Civil law

Mwangangi v Mutula [2026] KEHC 16955 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Civil Case E019 of 2025
Judgment date
27 October 2026
Judge(s)
J W W Mongare

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Background

The court is being called upon to determine two applications; The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 31st October 2025 that seeks the court to strike out and expunge the Defendant’s Defence dated 18th August 2025 and enter judgment in favour of the Plaintiff as prayed in the Plaint dated 19th June 2025, with interest and costs. In the alternative, the Plaintiff urges the court to enter judgment on admission under Order 13 Rule 2 of the…

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Question before the court

Having found the above, it would not be appropriate for me to consider the substantive issue of whether or not the pleadings disclose a reasonable cause of action.

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Reasoning passage

From the pleadings and submissions, the court is being called to determine whether the defence should be struck out or whether judgment should be entered on account of admission by the Defendant and; whether the defence should be amended. First, I note that the Plaintiff’s application is grounded on inter alia Order 2 Rule 15(1) (a) of the Rules and that Order 2 Rule 15(2) provides that “No evidence shall be admissible on an…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CIVIL CASE NO. E019 OF 2025

BETWEEN

ANNE YULA MWANGANGI………………………………….………….PLAINTIFF

AND

MARGARET KANINI MUTULA………………………………….…… DEFENDANT

RULING

Introduction and Background

1. The court is being called upon to determine two applications; The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 31st October 2025 that seeks the court to strike out and expunge the Defendant’s Defence dated 18th August 2025 and enter judgment in favour of the Plaintiff as prayed in the Plaint dated 19th June 2025, with interest and costs. In the alternative, the Plaintiff urges the court to enter judgment on admission under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules (“the Rules”) based on the Defendant's express admission in her Defence.

2. This application is supported by affidavits of the Plaintiff sworn on 31st October 2025 and 5th March 2026 and it is opposed by the Defendant through her replying affidavit sworn on 4th January 2026. The other application is that of the Defendant filed through the Notice of Motion dated 16th March 2026 seeking to amend her Defence in terms of the annexed draft Amended Statement of Defence. The application is supported by the Defendant’s advocate, Fred K. Musyimi, sworn on 16th March 2026 and it is opposed by the Plaintiff through her replying affidavit sworn on 19th June 2026. The applications have been canvassed by way of written submissions that I have considered together with the pleadings and I will be making relevant references to the same in my analysis and determination below.

Analysis and Determination

3. From the pleadings and submissions, the court is being called to determine whether the defence should be struck out or whether judgment should be entered on account of admission by the Defendant and; whether the defence should be amended. First, I note that the Plaintiff’s application is grounded on inter alia Order 2 Rule 15(1) (a) of the Rules and that Order 2 Rule 15(2) provides that “No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subrule (1) (a) but the application shall state concisely the grounds on which it is made.” This means that the court is only limited to taking into account grounds set out in body of the application and no regard is given to affidavits or documents filed together with the application. In short, an application founded on the ground that a pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action must not be supported by an affidavit and any application under Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) that is accompanied by an affidavit is defective and liable to be struck out (see Ringsview Apartments Limited v KCB Bank Kenya Limited & 4 others [2024] KEHC 4025 (KLR)] and Devshibhai & Sons Limited v Muhugu Limited & another [2025] KEHC 15566 (KLR)]

4. In Devshibhai & Sons Limited(supra), the court (Visram J.,) held as follows:

The [2nd Defendant’s] application invokes Order 2, rule 15(1)(a) yet is accompanied by a supporting affidavit. In Olympic Escort International Co. Ltd (supra), the Court of Appeal held that such a combination renders the application defective and liable to be struck out in the following terms:-

