Civil law

Ndambuki v Directline Assurance Company Limited & another [2026] KEHC 16917 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Civil Appeal E251 of 2025
Judgment date
27 October 2026
Judge(s)
J W W Mongare

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Background

The Appellant, through the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2025 seeks to stay the execution of the subordinate court’s judgment and decree issued by the Small Claims Court on 17th July 2025 in SCCC No. E1528 of 2024 – Machakos and all consequential orders issued in SCCC No. E1325 of 2025 pending the hearing and determination of this appeal.

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Question before the court

After careful consideration of the pleadings and the rival submissions I note that the principal issue for determination is whether the Appellant has established a valid basis for this court to grant an order for stay of execution. However, I note that the Respondent has averred that the present application is res judicata as the Appellant had filed an application dated 4th August 2025 seeking the same orders but the same was dismissed…

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Reasoning passage

On the face of the pleadings and submissions, I find that the issue stay of execution was directly and substantially the same in this court and the subordinate court, that the parties in both applications are the same, that the issue was heard and determined by the subordinate court and the subordinate court had jurisdiction to determine the application. However, I find that the first application sought stay pending the declaratory…

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SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the stay application was barred by res judicata because an earlier stay application had been dismissed by the Small Claims Court; and, if properly before the High Court, whether the Appellant satisfied the requirements for stay of execution pending…

Material facts

Following an accident on 10 December 2021 involving the Appellant’s motor vehicle KDB ***X and the 1st Respondent’s vehicle KDA ***E, judgment was entered against the Appellant. The subordinate court’s judgment was delivered on 30 June 2025 and a decree for…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CIVIL DIVISION (APPELLATE SIDE)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.E251 OF 2025

BETWEEN

DAMOUS MBALU NDAMBUKI..........………………….………………APPELLANT

AND

DIRECTLINE ASSURANCE

COMPANY LIMITED……………………………………………....1ST RESPONDENT

BLISSMAKS SERVICES LIMITED………………………….……….2ND RESPONDENT

RULING

Introduction & Background

1. The Appellant, through the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2025 seeks to stay the execution of the subordinate court’s judgment and decree issued by the Small Claims Court on 17th July 2025 in SCCC No. E1528 of 2024 – Machakos and all consequential orders issued in SCCC No. E1325 of 2025 pending the hearing and determination of this appeal.

2. The application is supported by the grounds on its face and the supporting affidavit of the Appellant sworn on 16th October 2025 and it is opposed by the 2nd Respondent through the replying affidavit of its advocate, Joseph N. Ngugi sworn on 4th December 2025. The parties have also supplemented their arguments by filing written submissions which I have considered and I will be making relevant references to the same in my analysis and determination below.

Analysis and Determination

1. After careful consideration of the pleadings and the rival submissions I note that the principal issue for determination is whether the Appellant has established a valid basis for this court to grant an order for stay of execution. However, I note that the Respondent has averred that the present application is res judicata as the Appellant had filed an application dated 4th August 2025 seeking the same orders but the same was dismissed for lack of merit on 18th September 2025. Germane to this determination is section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act which provides that:

No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them can claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.

2. Therefore, for the doctrine of res judicata to apply; the issue was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; the former suit was between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim; the parties were litigating under the same title; the issue was heard and finally determined in the former suit; and the court that previously heard and determined the issue was competent to try the suit in which the issue is raised (see Gichuki v Gichuki [1982] KECA 37 (KLR) and Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai & 5 Others [2017] KECA 477 (KLR)]. It is also not lost that the same principles apply with equal force to applications and the Court of Appeal, in Uhuru Highway Development Limited v Central Bank of Kenya, Exchange Bank Ltd (Involuntary Liquidation) & Kamlesh Mansukhlal Pattni [1996] KECA 102 (KLR) held that “…..once an application for injunction within a suit has been heard and determined under the principles laid down in Giella v. Cassman-Brown, a similar application cannot be brought unless there are new facts, not brought before the court earlier after exercise of due diligence, which merit a re-hearing and possible departure from the previous ruling.”

3. The Supreme Court, in Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & another v Muiri Cofee Estate Limited & 3 others [2016] KESC 6 (KLR) summed it all up by stating that the doctrine of res judicata, in effect, allows a litigant only one bite at the cherry. It prevents a litigant, or persons claiming under the same title, from returning to Court to claim further reliefs not claimed in the earlier action. It is a doctrine that serves the cause of order and efficacy in the adjudication process. The doctrine prevents a multiplicity of suits, which would ordinarily clog the Courts, apart from occasioning unnecessary costs to the parties; and it ensures that litigation comes to an end, and the verdict duly translates into fruit for one party, and liability for another party, conclusively.

