REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. E152 OF 2025
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LABOUR RIGHTS DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2, 10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 41, 47, 48, AND 232 OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE SECTION 5 OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT, 2007
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KENYA MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS, PHARMACISTS AND DENTIST UNION
(KPMDU) AND THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNORS
BETWEEN
SADIK OMAR ABDILLE….………………………………………………………………………………………PETITIONER
-VERSUS-
THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF WAJIR………………………………………………………1ST RESPONDENT
WAJIR COUNTY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD…..…………………………………………….…2ND RESPONDENT
THE COUNTY SECRETARY, WAJIR COUNTY………………….....................................…3RD RESPONDENT
THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER
FOR HEALTH, WAJIR COUNTY…..……………………………………………………………...…4TH RESPONDENT
THE COUNTY CHIEF OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF
MEDICAL SERVICES, WAJIR COUNTY……………………….......................................……5TH RESPONDENT
CORAM
Before Lady Justice Jemimah Keli
C/A Otieno
JUDGMENT
1. The Petitioner, a medical officer in the employment of the Respondent, aggrieved by various workplace issues, including slow career progression and the denial of release for study leave, commenced this suit by a Further Amended Petition dated 29th December 2025, seeking:-
a) A declaration that the Respondent's action and decision contained in their letter dated 28th August 2025 amounted to constructive dismissal of the Petitioner.
b) A declaration that the constructive dismissal of the Petitioner violated his rights under Article 41, 47 and 50 of the Constitution.
c) The Respondents be condemned to pay the Petitioner one month's salary in lieu of notice for unfair termination of employment.
d) The Respondents be condemned to pay the Petitioner compensation equivalent to Twelve (12) months' salary for unfair termination of employment.
e) The Respondents be condemned to pay the Petitioner damages for violation of Constitutional rights in the sum of Kenya Shillings Ten Million (Kshs.10,000,000/-).
f) The Respondents be ordered to pay the Respondent service pay or severance pay for each completed year of service and all other terminal benefits lawfully earned.
g) A permanent order of injunction do issue restraining, prohibiting and barring the Respondents, their officers, agents, servants, of any person acting under their authority from making of adverse reports, issuance of negative references, malicious complaints, victimization, blacklisting or any other conduct intended or calculated to undermine, prejudice, or interfere with the Petitioners' current or future employment, professional standing, or lawful engagement.
h) Cost of the petition.
i) Any other relief that the court deems fit to grant in the interest of justice.
2. In support of the Amended Petition, the Petitioner filed a Supporting Affidavit, sworn on 29th December 2025, together with the attached documents.
3. In response to the said Petition, the Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 7th August 2026 (which was determined); a list and bundle of authorities of even date; a further list and bundle of authorities dated 11th August 2026; and a Replying Affidavit sworn by Naema Ibrahim on 31st March 2026.
The Petitioners’ case in summary
4. The Petitioners case was that he is an employee of the 1st Respondent in the position of Medical Officer on permanent and pensionable terms from 5th October 2018 to date. His complaint is that for 7 years since his first appointment, the Petitioner has stagnated at one job group without being promoted, contrary to the scheme of services for medical doctors and the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), 2017 signed between the 1st Respondent and the Kenya Medical Practitioners Pharmacists and Dentists Board (KPMDU).
5. Further, the Petitioner avers that he requested to be released on study leave multiple times to pursue various post-graduate trainings and studies at various learning institutions, including at the University of Nairobi for a Masters of Medicine in Opthalmology pursuant to an admission letter dated 16th July 2025, with classes beginning on 18th August 2025; at Kampala International University for a masters of medicine in Otorhinolaryngology, pursuant to an admission letter dated 5th April 2025; at Kenyatta University for a masters of medicine in general surgery, pursuant to an admission letter dated 14th August 2024; at Moi Teaching & Referral Hospital for a master’s degree program in Pediatrics Surgery, pursuant to an admission letter dated 4th September 2023. For each admission received, the Petitioner contends that he requested to be released on study leave to attend and pursue these further studies, but the Respondents ignored his requests, causing him to miss limited opportunities to pursue his post-graduate studies. The Petitioners states that it has become apparent that the Respondents will never approve and/or grant any lawful and reasonable requests that he makes in respect of pursuing post-graduate studies, despite failing to provide written reasons why each study leave requested could not be granted.
6. The Petitioner avers that the length of service and years of service an officer has served the employer and the public ought to be seriously considered when the Respondents are considering applications made in respect of promotion and study leaves. However, in the case of the Respondents herein, junior medical officers, some of whom have not served for even a year, have been promoted and released on study leave while other deserving and senior officers have been overlooked. According to the Petitioner, this indicates bias, improper motives, nepotism, discrimination and the lack of merit as the basis for selecting officers to be promoted and to be released on study leave. It is the Petitioner’s case that he is aware of his personal knowledge, that his colleagues listed below were released on study leave.
