Background
The Appeal arises from the Ruling delivered on 4th September 2025 by the Senior Principal Magistrate, in Kithimani, PMCC No. 52 of 2022.
Paragraph 1 →Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Appeal arises from the Ruling delivered on 4th September 2025 by the Senior Principal Magistrate, in Kithimani, PMCC No. 52 of 2022.
Paragraph 1 →The first issue for determination is whether the trial magistrate erred in declining to extend time for substitution and revival of the suit. There is no dispute that the deceased died on 5th June 2022 and that no application for substitution was made within one year of his death. The suit abated by operation of law, per Order 24 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules on 5th June 2023.
Paragraph 49 →Upon obtaining the limited letters of administration, which were a mandatory prerequisite to the application for substitution, the Appellants moved the court in March 2024. Does a period of three months constitute an inordinate period of delay in the circumstances of the case? I don’t think so. I believe that if one were to treat the various steps individually, one would have reached a different conclusion from that of the trial court.…
Paragraph 66 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA, MACHAKOS
CIVIL APPEAL NO. E237 OF 2025
FAITH KASILILI KAMUTI and MUTUI NGOTHYA
MUSOVYWA (Suing on their own behalf and as the administrators
of the Estate of the late DANCAN KOTI MUTUI alias DUNCAN
KOTI MUTWII alias DANCUN MUTUI KOTI…………………………………………………………………………...APPELLANTS
VERSUS
DORCAS ESTHER NGUTHO……………………………….……………………………………RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
1. The Appeal arises from the Ruling delivered on 4th September 2025 by the Senior Principal Magistrate, in Kithimani, PMCC No. 52 of 2022.
2. The appeal arises from Kithimani PMCC No. 52 of 2022, initially instituted by Dancan Koti Mutui against Dorcas Esther Ngutho.
3. The suit arose from a road traffic accident which occurred on 24th December 2021 at around 3:30 p.m. along the Matuu–Mwingi Road at Kanyonyoo Area. The deceased alleged that he was travelling as a passenger in motor vehicle registration number KCQ 267S, owned by the Respondent and/or driven by her employee, servant, agent or authorised driver. The vehicle allegedly lost control, veered off the road and rolled several times.
4. The deceased pleaded negligence against the Respondent and/or her driver and claimed damages for personal injuries, including injuries to the head, back, chest, shoulders, right elbow and both ankles. He claimed Kshs. 6,550/= in special damages, general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities, costs and interest.
5. The Deceased died on 5th June 2022, before the determination of the suit.
6. Following the Deceased's demise, Faith Kasilili Kamuti and Mutui Ngothya Musovywa sought a limited grant of Letters of Administration pendente lite to continue the pending suit.
7. The record shows that they petitioned for the grant in December 2023 and a limited grant of Letters of Administration pendente lite was issued to them for the specific purpose of representing the estate in Kithimani SRMCC No. 52 of 2022 to its conclusion.
8. On 20th March 2024, the Appellants, Faith Kasilili Kamuti and Mutui Ngothya Musovywa, filed a Notice of Motion seeking, inter alia, the revival of the suit for hearing, substitution of the deceased with the Appellants as his legal representatives and extension of time within which to make the application for substitution. They further sought an order deeming the annexed amended plaint duly filed and served upon payment of the requisite court fees, together with the costs of the application.
9. The application was made because the deceased, Dancan Koti Mutui, had died on 5th June 2022, and the cause of action survived his death.
10. The Appellants explained that they were initially unaware of the existence of the pending suit and only became aware of the proceedings after being contacted in relation to the deceased's medical re-examination.
11. They submitted that the delay in seeking substitution was neither intentional nor inordinate, but was substantially occasioned by circumstances beyond their control. They urged the Court to exercise its discretion to extend time, revive the abated suit and allow them to proceed with the matter, maintaining that no prejudice would be occasioned to the Respondent.