4. On the face of the pleadings and submissions, I find that the issue stay of execution was directly and substantially the same in this court and the subordinate court, that the parties in both applications are the same, that the issue was heard and determined by the subordinate court and the subordinate court had jurisdiction to determine the application. However, I find that the first application sought stay pending the declaratory suit in the Small Claims Court whereas the present application seeks stay pending appeal in this court which are different reliefs in different proceedings. The Small Claims Court could not have granted stay pending appeal to this court because the appeal had not yet been filed and this court has appellate jurisdiction and is the appropriate court to grant stay pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides as follows:

No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.

5. If the doctrine of res judicata is applied strictly, the second limb of Order 42 Rule 6(1) above would be rendered nugatory because every refused application from the subordinate would automatically be res judicata and the appellate court could never exercise its statutory jurisdiction. A statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a way that renders it inoperative and I find that the correct interpretation is that Order 42 Rule 6(1) creates a special statutory regime for stay pending appeal that operates outside the ordinary res judicata framework. The trial court's refusal is not a final determination of the issue for purposes of res judicata but a precondition to the appellate court's jurisdiction.

6. In this case, the Appellant filed an application dated 4th August 2025 in SCCC No. E1325 of 2025 seeking stay meaning the trial court was moved first and a decision on the stay rendered on 18th September 2025. The Appellant then filed the present appeal and application seeking stay pending appeal and the appellate court's jurisdiction was triggered under the second limb of Order 42 Rule 6(1). I find that res judicata does not apply because Order 42 Rule 6(1) expressly contemplates a second application after refusal and because the appeal itself is a new proceeding constituting a change in circumstances. It is therefore my finding that the Appellant's application is properly before the court and the Respondent’s res judicata objection fails. The Appellant complied with the compulsory step of moving the trial court first and the trial court refused the application. This court is now seized of jurisdiction under Order 42 Rule 6(1) to consider the application on its merits.

7. As stated, the legal framework for granting a stay of execution pending appeal is well settled under Order 42 Rule 6 above. The Appellant must demonstrate that he will suffer substantial loss if the order is not granted, that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and that he is willing to provide such security as the court may order for the due performance of the decree.

3. These principles were enunciated in Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1979] KECA 22 (KLR) where the Court of Appeal stated what ought to be considered in determining whether to grant or refuse stay of execution pending appeal. The court said that:-

1. The power of the court to grant or refuse an application for a stay of execution is discretionary; and the discretion should be exercised in such a way as not to prevent an appeal.

2. Secondly, the general principle in granting or refusing a stay is, if there is no other overwhelming hindrance, a stay must be granted so that an appeal may not be rendered nugatory should the appeal court reverse the judge’s discretion.

3. Thirdly, a judge should not refuse a stay if there are good grounds for granting it merely because, in his opinion, a better remedy may become available to the applicant at the end of the proceedings.

4. Finally, the Court in exercising its discretion whether to grant or refuse an application for stay will consider the special circumstances and its unique requirements. The court in exercising its powers under Order XLI Rule 4(2) (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules, can order security upon application by either party or on its own motion. Failure to put security of costs as ordered will cause the order for stay of execution to lapse.

4. The background of facts is common that the subordinate court delivered judgment on 30th June 2025 followed by a decree issued on 17th July 2025 for Kshs. 475,412.00 inclusive of costs and interest. The Appellant's motor vehicle, KDB ***X, was involved in an accident on 10th December 2021 with the 1st Respondent’s vehicle KDA ***E and the latter sued the Appellant and judgment was entered against him. The Appellant then filed SCCC No. E1325 of 2025 against the insurer, the Respondents, seeking a declaration that his insurer is statutorily obligated to settle the decretal sum under the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act (Chapter 405 of the Laws of Kenya). The Appellant filed an application dated 4th August 2025 for stay of execution in the declaratory suit, which was dismissed through the ruling delivered on 18th September 2025.

5. The Appellant contends that the Respondent has engaged auctioneers who have proclaimed, attached and prepared a notification of sale of the Appellant's motor vehicle KDB ***X, that warrants of attachment and sale have been issued to realize Kshs.475,412.00 and the Appellant is apprehensive that the motor vehicle will be sold before the declaratory suit is heard and determined, rendering the suit nugatory. That the motor vehicle is the Appellant's only source of income and that it is the sole duty of the insurer to satisfy the decretal amount, that the Respondents will not suffer prejudice if the orders are granted and it is in the interest of justice that the orders sought are granted.