S/No. | Full Name of Medical Officer | Year of First Appointment as Medical Officer | Year Released for Paid Postgraduate Training | Period in years served before offered study leave | Year of first promotion | Status of Postgraduate Training (Completed/SDll in Training) |
1. | Abade Jamal | 2013 | 2016 | | 3 | 2021 | Completed |
| Mohamed | | | | | | |
2. | Somo Noordin | | | | 2 | 2021 | Completed |
| Bashir | 2015 | 2017 | | | | |
3. | Adan Abdi | | | | 2 | 2021 | Completed |
| Ukure | 2015 | 2017 | | | | |
4. | Bili Hussein | | | | 3 | 2021 | Completed |
| Abdi | 2015 | 2018 | | | | |
5. | Sheik Daud | | 2018 | | 1 | 2021 | Completed |
| Abdi | 2018 | | | Month | | |
6. | Hassan Rashid | | | | 6 | 2021 | Completed |
| Abdullahi | 2018 | 2018 | | months | | |
7. | Ibrahim Abdirahman | | 2017 | | 3 | 2023 | Completed |
| Abdullahi | 2014 | | | | | |
8. | Abdi Ibrahim Mohamed | 2015 | 2019 | | 4 | | Not Completed |
9. | Abbas Hassan Sharif | 2016 | 2018 | | 2 | 2023 | Completed |
10. | Bare Abdullahi Omar | 2016 | 2019 | | 3 | 2023 | Completed |
11. | Abdi Abdisalam | | 2019 | | 2 | | Completed |
| Mohamud | 2017 | | | | | |
12. | Hillow | | | | 1 | 2023 | Completed |
| Mohamed | | 2018 | | | | |
| Adan | 2017 | | | | | |
13. | Abdi Aweis | | 2018 | | 1 | | Completed |
| Ismail | 2017 | | | | 2023 | |
14. | Hanshi | | 2019 | | 2 | | Completed |
| Ibrahim | | | | | 2023 | |
| Ahmed | | | | | | |
| | 2017 | | | | | |
15. | Somow Arafat | | 2022 | | 1 | | Not Completed |
| Ahmed | 2021 | | | | | |
16. | Mohamed | | 2021 | | 3 | | Not Completed |
| Safia Ibrahim | | | | | | |
| | 2018 | | | | | |
17. | Abdullahi Samar Rashid | | 2018 | 1 month | 2023 | Completed |
| | 2018 | | | | |
18. | Mohamud | | 2021 | 3 | | Not Completed |
| Osman Billow | 2018 | | | | |
19. | Hassan | | 2020 | 2 | | Not Completed |
| Habiba Ibrahim | 2018 | | | | |
20. | Hassan Amina | | 2020 | 2 | | Not Completed |
| Abdille | 2018 | | | | |
21. | Mohamed | | 2020 | 2 | | Not Completed |
| Abdullahi Aden | 2018 | | | | |
22. | Mohamud | | 2019 | 1 | | Completed |
| Mohamed Ali | 2018 | | | 2023 | |
23. | Jaffer Fatuma | | 2020 | 2 | | Completed |
| Sharif | 2018 | | | | |
24. | Hassan Zahara | | 2021 | 3 | | Completed |
| Haji | 2018 | | | | |
25. | Hassanali | | 2023 | 4 | | Completed |
| Kawthar Shabbir Nurdin | 2019 | | | | |
26. | Shariff Ifraj | 2021 | 2021 | 1 | | Completed |
| Abdullahi | | | | | |
7. The Petitioner states that he is aware that some medical officers were released within their first year of appointment to pursue their postgraduate studies. However, the criteria for selecting those who proceed on study leave remain shrouded in mystery, and the Petitioner confirms that selection is not on a merit basis but rather on improper motives, such as the Petitioner’s ethnicity. Based on the data provided in the table above, it appears that the Respondents have not adopted a clear policy for releasing medical officers on study leave, and the process cannot be said to be transparent or equal, as junior medical officers are given preferential treatment over senior officers who have been in service longer. Under the current system, the Respondents cannot be held accountable, as there is no existing policy.
8. The Petitioner contends that the Respondents, through their actions, violated the Petitioner’s constitutional rights under Article 10 (2) (b) to good governance, integrity, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, equality and non-discrimination; Article 27, the right to equal treatment and equal benefit of the law; Article 28, human dignity; Article 41, fair labour practices; Article 47, expeditious, efficient, lawful and fair administrative action; Article 73 (2) (a) and (b); and Article 232. Further, the Petitioner avers that the Respondents’ actions contravene Section 5 of the Employment Act and their obligations under the CBA to promote the medical officers in consideration of their years of service and to enhance their skills through training and career advancement programmes, such as postgraduate degree programmes.
The Respondents’ case in brief
9. The Respondents contend that, by a letter dated 19th October 2022, the Respondent imposed a freeze on study leave, effective 20th October 2022, for staff across all health cadres, owing to an acute shortage of doctors, a ballooning wage bill, and the need to safeguard the Public’s constitutional right to the highest attainable standard of health under Article 43(1)(a) of the Constitution. The freeze applied universally to every county medical officer without exception and without reference to ethnicity, seniority, or political affiliation. Hence, the allegations of nepotism, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, political patronage, and clan favouritism in the grant of study leave are denied.
10. On the legal nature of study leave and unpaid leave, the Respondents emphasise that study leave is not a mandatory statutory entitlement under the Employment Act, 2007, unlike annual leave, maternity leave, paternity leave, and sick leave, which are codified under Sections 28 to 31 of the Employment Act. Rather, it is a discretionary benefit subject to the employer's operational requirements and applicable policy. Unpaid leave, on the other hand, entails the temporary suspension of the mutual obligations of the employer and employee under the employment contract, including the employer’s obligation to pay the employee’s salary and the employee’s obligation to perform services. It is a recognised and lawful form of leave under both Kenyan employment law and the Respondents’ HR policy, rather than a termination of employment.
11. Following the Court’s Ruling delivered on 14th August 2025, the Respondents contend that the Petitioner was released on unpaid study leave, effective 18th August 2025. The terms of the unpaid study leave were that the Petitioner’s employment contract was temporarily suspended during that period, no monthly salary was to be paid to him, and the period would not count towards leave or pensionable service benefits. These terms, it is stated, are the standard and natural consequences of unpaid study leave under the Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the Public Service, 2016. They are structural, not punitive, and apply to all public officers on unpaid leave.
