REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
CIVIL APPEAL NO. E071 OF 2025
TABITHA SYOMBUA MWINI APPELLANT
-VERSUS-
NZOKA KIMUNYI 1ST RESPONDENT
CHRISTINE KITOO NZOKA 2ND RESPONDENT
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF MACHAKOS 3RD RESPONDENT
(Being an appeal from the Rulings of Hon. P. M. Wechuli, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 6th March 2025 in Kithimani Senior Principal Magistrate's Court Civil Suit No. E154 of 2017)
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. This appeal concerns a family dispute between two co-wives and their husband. The Appellant, Tabitha Syombua Mwini, is the first wife of the 1st Respondent, Nzoka Kimunyi. The 2nd Respondent, Christine Kitoo Nzoka, is his second wife. The 3rd Respondent, the Catholic Diocese of Machakos, was joined in the suit as the church through whose priest the contested wedding was to be solemnised. It did not participate in the proceedings before the trial court or in this appeal.
2. By a Plaint dated 28th June 2017 filed in Kithimani Civil Suit No. E154 of 2017, the Appellant pleaded that she was married to the 1st Respondent in 1960 under Kamba customary law; that the 1st Respondent later married the 2nd Respondent under the same customary law with her consent; and that in June 2017 the 1st and 2nd Respondents began preparations for a Christian wedding at Mukusu Catholic Church, scheduled for 8th July 2017. She contended that the intended Christian marriage was unlawful under the Marriage Act, 2014 while her own marriage to the 1st Respondent subsisted, and that it would deprive her of her rights as a spouse.
3. The Plaint sought, in its principal prayer, a permanent injunction against the defendants, their agents, servants and/or representatives from celebrating, officiating, or in any manner conducting a Christian marriage at the Mukusu Catholic Church, together with costs, interest and any further relief.
4. Contemporaneously, the Appellant filed a Notice of Motion under certificate of urgency seeking a temporary injunction. The application was argued on 5th July 2017 before Hon. G. O. Shikwe, Senior Resident Magistrate. In opposition, counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents conceded on record that the 1st Respondent is in a subsisting polygamous union and that both are his wives under Kamba customary law, but contended that, as Roman Catholics, the 1st and 2nd Respondents were entitled to convert their union into a Christian marriage under the Marriage Act, 2014.
5. By an Order dated 6th July 2017 and issued on 7th July 2017, the trial court restrained the Respondents from celebrating, officiating or in any manner conducting a Christian marriage at Mukusu Catholic Church on 8/7/17 pending the hearing and determination of the suit, and directed the parties to comply with Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules within 30 days in order for the matter to be heard on its merits and on priority basis. The parties refer to a ruling of 21st July 2017 confirming those orders; that ruling is not in the record, but nothing turns on its absence.
6. The matter was certified ready for hearing on 4th October 2017. It thereafter came up for hearing or mention on numerous occasions between January 2018 and January 2022 without a hearing taking place. The record shows that hearings were lost because the 3rd Respondent had not been served, because the Appellant's counsel was engaged elsewhere or not ready, and, on 5th September 2018 and 3rd November 2021, because counsel for both sides informed the court that the parties were negotiating an out-of-court settlement. On 24th January 2018, the court extended the interim orders.
7. The last court attendance before the impugned applications was on 19th January 2022. On 12th April 2023, the Appellant's then advocates, J. W. Kiniti & Co., applied to cease acting, citing a breakdown in communication with their client. On 24th April 2023, the present advocates, Mathenge Mukundi & Associates, came on record for the Appellant.
8. By a Notice of Motion dated 29th May 2024, expressed to be brought under section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, the 1st and 2nd Respondents sought the dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution, on the grounds that five years had passed since their defence was filed, that the Appellant had lost interest, and that the delay was long and unexplained.
9. The Appellant opposed the application by a Replying Affidavit sworn on 18th November 2024. She deponed that she had not lost interest, that the delay was occasioned by family efforts to resolve the dispute amicably, and that her advocates had written to the registry on 7th November 2024 seeking a hearing date for the main suit.