6. In response, the Respondent depones that the Appellant has not laid any sufficient basis to warrant the orders sought and that the Appellant has failed to explain how he is aggrieved by the Ruling of the subordinate court. Further, that the Appellant has not shown sufficient cause to enable the court to grant stay of execution as provided under Order 22 Rule 22 of the Rules and that the Respondent stands to be greatly prejudiced by the delay that may be occasioned if the application is granted.

7. The Respondent states that in accordance with the doctrine of privity of contract, it is not privy to the insurance contract between the Appellant and the insurer and is therefore not bound by its terms. That disputes arising from the contract between the Appellant and the insurer should not impede the execution of valid court orders and that the cause of action is between the Appellant and the Respondent. The Respondent contends that it will be highly prejudiced if the court stays execution of a valid decree on grounds emanating from a suit to which they are not a party and whose issues do not relate to them.

8. The Respondent states that while the Appellant is entitled to seek declaratory orders against the insurer, such rights do not bar the Respondent from proceeding with execution of a valid decree against the Appellant and the Appellant is not barred by any law from settling the decretal amount and then suing the insurer for breach of contract and/or indemnity subject to the terms of their policy.

9. The Respondent states that the application is a ploy meant to delay and/or frustrate the cause of justice and is founded on grounds the Respondent is a stranger to. That the Appellant has neither refuted that the warrants of sale of property in execution of a decree for money were issued to M/S Racksam Auctioneers nor challenged the procedure undertaken in execution of the said warrants in satisfaction of the decree in Machakos SCCC No. E1528 of 2024. Therefore, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any justifiable reason that could stop the ensuing execution and that the instant application is incompetent, brought in bad faith, an afterthought and an abuse of court's process and it should be dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

10. Having gone through the pleadings and submissions, I find that the Ruling by the subordinate court was delivered on 18th September 2025 and the present application was filed on 16th October 2025 which is approximately 28 days later. I find that this is not unreasonable delay, especially considering the time needed to obtain the proceedings and file the appeal. On substantial loss, I find that the Appellant stands to lose his livelihood and the subject matter of the appeal and if sold, the vehicle will be transferred to third parties, rendering the appeal nugatory. On security, the Appellant has not expressly offered security, however, the court has discretion to order security as a condition for stay. The Appellant's insurer is a reputable insurance company and the declaratory suit seeks to establish its obligation to pay.

11. I note that the Appellant relies on the decision in Philip Kimani Gikonyo v Gateway Insurance Company Limited [2007] KEHC 1612 (KLR) to argue that the insurer is statutorily bound to settle the decretal sum. Going through this decision, while this case does establish that an insurer may be liable under section 10(1) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act, it does not directly address the issue of stay of execution pending appeal. However, the case is relevant to the underlying appeal as it supports the Appellant's argument that the insurer should pay. The stay application is merely to preserve the status quo pending the determination of that appeal. Further, whereas the Respondent is indeed a stranger to the insurance contract, the issue is not whether the Respondent is bound by the contract, but whether execution should be stayed to preserve the subject matter of the appeal. The Respondent's right to execute a valid decree is not absolute and it is subject to the court's discretion to stay execution where substantial loss may occur and the appeal would otherwise be rendered nugatory.

12. Therefore, balancing the interests of the parties, I find that the same tilts in favour of the Appellant because the motor vehicle is the subject matter of the appeal or is at least central to it and if it is sold, the appeal would be rendered nugatory and the Appellant would have nothing to recover even if successful. The Respondent can be compensated by costs for any delay and the Appellant's insurer is a reputable company capable of satisfying the decree if the appeal fails.

Conclusion and disposition

13. I am therefore inclined to grant a stay if the Appellant shall within 30 (thirty) days from the date of this ruling deposit the entire outstanding sum of Kshs.475,412.00 into an interest-earning joint account in the names of the advocates for the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent failing which the stay shall lapse automatically and the 2nd Respondent shall be at liberty to execute. Costs will be in the cause.

DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED virtually this 27th DAY OF OCTOBER

2026

............................................................................

J W W MONGARE

JUDGE

In the presence of;

1. Ms. Maina holding brief for Ms. Jeptoo for the Appellant

2. N/A for the Respondent

3. Abdisalan- Court Assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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