12. It is urged that the Respondents’ decision to release the Petitioner on unpaid study leave was not intended to be punitive but was simply compliance with a Court order, which neither required a prior hearing nor written reasons. Notably, the Petitioner, in his pleadings, did not seek paid study leave; hence, the Respondents were well within their rights to provide him with unpaid study leave.
13. The Respondents clarify that, out of respect for the Court, the 1st Respondent bent its own freeze policy exclusively for the Petitioner's benefit. No other medical officer has been released on study leave, paid or unpaid, since the freeze of 20th October 2022, except the Petitioner, and only by reason of the court order. They report that on 9th October 2025, barely six weeks after being released on court-ordered study leave, while the suit was still pending, the Petitioner was appointed as Principal Claims Management Officer at the Social Health Authority and assumed that position, a role he had applied for while simultaneously seeking study leave from the County. The Respondents take the position that the Petitioner’s voluntary assumption of this new position brought the employment relationship between him and the 1st Respondent to an end. However, when the Respondents sought to strike out the amended petition for lack of an employer-employee relationship vide an application dated 11th December 2025, the Petitioner introduced a new cause of action for constructive dismissal through the Further Amended Petition dated 29th December 2025 without obtaining leave of court.
14. It is the Respondents' case that the Petitioner is currently employed on a full-time basis at SHA and has abandoned his postgraduate studies. He is therefore a dishonest employee who sought study leave not for academic purposes but to take up alternative employment while continuing to draw a salary from Wajir County. This conduct is part of a pattern: the Petitioner was the subject of multiple show cause letters for desertion of duty. The Respondents disown the comparative data presented by the Petitioner, terming it as self-compiled, and state that it is not backed by any tangible, verifiable, or official evidence whatsoever. The Respondents also state that they are strangers to the committee minutes of 15th October 2025. They point out that the Minutes do not bear the official letterhead of the County Government of Wajir or any of its departments, carry no official stamp or seal, and are not certified by any authorised County officer.
15. The Respondents vehemently deny the allegation that the denial of study leave and non-promotion were driven by the Petitioner's ethnic identity, pointing out that no decision-maker is identified as having acted on ethnic grounds, no internal communications referencing ethnicity are produced, and no approval of study leave post-freeze to any officer of any ethnicity is identified.
16. The Respondents further complain that the Petitioner bypassed the grievance resolution mechanism prescribed under Articles VII and VIII of the CBA, thereby failing to exhaust the Respondents’ internal remedies. The Respondents state that Article III (E)(S) of the CBA expressly provides that the release of eligible employees for training is subject to "prevailing human resource training policies." The study leave freeze was precisely such a prevailing policy, which the CBA did not override.
17. The Respondents aver that the Petitioner has failed to meet the legal threshold for constructive dismissal, as the Respondents complied with the Court order of 14th August 2025; the Petitioner did not resign but assumed the SHA position in a premeditated, self-motivated departure, rather than as a consequence of any conduct by the Respondents. In relation to the particulars of constructive dismissal set out by the Petitioner, the claim that the Respondents failed to promote the Petitioner is denied, with the Respondents stating that promotion was governed by the applicable Scheme of Service. The claim that the stoppage of salary compelled the Petitioner to seek alternative employment is also denied, with the Respondents stating that the Petitioner had applied for the SHA position before his salary was stopped and before the letter dated 28th August 2025 was issued. He voluntarily and without notice walked away from his employment by assuming the SHA position while on court-ordered study leave. As such, the Petitioner cannot now seek the protections afforded to an employee whose employment was terminated by the employer.
18. In conclusion, the Respondents deny violating the Petitioner’s constitutional rights under Articles 10, 27, 28, 41, 47, 50, 73, and 232.
DETERMINATION
19. Following directions by the court that it would determine the Petition through written submissions, the Petitioners and Respondent filed their respective submissions.
Issues for determination
20. In their submissions dated 29th May 2026, the Petitioners identified the following issues for determination:-
i. Whether the Petitioner’s rights were violated.
ii. Whether the Petitioner was constructively dismissed.
iii. Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
21. Conversely, the Respondents filed submissions dated 16th June 2026, where they distilled the following issues for determination, namely:
i. Whether the Petitioner's constitutional rights were violated by the Respondents.
ii. Whether the Petitioner has satisfied the legal threshold for a claim of constructive dismissal.
iii. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
iv. What are the appropriate remedies in the circumstances.
22. The court finds the parties are in agreement on the issues for determination and outlines the same as follows-
i. Whether the Petitioner’s rights were violated.
ii. Whether the Petitioner was constructively dismissed.
iii. Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
The law
23. Section 5 of the Employment Act on discrimination in employment.
24. Article 10 of the Constitution on national values and principles of governance.
25. Article 27 of the Constitution on Equality and freedom from discrimination.
26. Article 41 of the Constitution on fair labour rights.
27. Article 47 of the Constitution on fair administrative action.
Whether the Petitioner’s rights were violated.
The Petitioner's submission
28. The Petitioner has filed the instant petition on grounds that the Respondents violated his constitutional rights. He had been serving the Wajir County Government as a medical officer for the past seven (7) years. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was neither promoted nor granted study leave. Despite the refusal of promotion and the denial of study leave, the Respondents continue to promote junior officers and allow them to take fully paid study leave. The Petitioner has provided the data on medical officers released on study leave by the Respondents over the past few years. The average/mean number of years the doctors had served before they were released on study leave was just 2.1 years. The Petitioner had served 7 years and submitted applications for study leave three times during his employment, all of which were unsuccessful. The Respondent’s conduct in allowing junior medical officers, some of whom had only served for 30 days to go on paid study leave while the Petitioner who had served for 7 years is denied the same study leave requires to be judicially examined. It is evident and very apparent, in the circumstances, that the Respondents apply different criteria in approving study leaves for other officers vis a vis the Petitioner. The criteria, if any, do not inspire confidence in the whole process. When the Respondents release a doctor who had served only a mere 30 days for fully paid study leave and deny or ignore the Petitioner’s requests despite serving 7 years, the obvious inference, insinuation and implication is that the Respondents’ conduct is not objective, fair and merit-based. It appears that some officers’ requests for study leave are fast-tracked and approved while others like the Petitioner is ignored altogether. Article 27 of the Constitution provides that every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law. The Petitioner’s request for study leave was refused and/or ignored by the Respondents 3 times while at the same time approving study leave requests submitted by junior officers, some of whom had only served 30 days.