10. The 1st and 2nd Respondents then filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 13th December 2024 on the grounds that there was no suit capable of being set down for hearing and that, in the absence of other substantive reliefs being pleaded in the Plaint and in furtherance to orders issued by the Honourable Court on 21st July 2017, there were no further issues pending for determination. The Appellant opposed it by a Replying Affidavit sworn on 8th January 2025.
11. On 23rd January 2025, the trial court directed that the application and the Preliminary Objection be determined together by way of written submissions. In two separate Rulings delivered on 6th March 2025, the learned Magistrate (Hon. P. M. Wechuli, PM) allowed the application and dismissed the suit for want of prosecution, and upheld the Preliminary Objection and struck out the suit with costs.
12. Aggrieved, the Appellant lodged this appeal by a Memorandum of Appeal dated 17th March 2025.
THE APPEAL AND THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS
The Grounds of Appeal
13. The Memorandum of Appeal dated 17th March 2025 raises the following eighteen grounds, reproduced verbatim:
1. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by making a finding and holding that the Ruling dated 21st July 2017 made orders with finality and same being capable of disposing of the entire main suit.
2. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact in misinterpreting the Ruling dated 21st July 2017 by failing to appreciate that the same confirmed the orders issued on 7th July 2017 and not subsequently filed as held in the impugned rulings.
3. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the court gave temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the main suit.
4. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to find and hold that the said ruling set down the main suit for hearing on priority basis.
5. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by making a finding that the main suit could not be set down for hearing due to the fact it had specific single prayer in its pleadings.
6. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by faulting the appellant's pleadings, yet the said pleadings were not fatally defective and ripe for being struck out.
7. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate that though parties are bound by their pleadings, the room for amendment was still available before striking the same out.
8. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by making a finding that the Notice of Preliminary Objection was merited, yet the judicial officer had to interrogate/exercise his discretion in the said pleadings, and the ruling dated 21st July 2017 and other court proceedings.
9. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the impending injustice, prejudice and imminent violation of marriage rights and livelihood of the appellant by summarily dismissing the suit with costs.
10. THAT the Honourable Magistrate misdirected himself in law and in fact that the plaintiff needed to seek for declaratory orders for the suit to be competent for setting down for hearing.
11. THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by making a finding and bringing out issues that were not part of the plaintiff's/appellant pleadings.
12. THAT the Honourable Magistrate misdirected himself in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the dispute and/or subject matter involved spouses in a Kamba Customs and traditions in a polygamous setting.
13. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to find and hold that the explanation given by the Appellant for the delay in the prosecution of the suit was satisfactory and justified.
14. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by faulting or casting aspersions on the explanation given for the delay despite the applicants not disputing/denying and/or contesting the existence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms amongst themselves.
15. THAT the learned trial magistrate misdirected himself in law and in fact by find and hold that if there was an alternate dispute resolution mechanism among the parties to resolve the dispute amicably, the applicant could not have filed the applications.
16. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the nature and the unique circumstance of the suit and calling for more evidence to the undisputed/uncontested explanation/issue on ADR amongst the parties.
17. THAT the Honourable Magistrate erred in law and in fact by applying his discretion in an injudiciously manner by summarily dismissing the suit with costs denying the appellant's suit to be heard on merits.
18. THAT the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the Appellant's submission and the authorities quoted therein.
14. The Appellant prays that the appeal be allowed; that both Rulings be set aside; that the suit be reinstated before a magistrate other than Hon. P. M. Wechuli; that the parties be granted leave to amend their pleadings; and that she be awarded costs.
15. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Appellant's submissions are dated 15th April 2026 and the 1st and 2nd Respondents' submissions are dated 21st May 2026. The 3rd Respondent did not file submissions.
The Appellant's Submissions
16. Counsel for the Appellant framed three issues: whether the trial court exercised its discretion judiciously in dismissing the suit; whether it misdirected itself in holding that the interim orders disposed of the suit; and costs. Relying on Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93, JMM v GNJ [2023] KECA 99 (KLR) and Sirma v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others [2019] KESC 64 (KLR), counsel submitted that an appellate court will interfere with a discretionary decision that is plainly wrong, based on a misdirection, or reached by taking into account irrelevant matters.
