Civil law

Ngesa v Mutua [2026] KEHC 16946 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Civil Appeal E129 of 2025
Judgment date
26 October 2026
Judge(s)
J W W Mongare

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Background

In the subordinate court, the Respondent filed suit against the Appellant stating that the Appellant was the registered owner of motor vehicle KDJ ***V, a Toyota Matatu and that on 3rd December 2022, the Respondent was a pedestrian lawfully walking along Machakos Bus Park when the Appellant or his driver/agent negligently drove the vehicle and hit him. The Respondent claimed that the Appellant was driving at excessive speed, that he…

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Reasoning passage

In the upshot, I find that the appeal partially succeeds to the extent of substituting liability at 50:50 instead of 80:20. The Appellant is also awarded half the costs of this appeal assessed at Kshs. 10,000.00

Paragraph 22 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CIVIL DIVISION (APPELLATE SIDE)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. E129 OF 2025

BETWEEN

VICTOR BABI NGESA….……….............................................................APPELLANT

AND

SILA MUTUA………………….………………………………………RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the Judgement and Decree of Hon. J. Omburah, SPM dated 7th May 2025 at the Magistrates Court at Machakos in MCCC No. E304 of 2023)

JUDGMENT

Introduction and Background

1. In the subordinate court, the Respondent filed suit against the Appellant stating that the Appellant was the registered owner of motor vehicle KDJ ***V, a Toyota Matatu and that on 3rd December 2022, the Respondent was a pedestrian lawfully walking along Machakos Bus Park when the Appellant or his driver/agent negligently drove the vehicle and hit him. The Respondent claimed that the Appellant was driving at excessive speed, that he failed to keep a proper lookout for other road users, that he failed to maintain proper control, that he failed to stop, slow down or swerve and that he caused the accident. The Respondent also invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2. The Respondent pleaded that as a result of the accident, he sustained blunt injuries to the right wrist joint with tenderness, fractured right ulna bone (styloid process) and blunt injury to the right ankle joint. He also pleaded special damages amounting to Kshs.11,030.00 that he sought together with general damages, costs and interest.

3. In his defence, the Appellant Admitted ownership of the vehicle but stated that at the material time the driver was Mr. Antony Mwangi, his employee. He denied that the Appellant was a pedestrian lawfully walking and denied negligent driving. He claimed that on 3rd December 2022, the Respondent, a tout at Machakos Bus Park, while seemingly drunk, recklessly attempted to board a moving matatu travelling ahead of the Appellant’s vehicle, missed a step and fell right in front of the Appellant’s vehicle, which was not in motion and that the Respondent then allegedly staged an accident by lying beneath the Appellant’s vehicle and refusing to move and that the County Government askaris eventually removed him.

4. The Appellant stated that the driver reported the incident to the police and took the vehicle for inspection at NTSA, where it was cleared of defects. He denied the application of res ipsa loquitur absent specific compelling circumstances and for these aforementioned reasons, he prayed that the suit against him be dismissed. After hearing the parties, the subordinate court rendered judgment on 7th May 2025 where it found it undisputed that the Respondent was at the scene, that the motor vehicle was present, that the Respondent was injured and that the police abstract showed an accident involving a pedestrian and the subject vehicle.

5. The Learned Magistrate preferred the Respondent’s account of the accident, reasoning that the driver admitted the Respondent was carried by County askaris from under his vehicle, creating the possibility the vehicle ran over or contacted him, that there was no reason to report to the police if no accident occurred and that the defence failed to call eye witnesses despite many being available at the bus park. The subordinate court further held that the NTSA inspection showing the vehicle was "proper" was not conclusive that it could not have hit the Plaintiff. That the injuries in the P3 form were consistent with being hit, that the Appellant’s driver could have joined the other matatu's owner/driver as a third party but did not and the Learned Magistrate found it unclear how the accident happened and held the Respondent contributed to it, apportioning liability 80% against the Appellant and 20% against the Respondent.

