REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
CAUSE NO. E720 OF 2025
TANYA KEMUMA ONGWENYI .............................................CLAIMANT
VERSUS
YELLOW PAGES LIMITED ..................................................RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Introduction.
1. For determination is the Claimant’s Memorandum of Claim dated 30th July, 2025, and subsequently amended vide an Amended Memorandum of Claim dated 25th November, 2025, where she seeks the following orders as against the Respondent:-
a) A declaration that the Act of the Respondent of terminating the service of the Claimant was unfair, illegal and unlawful.
b) A declaration that the Claimant was discriminated on the grounds of pregnancy.
c) Damages for unfair & unlawful termination Kshs. 90,000/= * 12 Kshs. 1,080,000/=
d) Notice Pay Kshs. 90,000/=
e) Damages for discrimination on grounds of pregnancy Kshs. 4,000,000/=
f) Exemplary damages
g) Reinstatement
h) Cost of this suit
i) Interest
j) Any other relief this honourable court may feel just and reasonable to award.
2. The Respondent entered an appearance on 15th August, 2025 and subsequently filed a Response to the Amended Memorandum of Claim dated 19th January 2026. The Respondent also filed a Witness Statement by Walter Oriaro Okumu dated 19th January 2026, together with a List and Bundle of Documents evenly dated.
3. Both the Claimant's and Respondent’s cases were heard on 29th April, 2026. The Claimant testified as CW1, adopting her Witness Statement as her evidence in chief, and produced her List and Bundle of Documents, as Claimant’s Exhibits Nos. 1-8, and a further bundle of documents admitted as Claimant’s Exhibits Nos. 9-11.
4. For the Respondent, Walter Oriaro Okumu, the Head of Customer Success & IT, testified as RW1. He adopted his Witness Statement dated 19th January, 2026 as his evidence in chief and produced the Respondent’s List and Bundle of Documents of even date as Respondent’s Exhibits Nos. 1-8.
5. During the hearing, an objection was raised to the production of the Respondent’s emails on the ground that they were not accompanied by a certificate of electronic evidence. Counsel for the Respondent admitted that no such certificate had been provided. The Court consequently ordered that the Respondent’s Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 be expunged from the record.
6. Both parties filed submissions.
The Claimant’s Case
7. The Claimant’s case is that she was employed by the Respondent as a Customer Success Segment Leader on or about 14th April, 2025, under a contract of service providing for a three-month probationary period. She avers that she served the Respondent diligently and performed her duties to its satisfaction. She further states that at the time of termination, she was earning a gross monthly salary of Kshs. 90,000/=.
8. The Claimant contends that she completed her three-month probation period, which commenced on 14th April, 2025 and ended on 14th July, 2025, and was therefore entitled to confirmation of employment with effect from 15th July, 2025. She maintains that the Respondent did not extend her probationary period nor raise any concerns regarding her performance before its expiry.
9. The Claimant avers that on 16th July, 2025, the Respondent issued her with a Key Performance Indicators form purportedly dated 16th April, 2025, together with a termination letter similarly dated. She contends that the alleged appraisal was fabricated because it was purportedly conducted two days after she commenced employment. She further maintains that she was never shown the appraisal form, consulted on its contents, or informed that her performance was under review during her employment.
10. The Claimant states that the Respondent’s Human Resource Policy, particularly Clause 9.5, provides that performance appraisal was a continuous process and that an immediate supervisor was required to guide and assist an employee in overcoming performance weaknesses. She maintains that the Respondent did not conduct a continuous appraisal, raise performance concerns, or place her on a Performance Improvement Plan.
11. The Claimant further avers that on the day before her termination she informed her immediate supervisor, Mr. Walter Oriaro Okumu, of her intention to proceed on maternity leave. She states that her supervisor expressed concern about the gap her absence would leave and that, shortly thereafter, she was given the appraisal form and the termination letter.
12. She contends that the decision to terminate her employment was motivated by her pregnancy and intended maternity leave, rather than the alleged poor performance.
13. The Claimant maintains that she was not issued with a show cause letter or afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations of poor performance before termination.
14. She therefore contends that the termination was arbitrary, unlawful and procedurally unfair, contrary to the Employment Act and the Constitution, particularly the provisions on fair labour practices and freedom from discrimination on grounds of pregnancy.