17. Counsel advanced three reasons why the discretion was wrongly exercised. First, the application to dismiss invoked only section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and not Order 17 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules; relying on Daniel Kimani Njihia v Francis Mwangi Kimani & another [2015] eKLR (Supreme Court), counsel argued that a court must be moved under the correct provision. Second, the motion was not supported by any affidavit, contrary to the principle in University of Nairobi v George Mabele Sifuna [2021] eKLR. Third, the trial court called for extraneous evidence, such as phone and WhatsApp messages, from elderly parties without formal education who live in the same neighbourhood, and so denied the Appellant a fair hearing under Articles 25, 27(1) and 50(1) of the Constitution. Counsel also pointed out that the Ruling itself stated that there were no proper grounds to have the suit dismissed yet went ahead to dismiss it.
18. On the Preliminary Objection, counsel submitted that the same objection had been raised by the Respondents' counsel on 24th January 2018, when the Appellant's counsel explained that only a temporary injunction had been obtained and a permanent one was sought; that the court then extended the interim orders and the Respondents participated in fixing hearing dates for about four years; and that under Order 40 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as explained in Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited v Henry Ndungu Kinuthia & another [2018] KECA 213 (KLR), an interlocutory injunction is temporary by nature and cannot dispose of a suit.
19. On costs, citing section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act and Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2014] eKLR, counsel asked that, this being a family dispute, each party bear its own costs.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents' Submissions
20. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents framed four issues: the exercise of discretion in dismissing the suit; whether the Preliminary Objection was properly sustained; whether the reliefs sought on appeal are available; and costs.
21. On the dismissal, counsel relied on Order 17 Rule 2(1) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Rules and on Ivita v Kyumbu [1984] KLR 441, Argan Wekesa Okumu v Dima College Limited & 2 others [2015] eKLR, Naftali Onyango v National Bank of Kenya [2005] eKLR and Rajesh Rughani v Fifty Investments Limited & another [2016] KECA 829 (KLR). Counsel submitted that the suit stagnated for over seven years and that no step was taken for over two years after 19th January 2022. The explanation of family negotiations was bare and unsupported. The 1st Respondent, then 82 years old and now about 90, had lived under the cloud of the litigation; witnesses' memories fade; and the continued pendency of the suit was itself a form of prejudice.
22. On the Preliminary Objection, counsel relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hassan Ali Joho & another v Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 others [2014] eKLR, and on the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings (Galaxy Paints Co. Ltd v Falcon Guards Ltd [2000] 2 EA 385; Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Limited v Intercom Services Limited & 4 others [2004] 2 KLR 183). Counsel submitted that the Plaint sought only to stop a single wedding, on a single day, at a single church; that the wedding did not proceed; and that the suit was therefore an empty shell with nothing left to try.
23. On the reliefs, counsel submitted that reinstatement is discretionary; that the Appellant offered no credible explanation and no surviving cause of action; that leave to amend is sought for the first time on appeal without a draft amendment; and that it would be unjust to subject an elderly Respondent to further litigation. Counsel asked that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
DUTY OF THIS COURT AND ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
24. This is a first appeal. This Court's duty is to reconsider and re-evaluate the record and reach its own conclusions, as stated in Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123. Both impugned decisions were made on the record and on affidavits and submissions, without oral evidence. This Court is therefore as well placed as the trial court to assess the material.
25. The dismissal of a suit for want of prosecution is, however, a discretionary decision. An appellate court does not substitute its own discretion merely because it would have decided differently. It interferes only where the trial court misdirected itself in law, misapprehended the facts, took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant ones, or where the decision is plainly wrong as held in Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93. The Supreme Court restated the narrow latitude for interfering with a discretionary decision in Sirma v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others [2019] KESC 64 (KLR).
26. By contrast, whether a preliminary objection raises a pure point of law, and whether it was correctly upheld, is a question of law on which this Court must reach its own conclusion.