6. On quantum, the subordinate court awarded general damages of Kshs.550,000.00 for pain and suffering and after considering inflation and the medical report which indicated a fracture of the right ulna plus soft tissue injuries, categorized as "maim" with permanent incapacity not assessable as treatment was ongoing. The subordinate court also awarded special damages of Kshs.7,840.00 which it stated were pleaded and proven. In sum, the Respondent was awarded Kshs.557,840.00, reduced by 20% contributory negligence, plus costs and interest.

7. The Appellant is aggrieved with these findings and appeals to the court through his Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th June 2025. He avers that the Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to appreciate that the Police Abstract did not expressly state that the motor vehicle was to blame for the accident, that he erred in law by shifting the burden of proof to the Appellant and in apportioning 80% liability on the Appellant when there was no evidence directly linking the Appellant to the accident.

8. Further that the Learned Magistrate erred by failing to give due regard to the Appellant's version of events and fully relying on the Respondent's word as absolute truth, that he erred by failing to appreciate that too much time had passed between the accident and the medical examination, so the injuries could have been sustained elsewhere and that he erred by failing to properly analyze the Plaintiff's evidence, which was full of inconsistencies, leading to a wrong conclusion. The Appellant also contends that the Learned Magistrate erred in awarding Kshs.550,000.00 general damages, which was too high and unjustified in the circumstances. For these reasons, the Appellant seeks that the Appeal be allowed, that the judgment of the subordinate court be set aside in its entirety and that costs of the appeal be borne by the Respondent.

9. The court directed that the appeal be canvassed by way of written submissions and I have considered the same together with the record and I will make relevant references to them in my analysis and determination below.

Analysis and Determination

10. As submitted by the Appellant, in determining this appeal, I am cognizant of the role of this court as a first appellate court which is to re-evaluate and re-assess the evidence before the court of first instance. At the same time, I also need to keep in mind the fact that the trial court interacted first hand with the parties (see Selle v. Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123)

11. The Appellant submits that he has collapsed the grounds of appeal to two issues; whether the trial court erred in law and fact by apportioning liability on the Appellant and; whether the trial court erred in law by awarding General Damages which was too excessive in the circumstances. On liability, a court’s finding and assessment is dependent on the facts and evidence available and the court considers causation and blameworthiness. This was held by the Court of Appeal in Isabella Wanjiru Karanja v Washington Malele [1983] KECA 72 (KLR)  where it was stated:

There are two elements in the assessment of liability, namely causation and blameworthiness. See Baker v Willoughby// [1970] AC 467. In my opinion there can be no excuse for the driver’s complete failure to see the pedestrian, or for the pedestrian’s complete failure to see the car. I would not disagree with the learned judge’s finding that the appellant’s speed was excessive in the circumstances, but the failure to keep a proper look out would seem to be the predominant factor.

12. In a different decision, the Court of Appeal in Rukwaro & another v Maina [2025] KECA 177 (KLR) also held as follows:

“…in this appeal, it is clear that the determination of the appeal revolves around the question of liability.

15. Section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act provides that:

Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.

16. This refers to the legal burden of proof. There is however, an evidential burden of proof which is captured in Sections 109 and 112 of the Evidence Act as follows:

109.The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of the fact shall lie on any particular person.

112. In civil proceedings, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any party to those proceedings, the burden of proving or disproving the fact is upon him.

17. The two provisions were dealt with in the decision of Anne Wambui Ndiritu –vs- Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi & Another [2005] 1 EA 334, in which this Court held as follows:

“As a general proposition under Section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. There is however the evidential burden that is case upon any party the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence which is captured in Sections 109 and 112 of the Act.”

18.It follows that the general rule is that the initial burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, the appellants in this appeal, but the same may shift to the respondent depending on the circumstances of the case. In the persuasive High Court case of Evans Nyakwana –vs- Cleophas Bwana Ongaro [2015] eKLR it was held that:

“ As a general preposition the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. That is the purport of Section 107 (i) of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 Laws of Kenya. Furthermore, the evidential burden…is cast upon any party, the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence. That is captured in Section 109 and 112 of law that proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person…The appellant did not discharge that burden and as Section 108 of the Evidence Act provides the burden lies in that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given as either side.”

