Civil law

Saba Gifco Ltd v Mutunda Transporters and Suppliers Ltd [2026] KEHC 17484 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Civil Case E004 of 2023
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
E. N. Maina

Case research

Open case research →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

The plaintiff, Saba Gifco Limited, claims damages from the defendant, Mutunda Transporters and Suppliers Limited, for material damage arising from a road traffic accident on 14th June 2021 at about 3:00 pm near Kapiti Plains along the Mombasa–Nairobi highway. The plaintiff's prime mover, registration number UAT 603M, pulling trailer UBF 774Q and on its way from Mombasa to Kampala, collided with the defendant's prime mover, registration…

Paragraph 1 →

Decision / orders

The receipts are in Ugandan shillings, and PW1 said the fuel was paid for in dollars and converted at the rate on the day of the accident. Special damages in Kenya shillings must be proved at the amount actually spent, and the conversion workings are not in evidence. I therefore allow each item only to the extent that the receipt supports the Kenya shillings amount claimed, as shown in the table.

Paragraph 59 →

Reasoning passage

The plaint names Saba Gifco Limited as the plaintiff and as the owner of the truck. PW1 said the plaintiff is a Uganda-based company, and the defendant's own driver identified the oncoming vehicle as Saba Gifco's. The defendant did not call evidence to show that the truck belonged to anyone else, and did not take the point in its submissions. I find that the plaintiff is the company that owned and operated the truck.

Paragraph 24 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CIVIL CASE NO. E004 OF 2023

SABA GIFCO LIMITED …………………………………………….. PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

MUTUNDA TRANSPORTERS AND SUPPLIERS LTD ……… DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff, Saba Gifco Limited, claims damages from the defendant, Mutunda Transporters and Suppliers Limited, for material damage arising from a road traffic accident on 14th June 2021 at about 3:00 pm near Kapiti Plains along the Mombasa–Nairobi highway. The plaintiff's prime mover, registration number UAT 603M, pulling trailer UBF 774Q and on its way from Mombasa to Kampala, collided with the defendant's prime mover, registration number KCL 855M.

2. Each side blames the other driver. The plaintiff says the defendant's driver negligently collided with its vehicle while it was being driven lawfully on its own lane. The defendant says its driver swerved to avoid a collision caused by other vehicles on the road, and that the plaintiff's driver drove too fast and kept no proper lookout.

3. The plaintiff pleads that it owns UAT 603M and trailer UBF 774Q and that the defendant owns KCL 855M. It pleads that on or about 14 June 2021 its vehicle was being lawfully driven along the Mombasa–Nairobi highway when the defendant's vehicle, negligently driven by the defendant's agent, servant or driver, rammed it head on. It pleads res ipsa loquitur and that the defendant is vicariously liable. It pleads that Rally Motors Assessors valued the vehicle before the accident at Kshs 4,000,000, assessed salvage at Kshs 400,000 and repairs at Kshs 3,846,850, and found it a constructive total loss. It pleads that demand was made and notice of intention to sue given. It claims special damages of Kshs 4,598,839.37 under fifteen items, loss of use of Kshs 17,563,350 (Kshs 29,175 a day for 602 days to the date of filing), costs, and interest on the special damages and the loss of use at court rates from the date of filing until payment in full.

4. The suit was heard virtually. The plaintiff called two witnesses, Kassim Mohamed Yamany (PW1) on 29 September 2025 and Johnson Maina (PW2) on 10 March 2026. The defendant called its driver (DW1) on 10 March 2026 and closed its case the same day. Both sides filed written submissions, and on 14 May 2026 the matter was mentioned and this date was fixed for judgment.

5. PW1, Kassim Mohamed Yamany. PW1 is a logistics businessman based in Kampala. He adopted his witness statement dated 23 February 2023 and produced the plaintiff's documents numbered 3, 4, 6 and 7 as exhibits P3, P4, P6 and P7. He testified that the defendant is to blame for the accident, that the truck was a complete write-off, that it was used mainly for long-distance carriage of goods and was earning income the plaintiff no longer earns, and that neither the defendant nor its insurer disputes the accident. He asked to be put back in the position he was in before the accident.

6. On cross-examination he said he was not at the scene and did not see the accident. He said the truck was lawfully registered and was being lawfully driven. He said it had loaded a container at Mombasa port for Kampala, that rates for loading and carriage vary from hire to hire, and that the truck is not now in use. He had not attached repair receipts, only the valuation, because the truck was not repaired. He said it was insured, with two insurers (third party and COMESA), but no evidence of insurance was produced and he could not see a certificate in his bundle.

