Civil law

Mutiso v Otieno & another (Civil Appeal E082 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 17450 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Civil Appeal E082 of 2025
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
E. N. Maina

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Background

This is an appeal on the quantum of damages awarded to the Appellant in a claim for compensation for personal injuries. The Appellant sued the Respondents for damages arising from a road traffic accident which occurred on 28th March 2024, in which he sustained a fracture of the left humerus, fracture of the anterior and posterior maxilla, radial nerve palsy of the left limb, dental injuries with loss of teeth, and cut wounds.

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Reasoning passage

Applying these principles, since there is medical and clinical evidence, and noting that the medical officer was not able to give a percentage of effect as well as noting that the weaknesses in proof of the Appellant's salary do not defeat the claim, I find that the Appellant established a real but not extreme risk of diminished future earning capacity in his trade as a plant machine operator. The weaknesses in proof of his specific…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CIVIL APPEAL NO. E082 OF 2025

DANIEL MUENDO MUTISO …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

VIVIAN AKINYI OTIENO 1ST RESPONDENT

PAUL PETERSON OMONDI OGWENO 2ND RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Mavoko, Hon. E. Kimaiyo Suter, Principal Magistrate, in Mavoko MCCC No. E327 of 2024 delivered on 3rd April 2025)

JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal on the quantum of damages awarded to the Appellant in a claim for compensation for personal injuries. The Appellant sued the Respondents for damages arising from a road traffic accident which occurred on 28th March 2024, in which he sustained a fracture of the left humerus, fracture of the anterior and posterior maxilla, radial nerve palsy of the left limb, dental injuries with loss of teeth, and cut wounds.

2. The trial court apportioned liability at 50:50 between the Appellant and the driver of motor vehicle registration KBR 706L, there being two irreconcilable accounts of the accident and no evidence supporting a finding of greater fault on either side.

3. On quantum, the trial court awarded Kshs.1,000,000/- as general damages for pain and suffering, future medical expenses of Kshs. 350,000, and special damages of Kshs. 35,000 as pleaded. The claim for loss of future income/diminished earning capacity, quantified at Kshs. 4,500,000, was rejected in its entirety. The trial court held that the Appellant had failed to prove the degree of incapacity in that Dr. Ndeti had not assessed a percentage ratio of permanent disability since the fracture was still healing.

4. After deducting the 50% contribution from the general damages of Kshs. 1,350,000 and adding the special damages of Kshs. 35,000, the trial court entered a net award of Kshs. 710,000, with costs and interest.

Grounds of Appeal

5. The Appellant filed a Memorandum of Appeal setting out the following grounds:

“(i) The trial court erred in declining to award damages for future diminished income or earning capacity by the mere fact that the doctor did not assess or opine the percentage ratio of permanent disability.

(ii) The trial court erred in finding that failure to prove the degree of incapacity ratio is fatal to the claim, irrespective of other medical evidence tendered.

(iii) The trial court erred in fact by failing to appreciate that the uncontroverted medical evidence, including the fracture of the left humerus, the Kitengela clinical summary, Dr. Ndeti's opinion, the Appellant's age, job designation and monthly earnings, was sufficient to assess damages for future income even in the absence of a disability percentage.

(iv) The trial court erred in finding that an award for loss of future income applies only upon proof of inability to engage in any income-generating activity whatsoever.

(v) The trial court erred on the burden of proof by requiring proof beyond the balance of probabilities standard applicable in civil matters.

(vi) The trial court erred by isolating the doctor's failure to assess the degree of permanent disability as fatal to the claim, when the Appellant was still undergoing treatment.

(vii) The trial court erred by holding, inconsistently, that the degree of incapacitation is not the sole determinant factor, yet applying it as such.

(viii) The trial court erred by ignoring the binding precedent that future diminished income can be awarded without a percentage disability ratio, and even where the claimant remains employed.”

The Submissions

6. The Appellant's counsel submits that the trial court overlooked the binding decision of the Court of Appeal in Mumias Sugar Company Limited v Francis Wanalo [2007] eKLR, which holds that there is no fixed formula, and no requirement of a percentage disability ratio, for assessing loss of earning capacity, and that the award may be token, modest or substantial depending on the risk the injury poses to future employability, whether or not the claimant is presently employed. The Appellant relies on his age of 23 years, his trade as a plant machine operator, his monthly earnings of Kshs. 44,000, the fracture of the left humerus with metal implants requiring future removal, and Dr. Ndeti's opinion that he would not perform his duties as before the accident, as sufficient basis for an award notwithstanding the absence of a quantified disability percentage.