“ Mr. Wamalwa reiterated in his submissions before us that it was improper to invoke Order 6 r 13 (1) (a) when there was affidavit evidence on record which the superior court analysed in arriving at its decision. Mr. Sevany on the other hand found no impropriety in combining the two prayers since it was expressly stated in the application that the only basis for seeking the order for striking out was because the defence was a bare denial. We think for our part that it was inappropriate to combine the two prayers, one of which requires evidence before a decision is made and one that does not. There was affidavit evidence on record and it was in fact considered by the learned judge. It matters not therefore that the Applicant had stated that the affidavits should not be considered. As the prayer sought under order 6 rule 13 (1) (a) was in contravention of sub rule (2) of that order, it was not for consideration and we would have similarly struck out the application on that score."(Emphasis mine)

13. A similar position was reaffirmed in Crescent Construction Co. Ltd (supra), where the court held the following:-

“Be that as it may, in all cases brought under Order VI Rule 13(1) (a), the court is obliged in law to look at no evidence i.e. no affidavit or any evidence from the bar in considering whether or not a Plaint or a pleading raises a cause of action. The court must look at the pleadings only and not go beyond the pleadings. The predecessor to this Court stated in the case of Jevaj Shariff & Co. v Chotail Pharmacy Stores (1960) EA 374 as follows: “The question whether a Plaint discloses a cause of action must be determined upon a perusal of the Plaint alone, together with anything attached so as to form part of it, and upon the assumption that any express or implied allegations of fact in it are true.” This is proper because once the court incorporates evidence in its consideration of the pleading at this stage, then the aim of the rule which is to dispose of unnecessary and baseless litigation speedily will be defeated.”

14. The rationale for the above, is because prejudice must be guarded against, and it will be very difficult for the Court to consider the other grounds based on the evidence produced, and then after having reviewed the same, go on to disabuse itself of that material when considering the ground of disclosing no reasonable cause of action under rule 15 (1) (a).

15. Accordingly, I find that by introducing affidavit evidence, the 2nd Defendant’s application offends the mandatory provisions of Order 2, rule 15(2) and is procedurally incompetent.

16. Having found the above, it would not be appropriate for me to consider the substantive issue of whether or not the pleadings disclose a reasonable cause of action.

5. I am in agreement with the holding of my colleague judge above that an application under Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) that is accompanied by an affidavit is defective and liable to be struck out. Further, as the Court of Appeal in Olympic Escort International Co. Ltd(supra) explained, it is inappropriate to combine prayers; one requiring evidence under subrules (b), (c) and (d) and one that does not under subrule (a). The court cannot consider the affidavit evidence for the (b), (c), (d) grounds and then disabuse itself of that material when considering the (a) ground as this is a fundamental procedural flaw. I therefore strike out the prayers that seek to strike out the defence under Order 2 Rule 15 as the prayers are defective and it would be inappropriate for the court to consider the substantive issue of whether or not the pleadings disclose a reasonable cause of action.

6. However, I will not strike out the entire application since the Plaintiff is also seeking judgment on admission under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Rules which is a separate and independent basis for the application. This prayer is born out of the Defendant’s Defence which the Plaintiff avers concludes with the prayer that "the Plaintiff's suit be allowed as admitted" and she characterizes this as a categorical, unambiguous concession of the entire claim, leaving no triable issue. In response, the Defendant depones that this was an inadvertent editing error, not a genuine concession of liability hence the reason why they have moved the court to amend the defence.

7. I am in agreement with the Defendant’s submission that the Rules grant the court discretionary power to allow amendment of pleadings as follows under Order 8 Rule 3(2) and (5) and Rule 5:

Amendment of pleading with leave [Order 8, rule 3]

(2) Where an application to the court for leave to make an amendment such as is mentioned in subrule (3), (4) or (5) is made after any relevant period of limitation current at the date of filing of the suit has expired, the court may nevertheless grant such leave in the circumstances mentioned in any such subrule if it thinks just so to do.

……….

(5) An amendment may be allowed under subrule (2) notwithstanding that its effect will be to add or substitute a new cause of action if the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has already been claimed in the suit by the party applying for leave to make the amendment.