15. In her oral testimony, the Claimant stated that the recruitment process that brought her to the employ of the Respondent was competitive and that she was terminated after informing her immediate supervisor of her intention to proceed on maternity leave.
16. She maintained that no concerns were raised regarding her performance before termination, and that no appraisal was conducted during her employment.
17. On cross-examination, CW1 confirmed that she reported to work on 14th April, 2025, at which time she was approximately four and a half months pregnant, but that her pregnancy was not visible. She denied having attempted to conceal her pregnancy.
18. She acknowledged that she understood the reason for the probationary period and the terms of her contract. She also confirmed that she understood that confirmation of appointment was subject to completion of probation, but maintained that the KPIs were only brought to her attention at the time of termination and that this was the only time she saw the KPIs.
19. CW1 disputed the Respondent’s position that meetings and emails exchanged during the course of work constituted performance appraisals. She maintained that she was terminated one day after informing her immediate supervisor that she intended to proceed on maternity leave. She further stated that she was eight months pregnant in July 2025 and did not know a company known as Delta Cargo Connections.
20. On re-examination, CW1 reiterated that she was employed on 14th April 2025, and terminated on 16th July 2025. She maintained that she had completed her probationary period by the time of termination.
The Claimant’s Submissions
21. It is the Claimant’s submission that her termination was substantively and procedurally unfair and was motivated by her pregnancy and intention to proceed on maternity leave.
22. She submits that the Respondent failed to establish a valid reason for terminating her employment pursuant to Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, contending that the appraisal dated 16th April, 2025 was unreliable, having been conducted two days after she commenced employment.
23. It was further submitted that the Respondent failed to comply with its Human Resource Policy on continuous performance appraisal and did not demonstrate that the Claimant was given specific performance targets or assistance to improve.
24. It is further submitted that the Respondent violated Section 41 of the Employment Act by failing to issue a show cause letter, conduct a disciplinary hearing or afford the Claimant an opportunity to respond to the allegations of poor performance. She further submits that she had completed her three month probationary period and was therefore entitled to confirmation.
25. It is her further submission that probationary employees were equally entitled to procedural fairness, relying on the decision in Kibuchi & 6 Others v Mount Kenya University; Attorney General (Interested Party) [2021] KEELRC 2310 (KLR).
26. On pregnancy discrimination, it is submitted that the timing of the termination, shortly after she had communicated her intention to proceed on maternity leave, demonstrated that pregnancy was the actual reason for the termination. She sought reliance on Articles 27(4) and 41 of the Constitution and Section 5(3), (6) and (7) of the Employment Act.
27. The Claimant finally urges the Court to find that the Respondent had failed to discharge the burden of disproving discrimination. She relied on Wanjira v Computer Learning Center [2023] KEELRC 2528 (KLR), to support her position.
The Respondent’s Case
28. The Respondent denies the allegations of unfair termination and discrimination on account of pregnancy. It states that the Claimant was employed as a Customer Success Segment Leader, but avers that her employment commenced on 15th April, 2025 pursuant to a Contract of Service dated 14th April, 2025.
29. The Respondent maintains that the Claimant was subject to a mandatory probationary period of three months, the successful completion of which was a condition precedent to confirmation of employment. It avers that confirmation was neither automatic nor guaranteed upon expiry of the probationary period, but that it depended on satisfactory performance and was to be communicated in writing.
30. The Respondent stated that the Claimant was issued with clear and measurable KPIs dated 16th April, 2025 against which her performance was to be assessed. It maintains that despite guidance, support and repeated feedback through oral discussions, written correspondence, monthly reviews and client feedback, the Claimant failed to meet the agreed KPIs.
31. The Respondent further states that the Claimant’s poor performance resulted in dissatisfaction among some of its clients, including the termination of a contractual relationship by one of its clients, thereby occasioning reputational and financial loss to the Respondent. It maintains that upon expiry of the probationary period on 15th July, 2025, a final evaluation was undertaken and the Claimant was found unsuitable for confirmation.
32. The Respondent denies that the Claimant’s pregnancy was the reason for the termination. It avers that the Claimant was visibly and heavily pregnant at the time of recruitment, a fact known to the Respondent, which nevertheless proceeded to employ her. It therefore contends that pregnancy was neither a consideration in the recruitment process nor the subsequent termination.