19. However, as held by this Court in Michael Hubert Kloss & Another vs. David Seroney & 5 Others [2009] eKLR:

“The determination of liability in a road traffic case is not a scientific affair. Lord Reid put it more graphically in Stapley vs. Gypsum Mines Ltd (2) (1953) A.C. 663 at p. 681 as follows:

‘To determine what caused an accident from the point of view of legal liability is a most difficult task. If there is any valid logical or scientific theory of causation it is quite irrelevant in this connection. In a court of law this question must be decided as a properly instructed and reasonable jury would decide it…The question must be determined by applying common sense to the facts of each particular case. One may find that as a matter of history several people have been at fault and that if any one of them had acted properly the accident would not have happened, but that does not mean that the accident must be regarded as having been caused by the faults of all of them. One must discriminate between those faults which must be discarded as being too remote and those which must not. Sometimes it is proper to discard all but one and to regard that one as the sole cause, but in other cases it is proper to regard two or more as having jointly caused the accident. I doubt whether any test can be applied generally…”

13. The Appellant submits that the Respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof under sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act to directly link the Appellant's motor vehicle to the accident and that the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof onto the defense. The Appellant points out that the Respondent failed to call crucial witnesses, including the police officer who investigated the matter or independent eyewitnesses at the Machakos Bus Park, despite the incident being heavily disputed. That a negative inference should be drawn against the Respondent for failing to call the investigating officer.

14. The Appellant maintains that the Respondent, working as a tout and seemingly intoxicated, tried to board a moving vehicle, missed a step, fell in front of the Appellant's stationary motor vehicle and staged an accident by lying underneath it. He submits that the trial court erred in interpreting the driver's statement that the Respondent was pulled out from under the car by County askaris as an admission of fault. Furthermore, that the trial court based its finding on a mere possibility that the vehicle ran over the Respondent, which was never pleaded in the Plaint. The Appellant submits that if any blameworthiness is found and because both parties failed to conclusively prove how the accident occurred, liability should have been apportioned equally.

15. On his part, the Respondent maintains that he proved his case on a balance of probabilities and that he testified that on the material day, while lawfully walking along the Machakos Bus Park road, he was hit due to the negligent driving of the motor vehicle. The Respondent maintains that the Appellant failed to call the mentioned County Askaris as witnesses to corroborate the driver's claim that the Respondent fell on his own, nor did the Appellant bring alternative parties into the suit. The Respondent counters the Appellant's argument regarding the police abstract by stating that a police abstract serves to confirm an accident was reported and negligence can still be independently proved. That the trial court rightly used it to confirm the occurrence of the undisputed accident, not to assign blame. The Respondent submits that the trial court evaluated the evidence properly and its apportionment of 80% liability to the negligent motorist and 20% to the circumstances was sound, lawful and warranted.

16. Having gone through the record and the submissions, I note that in his evidence, the Appellant’s driver admitted in cross-examination that that the Respondent was found underneath his vehicle. I find that this is a physical fact placing the vehicle in contact with, or over, the Respondent and it is what distinguishes this case from the decision of Madison Insurance Company Kenya Ltd v Mwendwa (Suing as the legal representative of the Estate of Yvonne Musangi Nzembei - Deceased) [2022] KEHC 16095 (KLR), cited by the Appellant, where the declaratory defendant was a stranger to the insured and the plaintiff had led no evidence connecting them. In this case, there is no dispute that the subject vehicle and driver were the Appellant's.