29. Even when the court intervened on 14th August 2025 and allowed the Petitioner to be granted study leave, the Respondents disingenuously complied with the court orders and issued administrative directives on 28th August 2025 as follows:
a) The Petitioner’s contract of employment is suspended;
b) Monthly salary to stop henceforth throughout the period of study leave;
c) Pension and leave benefits to freeze/stop in the period of study leave; and
d) Resumption of duty would be subject to availability of a suitable vacancy;
30. That the court did not order that the Petitioner be granted study leave on the above terms and conditions. Neither have any of the doctors currently on study leave ever been subjected to such harsh and draconian terms. The question that cannot be avoided, in the premises, is why the Petitioner has been singled out by the Respondents and subjected to the above terms as contained in their letter dated 28th August 2025. Is the Petitioner not entitled to the same benefits that are enjoyed by his colleagues that are on study leave? Is the Petitioner not entitled to the same protection enjoyed by his colleagues? Why have the Respondents singled out the Petitioner and allowed him to go on study leave on terms and conditions not imposed on others? There cannot be any justification for any of the questions posed in the foregoing paragraph. The questions posited hereinabove confirm that the Respondents have denied the Petitioner the equal benefit and equal protection of the law, thereby contravening his constitutional rights under Article 27 of the Constitution. Article 28 of the Constitution provides that every person has an inherent dignity and the right to have that dignity respected and protected. The Petitioner had been submitting applications for study leave which have never elicited any response or acknowledgement by the Respondents while in the same breath observing junior colleagues who had served less than a year and some even for 30 days go on study leave. This outright discrimination by the Respondents undermined the inherent dignity of the Petitioner. The lack of response from the Respondents to his repeated requests for study leave denied him the opportunity to assess the viability of the grounds they relied on in denying his requests. Instead, the Petitioner was left clueless and stranded and compelled to assume and/or imagine the reasons for refusal for his applications for study leave. This of itself amounts to psychological abuse, which is strictly prohibited under Article 29 (d) of the Constitution, which provides that every person has the right and security of the person, which includes the right not to be subjected to torture in any manner, whether physical or psychological. The Respondent’s refusal of the Petitioner’s study leave was an administrative action that is subject to the provisions of Article 47 of the Constitution and the Provisions of the Fair Administrative Actions Act (“the Act”). Section 4(2) of the Act states that every person has the right to be given written reasons for any administrative action taken against him.
31. The Petitioner stated that he submitted to the Respondents written applications and requests for study leave 3 times. The Respondents were obliged to provide the Petitioner with written reasons each time his request for study leave could not be granted. The Respondents failed to provide written reasons with each study leave application submitted to them. This violated the Petitioner’s right to fair administrative action as enshrined in Article 47 of the Constitution and, in particular, Section 4 of the Act, as stipulated hereinabove. The Respondents have alleged that the Petitioner had submitted his requests via private email instead of the Respondents’ official email addresses. This assertion is undermined by the Respondents themselves, who conduct official business from their private email addresses. For example, the suspension letter served on the Petitioner was sent by the 5th Respondent from her personal email address fardowsabishar@yahoo.com on 28th August 2025. If the Respondents’ assertion were true, the 5th Respondent could have sent the letter from her official email address, if any. Reference is made to annexure ‘SOA-08’ in the Petitioner’s supporting affidavit dated 3rd October 2025. Therefore, the claim that the Petitioner did not submit his application for study leave through official emails/channels does not hold water. It is baseless and has no merit and the court is urged to disregard this false narrative.
32. Section 4 (3) of the Act provides as follows:-
“Where an Administrative Act is likely to adversely affect the rights or fundamental freedoms of any person, the administrator shall give the person affected by the decision:
a) Prior and adequate notice of the nature and reasons for the proposed administrative action;
b) An opportunity to be heard and make representation in that regard;
c) Notice of a right to review or internal appeal against an administrative decision, where applicable;
d) A statement of reasons pursuant to section 6;
e) Notice of right to legal representation, where applicable;
f) Notice of right to cross-examine where applicable; or
g) Information, materials and evidence to be relied upon in making decision or taking the administrative action.’’
33. Essentially, Section 4 (3) of the Act, reinforces the principles of natural justice and the right to fair hearing as provided under Article 50 of the Constitution. On 28th August 2025, the Respondents made an administrative decision that adversely affected the Petitioner's rights. The administrative decision in question affected the Petitioner's income and employment status. The decision as communicated in the Respondents’ letter dated 28th August 2025 is summarised as follows: a) The Petitioner’s contract of employment is suspended; b) Monthly salary to stop henceforth throughout the period of study leave; c) Pension and leave benefits to freeze/stop in the period of study leave; and d) Resumption of duty would be subject to availability of a suitable vacancy; The Respondents’ decision as highlighted above adversely affected the rights of the Petitioner. Before he was suspended and his salary stopped, the Petitioner was entitled to due process, which due process required that he be issued with adequate notice for the nature and reasons for the administrative action and an opportunity to be heard. In fact, the decision reached by the Respondents on 28th August 2025 amounted to disciplinary action against the Petitioner. Suspension from employment and stoppage of salary are adverse disciplinary actions that should be subject to due process, the principles of natural justice, the requirement for fair labour practices as enshrined in Article 41 of the Constitution and the requirement for notices as provided for in section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007.