33. The Respondent further maintains that it did not induce the Claimant to resign from any previous employment and that she was competitively recruited on merit. It denies that a single conversation or incident relating to maternity leave triggered the termination, and maintains that the decision was based on performance assessments conducted throughout the probationary period.
34. The Respondent contends that due process was followed and that the Claimant was informed of the performance expectations during probation and given opportunities to improve. It maintains that the termination letter dated 16th July, 2025 expressly stated the reason for termination as non-performance, and further set out her terminal dues, including payment in lieu of notice and accrued entitlements.
35. The Respondent further avers that it remained willing to process the Claimant’s terminal dues and issue her a certificate of service, but that the Claimant failed and/or declined to cooperate with the required exit and clearance process.
36. RW1 testified that he was the Head of Customer Success and IT and the Claimant’s immediate supervisor. He stated that he was involved in the recruitment of the Claimant and that she was visibly pregnant at the time of her recruitment, a fact known to the Respondent.
37. RW1 stated that the Claimant was issued with KPIs on 16th April, 2025, against which her performance was to be assessed. He maintained that she failed to meet the agreed KPIs despite receiving guidance, support and repeated feedback. He further testified that some clients were dissatisfied with the services rendered by the Claimant and that one client, Delta Cargo Connections, terminated its contractual engagement with the Respondent.
38. RW1 maintained that the Claimant was responsible for the Delta Cargo account and disputed her assertion that she did not know the company. He stated that the Claimant was engaged in several performance meetings and discussions, both formal and informal, and that performance management was an ongoing process. He also stated that the original KPI document was generated on 16th April, 2025, and that the review was undertaken in July 2025.
39. On cross-examination, RW1 confirmed that he was the Claimant’s immediate supervisor and that her contract was effective from 15th April 2025. He stated that her probationary period was due to lapse on 15th July, 2025, and that she was terminated on 16th July 2025. He maintained that she was still on probation at the time of termination and that the probationary period was not extended.
40. RW1 stated that the Claimant did not perform well in a number of roles. He confirmed that an evaluation was conducted and that the appraisal was undertaken on 16th July, 2025, while the assessment document was dated 16th April 2025. He acknowledged that two days would not have been sufficient to conduct an appraisal, but maintained that performance appraisal was continuous.
41. He further confirmed that the Claimant was not placed on a Performance Improvement Plan because she was still on probation and stated that the Human Resource Policy did not apply to probationary employees. He denied that the decision to terminate the Claimant was made on account of her maternity leave, and further stated that no conversation took place regarding her intended maternity leave.
42. RW1 maintained that there was no need to issue a show cause letter because the Claimant was on probation. He nevertheless confirmed that no disciplinary hearing was held before the termination.
43. On re-examination, RW1 reiterated that the appraisal was conducted on 16th July, 2025 and maintained that the Claimant was given opportunities to improve her performance. He further stated that he did not have any conversation with the Claimant regarding her intention to proceed on maternity leave and maintained that the reason for termination was her failure to meet the required performance indicators.
The Respondent’s Submissions
44. It is the Respondent’s submission that the Claimant was serving under a probationary contract at the time of termination and was not confirmed because she failed to meet the required KPIs. It submits further that the expiry of the three month probationary period did not automatically result in confirmation, as confirmation was conditional upon satisfactory performance, and was to be communicated in writing.
45. The Respondent maintains that the Claimant was issued with KPIs at the commencement of her employment, received continuous guidance and feedback, but failed to meet the required performance standards. It sought to rely on Mbugua v New Muthokinju Hardware Limited [2025] KEELRC 748 (KLR) to support its position.
46. On pregnancy discrimination, the Respondent denies that the termination was connected to the Claimant’s pregnancy and maintains that she had been recruited while visibly pregnant. It is submitted that the Claimant has failed to establish a causal link between her pregnancy and the termination and that the decision was based on her failure to meet the agreed KPIs. Reliance was placed on Section 5(3) and (7) of the Employment Act and the case of Issa Mutungi & Co Advocates v Sitai [2024] KEELRC 1492 (KLR).