27. Having considered the record of appeal, the grounds of appeal and the parties' submissions, the following issues arise for determination:
(i) Whether the learned Magistrate erred in upholding the Preliminary Objection dated 13th December 2024 and striking out the suit.
(ii) Whether the learned Magistrate properly exercised his discretion in dismissing the suit for want of prosecution on the application dated 29th May 2024.
(iii) Whether the reliefs sought in this appeal, namely reinstatement before a different magistrate and leave to amend, should be granted.
(iv) Who should bear the costs.
28. The Preliminary Objection is considered first. The Ruling on the application to dismiss expressly relied on the outcome of the Preliminary Objection, so the correctness of that Ruling bears directly on the second issue.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
Issue (i): Whether the Preliminary Objection was properly upheld
29. The classic statement of what a preliminary objection is comes from Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, where Law JA said that it "consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit", and Sir Charles Newbold P added that it "raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion."
30. The Supreme Court adopted that test in Hassan Ali Joho & another v Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 others [2014] eKLR. It restated it in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Jane Cheperenger & 2 others [2015] KESC 2 (KLR) at paragraph 15: "Thus a preliminary objection may only be raised on a 'pure question of law'. To discern such a point of law, the Court has to be satisfied that there is no proper contest as to the facts." At paragraph 16, the Court added that a preliminary objection "should be founded upon a settled and crisp point of law".
31. The first ground of the objection, that "there is no suit capable of being set down for hearing", is not a point of law at all. It is a conclusion, and it can only be reached through the second ground. The second ground asserts that, since the Plaint pleads no other substantive relief and the court issued orders in July 2017, nothing remains for determination. With respect, that proposition fails the Mukisa Biscuit test on three counts.
32. First, it does not assume the Appellant's pleaded facts to be correct; it contradicts them. The Plaint pleads that the Appellant's customary marriage to the 1st Respondent subsists, that the intended Christian marriage is unlawful while it subsists, and that the Respondents had refused to call off the ceremony. Prayer (a) seeks a permanent injunction against the Respondents "celebrating, officiating, or in any manner conducting a Christian marriage at the Mukusu Catholic Church". The prayer is not limited to 8th July 2017. That date appears only in paragraph 9 of the Plaint, as part of the narrative of what prompted the suit.
33. The learned Magistrate read the date into the prayer, finding that "the pleadings do not seek to injunct the defendant from conducting any marriage in general ... They are in regard to a particular marriage." The principle that parties are bound by their pleadings, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Galaxy Paints Co. Ltd v Falcon Guards Ltd [2000] 2 EA 385 and Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Limited v Intercom Services Limited & 4 others [2004] 2 KLR 183, cuts the other way. The Appellant is bound by the prayer as she framed it, and as framed it is not confined to a single date. The pleaded cause of action is the alleged unlawfulness of a Christian marriage between the 1st and 2nd Respondents while the Appellant's marriage subsists. That cause of action did not expire on 8th July 2017.
34. Second, whether the dispute has been overtaken by events is a question of fact, and it is contested. The Appellant swore on 8th January 2025 that the Respondents remain desirous of conducting the marriage. The Respondents' own submissions before the trial court, dated 6th February 2025, confirm it: they stated that the pendency of the suit "delays the progression of the 1st and 2nd Defendants lives as they would wish to officiate their marriage in the Christian way" and that the Appellant "is keen on delaying their well deserved union". A party who says it still intends to do the very thing the suit seeks to restrain cannot, in the same breath, maintain as a pure point of law that the suit has nothing left to decide. The learned Magistrate resolved that contest by finding that "the said marriage ... was stopped". That was a finding of fact, made without evidence, on a preliminary objection. It is precisely what Mukisa Biscuit and Cheperenger forbid.
