General

Ruai Family Hospital Ltd v Pacific Crest Ltd & another [2026] KEHC 16859 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Judgment date
26 October 2026
Judge(s)
J W W Mongare

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Background

Through the Notice of Motion dated 27th January 2026, the Applicant seeks that the Respondents be summoned to appear in court to answer for their alleged contemptuous acts of 4th November 2025 in violation of orders issued on 7th October 2025 by the Business Premises Rent Tribunal and that the directors and/or proprietors of the Respondents be convicted and sentenced to a jail term for disobeying the court order.

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Reasoning passage

Going through the Order issued on 7th October 2025 by the Tribunal, I find that the same was clear and unambiguous as it explicitly stated: "THAT a temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Respondent herein by themselves, their servants or agents from levying distress for rent against the Applicant/Tenant herein pending hearing of the application inter-partes." There is no ambiguity in this prohibition.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

MISC. APPLICATION NO. E009 OF 2026

BETWEEN

RUAI FAMILY HOSPITAL LIMITED…………………………………APPLICANT

AND

PACIFIC CREST LIMITED……………………………..……….1ST RESPONDENT

NEXTGEN AUCTIONEERS…………………………….……2ND RESPONDENT

RULING

Introduction & Background

1. Through the Notice of Motion dated 27th January 2026, the Applicant seeks that the Respondents be summoned to appear in court to answer for their alleged contemptuous acts of 4th November 2025 in violation of orders issued on 7th October 2025 by the Business Premises Rent Tribunal and that the directors and/or proprietors of the Respondents be convicted and sentenced to a jail term for disobeying the court order.

2. The application is supported by grounds set out on its face and the affidavits of Paul Okoth, the Applicant’s Chief Finance Officer sworn on 27th January 2026 and 30th June 2026. It is opposed by the Respondents through the 1st Respondent’s Property Manager, Fatma Ali, sworn on 7th May 2026. The parties have also supplemented their positions by way of written submissions which are on record and which together with the pleadings I have considered and I will make relevant references to the same in my analysis and determination below.

Analysis and Determination

3. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and the rival submissions I note that the issues that arise for the court’s determination are whether the Respondents are guilty of contempt of the Tribunal’s Orders dated 7th October 2025 and whether their directors and/or proprietors should be punished for it. I am in agreement with the Respondents’ submission that whereas the Applicant has invoked sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Contempt of Court Act, 2016, this Act was declared unconstitutional in Kenya Human Rights Commission v Attorney General & another [2018] KEHC 9656 (KLR). However, courts still possess the inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through sanctions imposed through contempt of court. Indeed, section 5(1) of the Judicature Act(Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kenya) grants this court power to punish for contempt as follows:

The High Court and the Court of Appeal shall have the same power to punish for contempt of court as is for the time being possessed by the High Court of Justice in England and that power shall extend to upholding the authority and dignity of subordinate courts.

4. It is trite that once a court issues an order, it binds all and sundry, the mighty and the lowly equally without exception. It is meant to be obeyed and not otherwise and that the ingredients required to be proved for a successful contempt prosecution were set out by the Court of Appeal in Ochino & another v Okombo & 4 others [1989] KECA 65 (KLR) where it cited its own decision in Mwangi Mangondu v Nairobi City Council (Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1988) where it was held that, “[T]he court will only punish as a contempt breach of injunction if satisfied that the terms of the injunction are clear and unambiguous, that the defendant has proper notice of the terms and that breach of the injunction has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.” The position on the applicable standard of proof has been affirmed by the Supreme Court which held as follows in Githiga & 5 others v Kiru Tea Factory Company Ltd [2023] KESC 41 (KLR):

In enforcing compliance with lawful court orders, the procedures adopted by the court must be fair and reasonable in which full opportunity is given to an alleged contemnor to defend himself or herself. This is because contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal, require a higher standard of proof than in normal civil cases, and one can only be committed to civil jail or penalized on the basis of evidence that leaves no doubt as to the contemnor’s culpability.