7. PW1 explained the permit and voucher items as follows. Exhibit 7B is a Kenya National Highways Authority receipt for Kshs 20,000, which he said allowed a second vehicle to travel to Machakos to collect the damaged truck. He said the receipt is dated 2 June 2021. A Ugandan facilitation payment for the permit was made under cash payment voucher 15683 for UGX 170,000. Voucher 15684 is for UGX 680,000. The plaintiff is a Uganda-based company and so the receipts are in Ugandan shillings. The Rally Motors assessment was paid under voucher 15857 dated 22 June 2021. The fuel receipts were incurred after the accident and relate to a fleet of vehicles, but he claims only for the accident truck. He said he put the total at Kshs 4,598,000, excluding loss of business, being the replacement of the vehicle and the salvage. He had photographs of the vehicle in the yard but did not have them with him.

8. In re-examination he said the vehicles involved are named in the police abstract, that the defendant was blamed in it, that the plaintiff had to hire another vehicle to deliver the goods and another to bring the damaged truck to Uganda, that fuel was paid in dollars and converted at the rate on the day of the accident, and that photographs of each damaged part are attached to the assessor's report.

9. PW2, Johnson Maina. PW2 is a licensed motor vehicle assessor trading as Rally Motors Assessors, with 31 years' experience. On 19 June 2021 he was instructed by telephone by Saba Gifco Limited to assess UAT 603M, a MAN prime mover. He inspected it at a workshop in Nairobi. The cabin was entirely damaged and the chassis bent. Forty-nine parts worth Kshs 3,316,250 needed replacing, which with 16% VAT came to Kshs 3,846,850. He declared the truck a total loss as uneconomical to repair. He put the pre-accident market value at Kshs 4,000,000 and the salvage value at Kshs 400,000. His photographs are attached to his report dated 21 June 2021, which he produced as exhibit P5.

10. On cross-examination he said he holds a current licence and had attached the licence in force when he did the assessment. He has no letter of instruction because the instruction was by telephone. He said the owner of the vehicle is Saba Gifco Limited and that he could not remember who the plaintiff in this suit is, as it had been a while. No repairs were done because the truck was a total loss. He attached no documents to confirm the price of the parts, which he took from the open market. On the question of his fees, he said the receipt is dated 28 June 2021 and he was paid in Kenya shillings. In re-examination he said the parts prices came from various open markets.

11. The police officer could not attend. By consent of both counsel the police abstract was produced as exhibit P1. The plaintiff then closed its case.

12. The defendant denies the plaint generally, admits paragraphs 1 and 2 only as a description of the parties, and says it is a stranger to the ownership of both vehicles. It denies that its vehicle rammed the plaintiff's vehicle and denies the particulars of negligence. In the alternative it pleads that the plaintiff was solely to blame, with particulars: driving too fast, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to see KCL 855M in time, failing to give warning, failing to stop, slow down or swerve, and breaching the Traffic Act and the Highway Code. It denies the special damages and the loss of use, says it is a stranger to any demand or notice of intention to sue, and says it will oppose costs. It admits jurisdiction.

13. DW1, Joseph Musyimi. DW1 comes from Mwingi in Kitui County and has been a driver for 16 years. He testified in Kiswahili as a witness for the defendant and adopted his witness statement dated 22 May 2023 as his evidence in chief.

14. On cross-examination he said he was driving KCL 855M in the course of his employment, heading to Mombasa on the left lane. At Kapiti there was a stationary lorry on the left side of the road, whose registration number he did not take. A truck overtook him on the right, and he did not see its number either. He was driving at about 60 kph. He said the overtaking driver did not see the stationary truck ahead, which was partly on and partly off the road, and applied emergency brakes. The overtaking truck was in front of DW1's vehicle and very near, so DW1 swerved to the right so as not to ram into it. He then met an oncoming vehicle, which hit his vehicle because he had not swerved fully, on its left side. He said the oncoming vehicle belonged to Saba Gifco and was on its right lane heading towards Nairobi. There was no re-examination. DW1 did not say anything about the speed of the plaintiff's vehicle or about whether its driver kept a lookout.

15. The defendant called no other witness and closed its case on 10 March 2026. The court directed that written submissions be filed and exchanged and fixed 14 May 2026 for mention to give a judgment date.