12. The application was supported by the supporting affidavit of Faith Kasilili Kamuti, who deponed that the Appellants were contacted by the deceased's advocates sometime in August 2023 regarding the deceased's attendance for medical re-examination.
13. That upon becoming aware of the pending proceedings, they commenced the process of obtaining the necessary grant of representation to enable them to take over and prosecute the suit on behalf of the deceased's estate.
14. They submitted that the delay in applying for substitution was sufficiently explained and that the interests of justice warranted the revival of the suit and their substitution as the deceased's legal representatives.
15. The Respondent opposed the application; her case was that the application had been brought after an inordinate delay and was therefore barred by laches.
16. The Respondent contended that the suit had abated and that the Appellants had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant the exercise of the Court's discretion in their favour.
17. The Respondent maintained that the Appellants had not provided a satisfactory explanation for their failure to seek substitution within the period prescribed under Order 24 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. The Respondent opposed the revival of the suit and the extension of time sought by the Appellants.
18. On 10th January 2024, the Respondent filed an application seeking the dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution.
19. The trial court directed that the Respondent’s application for dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution be heard together with the Appellants' application for substitution and revival of the suit; the two were to be canvassed by way of written submissions.
20. In considering the Appellants' application, the trial court first observed that the deceased died on 5th June 2022 and that the legal representatives were not substituted within one year of his death as required under Order 24 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. The Court found that the suit had abated. The Court noted that Order 24 Rule 3(2) permits the Court, for good reason and upon application, to extend the time within which substitution may be made.
21. The Court considered whether the Appellants had demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay in seeking substitution. It noted that the deceased died on 5th June 2022, while the Limited Grant of Letters of Administration pendente lite was issued on 19th December 2023.
22. The Court further noted that the letter requesting the deceased's medical re-examination had been sent to the deceased's advocates on 30th September 2022 and that the Respondent's application for dismissal of the suit was filed on 10th January 2024, followed by the Appellants' application for revival and substitution on 20th March 2024
23. The Court considered the Appellants' explanation that they had been unaware that the deceased had a pending suit and only became aware of the proceedings after they were contacted in relation to the deceased's medical re-examination.
24. The trial court found the explanation not to have sufficiently accounted for the delay. In particular, the Court observed that the Appellants had not adequately explained why, having been informed of the suit, they did not move the Court promptly to seek an extension of time and substitution.
25. In reaching its determination, the Court considered the decision in Francis Mbugua Kiarie v Peter Tharao Kiarie [2005] eKLR, which the Appellants had relied upon in support of the revival of an abated suit. The Court distinguished the circumstances relied upon by the Appellants and reiterated that the discretion to extend time under Order 24 Rule 3(2) is dependent upon the applicant demonstrating good reason for the delay.
26. The Court ultimately found that the suit had abated because no legal representative of the deceased had been substituted within one year of his death and that the Appellants had not sufficiently explained the reasons for the delay in seeking substitution and extension of time. The Court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellants and granted the Respondent’s application for dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution.
27. Being dissatisfied with the ruling, the Appellants lodged the present appeal, premising it on six grounds.
28. They contend that the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by dismissing the application dated 20th March 2024; failing to appreciate the reasons advanced for the delay; misdirecting herself on the applicable law and facts; failing to properly consider the evidence and authorities presented by the Appellants; and failing to appreciate that dismissal of the suit was a drastic step which ought only to have been resorted to in the clearest of circumstances. The Appellants further fault the trial Court for failing to appreciate that no prejudice would be suffered by the Respondent if the application was allowed.
29. The Appellants pray for the appeal to be allowed and the Ruling delivered in Kithimani PMCC No. 52 of 2022 on 4th September 2025 be set aside.
30. They further seek an order allowing the revival of the suit for hearing and directing that Faith Kasilili Kamuti and Mutui Ngothya Musovywa be substituted as parties in place of the deceased. They also seek an order extending time for substitution and an order that costs of the appeal be borne by the Respondent.