35. Third, the objection rested on treating an interlocutory order as a final determination of the suit. The Order of 6th July 2017 was, on its face, granted "pending the hearing and determination of the suit", and the same Order directed the parties to comply with Order 11 "in order for the matter to be heard on its merits". An interlocutory injunction preserves the subject matter until trial. It does not adjudicate the rights in dispute. The Court of Appeal emphasised in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KLR 125 that at the interlocutory stage the court makes no definitive findings of fact or law. Such an injunction is also temporary by its nature: under Order 40 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules it lapses after twelve months unless extended for sufficient reason, as the Court of Appeal explained in Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited v Henry Ndungu Kinuthia & another [2018] KECA 213 (KLR). A temporary order that may lapse cannot be the final relief that exhausts a suit seeking a permanent injunction.
36. The Respondents' contention before the trial court that the suit was res judicata is equally untenable. The Supreme Court in John Florence Maritime Services Limited & another v Cabinet Secretary, Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR) listed finality of the previous decision among the essential elements of res judicata. An interlocutory ruling in the same suit is not a final decision between the parties on the matters in issue.
37. The record also shows that the Respondents' counsel raised the same contention on 24th January 2018. The court did not accept it. It extended the interim orders and the matter was later fixed for hearing several times, including by consent on 21st April 2021. On 14th July 2021, counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents told the court he had a witness present. Their application of 29th May 2024 to dismiss the suit for want of prosecution likewise presupposed a live suit. That conduct is not conclusive, but it confirms that whether anything remained to be tried was a contested question, unsuitable for summary determination.
38. Finally, the learned Magistrate faulted the Appellant for not seeking "any declaratory orders". It is for a plaintiff to choose the relief she seeks. Whether the relief pleaded is legally available or sufficient to resolve the dispute is a question for trial. It is not a ground for striking out a suit on a preliminary objection.
39. I therefore find that the Preliminary Objection dated 13th December 2024 did not raise a pure point of law, and that the learned Magistrate erred in upholding it and striking out the suit. Grounds 1 to 12 of the appeal succeed.
Issue (ii): Whether the suit was properly dismissed for want of prosecution
(a) Competence of the application
40. The Appellant attacks the application of 29th May 2024 on two procedural grounds: it cited section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and not Order 17 Rule 2(3), and no supporting affidavit was annexed despite the motion stating that one was.
41. On the first ground, the decision in Daniel Kimani Njihia v Francis Mwangi Kimani & another [2015] eKLR concerned a litigant seeking to invoke the Supreme Court's limited jurisdiction without identifying the provision conferring it. There, the omission went to the court's competence to entertain the matter at all. Here, the trial court's jurisdiction over its own suit was never in doubt. Order 17 Rule 2(1) allows the court to dismiss a dormant suit even on its own motion after notice, and Rule 2(3) allows any party to apply for dismissal. Order 51 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that no application shall be defeated on a technicality or for want of form that does not affect its substance. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution likewise directs that justice be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. The Appellant knew exactly what was sought, and why, and responded to it fully. The failure to cite Order 17 Rule 2(3) did not render the application incompetent.
42. On the second ground, the record contains no affidavit in support of the motion. Order 51 Rule 4 requires a notice of motion to state its grounds, and the motion did. The principal fact relied on, the period of inactivity, was apparent from the court's own record, which the court was entitled to consult. The absence of an affidavit therefore did not invalidate the application. It did, however, mean that no evidence of prejudice to the Respondents was placed before the trial court. That bears on the merits, as discussed below. The decision in University of Nairobi v George Mabele Sifuna [2021] eKLR, a decision of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, is not binding on this Court and does not alter that conclusion.
(b) The merits of the dismissal
43. Order 17 Rule 2(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules permits dismissal where "no application has been made or step taken by either party for one year". Even where that threshold is met, dismissal is discretionary. The governing test, settled since Ivita v Kyumbu [1984] KLR 441 and consistently applied, is "whether the delay is prolonged and inexcusable, and if it is, whether justice can be done despite the delay". The court must consider: (a) whether the delay is inordinate; (b) whether it has been satisfactorily explained; and (c) whether it has caused, or is likely to cause, such prejudice to the defendant that a fair trial is no longer possible, weighed against the prejudice that dismissal would cause the plaintiff. Each case turns on its own facts, and the court should strive to sustain a suit where justice can still be done. As Apaloo JA observed in the Court of Appeal in Philip Chemwolo & another v Augustine Kubede [1982–88] KAR 1036 at 1040, "Blunders will continue to be made from time to time and it does not follow that because a mistake has been made that a party should suffer the penalty of not having his case heard on its merits."