……

5. General power to amend [Order 8, rule 5]

(1) For the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, or correcting any defect or error in any proceedings, the court may either on its own motion or on the application of any party order any document to be amended in such manner as it directs and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as are just.”

8. The Court of Appeal, in Elijah Kipngeno Arap Bii v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2013] KECA 345 (KLR)  held as follows in respect of amendment of pleadings:

The law on amendment of pleading in terms of section 100 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order VIA rule 3 of the repealed Civil Procedure Rules under which the application was brought was summarized by this Court, quoting from Bullen and Leake & Jacob's Precedents of Pleading - 12th Edition, in the case of Joseph Ochieng & 2 others vs. First National Bank of Chicago, Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1991 as follows:-

“The ratio that emerges out of what was quoted from the said book is that powers of the court to allow amendment is to determine the true, substantive merits of the case; amendments should be timeously applied for; power to so amend can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings (including appeal stages); that as a general rule, however late, the amendment is sought to be made it should be allowed if made in good faith provided costs can compensate the other side; that the proposed amendment must not be immaterial or useless or merely technical; that if the proposed amendments introduce a new case or new ground of defence it can be allowed unless it would change the action into one of a substantially different character which could more conveniently be made the subject of a fresh action; that the plaintiff will not be allowed to reframe his case or his claim if by an amendment of the plaint the defendant would be deprived of his right to rely on Limitation Acts.”

9. Going through the draft amended defence, I would agree with the Defendant that the proposed amendment corrects a prayer that is inconsistent with the body of the Defence that would otherwise result in judgment on admission. The Defence was filed 18th August 2025 and the amendment was sought 16th March 2026 which is approximately 7 months. While this is a delay, I find that the same not necessarily "undue" given the circumstances. The Defendant acted after the Plaintiff filed her application, but the Court of Appeal in Central Kenya Ltd v Trust Bank Ltd & 5 others [2000] KECA 367 (KLR), cited by the Plaintiff, held that “mere delay is not a ground for declining to grant leave. It must be such delay as is likely to prejudice the opposite party beyond monetary compensation in costs.”

10. I also find that the proposed amendment does not introduce a new cause of action or defence as it merely corrects a prayer to align with the denials already pleaded in the body of the Defence. The Plaintiff further submits that she acquired a "vested right" to judgment on admission when the Defence was filed and that the court in Central Kenya Ltd(supra) cautioned that amendments should not affect vested interests or accrued legal rights. The question is thus whether the Plaintiff's right to apply for judgment on admission is a "vested right" or merely a procedural advantage. In my view, given that the admission was an obvious error that is inconsistent with the rest of the Defence, the court finds that the Plaintiff has not acquired a substantive vested right that cannot be compensated by costs.

11. I also find that any prejudice occasioned on the Plaintiff can be assuaged by an award of costs. All in all, I find that the Defendant's explanation of an inadvertent editing error is plausible as the body of the Defence contains no admission and the prayer is clearly inconsistent and I find her application to be made in good faith. I will therefore allow the Defendant to amend the defence as annexed in her deposition, meaning that the dmission ceases to exist and the basis for judgment on admission evaporates and this prayer is now moot.

Conclusion and Disposition

12. In the foregoing, I now issue the following dispositive orders:

1) The Plaintiff's application dated 31st October 2025 is struck out

2) The Defendant's application dated 16th March 2026 is allowed.

3) The Defendant is granted leave to amend her Statement of Defence dated 18th August 2025 in terms of the draft annexed and the same is deemed as filed and served upon the Plaintiff

4) Costs of both applications shall be in the cause

DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED virtually this 27th DAY OF OCTOBER

2026

............................................................................

J W W MONGARE

JUDGE

In the presence of;

1. Mr. Katunga Mbuvi for the Plaintiff/Applicant

2. N/A for the Defendant/Respondent

3. Abdisalan- Court Assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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