7. The Respondents' counsel supports the trial court's finding and submits that the Appellant did not discharge his burden of proof under sections 107, 108, 109 and 112 of the Evidence Act, relying on David Ogol Alwar v Mary Atieno Adwera & another [2021] eKLR. They further submit that his injuries occasioned no major disfigurement or degree of incapacitation, that his sole proof of employment was an unsigned, unstamped recommendation letter, that he could not name his own supervisor when cross-examined, and that his doctors neither assessed nor proposed any percentage of disability. They urge that the claim was rightly dismissed and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Issue for Determination

8. Both counsel are agreed, and this court concurs, that the appeal turns on a single issue:

(i) Whether the trial court erred in law and fact in declining to award any damages for diminished future earning capacity on the ground that the Appellant did not establish a percentage degree of permanent incapacity, and did not prove total inability to engage in any income-generating activity.

Analysis and Determination

9. This court has carefully considered the application, the affidavit, the rival submissions of the parties, the cases cited, the court record and the law, as follows:

10. This being a first appeal, this court must re-evaluate the evidence, weigh it, and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses, and should be slow to disturb findings of fact unless they were reached on no evidence or on a wrong application of legal principle, see Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123.

11. A distinction exists between an award for loss of future earnings properly so called, which compensates an ascertainable future loss and must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and an award for loss or diminution of earning capacity, which is a head of general damages compensating the risk that a disability exposes a claimant to losing present employment or to disadvantage in the labour market. The Court of Appeal in Mumias Sugar Company Limited v Francis Wanalo [2007] eKLR, citing Lord Denning MR in Fairley v John Thompson Ltd [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 40, stated:

“It is important to realize that there is a difference between an award for loss of earning as distinct from compensation for loss of future earning capacity. Compensation for loss of future earnings are awarded for real assessable loss proved by evidence. Compensation for diminution in earning capacity is awarded as part of general damages.”

12. In Mumias Sugar (supra), the Court of Appeal further held:

“Loss of earning capacity can be claimed and awarded as part of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities or as a separate head of damages. The award can be a token one, modest or substantial depending on the circumstances of each case. There is no formula for assessing loss of earning capacity. Nevertheless, the Judge has to apply the correct principles and take the relevant factors into account in order to ascertain the real or approximate financial loss that the plaintiff has suffered as a result of disability.”

13. I agree with counsel that indeed the trial magistrate erred in treating the absence of a percentage of permanent incapacity, and the absence of proof that the Appellant could not engage in any income-generating activity whatsoever, as together dispositive of the entire claim. That approach converts a single evidentiary indicator into an inflexible precondition, contrary to Mumias Sugar (supra). Nor was it open to the trial court to require proof of total employability as the threshold for any award, since the head of damage protects against a real risk of disadvantage in the labour market, not only against certain and total loss of livelihood. However, correcting the legal test does not automatically entitle the Appellant to the sums claimed. I must still assess, on the record, whether there was a real and appreciable risk that his future employability in his trade has been diminished and, if so, the sum that fairly reflects that risk.

14. In assessing the damages, I am guided by the Court of Appeal in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Service, Gathogo Kanini v A.M. Lubia and Olive Lubia [1987] KLR 30, which held:

“The principles to be observed by this appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial judge are that it must be satisfied that either the judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one, or that, short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages.”

By applying the wrong test, the trial court left out of account a relevant factor, namely the effect of the injuries on the Appellant's future earning capacity. This court is therefore justified in assessing the award afresh.

15. The following evidence in the Appellant's favour stood substantially unchallenged. He was 23 years of age at the material time, with a long working life ahead. He sustained a fracture of the left humerus requiring metal implants and future surgical removal, together with radial nerve palsy of the left limb requiring rehabilitation. The Kitengela Medical Services clinical summary of 29th March 2024 recorded that he could not use the left upper limb. Dr. Ndeti opined that the injuries had interfered with his routine duties and that, being a plant machine operator, he would not perform his duties as before the accident. Dr. Ndeti explained, without serious challenge, that he could not yet quantify a percentage of permanent incapacity because the fracture was still healing and further treatment remained outstanding. That explanation is medically coherent and does not cast doubt on the reality of the impairment.

