on the Appellant’s union because he refused to give other addresses and that he neither responded nor attended the hearing.
On appeal, counsel for the Respondent submits that this court should not interfere with findings of fact unless the trial court acted on no evidence, misapprehended it or applied wrong principles, and that none of those is shown. He says that under section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 the Appellant first had to prove that he was terminated, and that being denied entry is not termination.
He adds that sections 41, 43 and 45 apply only once termination is proved and that salary paid after 15th August, 2023 if proved, is inconsistent with a summary termination. He submits that notice pay, compensation and a certificate of service depend on proof of termination, that severance pay arises only on redundancy, and that leave is a special claim that was not proved. He asks for dismissal with costs.
After a considered look at the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties, the issues for determination become;
1. Whether the trial court’s decision that the Appellant absconded duty, and its dismissal of his claim on that footing, is legally sound.
2. Whether the termination of the Appellant’s employment was unfair for want of a valid reason and a fair procedure.
3. Whether the Appellant was a casual employee.
4. What reliefs, if any, the Appellant is entitled to, and who should bear the costs of the appeal.
This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify, as is in the authority of Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd and Others [1968] EA 123.
The Respondent is right that this court will not lightly disturb findings of fact. But a finding that rests on no evidence, or on a wrong principle, is not protected by that rule, and it is the duty of this court to test the trial court’s findings against the record. The Respondent avers that the trial court found its position on abscondment more credible being the custodian of the employee records. The copy of the trial judgment on the record has three pages. The second ends with the Claimant’s case and the third opens at severance pay, so whatever analysis lies between them, including on leave, is not before me. I take the trial court’s findings from the passages that are there and evaluate the evidence myself.
The 1st issue for determination is whether the trial court’s decision that the Appellant absconded duty, and its dismissal of his claim on that footing, is legally sound. The finding that the Appellant absconded duty is the foundation of the trial court’s decision. The court reasoned that the Claimant was not unlawfully terminated but he absconded duty, so that notice pay did not arise and that for the same reason the claim for compensation must fail.
Absence from work without leave or lawful cause may be gross misconduct under section 44(4)(a) of the Employment Act, 2007. But it is for the employer who alleges it to prove it. Where the allegation is desertion, the employer must show the steps it took to reach the employee and bring him to account. See Owudu v Digital Sanitation Services Limited [2024] KEELRC 917 (KLR), paragraphs 19 and 20.
The Respondent’s papers do not hold together. In its Memorandum of Response it says the Appellant was not terminated but absconded duty, yet it also says that it terminated him after following the termination procedure. RW1’s statement says he was fairly and procedurally terminated”, and exhibit RE3 is a letter of 30th August, 2023 headed Termination Letter.
An employee who has deserted has not been dismissed, and an employer who dismisses after a disciplinary process has not been abandoned. The two cannot both be true. The trial court accepted both, finding that the Appellant absconded and also that he was terminated on 30th August, 2023. Those findings cannot go together.
The evidence of desertion is thin. RW1 said the Appellant has never reported to work after that. He did not say that anyone telephoned the Appellant, visited his home or wrote to him. Asked about the letters, he said he had no evidence that the Appellant received the show cause letter or the termination letter. Of the hearing notice he said he refused, but showed nothing to support it. The Respondent states that the Appellant refused to give other addresses. That is pleaded and not proved. RW1 did not say when he was asked, by whom, or what he answered. The Respondent had employed the Appellant for nearly six years and paid him through a bank, and it produced no employee file.
The charge sheet itself raises doubt. The show cause letter is dated 14th August, 2023 and the labour office stamped it on 15th August, 2023. Its third charge is refusing to report to work after the walk out of 14th August, 2023. A letter written on 14th August, 2023 could not yet charge a refusal to report that had not happened.
The alleged strike, threats and destruction of property are in the same position. The only evidence is RW1’s word. No incident report, list of those involved, supervisor’s statement, photograph or valuation of damage was produced. RW1 said the police were called but we did not make a formal report and the Appellant was never prosecuted. The Appellant denied taking part in any demonstration.
This court does not doubt that something happened at the gate on 14th August, 2023. RW1 says about 50 workers refused to fill the forms and the Appellant says he and others were turned away for want of one. That is not proof that the Appellant led a strike, damaged property or deserted. The Respondent carried the burden of proof and met this with mere assertions.