44. On the delay aspect, I agree with the learned Magistrate that the statutory threshold was met. After 19th January 2022, no step was taken to advance the suit until the application of 29th May 2024. The application by the Appellant's former advocates to cease acting and the notice of change of advocates in April 2023 concerned representation, not the prosecution of the suit. In any event, both were made more than a year before the application. The Appellant's letter of 7th November 2024 came after the application and cannot cure the earlier default. A delay of over two years in a suit filed on a fast track in 2017, which the court had directed be heard on priority, is inordinate.
45. The learned Magistrate rejected the Appellant's explanation of family negotiations by holding that there was no evidence to this effect. That finding overlooked the trial court's own record. On 5th September 2018, counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents told the court that the parties were likely to compromise [the] matter by consent and sought time for that purpose. On 3rd November 2021, counsel for the Appellant informed the court that the parties had talked with defendant counsel to attempt settling [the] matter out of court and counsel holding brief for the Respondents' advocates said, I confirm. The Respondents never denied the negotiations on affidavit. A court should not demand documentary proof, such as minutes or WhatsApp messages, of a fact that its own record shows both sides acknowledged. It was also a misdirection to reason that the Respondents would not have filed this present application had negotiations existed. The fact that negotiations later failed says nothing about whether they took place.
46. Even so, the record corroborates negotiations only up to November 2021. For the later period, the record shows a breakdown between the Appellant and her former advocates, who applied to cease acting in April 2023, followed by a change of advocates. Lapses of counsel, though not a complete answer, are relevant to whether a litigant should be denied a hearing: Philip Chemwolo (above); Belinda Murai & Others v Amos Wainaina [1978] KLR 278. The explanation is therefore partly substantiated and partly wanting. It is not, as the trial court found, wholly without basis.
47. On prejudice and whether justice can still be done, this is where the Ruling falls short most seriously. Having quoted Ivita v Kyumbu and the guidance in Nilesh Premchand Mulji Shah & another t/a Ketan Emporium v M. D. Popat and others [2016] eKLR, the learned Magistrate never considered whether the delay made a fair trial impossible or prejudiced the Respondents. No affidavit of prejudice was filed. The submissions on appeal about the 1st Respondent's age and fading memories were not before the trial court as evidence. The Appellant is herself elderly; she was 76 in 2017, by her counsel's account on record.
48. The issues for trial are narrow. The existence of both customary marriages is admitted on record by the 1st Respondent's counsel (5th July 2017). The Appellant has filed statements for two witnesses and the Respondents indicated one. The central question is largely one of law: whether, under the Marriage Act, 2014, a man in a subsisting polygamous customary marriage may contract a Christian marriage with one of his wives without the other's participation. Nothing in the record suggests the passage of time has made a fair trial of that question impossible.
49. Against that, dismissal would permanently deny the Appellant a determination of a matter touching on her marital status and her rights as a spouse. Those interests are protected by Article 45 of the Constitution, and her right to have the dispute decided in a fair hearing is guaranteed by Article 50(1). The right to be heard is fundamental, and a court should be slow to drive a litigant from the seat of justice without hearing her case unless justice truly demands it.
50. Two further features of the Ruling are significant. First, it states, under the heading "(b) Explanation for the delay?", that "There are no proper grounds to have the suit dismissed". It then allows the application without reconciling that statement with the outcome. Second, it bases the dismissal in part on the separate Ruling on the Preliminary Objection, stating that "it has been found that the suit as set out in the pleadings is not sustainable". I have found that Ruling to be erroneous. A discretion exercised partly on an erroneous premise is a discretion exercised on an irrelevant consideration, within the meaning of Mbogo v Shah.
51. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the learned Magistrate misdirected himself. He failed to consider his own record on the question of explanation, failed to address prejudice and whether justice could still be done, and took into account the erroneous finding that the suit was unsustainable. This Court is therefore entitled to interfere and to exercise the discretion afresh.