The Submissions

16. The plaintiff submits on liability that the police abstract of 15 June 2021 blamed the defendant's vehicle and, relying on Kibichi v Mathai [2024] KEHC 4065 (KLR), that an abstract filled by trained officers and unrebutted by other evidence is sufficient on a balance of probabilities. It says DW1 admitted swerving into the plaintiff's lane and did not deny that the plaintiff's vehicle was on its correct lane. It relies on William Kabogo Gitau v George Thuo & 2 Others [2010] 1 KLR 526 for the standard of proof, on Anne Wambui Ndiritu v Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi [2004] eKLR and Rahab Micere Murage v Attorney General [2012] eKLR on the burden and on well-driven vehicles not being involved in accidents without cause, and on Embu Public Road Service Ltd v Riimi [1968] EA 22 for res ipsa loquitur. It says that if the defendant wished to blame the other vehicles it should have instituted third-party proceedings.

17. On special damages it submits that the loss was pleaded and proved by the assessment report and receipts, and that the evidence of the vehicle's total loss was not rebutted. It cites Scarce Commodities Ltd & another v Augustus Wafula Wambati [2022] eKLR (quoting Nkuene Dairy Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd v Ngacha Ndeiya) and Jogoo Kimakia Bus Services Ltd v Electrocom International Ltd [1992] KLR 177. On loss of user it submits that the award is discretionary and in the nature of general damages, citing Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger [2017] eKLR, and that the vehicle's replacement would cost significantly more than the daily income lost. It asks for judgment for Kshs 22,167,189.37 plus costs and interest.

18. The defendant submits that the accident was mainly caused by the plaintiff's driver, who it says was driving too fast and failed to keep a proper lookout when DW1 swerved to avoid a stalled truck and an overtaking vehicle. It relies on Zarina Akbarali Shariff v Noshir Pirosesha Sethna [1963] EA 239 and Masembe v Sugar Corporation [2002] 2 EA 434, and on the Joshua Mulinge Itumo (2021) decision that a driver on his own side must still keep a proper lookout. It asks for liability to be apportioned 50:50.

19. On quantum it relies on Hahn v Singh [1985] KLR 716 that special damages must be strictly proved. It says some documents are defective: the KENHA permit receipt bears registration UAT 486Z, not UAT 603M, and some documents are company invoices rather than third-party receipts. On loss of user it relies on David Bagine v Martin Bundi, Chumba & another v Kwick Servess Shuttle Ltd (2024) and Ryce Motors Ltd & another v Elias Muroki [1996] eKLR that the claim is special damages and must be strictly proved. It says the plaintiff, which it describes as a properly established business operating in Kenya and Uganda, produced no accounts, and asks that the claim be dismissed. It also says it received no demand letter or offer to settle and that each party should bear its own costs.

Issues for determination

20. The pleadings, evidence and submissions raise these issues:

(i) Whether the plaintiff owned the vehicle and is the proper party to sue.

(ii) Who was to blame for the accident, whether the plaintiff's driver contributed to it, and whether the defendant is vicariously liable.

(iii) What special damages and loss of use the plaintiff has proved, and whether interest is payable.

Analysis and determination

21. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record, the testimonies, the submissions and the law, the analysis is as follows.

22. The plaintiff must prove its case on a balance of probabilities (sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act), and the same standard applies to the defendant on any fact it asserts, including contributory negligence.

23. The defence pleads that the defendant is a stranger to the ownership of both vehicles. The plaintiff produced no registration record or logbook for UAT 603M or trailer UBF 774Q. The motor vehicle search it produced (P4) is for the defendant's vehicle, KCL 855M. The evidence on ownership is PW1's statement that the truck was lawfully registered and DW1's evidence that the oncoming vehicle belonged to Saba Gifco.

24. The plaint names Saba Gifco Limited as the plaintiff and as the owner of the truck. PW1 said the plaintiff is a Uganda-based company, and the defendant's own driver identified the oncoming vehicle as Saba Gifco's. The defendant did not call evidence to show that the truck belonged to anyone else, and did not take the point in its submissions. I find that the plaintiff is the company that owned and operated the truck.

25. No witness for the plaintiff saw the collision. PW1 was not there, and the plaintiff's driver was not called. The only eyewitness is DW1, and his own evidence settles the central facts. He was driving towards Mombasa on his left lane at about 60 kph. A truck that had overtaken him was, after braking, in front of him and very near. He swerved to the right to avoid it, and his vehicle was struck by the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle because he had not swerved fully. The defendant accepts in its submissions that the plaintiff's driver was on his rightful lane. On a road with one lane in each direction, a swerve to the right is a move into the lane of oncoming traffic. In my view, therefore, the collision happened because the defendant's vehicle was in the plaintiff's lane.