31. The Appellants' written submissions challenge the decision of the trial Court dismissing their application for revival of the suit and substitution of the deceased with his legal representatives.
32. The Appellants identify three principal issues for determination, namely whether the suit had abated, whether the cause of action survived the deceased, and whether it was just and proper to grant the orders sought.
33. On the issue of abatement of the suit, the Appellants acknowledge that the application for substitution was not made within one year of the deceased's death, as contemplated under Order 24 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
34. They nevertheless submit that the proviso to the rule empowers the Court, where sufficient cause is demonstrated, to extend the time for making the application. The Appellants contend that they sufficiently explained the delay through the supporting affidavit, particularly the circumstances surrounding their discovery of the pending suit and the subsequent steps taken to obtain the necessary grant of representation.
35. The Appellants rely on the case of Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR for the principles governing the exercise of discretion to extend time. They submit that the Court should consider, inter alia, the length and reason for the delay, whether the application was brought without undue delay, whether the opposing party would suffer prejudice, and the interests of justice. They further rely on James Gitau Gikobe v Michael Henry Kipchiechie, Civil Appeal No. 205 of 2001 and Francis Mbugua Kiarie v Peter Tharao Kiarie [2005] eKLR, in support of the proposition that where sufficient reason for the delay in substitution is demonstrated, the Court may revive an abated suit
36. On whether the cause of action survived the deceased, the Appellants submit that the Respondent's contention that the cause of action did not survive is misconceived. They rely on Section 2(1) of the Law Reform Act, Cap. 26, which preserves causes of action existing for the benefit of a deceased person's estate, subject to the statutory exceptions. The Appellants submit that the deceased's claim, arising from the injuries sustained in the accident, was a cause of action capable of surviving his death and therefore capable of being prosecuted by his legal representatives.
37. On whether it was just to grant the orders sought, the Appellants submit that they were deserving parties for the exercise of the Court's discretion. They contend that although the application was filed outside the prescribed period, the delay had been explained and the Respondent had not demonstrated any prejudice that would be suffered if the suit were revived.
38. They urge the Court to determine the matter on its merits rather than allowing the claim to be defeated on account of procedural delay.
39. In support of the broader interests-of-justice argument, the Appellants rely on Rosemary Bunny v Gichuru Kamotho [2005] eKLR, Samuel Muchiri Wanjuguna & 6 Others v The Minister for Agriculture [2013] eKLR, and Abdirahman Abdi v Safi Petroleum Products Ltd & 6 Others [2011] eKLR. The authorities support the general proposition that, in appropriate circumstances, procedural defaults should not prevent a dispute from being determined on its merits, particularly where any prejudice to the opposing party can be addressed through appropriate orders.
40. The Appellants pray that the appeal be allowed, the ruling delivered on 4th September 2025 be set aside, and their application dated 20th March 2024 be allowed. They further seek revival of Kithimani PMCC No. 52 of 2022, substitution of the deceased with Faith Kasilili Kamuti and Mutui Ngothya Musovywa, extension of time for substitution, and costs of the appeal
41. The Respondent did not file written submissions in the appeal
42. I have considered the record of appeal, the memorandum of appeal, and submissions filed, from which the following issues fall for determination: whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellants had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant an extension of time for substitution and revival of the abated suit, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the suit for want of prosecution instead of allowing the application for extension of time, substitution and revival of the suit.
43. I will start with the obvious error in the decision of the trial court, that is, once the court declined the Applicant’s application for extension of time, substitution and revival of the suit, the suit remained abated and was not available for dismissal for want of prosecution, not to mention the fact that at the time the Respondent’s application for dismissal of the suit was filed, on 10th January 2024, the suit had already abated and that application was not competent when it was filed.
44. Further, the Plaintiff was deceased, and the Respondent could not possibly move against a deceased person before substitution.