52. Exercising that discretion, I bear in mind Article 159(2)(b) of the Constitution and sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, which require that justice not be delayed and that disputes be resolved justly, expeditiously and proportionately. The delay was inordinate and only partly explained. But the issues are narrow, no prejudice was proved, and a fair trial remains possible. The interests of justice favour a hearing on the merits, on strict terms that protect the Respondents' legitimate interest in finality. Grounds 13 to 18 succeed to that extent.
Issue (iii): The reliefs sought
53. Having set aside both Rulings, the suit stands reinstated. To protect the Respondents from further delay, reinstatement will be on terms: strict timelines, priority hearing, and a default consequence if the Appellant fails to comply.
54. The Appellant asks that the suit be heard by a magistrate other than Hon. P. M. Wechuli. No allegation of bias was made or established, and an adverse ruling is not, by itself, a ground for recusal. However, the learned Magistrate has already pronounced that the suit as pleaded is unsustainable, which is a view on the very question that will arise at trial. To safeguard the appearance of impartiality, and with no disrespect to the learned Magistrate, it is appropriate that the suit be heard by another judicial officer as the head of station may allocate.
55. The prayer for leave to amend was not made in the trial court, and no draft amended pleading is before this Court. Whether leave should be granted depends on considerations, such as the nature of the proposed amendment, delay and prejudice, that the trial court is best placed to assess on a proper application under Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules. This Court declines to grant leave in the abstract. That is without prejudice to the right of any party to apply to the trial court.
56. Whether any interlocutory order made in 2017 or 2018 remains in force was not argued fully before this Court and is not determined here. Any party is at liberty to apply to the trial court for appropriate interim orders pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
Issue (iv): Costs
57. Under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, costs follow the event unless the court, for good reason, orders otherwise. As the Supreme Court explained in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2014] eKLR, the rule is not intended to penalise the losing party, and the court retains discretion. This is a dispute between a husband and his two wives of many decades. The Appellant herself asked that each party bear its own costs, and the Appellant's own delay contributed to the applications below. An order that each party bear its own costs, here and in the two applications below, best serves justice and the prospect of family harmony.
DISPOSITION
58. In the result, the appeal has merit, and I make the following orders:
(i) The appeal is allowed.
(ii) The Ruling delivered on 6th March 2025 on the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 13th December 2024 is set aside, and is substituted with an order dismissing the Preliminary Objection.
(iii) The Ruling delivered on 6th March 2025 on the Notice of Motion dated 29th May 2024 is set aside, and is substituted with an order dismissing the said Notice of Motion.
(iv) Kithimani Senior Principal Magistrate's Court Civil Suit No. E154 of 2017 is reinstated.
(v) The suit shall be heard and determined on a priority basis by a magistrate other than Hon. P. M. Wechuli, as the head of station at Kithimani Law Courts shall allocate.
(vi) The Appellant shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this judgment, cause the suit to be listed before the trial court for directions, and shall take all necessary steps to have it set down for hearing. In default, the suit shall stand dismissed for want of prosecution without further reference to the court.
(vii) The trial court shall endeavour to hear and determine the suit within six (6) months of the date it is first listed for directions. No adjournment shall be granted at the instance of the Appellant save for exceptional reasons recorded by the court.
(viii) Prayer (b) of the Memorandum of Appeal, for leave to amend pleadings, is declined, without prejudice to the right of any party to apply to the trial court under Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
(ix) Any party is at liberty to apply to the trial court for interim orders pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
(x) Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal and of the Notice of Motion dated 29th May 2024 and the Preliminary Objection dated 13th December 2024 in the trial court.
(xi) The Deputy Registrar shall forthwith transmit a copy of this judgment, together with the lower court file, to the Kithimani Law Court.
READ AND PUBLISHED IN THE CTS THIS 28TH OCTOBER 2026 IN THE PRESENCE OF:
NO PARTY PRESENT.
BEFORE HON JOYCE MKAMBE GANDANI, JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
COURT ASSISTANT: BEN