5. Further, our jurisprudence has shifted and developed that knowledge of an order supersedes personal service. The rationale behind this change appears to be the need to protect the integrity and dignity of Court orders. To excuse a contemnor who has knowledge of a Court order simply because he has not been personally served is to open up Court orders and process to deliberate, willful, contemptuous and cynical disobedience (See Sang v Keter & 5 others [2024] KEELC 14136 (KLR) ].

6. Going through the Order issued on 7th October 2025 by the Tribunal, I find that the same was clear and unambiguous as it explicitly stated: "THAT a temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Respondent herein by themselves, their servants or agents from levying distress for rent against the Applicant/Tenant herein pending hearing of the application inter-partes." There is no ambiguity in this prohibition.

7. On the knowledge of the order, the Respondents state they were not personally served and that the order served on 22/23rd October 2025 and issued on 8th October 2025 did not contain the injunctive terms. However, as stated, the law has evolved and knowledge supersedes personal service. The Applicant's further deposition demonstrates that the Applicant's counsel sent a Litigation Update on 8th October 2025 containing the Order with the injunctive order and the Applicant deponed that when the Respondent arrived on 4th November 2025, they were shown the hard copy of the Order and the Applicant even called the 1st Respondent's counsel. Therefore, I find that the Respondents had actual knowledge of the specific injunctive order before or during the act of distress and the failure to personally serve them with this specific version is not fatal to the Applicant’s case for contempt.

8. On whether the terms of the Order were breached, the evidence shows that on 4th November 2025, the 2nd Respondent proceeded to the hospital premises, proclaimed items, demanded payment and only ceased upon payment of Kshs.1,622,378. This action directly contravened the clear order restraining them "…from levying distress for rent” and the breach occurred. As to whether this action and breach was deliberate and willful, to the Respondents, they were served with an extracted order dated 8th October 2025 which did not contain the injunctive relief. They proceeded on the belief that the interim order had been superseded by the directions given on 8th October 2025.

9. The alleged breach occurred on 4th November 2025, the day before the scheduled inter-partes hearing the following day. I find that the Respondents reasonably believed they were acting lawfully under the Proclamation Notice issued on 2nd September 2025, as the 14-day statutory period had long expired. While the Auctioneers were shown the 7th October 2025 order, I find that the Respondents' actions were arguably driven by a genuine, even though incorrect, belief that the subsequent 8th October 2025 order superseded the earlier injunction. As stated, contempt requires a deliberate defiance of the court, not a mistaken belief in the legality of one's actions.

10. The moment the Applicant paid the outstanding arrears of Kshs.1,622,378.00 on 4th November 2025, the 2nd Respondent immediately discontinued the attachment, vacated the premises and did not cart away or sell any goods. This lack of malice or continued defiance supports the conclusion that their conduct was not willful contempt, but rather a lawful albeit misguided execution of a distress order based on the documents they held.

11. Further, the Respondents deponed that the Applicant withdrew the Tribunal proceedings on 5th December 2025 and was ordered to pay costs which they contend is an abuse of process. While this was not the main reason for dismissal, I find that it weakens the Applicant's equity because having abandoned the forum where the order was issued, the Applicant's pursuit of contempt in this court is rather suspect.

12. In any event, there is a clear conflict between the order dated 7th October 2025 with the injunction and the order dated 8th October 2025 without the injunction. When a party acts on a version of an order that lacks the prohibitory clause, the court cannot easily infer that their subsequent actions were willful and malicious. I am in agreement with the Respondents’ submission that as established in Mutitika v Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KECA 60 (KLR), any doubts must be resolved in favor of the alleged contemnor, especially where liberty is at stake. In sum, I find that the Applicant has failed to prove the element of willfulness and deliberateness beyond the required standard. The Respondents acted on a version of the court order that did not contain the injunction and ceased immediately upon payment.

Conclusion & Disposition

13. The upshot is that the Respondents are not in contempt of court and the Application dated 27th January 2026 stands dismissed with costs to the Respondents.

DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED virtually this 26th DAY OF OCTOBER

2026

............................................................................

J W W MONGARE

JUDGE

In the presence of;

1. N/A for the Applicant

2. N/A for the Respondents

3. Abdisalan- Court Assistant

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