34. The Respondents have not accorded the Petitioner an opportunity to be heard nor given him any prior notice before suspending him from employment and stopping his salary. No evidence to the contrary have been tabled before this Court by the Respondents. 32. In any event, obtaining a court ruling in one’s favour does not warrant suspension from employment and the denial or withholding of one’s salary. Article 48 of the Constitution requires the State not to impede access to justice, and the State, by extension, includes the Respondents. Further, Article 22 of the Constitution entitles the Petitioner to institute proceedings before a court to determine whether his constitutional rights were violated. The Respondents cannot therefore impose adverse conditions on the Petitioner or punish him for simply exercising a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution. The Respondents, if aggrieved, have ample avenues and remedies to challenge court orders or rulings as provided in law. They could have either filed an application for review or proceeded to the Court of Appeal for the setting aside of the Court ruling issued on 14th August 2025. They did not pursue any of the 2 remedies available to them under the law. Instead, they made an administrative decision that further violated and aggravated the Petitioner’s rights under the law. The fact that the court partly stayed their illegal directives does not cure or absolve them of the constitutional infractions. On the preponderance of the evidence and facts laid before this court, it is indisputable that the Respondents have grossly violated the Petitioner’s rights under the Constitution. The Respondents have discriminated the Petitioner, favoured junior staff over him for promotions and study leave, denied him training and career development opportunities as required under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, subjected him to disciplinary process without according him an opportunity to make representations, suspended him from employment and stopped his salary. His future employment is not guaranteed and was subjected to availability of a vacancy despite being employed on permanent and pensionable basis. The Respondents have made a mockery of due process and we cannot belabor the fact that they have mutilated and grossly infringed the Petitioner’s rights, freedoms and protections as provided under the Constitution.
The respondent’s submissions
35. The Petitioner alleges violations of Articles 10, 27, 28, 41, 47, 50, 73 and 232 of the Constitution. The Respondents deny each allegation for the reasons set out below. Article 10 - National Values and Principles of Governance - the allegation that the study leave administration lacked transparency and accountability is fully addressed by the existence of the freeze policy: a documented, universally communicated institutional decision. A blanket moratorium/freeze on study leave, applied without exception to every officer regardless of rank, ethnicity or political connection, is the paradigm of transparent and accountable governance. The Respondents were not required to publish criteria for a discretionary benefit that was simply suspended for all. The freeze letter of 19th October 2022 sets out the basis plainly being shortage of doctors, wage bill, and public health obligation.
36. Article 27- Equality and Freedom from Discrimination - the entirety of the Petitioner's discrimination case rests on a self-compiled comparative table at paragraphs 19–26 of the Further Amended Petition. The Replying Affidavit establishes that this table is a figment of the Petitioner's own imagination, unbacked by any tangible, verifiable, or official evidence whatsoever. It is self-compiled; not a single entry is supported by any document from the County Government. The Respondents are strangers to it. More decisively, the Replying Affidavit deposes that no medical officer of any ethnicity, seniority, or political affiliation has been released on study leave, paid or unpaid, since the freeze of 20th October 2022, save for the Petitioner himself and that was done solely by reason of the court order of 14th August 2025. The allegation that he was singled out for adverse treatment is thus the very inverse of the truth: he was the only officer to benefit from study leave after the freeze.
37. A party alleging discrimination must do more than assert it in bare terms. The Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR (Civil Appeal 290 of 2012) affirmed the principle from Anarita Karimi Njeru that:-
"...the principle underscores the importance of defining the dispute to be decided by the court... a petitioner must provide evidence which demonstrates how their rights have been violated, as merely citing the provisions of the Constitution alleged to have been violated is not enough."
38. The Petitioner has not produced any valid comparator; no officer of any ethnic group was granted study leave after October 2022. Without a valid comparator, the discrimination claim is unsustainable on the facts. The Petitioner, albeit alleging discrimination, failed to place before this Honourable Court any evidence whatsoever in support of the said allegation. The mere assertion of discrimination, without more, cannot amount to proof of discriminatory treatment. The evidence on record demonstrates that there was a general freeze on study leave, and the Petitioner adduced no evidence of special circumstances that would have warranted his being treated differently from other employees subject to the said policy. The allegation that discrimination was driven by the Petitioner's ethnicity is equally unsubstantiated. As deposed in the Replying Affidavit: no decisionmaker is identified as having acted on ethnic grounds; no internal communication referencing ethnicity is produced; and no post-freeze study leave approval to any officer of any ethnicity is identified. The freeze is the complete and sufficient answer to this allegation. The Petitioner is, after all, a member of the Ogaden community, one of the largest clans in Wajir County and has consistently held the positions of Deputy Governor and Senator in the County. Allegations of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity require substantiation, as was held in Shadrack Kosgei & another v Governor of Nakuru County & 2 others (Constitutional Petition 67 of 2014) [2016] KEHC 4629, thus:-
‘In this country many communities e.g. Luo, Luyha and Kisii, Kikuyu, Meru, Embu and to some extent Kamba are known to have names in common. What is it that identifies the persons named as members of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities as opposed to say Meru, Embu, Kamba, Pokot or Turkana. It is a well established principle in law that ‘he who alleges must prove’.