47. On procedural fairness, Counsel acknowledged the decision in Kibuchi & 6 Others v Mount Kenya University; Attorney General [2021] KEELRC 2310 (KLR), but maintained that the Claimant was continuously engaged on her performance, given feedback and afforded opportunities to improve.
48. Regarding the remedies sought, the Respondent opposed the claims for compensation, pregnancy discrimination damages, reinstatement and exemplary damages. It maintains that gratuity has not been pleaded nor is it supported by a contractual or statutory provision.
49. The Respondent acknowledged the Claimant’s entitlement to seven days’ notice pay, and a certificate of service, which it stated was offered, but remained uncollected due to the Claimant’s failure to complete the exit clearance process.
Analysis and Determination
50. I have considered the pleadings, the evidence tendered, the rival submissions and the witnesses’ oral testimonies. The issues falling for determination are: -
i. Whether the Claimant had completed her probation by the time of termination.
ii. Whether the termination of the Claimant’s employment was substantively and procedurally fair.
iii. Whether the Claimant was discriminated against on account of pregnancy and intended maternity leave.
iv. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the remedies sought.
Whether the Claimant had completed her probation by the time of termination
51. It is common ground that the Claimant was employed under a contract providing for a three month probationary period, which she maintains commenced on 14th April, 2025, while the Respondent contends that it commenced on 15th April, 2025. Both parties, however, agree that the probationary period was three months, and that the Claimant was terminated on 16th July, 2025.
52. Section 42(2) of the Employment Act provides that a probationary period may be extended for a further period not exceeding six months, but only with the agreement of the employee. RW1 expressly confirmed that the probationary period was not extended. There was equally no evidence of any agreement between the parties to extend the probationary period.
53. The Respondent's contention is that confirmation was conditional upon satisfactory performance and had to be communicated in writing. Nothing, however, entitled the Respondent to unilaterally extend the probationary period beyond the agreed contractual duration. The Court of Appeal settled this question in Kwale International Sugar Company Limited v Mbaya [2024] KECA 795 (KLR), where it affirmed that an extension of probation must comply with Section 42(2) of the Employment Act.
54. Further, in Aysha Hafsa Musa v Computer Revolution Limited, Cause No. 2110 of 2015, [2021] KEELRC 1090 (KLR), the Court held that an employee whose probationary period had lapsed, without an agreed extension, was no longer considered to be serving under a probationary contract.
55. In the present case, whether the Claimant’s contract's commencement date was 14th or 15th April, 2025, the three-month probationary period had expired before 16th July, 2025, being the date the Claimant was terminated. The Respondent did not demonstrate or even allege that the probationary period was extended by agreement or at all.
56. I therefore have no difficulty finding that the Claimant’s employment had effectively moved beyond the probationary stage, and was no longer a probationary employee when her services were terminated.
Whether the termination of the Claimant’s employment was substantively and procedurally fair
57. On whether the Claimant’s termination was substantively justified, Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act place an obligation upon an employer to establish that the reason for the termination was valid, fair and related to the employee's conduct, capacity or compatibility.
58. The Respondent's position is that it terminated the Claimant’s service on account of poor performance and failure to meet the agreed KPIs. It contends that the Claimant was given performance targets, guidance and continuous feedback throughout her probationary period. It further contended that the Claimant’s performance resulted in client dissatisfaction and the termination of the Respondent's business relationship with a company known as Delta Cargo Connections.
59. Although RW1 maintained that the Claimant was issued with KPIs on 16th April, 2025, he admitted that the appraisal itself was conducted on 16th July, 2025, the very date on which the Claimant was issued with the letter of termination. He further acknowledged that the document relied upon as the appraisal is dated 16th April, 2025, barely two days after the Claimant commenced employment.
60. The Respondent's explanation that performance management was a continuous process was not sufficiently supported, as there was no evidence of documented performance reviews, specific shortcomings communicated to the Claimant, or measures taken to address the alleged deficiencies. Additionally, the Respondent's witness acknowledged that the Claimant was not placed on a Performance Improvement Plan.
61. The Court is also alive to the fact that the Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which were emails, were expunged from the record for want of the requisite certificate of electronic evidence; hence, it cannot rely on those documents to establish the alleged written feedback, client complaints or performance discussions.