45. The decision of the trial court to grant the Respondent’s application for dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution in the circumstances of the case was not legally tenable, was bad in law and incompetent.
46. This is a first appeal, where the court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence and draw its own conclusion; see Selle and Another v Associated Motor Board Company and Others [1968] EA 123.
47. I note that the decision of the trial court, the subject of the present appeal, entailed the exercise of judicial discretion. In Mbogo and another -vs-Shah (1968) EA 93, the Vice President of the Court, Sir Clement de Lestang, stated that the appellate court will not interfere with an inferior court’s judicial discretion unless satisfied the decision is clearly wrong due to a misdirection, acting on improper matters, or failing to consider relevant matters leading to a wrong conclusion.
48. The important dates in the chronology of the case are as follows;
On 5/6/2022, Dancan Koti Mutui (The Plaintiff) died.
On 30/9/2022, a letter requesting the deceased’s medical re-examination was sent to his advocates
Sometime in August 2023, according to the supporting affidavit of Faith Kasili Kamuti, the appellants were contacted by the deceased’s advocate regarding his attendance for a medical re-examination, thereby becoming aware of the proceedings
Sometime in December 2023, the Appellants petitioned for a limited grant of letters of administration pendente lite.
On 19/12/2023, a limited grant of letters of administration pendente lite was issued to the Appellants. (1 year, 6 months after his demise)
On 10/1/2024, the Respondent filed an application seeking dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution.
On 20/3/2024, the appellants filed an application for revival of the abated suit, substitution of the deceased with the Appellants as legal representatives, and extension of time for substitution. (1 year, 9 months after his demise)
49. The first issue for determination is whether the trial magistrate erred in declining to extend time for substitution and revival of the suit. There is no dispute that the deceased died on 5th June 2022 and that no application for substitution was made within one year of his death. The suit abated by operation of law, per Order 24 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules on 5th June 2023.
50. The proviso to Order 24 Rule 3(2), however, empowers the Court, for good reason and upon application, to extend the time for substitution.
51. Further, Order 24 Rule 7(2) provides for the revival of an abated suit where the applicant demonstrates that he or she was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit
52. In determining whether sufficient cause has been demonstrated, the Court must consider the explanation for the delay, the length of the delay, the conduct of the applicant after acquiring knowledge of the proceedings, and the interests of justice, including any prejudice that may be occasioned to the opposing party.
53. In the present matter, the Appellants explained that they were unaware of the existence of the suit until they were contacted in relation to the deceased's medical re-examination in August 2023
54. The Appellants stated that they thereafter commenced the process of obtaining a grant of representation, which was issued on 19th December 2023, before filing the application for substitution and revival on 20th March 2024
55. The fact that the Appellants were required to obtain a grant of representation before making the application is a relevant consideration in explaining the delay.
56. It took the Appellants 3 months between the time they were informed of the suit and when they obtained letters of administration, and another 3 months from when they obtained the letters to the filing of the application.
57. The trial Court was entitled to examine the period between their alleged discovery of the proceedings, the issuance of the grant and the filing of the application. The question was whether the explanation, considered as a whole, was reasonable and sufficient to warrant exercising discretion in their favour.
58. The trial magistrate found that the explanation was inadequate, particularly because the Appellants had not satisfactorily explained why they failed to approach the Court promptly after learning of the pending proceedings. That finding must be considered against the chronology and the affidavit evidence on record
59. The trial court found, albeit erroneously, that the letters of administration were granted one year before the application for dismissal of the suit was made and that the Appellants had not sufficiently explained the delay.
60. One of the Appellants' grounds in support of their appeal is that the trial magistrate misapprehended the facts and evidence before her. I have considered the record and confirm that indeed the letters of administration were issued less than a month before the application for dismissal was made.
61. I am also persuaded that the trial court did not consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. I say so because, from the record, it is clear that at some point in the proceedings, counsel representing the deceased lost contact with the deceased, and the reason is apparent: the plaintiff had died.