26. The defendant says DW1 acted in an emergency created by a stationary lorry and the overtaking truck. I am not satisfied that this answers the claim, for four reasons. First, this account is not pleaded: the defence says only that the plaintiff was solely to blame. Second, neither vehicle was identified, DW1 took no registration number, and no other evidence supports his account of what they did. Third, DW1's evidence as recorded does not say that he braked, and the submission that he tried to brake but could not because of the weight of his prime mover is not part of the recorded evidence. Fourth, even on his account the overtaking truck was very near him, and a driver who responds by crossing into the opposing lane takes the risk onto the oncoming traffic. A driver who does that must show that it was the only reasonable course, and DW1 did not.

27. The police abstract (P1) was produced by consent without its maker. It records KCL 855M as blamed. It is only a record of the investigators' initial view and does not bind the court, but it is consistent with DW1's own account that his vehicle crossed into the plaintiff's lane, and I use it to support that eyewitness account. For the same reason I do not need to rely on res ipsa loquitur.

28. The plaintiff says the defendant should have joined the other drivers as third parties. A defendant may rely on another's fault as a defence without joining that person, but it must prove it. Here the other vehicles are untraced and unproved, and I cannot apportion fault to them.

29. I find that DW1 negligently drove KCL 855M into the lane of oncoming traffic and so caused the collision.

30. The defendant asks that the plaintiff bear half the blame. The defence pleads that the plaintiff drove too fast and kept no proper lookout, but no evidence was given on either point. DW1 did not say how fast the plaintiff's vehicle was travelling or what its driver did, there was no police witness, and no reconstruction or measurement was produced. Submissions are not evidence.

31. Zarina Akbarali Shariff (supra), Masembe (supra) and Joshua Mulinge Itumo (supra) state the duty of a driver on his own side to keep a lookout and to drive at a speed that lets him avoid a collision that becomes apparent. That duty is not in doubt. But the defendant must prove a breach of it, and nothing before me shows one. On DW1's own account the swerve was sudden, made when the overtaking truck was very near, and it took his vehicle into the lane of a driver who was where he was entitled to be. The defendant's submission that DW1 swerved successfully and was struck on the rear left is also at odds with DW1's own account that he had not swerved fully.

32. I decline to find contributory negligence. Liability rests wholly on the defendant.

33. DW1 said he was driving KCL 855M in the course of his employment. The motor vehicle search (P4) lists the defendant as a registered owner of KCL 855M, together with a financier, The Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited, and the police abstract names the defendant as the owner.

34. On the meaning of vicarious liability, I am guided by the Court of Appeal in John Nderi Wamugi v Ruhesh Okumu Otiangala & 2 others (Civil Appeal 24 of 2015) [2015] eKLR, which held:

“vicarious liability is a doctrine in the law of torts that assigns liability for an injury to a person who did not personally cause the injury but who has a particular legal relationship to the person who acted negligently. Such liability is not pegged on ownership, but on the legal relationship, for example between an employer and an employee.”

35. The Court referred to the definition in Black's Law Dictionary, 9th edition, at page 998:

“Liability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.”

36. Where the driver of a vehicle is not shown to be the owner's servant, the owner remains liable if the driver was acting on the owner's behalf. In Abdi Ali Dere v Firoz Hussein Tundal & 2 others (Civil Appeal 310 of 2005) [2013] eKLR the Court of Appeal approved the statement of du Parcq LJ in Hewitt v Bonvin & another [1940] 1 KB 188:

“The driver of a car may not be the owner's servant, and the owner will be nevertheless liable for his negligent driving if it be proved that at the material time he had authority, express or implied, to drive on the owner's behalf.”

37. In the same judgment the Court cited the presumption stated in Karisa v Solanki [1969] EA 318 at page 322:

“Where it is proved that a car has caused damage by negligence, then in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a presumption arises that it was driven by a person for whose negligence the owner is responsible.”

38. On the evidence, DW1 said he was driving KCL 855M in the course of his employment, the defendant is a registered owner and is named as the owner in the police abstract, and the defendant gave no evidence that DW1 was driving for a purpose in which it had no interest. DW1 was therefore driving on the defendant's business, and the defendant is vicariously liable for his negligence.

39. The threshold for special damages is settled. I am guided by the Court of Appeal in Capital Fish Kenya Limited v The Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited (Civil Appeal 189 of 2014) [2016] eKLR, where the Court held:

“it is trite law that special damages must not only be specifically pleaded, they must also be strictly proved with as much particularity as circumstances permit.”

