Criminal law

Mwange v Republic [2026] KEHC 16695 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Criminal Appeal E017 of 2026
Judgment date
15 October 2026
Judge(s)
Emmanuel Bitta

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Case at a glance

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Background

The Appellant, Charles Ndunda Mwange, has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence by the Magistrates' Court in Kangundo.

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Decision / orders

In the end, I uphold the conviction on the Appellant’s own plea of guilt and find that an appeal does not lie on the same.

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Reasoning passage

The Appellant in this case was convicted on his own plea of guilty. I have set out the record of the proceedings before the trial court; I find that the trial court followed the procedure established in Adan v Republic (1973) EA 445 at 446 to a T.

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SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the appellant’s guilty plea was unequivocal and therefore barred an appeal against conviction under section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and whether the seven-year imprisonment sentence for stealing stock was excessive, disproportionate, or…

Material facts

Charles Ndunda Mwange was charged with stealing two sheep valued at Kshs 28,000 belonging to John Ndolo Ndunda, at Uthini area in Kangundo Sub-county between 31 May and 1 June 2025. On 3 June 2025, he requested that the charge be read in Kiswahili, pleaded…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E017 OF 2026

CHARLES NDUNDA MWANGE………………………………………….APPELLANT

VERSUS

REPUBLIC………………………………………………………………….RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. The Appellant, Charles Ndunda Mwange, has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence by the Magistrates' Court in Kangundo.

2. The Appellant was arraigned in court on 3rd June 2025 facing a charge of stealing stock contrary to section 278 of the Penal Code. The particulars of the offence were that:

“On the 31st day of May and on the 1st day of June 2025 at Uthini area in Kangundo sub-county, within Machakos County, stole two (2) sheep valued at Kshs 28,000, the property of John Ndolo Ndunda”

3. The court record reflects that in the accused’s presence, he was informed of his constitutional right to legal representation and the gravity of the sentence.

4. The record reflects that the Appellant together with his co-accused sought that the charges be read to them in Kiswahili.

5. The record reflects that the charges were read over to the Appellant and his co-accused in their preferred language, Kiswahili, to which the Appellant stated: “it is true”.

6. The record reflects that the trial court entered a plea of guilty for the Appellant. The record reflects that the facts of the charge were then read over to the Appellant and photos of the recovered sheep were admitted into evidence as Pexb. 1 a-c.

7.

The Appellant is then recorded to have stated as follows:

“The facts are true. I stole the sheep. I sold it at Kshs 5,000/-. I also stole the 1st sheep and sold it at Kshs 5,000/-. The 2nd and 3rd accused did not know the sheep was stolen. I just sold to them”.

8. The matter proceeded to mitigation, whereupon the Appellant stated as follows:

“I stole because of health issues. I was looking for money to go to the hospital.’

9. After considering his mitigation and hearing from the victim, the trial court sentenced the Appellant to serve 7 years' imprisonment.

10. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the Appellant preferred the present appeal. In his petition of appeal dated 16th February 2026, the Appellant based his appeal on the following grounds;

a. The trial court erred in law and fact in recording a plea of guilty that was not unequivocal, as the ingredients of the offence were not properly explained to the Appellant in a language he understood.

b. The trial court failed to adequately consider the appellant’s mitigation before passing sentence, that he pleaded guilty and saved the court’s time, the value of the stock involved, and the possibility of a non-custodial sentence, thereby arriving at an unjust decision.

c. The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and not supported by the circumstances of the case, thus warranting interference by the court.

11. The Appellant sought for his conviction to be quashed and the sentence set aside or varied with a non-custodial sentence.

12. I have carefully considered the appeal before this Court, the record of the trial before the Lower Court as well as the written submissions filed by both parties. This is a first appeal in which the duty of the Court is to re-examine and re-analyse the evidence adduced before the lower court and to draw its own conclusions.

13. This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reappraise the evidence, subject it to an exhaustive scrutiny and draw its own inferences of fact to come to its own independent conclusion, as to whether or not the decision of the trial court can be sustained. An Appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (see Pandya v Republic [1957] EA. 336) and the appellate court’s own decision on the evidence.

14. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that;

“no appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence”

15. The Court of Appeal in Joseph Wambua Mbuvi v Republic [2019] KECA 740 (KLR) held as follows;

13. The record shows that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence as charged after the particulars were read out to him. It is undisputed that the Constitution guarantees an accused person certain rights; among these is the right to due process and fair trial. When an accused person pleads guilty, he/she relieves the prosecution of the duty to call witnesses; he gives up his right to cross-examine them and the right to put forward his/her defence. In a plea of guilty, the factual issues will not be decided by the trial court; all that is left is for an accused to be sentenced (see David Mbewa Ndede vs. Republic Cr. App. No. 1 of 1989 (unreported). We are cognizant that a guilty plea does not necessarily mean an accused person gives up the right to appeal his conviction. If the accused seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the statute that he was convicted under, he may still have the right to appeal. Where a plea of guilty is entered, the trial court must ensure before conviction that the facts disclose the offence charged.