62. While the Court appreciates that poor performance may constitute a valid reason for termination, an employer must demonstrate the shortcomings complained of and establish that the employee was made aware of the performance expectations and the areas requiring improvement. The mere assertion that an employee failed to meet KPIs does not discharge the employer's evidential burden.
63. I therefore find and hold that the Respondent has failed to sufficiently demonstrate a valid and fair reason for terminating the Claimant's employment, which renders the termination substantively unfair.
64. On procedural fairness, Section 41 of the Employment Act requires an employer contemplating termination on grounds of poor performance to explain the reasons to the employee and afford the employee an opportunity to respond in the company of another employee or shop-floor union representative of his/her choice.
65. The Respondent's contention that no disciplinary hearing was necessary because the Claimant was on probation cannot stand for two reasons. First, the Claimant's probationary period had already expired, and secondly, it is now settled that even where an employee is serving under a probationary contract, the requirement of procedural fairness remains applicable. (See Monica Munira Kibuchi & 6 Others v Mount Kenya University; Attorney General (Interested Party) [2021] KEELRC 2310 (KLR)).
66. RW1 admitted that the Claimant was not issued with a show cause letter and that no disciplinary hearing was conducted before termination. Further, the Respondent's assertion that the Claimant received continuous feedback cannot substitute the mandatory hearing contemplated under Section 41. Performance discussions and a disciplinary hearing are not one and the same.
67. I therefore find that the Respondent failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements under Section 41 of the Employment Act.
68. The termination is thus procedurally unfair, and so I hold.
Whether the Claimant was discriminated against on account of pregnancy
69. The Claimant’s assertion is that her termination was motivated by her pregnancy and intention to proceed on maternity leave. She testified that she informed her immediate supervisor of her intention to proceed on maternity leave the day before her termination, whereupon the supervisor expressed concerns about the gap her absence would create, and was then presented with the appraisal and the termination letter.
70. On its part, the Respondent denied this allegation, maintaining that it knew of the Claimant's pregnancy at the time of recruitment and that the termination of her employment was exclusively based on poor performance.
71. Article 27(4) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds including sex and pregnancy. Further, Section 5(3) of the Employment Act expressly prohibits discrimination against an employee on the ground of pregnancy in respect of termination of employment. Section 46(a) of the Act also expressly provides that an employee's pregnancy or any reason connected with it does not constitute a fair reason for dismissal.
72. Further, Section 5(7) of the Employment Act, requires that an employer proves that the alleged discrimination did not take place and that the discriminatory act or omission was not based on any of the prohibited grounds. In Gichuru v Package Insurance Brokers Limited [2021] KESC 12 (KLR), the Supreme Court clarified the evidential burden in discrimination claims, holding that the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination before the evidential burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate and non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. The Court further held that the burden does not automatically shift merely because discrimination is alleged.
73. Similarly, in GMV v Bank of Africa Kenya Limited [2013] KEELRC 162 (KLR), the Court found that termination on account of pregnancy was discriminatory and unlawful. The Court emphasized that once circumstances establishing a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination are demonstrated, the employer must provide a legitimate explanation for the impugned decision.
74. The fact that the Respondent confirmed knowledge of the Claimant's pregnancy at recruitment is not, by itself, sufficient to disprove subsequent discrimination. The relevant question is whether the decision to terminate her employment was subsequently influenced by her pregnancy or intended maternity leave.
75. The Claimant's evidence is that she communicated her intention to proceed on maternity leave to her immediate supervisor shortly before the termination, and the termination followed almost immediately.
76. It is also significant, in my view, that the Respondent's alleged final appraisal was undertaken on the same day of the termination, despite the alleged performance concerns supposedly having arisen throughout the preceding three months, and the probation period having lapsed.
77. The Respondent's witness (RW1) denied having a conversation with the Claimant regarding maternity leave. However, the Respondent did not satisfactorily explain why the alleged performance deficiencies did not result in a documented performance review or an improvement process before the probation period expired.
78. Taking the foregoing into account, I am persuaded that the proximity between the Claimant's communication of her intention to proceed on maternity leave and the termination, considered alongside the weaknesses in the Respondent's explanation, establishes a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.