40. On damages to a motor vehicle, how they are proved and who proves them, the Court of Appeal in Nkuene Dairy Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd & another v Ngacha Ndeiya (Civil Appeal 154 of 2005) [2010] eKLR held:

“In our view special damages in a material damage claim need not be shown to have actually been incurred. The claimant is only required to show the extent of the damage and what it would cost to restore the damaged item to as near as possible the condition it was in before the damage complained of.”

“The experience of the Assessor was not challenged and we think Onyancha J. was right in describing him as an expert, and his report as being opinion evidence. The court had the right to accept or reject his opinion if the circumstances so dictated.”

41. In the foregoing, the plaintiff needed not only to plead special damages specifically but also to prove them strictly, with as much particularity as possible. Secondly, there is no need to show that the material damage has actually been incurred, but the plaintiff must show the extent of the damage and the cost of restoring the damaged item, not to an identical level as before the accident but as near as possible to it. The plaintiff pleaded fifteen items whose amounts add up to Kshs 4,598,840.08, which is 71 cents more than the pleaded total of Kshs 4,598,839.37. The pleaded total is the sum claimed and I take it as the ceiling.

42. The measure of loss for a vehicle that is not worth repairing is also settled in Concord Insurance Company Limited v David Otieno Alinyo & another (Civil Appeal 163 of 2002) [2005] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal set out the principle stated in Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 at page 1070:

“The principle is that of restitution integrum, that is to say, to put the plaintiff in the same position as though the damage never happened. It has come to be settled that in general the measure of damages is the cost of repairing the damaged article, but there is an exception if it can be proved that the cost of repairs greatly exceeds the value in the market of the damaged article. This arises out of the plaintiff's duty to minimise his damages.”

43. In looking at the value to be awarded for a lost profit-earning vehicle, the Court of Appeal in Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra) cited Halsbury's Laws of England at paragraph 13 of its judgment and entered the loss of the vehicle in its own award as a net figure:

“The measure is the value of the Chattel to the owner as going concern at the time and place of the loss so that he might be in a position to purchase a replacement.”

44. On the deduction of salvage, the Court of Appeal in Abdi Ali Dere v Firoz Hussein Tundal & 2 others (supra) stated:

“In the present appeal, the assessor had put the pre-accident value of the appellant's lorry at Kshs 2,600,000/- less Kshs 270,000/- which was recovered from the sale of the salvage, leaving a claim of Kshs 2,330,000/- which is what the appellant would have required to replace his lorry at the date and time of the accident.”

45. I am persuaded by the decision of Justice Janet Mulwa in Permuga Auto Spares & another v Margaret Korir Tagi (Civil Appeal 288 of 2010) [2015] eKLR, where the learned Judge held:

“It is the courts view that once a vehicle has been written off, the only compensation is the per-accident [sic] value, less salvage value as assessed and other reasonable consequential expenses that are subject to prove.”

46. The plaintiff attributes Kshs 3,846,850 to the "replacement cost" of the vehicle and claims a further Kshs 400,000 as salvage. Those two figures come from the assessor's report (P5): the first is his repair estimate for forty-nine parts (Kshs 3,316,250 plus 16% VAT) and the second is his salvage value. They are not the cost of replacing the truck. My own calculation is different and is set out below: the pre-accident value of Kshs 4,000,000 less the salvage of Kshs 400,000, which is Kshs 3,600,000/-.

47. First, a plaintiff cannot recover both the cost of repair and the value of a vehicle that has been written off. PW2 found the truck uneconomical to repair and declared it a total loss, PW1 said it was not repaired, and no repair invoice was produced. The measure of loss is the pre-accident value of Kshs 4,000,000 less the salvage of Kshs 400,000 that the plaintiff keeps, which is Kshs 3,600,000.

48. Second, the figure claimed (Kshs 4,246,850 for the vehicle alone) is more than the vehicle was worth before the accident. Salvage is a value the plaintiff retains, not a further loss. The claim for salvage of Kshs 400,000 therefore fails.

49. The plaint pleads the Rally Motors valuation: a pre-accident value of Kshs 4,000,000, salvage of Kshs 400,000, repairs of Kshs 3,846,850 and a constructive total loss. The pre-accident value and the salvage are therefore pleaded. An award of Kshs 3,600,000 rests on pleaded facts and is below the pre-accident value of the vehicle.