39. If the Petitioners allege that the 19 appointees belong to certain ethnic groups, they are required to prove this as a fact. This court is being invited by the Petitioners to presume the ethnicity of the 19 appointed persons solely on the basis of their given names. In the case of Anarita Karimi v Republic as restated in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society Of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR the court held that a petition alleging a breach of the Constitution must state the provision of the Constitution that has been contravened and the manner in which it has been contravened. The petition must contain sufficient information to enable the other side to understand and respond to the case against them. The court proceeded to hold that the petitioner failed to meet this threshold as they had not provided proof of ethnicity, as the names of the candidates alone cannot be used to determine their ethnicity. On this ground the petitioners claim was found to be unproven. The same situation pertains in this present petition. No proof of the ethnicity of the 19 appointed persons has been availed to this court. A mere allegation of ethnicity without substantive evidence to prove the same will not suffice. The names of the appointed persons are not sufficient basis upon which this court can impute their ethnicity. The Petitioner’s allegation of discrimination is thus unsubstantiated. No evidence, in the form of letters from the County, releasing any medical officer post-freeze, has been availed.
40. Article 28 — Human Dignity -The Respondents deny any violation of the Petitioner's inherent dignity. The Petitioner was employed, remunerated, and treated as any other officer throughout his service. Administrative shortcomings, even if established, do not automatically constitute a violation of inherent human dignity. The threshold for a dignity violation is high: the employer's behaviour must be "so intolerable that it made it considerably difficult for the employee to continue working"( Kenneth Kimani Mburu & Another v Kibe Muigai Holdings Limited [2014] eKLR, Rika J.) It is our submission that thus threshold is not met here.
41. Article 41 — Fair Labour Practices 30-Under the Employment Act, 2007, there is no statutory provision that explicitly mandates study leave as a right for employees. Unlike annual leave (Section 28), maternity leave (Section 29) or sick leave (Section 30), study leave is not listed as a mandatory entitlement. Study leave is a privilege granted at the discretion of the employer, subject to the terms of the employment contract and the employer's policies, and dependent on availability and the needs of the employer. Article III(E)(5) of the CBA annexed to the Respondents’ replying affidavit itself expressly provides that the release of eligible employees for training is subject to "prevailing human resource training policies". The study leave freeze was precisely such a prevailing policy. The CBA did not, and could not, override a validly imposed institutional freeze. Regulating a discretionary benefit under a lawful institutional policy is not an unfair labour practice.
42. Out of respect for the Court's order of 14th August 2025, the 1st Respondent bent the rules and existing policy for the Petitioner alone and released him on unpaid study leave, notwithstanding the existing freeze, budgetary constraints, and the fact that the ophthalmology programme was not a priority specialism for the County. No other medical officer has been released on study leave, paid or unpaid, since the freeze of 20th October 2022. The Petitioner cannot, therefore, allege unfair labour practice. Indeed, having secured new employment, the Petitioner abandoned the much sought-after Master's programme, a fact which sufficiently demonstrates that the Petitioner's application for study leave was merely a pretext to abscond from duty while earning salary. Note the Application for his new Job was made prior to his request for study leave and filing of the Petition.
43. Article 47 — Fair Administrative Action - The Petitioner argues that the letter dated 28th August 2025 was an administrative decision requiring prior notice and a hearing under Article 47 and the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. This analysis is fundamentally misconceived. The letter of 28th August 2025 was not an administrative decision or a disciplinary action-it was an act of compliance with a court order. It required neither prior hearing nor written reasons. To require the Respondents to justify compliance with a court order would be to require them to explain obedience to a judicial direction-a concept without any basis in law. The terms communicated-temporary suspension of the employment contract and cessation of salary- are the standard and natural consequences of unpaid leave. They are structural, not punitive, and apply to all public officers on unpaid leave. Unpaid leave, by its very nature, entails the temporary suspension of mutual contract obligations: the employee's obligation to perform services and the employer's obligation to pay remuneration. The import of the court order by Marete J and the letter dated 28th August 2025 were explained by the ruling of Nderi J rendered on 2nd October 2025 in Abdilie v County Government of Wajir & 4 others (Employment and Labour Relations Petition E152 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 2709 (KLR) (2 October 2025) (Ruling) . The court confirmed that the letter was made in compliance with a court order and was not an administrative action thus;
“The court has considered the Ruling by Hon. Marete J. and the order.. 26.It is the court’s considered finding that the letter of release for the Applicant to go on study leave was in accordance with the court order to the extent that the court did not grant the Applicant paid study leave nor had the Applicant applied for paid study leave in the application and the petition. 37)The Ruling has neither been appealed or reviewed thus binding.’
44. Articles 73 and 232 — Leadership Integrity and Public Service Values -The allegations of nepotism, corrupt practices and violation of Article 232(1)(g) rest entirely on the unsubstantiated comparative table already addressed above. In the absence of any evidence that decisions were influenced by improper motives, these are bare allegations that cannot ground a constitutional finding.
Decision
45. The crux of the defence was that study leave is not a statutory right under the Employment Act and that they had, by circular, frozen study leave for all officers serving in the medical department since 2022. The CBA was produced, and it provided for training and development. The employees are eligible for postgraduate training on completion of mandatory professional internship and registration by the relevant regulatory boards. The petitioner had complied with the condition, having been employed by the respondent for 7 years. The same policy, at page 8, stated that the release of eligible employees shall be subject to prevailing human resources training policies. The CBA also provided for release of employees on paid study leave.
46. The respondent relied on the letter dated 19th October 2022 titled ‘freeze on study leave’ (NI-2) to justify the failure to release the petitioner for study leave. The letter by the County Executive Member of Health, Wajir County, asked the Governor to formally freeze /suspend all study leaves until the Human Resources audit and training needs assessment are conducted and the report submitted. The request by the petitioner for training was vide emails of 2023 and 2025 thus affected by the freeze. The petitioner did not deny knowledge of the freeze of study leave.