17. It is also my finding that the driver's version that the Respondent was drunk, chasing another matatu, staged the accident and had to be pulled out by askaris was wholly uncorroborated. I cannot fault the trial court for drawing an adverse inference from that omission and the Appellant's submission that the burden was shifted onto him is only partly right as the evidential burden legitimately shifted once the Respondent had placed the vehicle over him and shown injuries as a result of the accident. However, I am inclined to agree with the Appellant that considering the trial court itself held that “Since it is not clear from the pleadings or the plaintiff's evidence the circumstances that led to the accident or how he was hit one may have some questions to ask...” it follows that the 80:20 apportionment was generous to the Respondent on scanty evidence. I agree that the Court of Appeal in Stephen Obure Onkanga v Njuca Consolidated Limited [2013] KECA 475 (KLR) reiterated that “…where there was no concrete evidence to distinguish between the blameworthiness or otherwise of the two drivers both should be held equally to blame. Accordingly, in the instant appeal, as there was no concrete evidence to distinguish between the blameworthiness or otherwise of the appellant or the respondent, both should be held equally to blame. Similarly, and in the present case, since the blameworthiness between the parties was hazy, equal blame on a 50:50 basis is the principled outcome and I will therefore disturb the apportionment of the subordinate court and substitute it as such.

18. On quantum, I am in agreement with the Respondent’s submission that in Butt v Khan [1978] KECA 24 (KLR), the Court of Appeal set out the general principles upon which an appellate court can interfere with an award of damages as follows:

An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the judge proceeded on wrong principles, or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect, and so arrived at a figure which was inordinately high or low.

19. The Supreme Court, in Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General [2022] KESC 78 (KLR) endorsed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a “Meru Express Services (1976)” & another v Lubia & another (No 2) [1985] KECA 137 (KLR) where it was held as follows:

‘‘The principles to be observed by an appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial judge were held by the former Court of Appeal of Eastern Africa to be that it must be satisfied that either that the Judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one, or that, short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage.’’

20. The apex court also cited with approval the decision of the Supreme Court of the UK in Robert Perekebena Naidike vs The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, [2004] UKPC 49 where it was stated that:

‘‘A court of appeal must be satisfied that: the trial judge either misdirected himself/herself on the relevant facts of law (took irrelevant facts into consideration or ignored relevant (emphasis added) one or misinterpreted or misapplied some relevant legal principle), or the trial judge’s assessment of damages is a ‘wholly erroneous estimate.’’

21. A court should further be mindful to make fair and consistent awards in line with the principle that similar injuries must attract similar awards (see Nyamete & another v Ogutu [2024] KEHC 2639 (KLR). From the record, I find that the Respondent's cited cases; Mary Akinyi Atella v Omondi Beatrice Monica [2021] KEHC 1550 (KLR), George Raini Atungu v Jared Ogwoka Ondari [2021] KEHC 1612 (KLR) and Eagle Vet Kenya Limited & another v Munyoki [2022] KEHC 14967 (KLR) are materially comparable to a fractured ulna styloid plus soft tissue injuries and had awards ranging from between Kshs.500,000.00 and Kshs.800,000.00. The Appellant's own comparators, that is, Paul Kipsang Koech & Another v Titus Osule Osore [2013] KEHC 3561 (KLR) where Kshs.200,000.00 was awarded for a broken incisor and soft tissue and Joseph Mutua Nthia v Fredrick Moses M. Katuva [2019] KEHC 4154 (KLR) where Kshs.400,000.00 for lost teeth and soft tissue involve lesser bony injury and are therefore weaker comparators. I therefore find that the subordinate court took inflation and comparable awards into account and I find no reason why the award of general damages should be disturbed.

Conclusion and Disposition

22. In the upshot, I find that the appeal partially succeeds to the extent of substituting liability at 50:50 instead of 80:20. The Appellant is also awarded half the costs of this appeal assessed at Kshs. 10,000.00

DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED virtually this 26th DAY OF OCTOBER

2026

............................................................................

J W W MONGARE

JUDGE

In the presence of;

1. Mr. Osumba for the Appellant

2. N/A for the Respondent

3. Abdisalan- Court Assistant

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