50. On the figures alone, the repair estimate of Kshs 3,846,850 is below the pre-accident value of Kshs 4,000,000, so the cost of repair does not exceed the market value of the truck. The question is whether repair was a reasonable course for an owner who must mitigate its loss. Repair would cost Kshs 3,846,850 and restore a truck worth Kshs 4,000,000. Replacement would cost Kshs 4,000,000, and the wreck would sell for Kshs 400,000, a net cost of Kshs 3,600,000, which is Kshs 246,850 less than repair. PW2 also found the cabin entirely damaged and the chassis bent, and declared the truck uneconomical to repair. PW1 said it was not repaired, and the defendant led no evidence that repair was reasonable. I accept PW2's opinion and find the truck a total loss. The loss to be compensated is therefore the net sum of Kshs 3,600,000, and not the repair estimate of Kshs 3,846,850.

51. PW2 gave the pre-accident market value of Kshs 4,000,000 and the salvage value of Kshs 400,000 in his evidence and in his report (P5), and the same figures are pleaded. He is a licensed assessor with 31 years' experience, and his experience was not challenged. The cross-examination of PW2 covered his licence, the absence of a letter of instruction, the source of the part prices and his fees, and not his valuation of the truck. The defendant called no evidence of a different value. I therefore give the assessor's valuation credibility. The defendant's objection that the part prices were taken from open markets without documents goes to the repair estimate, which is not the basis of the award. The plaintiff did not produce a logbook for the vehicle or evidence of its purchase price or age, so the valuation is the only evidence of value. I accept the pre-accident value and salvage figures. I award Kshs 3,600,000 under this head, being Kshs 4,000,000 less Kshs 400,000.

52. The remaining thirteen items total Kshs 351,990.08. They are:

Item (as pleaded)

Claimed (Kshs)

Allowed (Kshs)

Breakdown/recovery charges

10,080.24

10,080.24

Permit

25,000.00

nil

Assessor's fees

20,000.00

20,000.00

Escort

11,764.71

11,764.71

Fuel

54,704.00

54,704.00

Crane hire

58,000.00

58,000.00

Mileage (UAT 603M)

47,700.00

47,700.00

Mileage (replacement vehicle)

53,000.00

53,000.00

COVID test

5,000.00

nil

Security

46,044.12

46,044.12

NTSA search

5,000.00

5,000.00

Police abstract

15,147.01

15,147.01

Alteration

550.00

550.00

Total

351,990.08

321,990.08

53. Each of these items is pleaded with an amount. Whether each is proved is addressed below.

54. The plaintiff's list of documents includes receipts and vouchers for these items (item 7, (a) to (o). PW1 explained them in evidence, and the defendant's challenge was limited. It says the KENHA receipt bears registration UAT 486Z and not UAT 603M, that the COVID test relates to UAT 620M, that some documents are company invoices and not third-party receipts, and that the crane hire is Kshs 58,800 against the Kshs 58,000 pleaded. I take the crane hire at the pleaded Kshs 58,000.

55. The plaintiff may recover the losses that the accident caused to UAT 603M and the costs that flowed reasonably and directly from it. These include the costs of recovering the damaged truck, being the breakdown and recovery charges, the crane hire, together with the assessor's fees, the police abstract and the NTSA search. They also include the incidental costs of moving the truck and the cargo, such as the hire of an alternative vehicle to deliver the goods and to bring the truck to Uganda. The permit item of Kshs 25,000 is made up of a KENHA receipt of Kshs 20,000 issued to Saba Gifco for prime movers, and a facilitation fee of Kshs 5,000 for processing a special load permit for UAT 486Z and UAT 482Z. PW1 said the permit was to allow a vehicle to travel to Machakos to collect the damaged truck. The KENHA receipt (exhibit 7B), which the plaintiff produced, and PW1's own evidence show that the Kshs 20,000 was paid on 2 June 2021, twelve days before the accident of 14 June 2021. A payment made before the accident cannot be a cost of recovering a truck that was damaged on 14 June 2021. It was already incurred before the accident and is not tied to recovery. The facilitation fee was for processing the same permit and falls with it. The permit of Kshs 25,000 is therefore disallowed. The COVID test of Kshs 5,000 relates to UAT 620M, which is not the vehicle in the claim, and PW1 gave no explanation for it. It is also disallowed.