79. The Respondent was consequently required to demonstrate that its decision was wholly unrelated to the Claimant's pregnancy or intended maternity leave. In my view, it failed to discharge that burden.
80. I accordingly find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Claimant's pregnancy and intended maternity leave materially influenced the decision to terminate her employment. The termination is therefore discriminatory, contrary to Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution and Sections 5(3) and 46(a) of the Employment Act, and so I hold.
Whether the Claimant is entitled to the remedies sought
81. Having found that the termination was substantively and procedurally unfair and that the Claimant was discriminated against on account of her pregnancy, I now turn to the remedies sought.
Compensation for unfair termination
82. Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act empowers the Court to award compensation equivalent to a maximum of twelve months' gross salary. In determining the appropriate award, the Court is guided by the factors set out under Section 49(4) of the Act.
83. The Claimant was in the service of the Respondent for only three (3) months. Taking into account the short duration of her employment, and the circumstances of her termination, I deem an award of two months’ salary sufficient compensation for the unfair termination.
Notice pay
84. I have found that the Claimant was no longer serving under probation when her employment was terminated. Accordingly, the seven-day notice applicable to probationary contracts under Section 42(4) was no longer applicable to her.
85. In the absence of evidence of a contractual notice period, the statutory minimum under Section 35(1)(c), read with Section 36 of the Employment Act, applies, and which then entitles the Claimant to one month’s notice or payment in lieu thereof.
86. I therefore award the Claimant one month's gross salary of Kshs.90,000/= in lieu of notice.
Damages for pregnancy discrimination
87. The Court has found that the Respondent violated the Claimant's constitutional and statutory right to equal treatment by terminating her employment on account of her pregnancy and intended maternity leave.
88. In GMV v Bank of Africa Kenya Limited (supra), the Court awarded damages for pregnancy discrimination. Similarly, in Lucy Wanjiru Nyaga v Batiment Group Limited [2019] KEELRC 1317 (KLR), the Court awarded Kshs.1,250,000/= for pregnancy related discrimination and unlawful termination.
89. These decisions confirm that the Court may grant distinct damages for discrimination, having regard to the circumstances and the gravity of the violation.
90. Considering the nature of the violation, the circumstances in which the Claimant lost her employment and the need to vindicate her constitutional right against discrimination, I find an award of Kshs.1,000,000/= reasonable compensation, and is hereby awarded.
Reinstatement
91. Although reinstatement is available under Section 49(3)(a) of the Employment Act, it is not an automatic remedy. It is now settled that the Court must consider the circumstances of each case when determining whether to grant a prayer for reinstatement, including the practicability of reinstatement.
92. Given the short employment relationship and the circumstances surrounding the Claimant’s termination, I do not consider reinstatement an appropriate remedy.
93. This prayer is therefore declined.
Exemplary damages
94. Exemplary damages are exceptional and are not awarded merely because a termination has been found unfair or discriminatory.
95. In the circumstances of this case, I find that the reliefs already awarded sufficiently vindicate the Claimant's rights.
96. I decline to make a separate award of exemplary damages.
Certificate of Service
97. A certificate of service is a statutory guarantee. The Respondent is directed to issue the Claimant with a certificate of service pursuant to Section 51 of the Act.
98. In the final analysis, the Claimant’s claim succeeds and orders granted as follows: -
a) A declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment is unfair and unlawful.
b) A declaration that the Claimant was discriminated against on account of pregnancy and intended maternity leave.
c) Accordingly, the Respondent shall pay the Claimant: -
i. Two months' salary as compensation for the unfair termination at Kshs.180,000/=.
ii. One month's salary in lieu of notice at Kshs.90,000/=.
iii. Damages for discrimination on the ground of pregnancy and intended maternity leave at Kshs.1,000,000/=.
iv. A certificate of service to be issued within 14 days of this judgment.
v. The Respondent shall bear the costs of the suit.
vi. Interest at Court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full.
99. Judgment accordingly.
SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED BY VIDEO-LINK AND IN COURT AT NAIROBI THIS 12TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026.
C. N. BAARI
JUDGE
Appearance:
Mr. Onyango present for the Claimant
Ms. Mwangi h/b Ms. Ogera for the Respondent
Ms. Esther S - C/A