62. The record reflects that counsel for the Appellants then got in touch with the Appellants with a view to reaching his client, who counsel was not aware was dead, to inform him to go for a medical re-examination. That communication is what informed the Appellants that the deceased had a pending case in court. That, to me, is a plausible explanation.
63. The fact that they were unaware of the suit is relevant in excusing the period before their knowledge.
64. The Appellants subsequently moved the court for limited letters of administration to enable them to take the next step; that process took them three months, which to me is not an inordinate period of time.
65. I note from the record, particularly the annexure to the application, that the deceased’s only assets were his personal effects; he was survived, on the other hand, by five dependants, comprising his widow and four minor children.
66. Upon obtaining the limited letters of administration, which were a mandatory prerequisite to the application for substitution, the Appellants moved the court in March 2024. Does a period of three months constitute an inordinate period of delay in the circumstances of the case? I don’t think so. I believe that if one were to treat the various steps individually, one would have reached a different conclusion from that of the trial court. Looking at the time cumulatively would be a misdirection to my mind; the period of delay attributed to the Appellants' counsel could not be visited upon the Appellants, and the period needed to obtain legal standing to make the application ought to have received due consideration; the upshot is that I find that the trial court misdirected itself, by first making an error on the period between when the limited letters were obtained and when the application for dismissal was made, secondly by not giving due consideration to the fact that the application could not be made before letters of administration, had the trial court not misdirected itself on those two material issues, it would have found that the period under consideration was only three months.
67. The Respondent will doubtless suffer prejudice, that is, delay in the resolution of the case, but that prejudice is not without remedy in the form of an award of costs. The converse is the case upon the Appellants, who have demonstrated willingness to prosecute the case from when they were made aware of it, and who will suffer prejudice that is not compensable in the dismissal of their application.
68. I find that the Appellants have made out a case for extension of time within which to make the application for substitution and revival of the suit.
69. On substitution, the case is straightforward; the original plaintiff is deceased, and there is need for his substitution for the benefit of his estate. The Appellants have obtained the necessary letter of administration from the court to enable them to continue the action.
70. On revival of the suit, Order 7(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules permits the filing of an application for revival of an abated suit upon proof that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit.
71. I have already found that the Appellants were unaware of the existence of the suit until they were contacted by the deceased’s advocate; they then started the process of obtaining limited grant of letters of administration, and they then filed the application for extension of time, substitution and revival on 20th March 2024.
72. The circumstances leading to the delay have been sufficiently explained; the Appellants could not seek substitution as legal representatives of the deceased’s estate without first obtaining the requisite grant of representation.
73. I am not persuaded that the Appellants were guilty of deliberate inaction or that the delay was intended to obstruct or frustrate the Respondent’s defence. The delay between the issuance of the grant and filing of the application, though not negligible, was not in the circumstances inordinate.
74. I am satisfied that the Appellants have established sufficient cause for the revival of the suit.
75. The cause of action arose from personal injuries sustained in a road traffic accident; the cause of action is capable of surviving for the benefit of the deceased’s estate.
76. The Appellants, having obtained a limited grant of representation, are capable of seeking the continuation of the suit.
77. I find merit in the appeal, and
I order as follows;
A. The ruling delivered on 4th September 2025 is hereby set aside.
B. The Appellants' application dated 20th March 2024 is hereby allowed.
C. Time within which to seek substitution of the deceased plaintiff is extended.
D. The abated suit, Kithimani PMCC No. 52 of 2022, is hereby revived.
E. The Appellants herein are permitted to be substituted for the deceased plaintiff in their capacities as legal representatives of his estate
F. The Respondent’s application dated 10th January 2024 for dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution is struck out.
G. The Appellant shall have the costs of the appeal.
Dated, signed and delivered in Mombasa via Microsoft Teams this 15th day of October, 2026
Emmanuel Bitta
Judge of the High Court
In the presence of;
Nechesah C/A