56. The assessor's fees are claimed at Kshs 20,000. That is the amount on the Rally Motor Assessors invoice of 21st June 2021 that forms part of the assessment report (P5), which shows professional fees of Kshs 20,000 and nothing else. PW2 stated in cross-examination that he was paid Kshs 53,000, but that is not what is pleaded under this item, and a plaintiff cannot recover more than it pleaded. I rely on the invoice and allow the assessor's fees at the pleaded Kshs 20,000.

57. On the defendant's submission that some documents are company invoices or vouchers and not third-party receipts, the Court of Appeal in Abdi Ali Dere v Firoz Hussein Tundal & 2 others (supra) held:

“In our opinion it is not correct to say, as the trial court did, that in all and sundry cases a payment voucher cannot be evidence of payment.”

58. PW1 explained the vouchers and the defendant did not seriously challenge him on them. They carry less weight than a third party's receipt, but together with his oral evidence they suffice.

59. The receipts are in Ugandan shillings, and PW1 said the fuel was paid for in dollars and converted at the rate on the day of the accident. Special damages in Kenya shillings must be proved at the amount actually spent, and the conversion workings are not in evidence. I therefore allow each item only to the extent that the receipt supports the Kenya shillings amount claimed, as shown in the table.

60. The special damages allowed are summarized as follows:

Head

Claimed (Kshs)

Allowed (Kshs)

Vehicle (pre-accident value of Kshs 4,000,000 less salvage of Kshs 400,000)

4,246,850.00

3,600,000.00

Other items

351,990.08

321,990.08

Total

4,598,839.37

3,921,990.08

61. The plaintiff claims Kshs 17,563,350, being Kshs 29,175 a day for 602 days. This is much more than the value of the vehicle itself.

62. The parties disagree on whether loss of use is general or special damages. The plaintiff relies on Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra). The defendant relies on Ryce Motors Ltd & another v Elias Muroki Motors (supra), David Bagine v Martin Bundi (Civil Appeal 283 of 1996) [1997] eKLR and Chumba & another v Kwick Servess Shuttle Ltd (2024). The Court of Appeal has set a different threshold under each label, and I set out both.

63. On the first label, that loss of use is special damages, the Court of Appeal in David Bagine v Martin Bundi, (supra) held:

“We must and ought to make it clear that damages claimed under the title ‘loss of user’ can only be special damages. That loss is what the claimant suffers specifically. It can in no circumstances be equated to general damages to be assessed in the standard phrase ‘doing the best I can’. These damages as pointed out earlier by us must be strictly proved.”

64. On the second label, that loss of use is general damages, the Court of Appeal in Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra) at paragraph 16 held:

“The loss of use of a profit making chattel such as a lorry or matatu through an accident is similarly a claim in general damages. The standard of proof in such claims is on balance of probabilities and the principle of restitutio in integrum is applied in such cases.”

65. The defendant relied on Ryce Motors Ltd & another v Elias Muroki Motors (supra) for the proposition that the claim is special damages and must be strictly proved. The Court of Appeal in Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra) at paragraph 19 did not follow Ryce Motors on that point, as the Court found that decision inconsistent with its earlier decisions. I therefore do not place reliance on it.

66. The plaint pleads Kshs 29,175 a day from 14th June 2021 until replacement and particularizes 602 days, so the claim is pleaded as special damages require.

67. On the first label the loss must be strictly proved, as held in David Bagine v Martin Bundi (supra) and as Capital Fish Kenya Limited v The Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited Fish (supra) requires of special damages generally. PW1 said the truck was used for long-distance carriage and earned income, but also said that rates differ from hire to hire. He did not say what the truck earned, how often it travelled, or what costs it avoided while it was off the road. There were no accounts, trip records, freight contracts, invoices for loads carried or bank statements, and no witness explained how Kshs 29,175 was arrived at. The demand letter (P3) claimed USD 250 a day, which is a different figure and currency from the one pleaded. The claim fails the special damages threshold.

68. A claim for a specific daily sum for a stated number of days is a claim for a particular, quantified loss of income hence special damages. The plaintiff pleaded it as one, and it has to be proved as one. On either view, however, the plaintiff must still show that it lost income because the vehicle was out of use, and the amount of that loss. I do not need to decide which label is right, because the claim fails on proof under both.

69. Were the court also to consider the loss of use as general damages, the standard is a balance of probabilities, and even there a mere assertion does not suffice. Some proof of earnings is needed, such as of each trip made, of what the vehicle earned on each trip, and of the expenses incurred per day, including the cost of fuel and fees paid, as was the case in Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra) at paragraph 20, where the Court of Appeal accepted oral evidence without documents because the owner gave this evidence, which the plaintiff here did not give:

“He gave evidence of the routes he was operating – Nairobi, Thika Matuu and that he was making three trips a day. He also gave evidence of what the vehicle earned for each trip and the expenses incurred per day including the cost of fuel and the fees he paid for the stage.”