14. In this matter, the record shows the appellant pleaded guilty. The law and practice on the taking and recording of a plea of guilty is stated in Adan v Republic (1973) EA 445 at 446:

“When a person is charged, the charge and the particulars should be read out to him, so far as possible in his own language, but if that is not possible, then in a language which he can speak and understand. The magistrate should then explain to the accused person all the essential ingredients of the offence charged. If the accused then admits all those essential elements, the magistrate should record what the accused has said, as nearly as possible in his own words, and then formally enter a plea of guilty. The magistrate should next ask the prosecutor to state the facts of the alleged offence and, when the statement is complete, should give the accused an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts. If the accused does not agree with the statement of facts or asserts additional facts which, if true, might raise a question as to his guilt, the magistrate should record a change of plea to "not guilty" and proceed to hold a trial. If the accused does not deny the alleged facts in any material respect, the magistrate should record a conviction and proceed to hear any further facts relevant to sentence. The statement of facts and the accused's reply must, of course, be recorded.

15. In Hando S/o Akunaay -v - Rex (1951) 18 EACA 307 it was stated as follows:

“…before convicting on any such plea of guilty, it is highly desirable not only that every constituent of the charge should be explained to the accused, but that he should be required to admit or deny every such constituent.”

16. In this appeal, we have examined the record of appeal. We are satisfied that the plea of guilty was unequivocal. Twice over, the appellant admitted that he committed the offence as charged. By pleading guilty, Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars the appellant from preferring the instant appeal. The Section reads:

“No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.

17. In Olel v. Republic [1989] KLR 444, it was held:

 “Where a plea is unequivocal, an appeal against conviction does not lie. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code (cap 75) does not merely limit the right of appeal in such cases but bars it completely.”

18. In this appeal, the appellant’s conviction was based on his unequivocal plea of guilty. It follows that Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars him from lodging the present appeal save as to the extent or legality of the sentence, if at all. We note that a plea of guilty does not necessarily bar a convicted person from appealing if the challenge is on the legality of the sentence or constitutionality of the conviction.

16. The Appellant in this case was convicted on his own plea of guilty. I have set out the record of the proceedings before the trial court; I find that the trial court followed the procedure established in Adan v Republic (1973) EA 445 at 446 to a T.

17. I also find that the charges were explained to the Appellant in a language that he understood and which he responded to as set out in the record of the trial.

18. The Appellant was unequivocal on the facts read out to him; twice over he admitted to the charge in unequivocal terms. I therefore hold that an appeal against conviction does not lie.

19. The particulars of the charge and the facts as read out and admitted by the Appellant similarly support the charge of stealing stock contrary to section 278 of the Penal Code.

20. On sentencing, the Court of Appeal in Wanjema -v- Republic (1971) EA 493 stated as follows on interfering with sentencing:

“[The] Appellate Court should not interfere with the discretion which a trial court extended as to sentence unless it is evident that it overlooked some material factors, took into account some immaterial factors, acted on a wrong principle, or the sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case.”

21. The Appellant challenges the sentence meted out as being excessive, that the trial court failed to take into account that he had pleaded guilty, that the trial court took into consideration matters that it ought not have by giving undue attention to the victim's statement, taking into account the murder charge against the appellant that was pending before the court, thereby arriving at a disproportionate and harsh sentence.

22. The offence of stealing stock carries a maximum sentence of fourteen years (14). The Appellant was a first offender who had stolen from the complainant, who had stood surety for him in another pending case before the court, where the Appellant had absconded. The court was entitled to consider the victim's statement.

23. The Appellant was convicted on his own plea of guilty, and that fact should have entitled him to a discount of the custodial sentence that the Court determined to impose.

24. The Appellant was a first offender with no previous record; this was a material consideration that the trial court ought to have considered before sentencing.

25. The trial court properly evaluated the victim impact statement.

26. No doubt, stealing stock is a serious offence that should attract an appropriate sentence. The Appellant is nevertheless entitled to an individualized and proportionate sentence having regard to all the aggravating and mitigating factors that I have enumerated.

27. Having regard to the fact that the offence is a serious one, the victim impact statement, the fact that the Appellant is a first offender, and that he was convicted on his own plea of guilty, I, independent of the trial court, believe a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment is proportionate.

28. In the end, I uphold the conviction on the Appellant’s own plea of guilt and find that an appeal does not lie on the same.

29. I find and hold that the trial court did not impose an excessive or disproportionate sentence to the offence committed.

30. I consequently hold as follows;

A. The Appeal on conviction is hereby dismissed.

B. The Appeal on sentence is hereby dismissed.

Dated, signed and delivered via Microsoft Teams, at Mombasa, this 15th day of October 2026.

Emmanuel Bitta

Judge of the High Court

In the presence of:

Nechesah C/A

Charles Ndunda from Machakos Main Prison

N/A for ODPP

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