The Appellant’s evidence has weaknesses. He said he was dismissed on 11th August, 2023 a day he also said he worked normally, and he later referred to 11th August, 2020. His counsel’s submission that the Respondent admitted non-service of the letters is stronger than the record, since RW1 said only that he had no evidence of receipt. These points do not relieve the Respondent of proving desertion. Their reliance on a salary payment of 16th August, 2023 also fails. The Co-operative Bank statement he produced covers 30th October, 2017 to 2nd August, 2023 and cannot show it. The trial court itself found the August, 2023 salary unpaid.
Turning to the soundness of the decision as a whole, this court finds it unsound in law in four respects. First, abscondment was found without evidence to support it. Second, under section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 the employer must justify the grounds of termination, and the passages before me do not test the Respondent’s case against that burden. Thirdly, sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Act are not applied in any passage before me, although the court itself found that the Appellant was terminated on 30th August, 2023. Fourth, the findings contradict each other, as shown above. A decision resting on those findings cannot stand.
Parts of the decision are sound. The dismissal of severance pay is sustainable because severance pay arises on redundancy and none was pleaded or proved. The award of August, 2023 salary is not challenged and the costs of the suit follow it. The finding of abscondment and the dismissal of the claims for notice pay, compensation and leave pay on that footing are set aside. Grounds 2 and 4 succeed.
On the 2nd issue for determination is whether the termination of the Appellant’s employment was unfair for want of a valid reason and a fair procedure. The Respondent says the Appellant first had to prove that he was terminated, and that being denied entry is not termination. The argument fails on the Respondent’s own papers. It pleaded a termination and produced a letter of 30th August, 2023 stating: You are hereby notified of the termination of your employment forthwith. The Appellant did not need to produce a termination letter that the Respondent itself produced. Whether he learnt of the termination at the gate on 15th August, 2023 or later does not matter to fairness. Once the Respondent ended the employment, it had to prove a valid and fair reason under sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act and a fair procedure under section 41.
On reason, the show cause letter raised four charges: refusing to fill the data sheet, taking part in an unlawful strike and walk out, refusing to report to work afterwards and intimidating other employees. The termination letter instead refers to a show cause on account of absenteeism and does not say which charge was found proved. For the reasons given on the 1st issue, none of those charges was proved. The Respondent did not show a valid reason and the termination was unfair within sections 43(1) and 45(2) of the Employment Act, 2007.
On procedure, section 41 requires an employer who is considering dismissal for misconduct to explain the reason to the employee, to allow him a colleague or union representative and to hear and consider his representations. The first step is that the employee is told. The Respondent’s own case is that it did not hand the three letters to the Appellant. The Respondent submits that they lodged them with the labour office and passed them to the Appellant’s union through shop stewards. The labour office stamps read 15th August, 2023 on the show cause letter and 30th August, 2023 on the termination letter, and the stamp on the hearing notice appears to read 22nd August, 2023. Lodging a letter with the labour office is not notice to the employee. There is no evidence that the Appellant belonged to the union named on the show cause letter, no acknowledgement from the union, and no evidence that anyone gave any letter to him. The Appellant said he received none, and RW1 had no evidence that he did.
A hearing notice the employee never received cannot support a hearing in his absence. The hearing notice of 22nd August, 2023 set the hearing for 30th August, 2023 and the termination letter of the same day says he did not attend. No minute of any hearing was produced and nothing shows who sat, what was considered or how the decision was reached. The Respondent further avers the Appellant waived his right to respond by staying silent. A person cannot waive a right he was never told about. The duty to notify and to hear is the employer’s and sending documents to third parties does not discharge it. Section 41 was not complied with.
I therefore find that the termination was unfair for want of both a valid reason and a fair procedure. Ground 1 succeeds, and the finding that the Appellant was not unlawfully terminated cannot stand. This answers the 2nd issue for determination.
The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Appellant was a casual employee. The Respondent answers the claims for notice and leave by calling the Appellant a casual labourer and the Appellant used the same words when he testified. The label does not decide the point. Section 2 of the Employment Act defines a casual employee as one whose terms of engagement provide for payment at the end of each day and who is not engaged for longer than twenty-four hours at a time.
On the Respondent’s own pleading the Appellant was paid every fortnight, not at the end of each day. He said he received an advance in the middle of the month and the balance on the 1st. That is not a casual engagement within section 2.
Even if he began as a casual, section 37 of the Act converts the contract of a casual employee who works continuously for a month or more into one under which wages are paid monthly, and gives him the terms and conditions the Act provides for other employees. The Respondent cannot call the Appellant a casual and also avoid section 37.