70. PW1 did not say what route the truck ran, how many trips it made, what it earned on a trip or what it cost to run. On a balance of probabilities there is no basis on which I can find a daily income of Kshs 29,175 or any other figure.

71. In any case, the Court of Appeal further considered as follows at paragraph 13 in Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra), citing Halsbury's Laws of England:

“The value of prospective future earnings of the lost chattel cannot merely be added to the market value since the earning capacity of the chattel will have been taken into account in arriving at its capitalised value and mere addition would result in duplication.”

72. The plaintiff seeks the value of the vehicle in this judgment, and an award of the vehicle's value together with more than two and a half times its value again every year in lost use at the pleaded daily rate would put the plaintiff in a better position than before the accident, which for the reasons discussed above is declined.

73. I am also persuaded by the decision of Justice Janet Mulwa in Permuga Auto Spares & another v Margaret Korir Tagi (supra), where the learned Judge further held:

“The circumstances of this matter are different. It is the courts view that once a vehicle has been written off, the only compensation is the per-accident [sic] value, less salvage value as assessed and other reasonable consequential expenses that are subject to prove. There would ordinarily be assessment charges, towing charges, excess but not loss of user. The payment of the pre-accident value is made to bring the owner to as near as possible to the state he would have been if not for the accident and loss. In the court's view, to award damages for loss of user as well as the pre-accident value and other consequential losses would be to award double compensation. The claim for loss of user is disallowed.”

74. The plaintiff is awarded the pre-accident value less salvage and the reasonable consequential expenses proved. An award for loss of use on top of that would be double compensation for the same loss.

75. The plaint pleads loss from 14 June 2021 until replacement and counts 602 days. In this regard I am guided by the Court of Appeal in David Bagine v Martin Bundi (supra), where the Court held:

“Damages for loss of user of a chattel can be limited (if proved ) to a reasonable period which period in this instance could only have been the period during which the respondent's lorry could have been repaired plus some period that may have been required to assess the repair costs.”

76. I am also guided by Samuel Kariuki Nyangoti v Johaan Distelberger (supra) at paragraph 22, where the Court added:

“There are no reasons given for claiming loss of use for one year or the steps the appellant took to mitigate the damages. In Chinese Technical Team for Kenya National Sports Complex, a period of 6 months was considered as a reasonable period for computing loss of user of a matatu which we also consider to be reasonable for this case.”

77. Even if lost earnings were proved, a plaintiff must act reasonably to reduce its loss. A vehicle declared a total loss on 21 June 2021 could have been replaced within a reasonable time. The plaintiff gave no reasons for the days claimed and no evidence of any steps to replace the truck, and it cannot recover for years of loss that it chose not to mitigate.

78. The plaintiff herein did not mitigate its loss or prove its lost earnings, and so even an award for loss of use of a commercial vehicle for a reasonable period while a replacement was found fails. This court therefore finds that the plaintiff has not proved its loss of use, the claim of Kshs 17,563,350 is dismissed, and any alternative award fails for lack of proof.

Costs and interest

79. Costs follow the event unless the court orders otherwise (section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act). The plaintiff has succeeded on liability and on the main part of its special damages, though not on the vehicle claim as pleaded or on loss of use. The defendant says it had no demand or offer of settlement, but the plaintiff's list of documents includes a demand letter and a notice of intention to sue, and the defendant did not call evidence to deny receiving them. I see no reason to depart from the general rule, and the plaintiff will have the costs of the suit.

80. Special damages carry interest from the date of filing of the suit, as prayed, because they are a loss already incurred when the suit was filed. Interest will run at court rates until payment in full.

Disposition

81. For the reasons above, judgment is entered in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant as follows:

1. Liability 100%.

2. Material damages for loss of the motor vehicle: Khs.3,600,000/-.

3. Special Damages: Kshs.321,990.08.

4. Claim for the salvage and loss of user are dismissed.

5. Interest at Court rates from the date of filing suit until payment in full.

6. Costs of the suit.

Orders accordingly.

Judgment dated, signed and delivered virtually via Microsoft teams on this 29th day of October, 2026.

E. N. MAINA

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Ms Iman for Nafula for Plaintiff

Ms Kwamboka for Defendant

Miriam – Court Assistant/Interpreter

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder