Background
The Appellant, David Kyalo, has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence by the Magistrates' Court in Kithimani.
Paragraph 1 →Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Appellant, David Kyalo, has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence by the Magistrates' Court in Kithimani.
Paragraph 1 →In Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, the Supreme Court considered the issue of legal representation at state expense and stated inter alia that:
Paragraph 50 →In the end, I uphold the conviction on the Appellant’s own plea of guilt and find that an appeal does not lie on the same.
Paragraph 52 →The Appellant in this case was convicted on his own plea of guilty. I have set out the record of the proceedings before the trial court; I find that the trial court followed the procedure established in Adan v Republic (1973) EA 445 at 446.
Paragraph 24 →Whether David Kyalo could appeal his conviction after an unequivocal guilty plea; whether the plea-taking process was proper; whether lack of legal representation caused substantial injustice under Article 50; and whether the 30-year sentence for grievous…
David Kyalo was charged with grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code for injuring Mary Fundimbiu at Kaluluini village on 2 February 2025. After initially pleading not guilty, he changed his plea when the complainant testified. The charge was…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E104 OF 2025
DAVID KYALO…………………………………………………..…………APPELLANT
VERSUS
REPUBLIC………………………………………………………………….RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
1. The Appellant, David Kyalo, has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence by the Magistrates' Court in Kithimani.
2. The Appellant was arraigned in court on 5th February 2025 facing a charge of grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code. The particulars of the offence were that:
“On the 2nd day of February 2025 at Kaluluini village, Musingini sublocation, Masinga location, in Masinga sub-county within Machakos county, unlawfully did grievous harm to Mary Fundimbiu”
3. The court record reflects that in the accused’s presence, the substance of the charge and every element thereof was stated by the court to the Appellant in a language that he understands, who, being asked whether he admits or denies the truth of the charges, replied that “ni ukweli”
4. The Court record reflects that the court explained to the Appellant the sentence of the offence.
5. The Court then directed that the Appellant be taken to hospital before the facts could be read out to him.
6. On the 13th February 2025, when the Appellant next returned to court, he sought for the charges to be read afresh to him.
7. The court record reflects that the trial court read over the charges and explained them to the Appellant in Kiswahili, which language he understood and responded to.
8. The Appellant responded by stating “si ukweli”, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty.
9. The matter proceeded for trial on the 6th of October 2025. PW1, the complainant, took the stand and, upon taking the oath, the Appellant prayed to plead guilty.
10. The court read over and explained the charges to the Appellant in Kiswahili and the Appellant responded as follows: “ni ukweli”.
11. The trial court entered a plea of guilty.
12. The prosecutor thereupon proceeded to state the facts upon which the charge is based in detail and also produced a duly filled P3 form (PEXH 1).
13. The Appellant responded by stating thus: “maelezo ni ukweli”
14. The matter proceeded to mitigation, whereupon the Appellant stated as follows:
“I have been in custody for 9 months. I pray the period be considered; I was not normal at the time of the incident. I had been given a drink.’
15. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to serve 30 years' imprisonment less the time spent in custody.
16. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the Appellant preferred the present appeal. In his petition of appeal dated 22nd October 2025, the Appellant based his appeal on the following grounds;
a. The trial court erred in matters of law and fact by failing to find that key elements required to prove the offence charged were not proved to the requisite threshold as by law stipulated
b. The trial court erred in matters of law and fact by failing to find that the prosecution case was tainted by material contradictions and unsafe to base a conviction.
c. The trial magistrate erred in matters of law and fact by failing to consider that the Appellant was not provided with legal representation, nor was Article 50 of the Constitution relating to fair hearing complied with.
d. The sentence of 30 years' imprisonment meted out to the appellant was excessive and against the spirit of rehabilitation and reintegration, considering current developments in jurisprudence as regards sentencing.
17. The Appellant sought for his conviction to be quashed and the sentence of 30 years' imprisonment for the offence of grievous harm be varied, reduced and/or set aside and for him to be set at liberty forthwith unless otherwise lawfully held.
18. I have carefully considered the appeal before this Court, the record of the trial before the Lower Court as well as the written submissions filed by both parties. This is a first appeal in which the duty of the Court is to re-examine and re-analyse the evidence adduced before the lower court and to draw its own conclusions on the same.
19. This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reappraise the evidence, subject it to an exhaustive scrutiny and draw its own inferences of fact so as to come to its own independent conclusion, as to whether or not the decision of the trial court can be sustained. An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (see Pandya v Republic [1957] EA. 336) and the appellate court’s own decision on the evidence.
20. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusion (see Shantilal M. Ruwala v R. [1957] EA. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court’s finding and conclusion; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate’s findings should be supported.