The Respondent says he worked intermittently, but RW1 had no record of the days he worked. He agreed that an employer must keep employment records, as section 74 of the Act requires. He also said the Appellant worked from December 2017. The Respondent submitted that the bank statements show fluctuating payments, but it identified no period in which the Appellant was away.
This court finds that the Appellant served the Respondent continuously from December, 2017 until August, 2023 and was not a casual employee. If he began as one, section 37 converted his contract long before 2023. He was entitled to notice and to the leave as provided by the law and statute. Issue no. 3 is hereby answered.
The 4th issue for determination is what reliefs, if any, the Appellant is entitled to, and who should bear the costs of the appeal. Let us begin with the Appellant’s pay. His evidence is that his gross monthly pay was Kshs. 18,980.00 which is Kshs. 730.00 a day over 26 days and the Respondent itself pleaded the Kshs. 730.00 daily rate. The Respondent produced no payroll or wage record. I adopt Kshs. 18,980.00 as his gross monthly pay.
On notice pay, the Appellant was dismissed without notice and without proof of gross misconduct. Under sections 35(1)(c) and 36 of the Employment Act he is entitled to one month’s pay in lieu of notice, which is Kshs. 18,980.00.
Compensation: section 49(1)(c) allows up to twelve months’ gross pay and section 49(4) lists what the court must weigh. The Appellant served for about five years and eight months. The Respondent had no proven reason and gave him no hearing, he did not contribute to the termination and he does not seek reinstatement. Against that, he was a general worker on a modest wage and his own evidence on dates was unsteady. Twelve months is the ceiling and is not warranted. I assess compensation at six months’ gross pay, which is Kshs. 113,880.00.
On the issue of payment in lieu of untaken leave, section 28(1)(a) of the Employment Act gives twenty-one working days with full pay after every twelve consecutive months of service. The claim of 26 days a year has no basis in the Act or in any contract before me. The Respondent kept no leave records, and RW1’s only answer was that the Appellant was a casual, which I have rejected.
But the Appellant did not say when he asked for leave or who refused it and claims six years of leave in a lump. Under section 28(4) leave not taken lapses eighteen months after the end of the leave-earning year. Leave for the years ended December 2021 and earlier had lapsed by 30th August 2023, and he has not shown that the Respondent prevented him from taking it. What survives is the leave for the year ended December, 2022 which is 21 days, and the leave for the eight completed months from December, 2022 to August, 2023. At one and three-quarter days a month under section 28(1)(b) that is 14 days. The total is 35 days. At Kshs. 730.00 a day (Kshs. 18,980.00 divided by 26) that is Kshs. 25,550.00.
Severance pay arises on redundancy under section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007. No redundancy was pleaded or proved and the Appellant’s submissions do not pursue the claim. The trial court rightly dismissed it.
The award of salary for August, 2023 is not challenged and is left undisturbed. The Appellant is also entitled to a certificate of service under section 51 of the Employment Act, which the Respondent’s own letter of 30th August, 2023 invites him to collect.
On costs, the Respondent relies on section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. The court’s discretion over costs in this jurisdiction is in section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, and rule 70(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 applies. The Appellant has succeeded in part, and I direct that each party bear its own costs of the appeal.
I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order thus;
(i) The finding that the Appellant absconded duty, and the dismissal of the claims for notice pay, compensation, leave pay and a certificate of service, in the Judgment and Decree delivered on 4th February 2025 in Milimani MCELRC No. E856 of 2024, are all set aside.
(ii) A declaration be and is hereby issued that the termination of the Appellant’s employment by the Respondent on 30th August, 2023 was unfair and unlawful.
(iii) The Respondent shall meet and pay the Appellant relief as follows;
a) One month’s salary in lieu of notice Kshs. 18,980.00
b) Compensation, six months’ gross salary Kshs. 113,880.00
c) Accrued leave pay, 35 days at Kshs. 730 Kshs. 25,550.00
Total Kshs. 158,410.00
(iv) The award of salary for August 2023 and of the costs of the suit made by the trial court remains undisturbed.
(v) The Respondent shall issue the Appellant with a certificate of service within thirty (30) days of the date of this judgment of court.
(vi) The sum in order (iii) shall carry interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.
(vii) The claim for severance pay is dismissed and the appeal is otherwise dismissed to the extent that it seeks compensation beyond six months’ gross pay and leave pay beyond 35 days.
(viii) Each party shall bear their costs of the appeal.
Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Miss Kulei instructed by Kangethe Waitere & Co. Advocates for the Appellant.
2. Mr. Eredi instructed by Eredi Mulama & Co. Advocates for the Respondent.