47. Regarding whether the petitioner's rights were violated, the petitioner pleaded that some medical officers were released and granted paid study leave. The majority of the persons indicated as having been granted paid study leave were before the freeze letter. I noted one alleged to have been released in 2022 and another in 2023. The court noted that the one alleged to have been released in 2023 was for a period of 4 years, yet was indicated as completed. That, on its own, undermined the credibility of the statistics, as 4 years would have ended in 2026 or 2027, depending on the month of release. The statistics were reflected in the petition dated 3rd October 2025. No single release document was filed to corroborate the allegations. In the circumstances, the court believed that the respondent had frozen study leave by the letter dated 19th October 2022.
48. The court found the respondent's defence that the email requesting study leave was not shared formally to elicit a response plausible, as the appointment letter contained the employer's email, which was not addressed in the emails before the court. (see letter of employment dated 1st October 2018, SOA -02) . The petitioner in affidavit dated 3rd October 2025 averred as follows-
‘THAT on 16th July 2025, I forwarded and attached my admission letter from the University of Nairobi to the Respondents via their respective personal email addresses. On 17th July 2025, I formally sought for, by way of email, a paid study leave. (Annexed hereto and marked SOA-07 is a copy of my email correspondence to the Respondents). THAT the Respondents communicate and conduct official county business through their personal email addresses. Case in point would be the decision to temporarily suspend my contract of employment, which was communicated to me through the personal email address of the 5th Respondent, i.e. fardowsabishar@yahoo.com; (Annexed hereto and marked SOA-08 is a copy of their email correspondence from the 5th Respondent). THAT the foregoing annexure confirms and corroborates my assertion that the Respondents have been receiving my requests for paid study leaves in the past, which request they repeatedly ignored. The claim that the request for paid study leave was not submitted through official email addresses should not therefore arise in the circumstance as the Respondents do not either have official email addresses nor use the same to communicate official business. THAT on 5th September 2023, I sought, vide email, a request to be released on study leave to pursue a master's program offered by the Moi Teaching & Referral Hospital. I attached the admission letter in the email correspondence and the same did not elicited any response. (Annexed hereto and marked SOA-09 is a copy of the email correspondence). THAT in light of the above, it is apparent that the Respondents herein will never approve and/or grant any lawful and reasonable requests that I make in respect of pursuing post-graduate studies while they continue to release junior medical officers on paid study leave annually. THAT I have never been provided with written reasons as to why my study leave could not be granted in each respective post-graduate program that I had submitted to the Respondents. Accordingly, I cannot understand the rationale behind the conduct of the Respondents especially when I see my junior colleagues being released on fully paid study leave every now and then.’
49. The petitioner in a further affidavit dated 29th May 2026 stated-
‘THAT I deny that my study leave applications were informal or incapable of approval. The Respondents were fully aware of my postgraduate admissions and applications and cannot rely on technical administrative excuses to defeat substantive constitutional right’.
50. The court was unable to discern, from the emails annexed by the petitioner, the status of the persons to whom the emails were addressed requesting study leave. The court noted the email (personal) shared letter of 28th August 2026 (S0A-08). The email annexed a letter that disclosed the author and was copied to the employer. The petitioner's emails, on the other hand, had no annexures of formal letters. The email of 28th August 2025 was a formal letter dated 28th August 2025. The petitioner ought to have communicated formally with the employer regarding his study leave; in the same way, the employer communicated by attaching formal letters. The employer's defence is accepted, on the basis of a lack of formal communication to elicit a formal response. The petitioner further applied for study leave during the period of the freeze. He was aware of the decision. The court, for the foregoing reasons, finds no violations of Article 47 on fair administrative action, on a balance of probabilities.
51. On discrimination, I found no evidence to support the claim of discrimination, as the allegations were not supported by documentary evidence. There was no evidence of an application for promotion or training before the letter freezing the study leave was issued. Study leave is at the employer's discretion, depending on human resources policies and needs. The defence of having frozen study leave is sufficient for the court to find no basis for allegations of violation of the petitioner's rights related to the lack of approval of the study leave sought post the freezing of study leave approvals. To this defence, the petitioner in affidavit dated 29th May 2026 stated-
‘THAT the Respondents’ alleged study leave freeze cannot be used as a blanket shield to justify violation of constitutional rights.’
52. The petitioner does not deny the existence of the study leave freeze. The court cannot defeat, by fiat of the pen, the employer's management prerogative to freeze study leave for its employees in the department where the petitioner worked for the interest of the employer’s business. The freeze of study leave is held to be a valid defence.
53. In the upshot, I find the claim for constitutional violations has not been substantiated.
Whether there was constructive dismissal
54. The petitioner sought for order that –
‘A declaration that the Respondent's action and decision contained in their letter dated 28th August 2025 amounted to constructive dismissal of the Petitioner.’
55. Pursuant to the ruling of Justice Marete dated 14th August 2025, the Respondents issued the Petitioner with a letter dated 28th August 2025, being released on study leave to pursue a post graduate degree in Ophthalmology at the University of Nairobi. This was indicated to be in pursuance of the ruling of the court. He was released on unpaid leave effective 18th August 2025. It was indicated that the contract was temporarily suspended during the study leave. It was also indicated that on completion of studies he would be considered for re-absorption into employment subject to availability of a suitable vacancy,
56. The court finds that the letter was subject of a further ruling of the court dated 2nd October 2026 where Justice Nduma Nderi interpreted the ruling of Justice Marete of 28th August 2025 and held-
‘It is the court's considered finding that the letter of release for the Applicant to go on study leave was in accordance with the court order to the extent that the court did not grant the Applicant paid study leave nor had the Applicant applied for paid study leave in the application and the petition.
The Applicant is however entitled to return to his work place upon completion of the study leave since leave of absence does not amount to termination of employment so as to allow the Respondents to "temporarily suspend" the contract of employment of the Applicant during the study leave as the Respondent stated in the letter of 'release on study leave' written by the Respondent to the Applicant dated 28/8/2025.
Accordingly, the application succeeds partly to the extent that the Respondent is restrained from temporarily suspending the contract of the employment of the Applicant while on study leave, and to continue to treat the Applicant as its employee on release on study leave. The issue of being considered for re-absorption does not also therefore arise in the circumstances of the case.
This is the proper interpretation of the ruling of the court per Marete J. dated 14/8/2025.
As regards whether or not the Applicant is entitled to payment during the study leave, this is a matter that should be determined upon the hearing of the petition on the merits.’’
57. The petitioner never resigned at any stage. Constructive dismissal is a common law doctrine not legislated in Kenya. The court has approved the doctrine for application in Kenya. The doctrine was restated by the Court of Appeal in Coca Cola East & Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga [2015] eKLR. The Court of Appeal further set out the applicable legal principles in constructive dismissal claims as follows-
‘a. What are the fundamental or essential terms of the contract of employment?
b. Is there a repudiatory breach of the fundamental terms of the contract through conduct of the employer?
c. The conduct of the employer must be a fundamental or significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract.
d. An objective test is to be applied in evaluating the employer’s conduct.
e. There must be a causal link between the employer’s conduct and the reason for employee terminating the contract i.e. causation must be proved.
f. An employee may leave with or without notice so long as the employer’s conduct is the effective reason for termination.
g. The employee must not have accepted, waived, acquiesced or conducted himself to be estopped from asserting the repudiatory breach; the employee must within a reasonable time terminate the employment relationship pursuant to the breach.
h. The burden to prove repudiatory breach or constructive dismissal is on the employee.
i. Facts giving rise to repudiatory breach or constructive dismissal are varied.’’
58. In the instant case, the petitioner never terminated his services. He came back to court, and the court interpreted the ruling granting the leave.
59. Unpaid leave is provided for under the 2020 PSC regulations as follows:-
'39. (1) An authorised officer may, on recommendation of the respective Human Resource Management Advisory Committee, grant a public officer unpaid leave for a period not exceeding six months which may extended only once for a period not exceeding six months for the purpose of attending to urgent private affairs of exceptional nature.
(2) Unpaid leave shall not be increment-earning.
(3) During the period of unpaid leave, the public body shall not make a contribution of its portion towards the officer’s pension under a contributory pension scheme.
(4) Despite paragraph (3), an officer on unpaid leave may continue to contribute towards the officer’s pension under a contributory pension scheme during the unpaid leave.
(5) The period of unpaid leave shall not be pension-earning under the Pensions Act.’’
60. The petitioner sought to pursue a Master of Medicine for the academic year 2025/2026, meaning he was to be away for more than 6 months. The employer complied with the court order in granting the leave. The Court finds that the employer was in error in using the term "temporary suspension," in the letter of release which the court corrected, vide ruling of 2nd October 2025. However, the court found, holistically, that the letter complied with the regulation(2020 by PSC) regarding unpaid leave. The court finds that the ruling of the court was clarified by the court and there being no evidence of non-compliance with the decision of Justice Nduma Nderi, I find that the petitioner has not met the threshold of constructive dismissal.
61. On the issue of unpaid leave , I find that Justice Nduma Nderi already held that Justice Marete, who issued the order for release to study leave, did not grant an order of paid leave nor had the petitioner pleaded for the same. Indeed, the issue of paid leave only appears in the subsequent amended petition. The issue of study leave has already been overtaken by events, as the trial court(Justice Marete) issued the order with finality. The unpaid study leave can thus not be the basis of the claim of constructive dismissal. I reiterate that the petitioner did not meet the threshold of constructive dismissal. He never resigned from employment; the letter of study leave was issued pursuant to a court ruling, which was interpreted by the court, and it was clarified that the unpaid leave did not suspend the contract. I find the use of temporary suspension was an error in interpretation of the law by the respondent, which issue was corrected by a ruling of the court and indeed the court(Justice Nduma) held-
‘The issue of being considered for re-absorption does not also therefor arise in the circumstances of the case.’’
62. The study leave was ordered by the court. The order granting the study leave at interim stage was interpreted by the court. There was no issue of non-compliance post the decision of Justice Nduma. Indeed, evidence was placed before the court by the respondent that the petitioner was blessed with an appointment under the Social Health Authority (SHA), vide circular dated 9th October 2025, as Principal Claims Management Officer. (‘NI-2’ being letter dated 11th December 2025). He appears to have left quietly, which is also a breach of his employment contract, as he ought to have given notice or resigned with or without notice. The court, in the circumstances, finds that the facts before it did not meet the threshold for constructive dismissal, as held in Coca-Cola East & Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga [2015] eKLR.
Remedies
63. The petitioner sought various reliefs as stated in paragraph 1 of the decision. I held there was no proof of the claims of violations of the Constitution as pleaded. I held the claim did not meet the threshold of constructive dismissal. In the circumstances, I find no merit in the petition and dismiss the same. I make no order as to costs, taking into account the history of the case and especially the final order by the trial court of 14th August 2025. Each party to bear their own costs.
64. It is so Ordered.
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT MACHAKOS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
JEMIMAH KELI,
JUDGE.
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Court Assistant: Otieno
Applicant: Nyatichi h/b Abubakah
Respondent- Aswani h/b Kusow