21. Section 350 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that an appellant shall not be permitted, at the hearing of the appeal, to rely on a ground of appeal other than those set out in the petition of appeal:
22. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that “no appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence”
23. The Court of Appeal in Joseph Wambua Mbuvi v Republic [2019] KECA 740 (KLR) held as follows;
13. The record shows that the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence as charged after the particulars were read out to him. It is undisputed that the Constitution guarantees an accused person certain rights; among these is the right to due process and fair trial. When an accused person pleads guilty, he/she relieves the prosecution of the duty to call witnesses; he gives up his right to cross-examine them and the right to put forward his/her defence. In a plea of guilty, the factual issues will not be decided by the trial court; all that is left is for an accused to be sentenced (see David Mbewa Ndede vs. Republic Cr. App. No. 1 of 1989 (unreported) We are cognizant that a guilty plea does not necessarily mean an accused person gives up the right to appeal his conviction. If the accused seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the statute that he recast, he may still have the right to appeal. Where a plea of guilty is entered, the trial court must ensure before conviction that the facts disclose the offence charged.
14. In this matter, the record shows the appellant pleaded guilty. The law and practice on the taking and recording of a plea of guilty is stated in Adan v Republic (1973) EA 445 at 446:
“When a person is charged, the charge and the particulars should be read out to him, so far as possible in his own language, but if that is not possible, then in a language which he can speak and understand. The magistrate should then explain to the accused person all the essential ingredients of the offence charged. If the accused then admits all those essential elements, the magistrate should record what the accused has said, as nearly as possible in his own words, and then formally enter a plea of guilty. The magistrate should next ask the prosecutor to state the facts of the alleged offence and, when the statement is complete, should give the accused an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts. If the accused does not agree with the statement of facts or asserts additional facts which, if true, might raise a question as to his guilt, the magistrate should record a change of plea to "not guilty" and proceed to hold a trial. If the accused does not deny the alleged facts in any material respect, the magistrate should record a conviction and proceed to hear any further facts relevant to sentence. The statement of facts and the accused's reply must, of course, be recorded.
15. In Hando S/o Akunaay -v - Rex (1951) 18 EACA 307 it was stated as follows:
“…before convicting on any such plea of guilty, it is highly desirable not only that every constituent of the charge should be explained to the accused, but that he should be required to admit or deny every such constituent.”
16. In this appeal, we have examined the record of appeal. We are satisfied that the plea of guilty was unequivocal. Twice over, the appellant admitted that he committed the offence as charged. By pleading guilty, Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars the appellant from preferring the instant appeal. The Section reads:
“No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.
17. In Olel v. Republic [1989] KLR 444, it was held:
“Where a plea is unequivocal, an appeal against conviction does not lie. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code (cap 75) does not merely limit the right of appeal in such cases but bars it completely.”
18. In this appeal, the appellant’s conviction was based on his unequivocal plea of guilty. It follows that Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars him from lodging the present appeal save as to the extent or legality of the sentence, if at all. We note that a plea of guilty does not necessarily bar a convicted person from appealing if the challenge is on the legality of the sentence or constitutionality of the conviction.
24. The Appellant in this case was convicted on his own plea of guilty. I have set out the record of the proceedings before the trial court; I find that the trial court followed the procedure established in Adan v Republic (1973) EA 445 at 446.
25. The Appellant was unequivocal on the facts read out to him by the prosecutor; he stated “maelezo ni ukweli”. I therefore hold that an appeal against conviction does not lie.
26. The Appellant was charged under section 234 of the Penal Code. For the Appellant to be convicted of the offence of doing grievous harm under section 234 of the Penal Code, the prosecution had to prove each of the following essential ingredients beyond reasonable doubt: the victim sustained grievous harm, the harm was caused unlawfully, the accused caused or participated in causing the grievous harm.
27. Concerning the first element, bodily “harm” means any bodily hurt, disease or disorder whether permanent or temporary. The nature of grievous harm is defined by section 4 of the Penal Code as any harm which amounts to a maim or dangerous harm or seriously or permanently injures health or which is likely so to injure health, or which extends to permanent disfigurement or to a permanent or serious injury to any external or internal organ, membrane or sense.
28. The facts of the case as read out by the prosecutor were that on 2nd February 2025, the complainant was at her house eating supper when the appellant approached her and took a chapati from the complainant’s granddaughter. Upon the complainant asking him why he did so, the Appellant assaulted the complainant using his hands; he slapped her on the head and face and later took a panga and hit her with it. The complainant tried to defend herself and was injured on the right hand. She screamed for help, was rescued and taken to hospital and later to Matuu police station where she reported.
29. The complainant was issued with a P3 form which was filled at Masinga Sub-County Hospital. Upon examination, the medical practitioner who examined her assessed her injury as grievous harm. The P3 form was produced as PEXH 1.
30. The facts, prima facie, are capable of sustaining a charge of grievous harm.
31. On sentencing, the Court of Appeal in Wanjema -v- Republic (1971) EA 493 stated as follows on interfering with sentencing:
“[The] Appellate Court should not interfere with the discretion which a trial court extended as to sentence unless it is evident that it overlooked some material factors, took into account some immaterial factors, acted on wrong principle, or the sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case.”
32. The Appellant challenges the sentence meted out as being excessive and against the spirit of rehabilitation and reintegration.
33. The trial court, in sentencing, stated that it had considered the victim's statement, the nature of the offence, and that the Appellant had constantly assaulted the complainant, who was his mother, to the extent of removing her teeth and cutting her with a panga, and proceeded to sentence him to serve 30 years' imprisonment less the time spent in custody.
34. I believe that from the said it is apparent that the trial court exercised its sentencing discretion improperly because material mitigating factors and the applicable sentencing framework were not applied.
35. Section 234 of the Penal Code carries a maximum of life imprisonment, but it does not prescribe a fixed minimum; the appropriate sentence, therefore, remains case-specific.
36. The Sentencing Policy Guidelines 2023 state that where the law provides that a person is liable to imprisonment for life or any other period, the Court may impose a shorter term unless the legislation expressly creates a mandatory minimum.
37. The Appellant was convicted on his own plea of guilty, and that fact should have entitled him to a discount of the custodial sentence that the Court determined to impose. There is no indication on record that the trial magistrate considered that point.
38. The prosecutor informed the trial court that the Appellant was a first offender with no previous record; this was a material consideration that the trial court ought to have considered before sentencing. There is no indication that the trial court weighed the same to the Appellant’s benefit.
39. The Appellant’s advanced age constituted yet another factor that the trial court ought to have evaluated; the record does not indicate the trial court assessed that in sentencing the Appellant.
40. The Appellant has complained that the trial court introduced facts that were not borne out by the record in sentencing; for instance, the allegation that the Appellant had removed the complainant’s teeth.
41. On the other hand, the trial court properly evaluated the nature of the offence, the victim impact statement and the nature of the injuries suffered.
42. No doubt, grievous harm is a serious felony that should attract an appropriate sentence. The Appellant is nevertheless entitled to an individualized and proportionate sentence having regard to all the aggravating and mitigating factors that I have enumerated.
43. In the case of Poghisio vs Republic (2025) KEHC 10437, the Appellant, convicted on his own plea of guilt for grievous harm, received a 10-year imprisonment term; the Court reviewed the sentence downward to 6 years' imprisonment even though he was a repeat offender.
44. In Mogwasi and another vs Republic (2026) KEHC 2728, the court upheld a sentence of 7 years for grievous harm; in that case, the injuries included deep cut wounds and internal head injury.
45. The point that I make from the two decisions is that the sentence of 30 years' imprisonment is extremely severe and disproportionate.
46. Having regard to the fact that the offence is a serious felony, the injuries to the hand and head of the victim that were classified as grievous in the P3 form and the victim impact statement, the fact that the Appellant is a first offender, and that he was convicted on his own plea of guilty, and that he is advanced in age, I believe a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment would be proportionate.
47. The last issue raised by the Appellant is on Article 50 of the Constitution, more specifically on the lack of legal representation.
48. The case before the trial court never proceeded to trial; it was truncated by the Appellant’s unequivocal plea of guilty. I have gone through the record of the proceedings before the trial court from which I perceive that the trial magistrate was keen to ensure that the Appellant’s rights were not prejudiced in the process.
49. I notice that the trial magistrate directed that the Appellant be taken to hospital before the facts could be read to him at the first instance, that is on 5th February 2025, on 22nd July 2025 when the prosecution was ready with witnesses in court and the Appellant indicated that he wasn’t ready by reason of being unwell, the trial magistrate adjourned the hearing and ordered that the Appellant be taken to hospital, and on the next hearing date when the Appellant pleaded guilty, the trial magistrate made sure that the procedure as settled in law was followed to the letter.
50. In Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, the Supreme Court considered the issue of legal representation at state expense and stated inter alia that:
“The right to legal representation at state expense, under the said Article, was a fundamental ingredient of the right to a fair trial and was to be enjoyed pursuant to the constitutional edict without more. However, in accordance with the language of the Constitution, this particular right was not open-ended but only became available “if substantial injustice would otherwise result.”
51. From my perusal of the record, I am satisfied that the appellant fully comprehended the nature and severity of the charges which he faced. The Appellant unequivocally chose to enter a plea of guilty after being given ample opportunity to consider the same and after being made aware of the nature and sentence of the offence. There is no indication that the failure to comply with Article 50(2) resulted in substantial injustice to the appellant. I therefore dismiss this ground of the appeal
52. In the end, I uphold the conviction on the Appellant’s own plea of guilt and find that an appeal does not lie on the same.
53. I find and hold that the trial court misdirected itself on the sentence imposed by failing to take into account material factors, improperly introducing facts that were not properly before it, failing to exercise its sentencing discretion properly, and thereby arriving at an unduly harsh and disproportionate sentence.
54. I consequently hold as follows;
A. The Appeal on conviction is hereby dismissed.
B. The Appeal on sentence is hereby upheld; the sentence of 30 years' imprisonment is hereby set aside and substituted with a sentence of 6 years less the time spent in custody from the 6th of October 2025.
Dated, signed and delivered via Microsoft Teams, at Mombasa, this 15th day of October 2026.
Emmanuel Bitta
Judge of the High Court
In the presence of:
Nechesah C/A
David Kyalo from Kamiti Maximum
N/A for ODPP