16.The trade of a plant machine operator depends, in my opinion, on the full and coordinated use of both upper limbs. I am cognizant that the Appellant would not be able to perform his duties, or his daily activities, as he did before the accident. In quantifying that effect, I have considered that he required a metal implant which, together with the radial nerve palsy, calls for substantial rehabilitation before he can use the limb again for ordinary daily activity, let alone operate heavy plant, which demands far greater effort. Even after the implant is removed, time and sustained rehabilitation will be required to restore him to proper function. Such a fracture is capable of generating a genuine risk to continued engagement in that trade, more direct than the amputation of a finger considered in Mumias Sugar (supra), where the claimant, a former fitting apprentice, was found to face only a minimal risk in the labour market.

17. The Respondents correctly point to weaknesses in the proof of the Appellant's specific employment and earnings. The sole documentary proof was an unsigned, unstamped recommendation letter, and he could not name his immediate supervisor. These matters undermine the Appellant's case but do not extinguish his diminished earning capacity. In William J Butler v Maura Kathleen Butler [1984] KLR 225, considered in Mumias Sugar (supra), the Court of Appeal (Nyarangi Ag. JA) stated:

“The trial judge was here doing his best, to assess in monetary terms, the loss of earning capacity. It was immaterial that the respondent had not been in salaried or similar employment. This type of claim could, as Kneller JA says, be a claim on its own and the figure need not be plucked from the air, because the plaintiff would be expected to furnish the material on which a reasonable figure could be based.”

I am also persuaded by the decision of Justice L.N. Mugambi in Nyatogo v Mini Bakeries Limited (Civil Appeal E38 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 1593 (KLR), where the court held:

“Diminished earning capacity need not be specifically pleaded and proved but lost of earnings must be specifically pleaded and proved. Usually, loss of earning capacity is concerned with the effect of the injury on the person's future earning ability as opposed to the present loss. However, it is the responsibility of the respondent to demonstrate, by way of evidence, the effect that injury would have on his earnings in the future in order to get an award under that head.”

18. The trial court, at paragraph 25 of its judgment, correctly distinguished the authority the Appellant relied on for the Kshs. 4,500,000 claimed, that case having involved an assessed 50% permanent disability following amputation, a materially more serious injury than the one before this court. That distinction is sound and is not disturbed.

19. Applying these principles, since there is medical and clinical evidence, and noting that the medical officer was not able to give a percentage of effect as well as noting that the weaknesses in proof of the Appellant's salary do not defeat the claim, I find that the Appellant established a real but not extreme risk of diminished future earning capacity in his trade as a plant machine operator. The weaknesses in proof of his specific employment call for a modest, not substantial, award. Applying the principles in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Service, Gathogo Kanini v A.M. Lubia and Olive Lubia (supra), I have taken into account the relevant factors, being the Appellant's youth, the nature of his injuries, the rehabilitation required and the demands of his trade. Since the Appellant is expected to heal, the risk to his earning capacity is not permanent. I therefore restrict the award to the period from the date of this judgment until the fracture heals, which I assess at three years. An award of Kshs. 350,000 as general damages for diminished future earning capacity for that period is neither inordinately low nor inordinately high and is fair and proportionate and I so award the same.

Analysis and Determination

20. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds in part. The finding of the trial court declining to make any award for diminished future earning capacity is set aside and substituted with an award of Kshs. 350,000 as general damages for diminished future earning capacity, restricted to the period from the date of this judgment until the fracture heals, assessed at three years pending the Appellant's full recovery. The findings on liability, general damages for pain and suffering, future medical expenses, and special damages were not appealed and are affirmed.

21. The revised computation of the award upon which judgment is entered in favour of the Appellant against the Respondent is as follows:

Head of Damages

Amount (Kshs.)

General damages, pain and suffering

1,000,000/-

General damages, diminished future earning capacity

350,000/-

Future medical expenses

350,000/

Total general damages

1,700,000/-

Less 50% contribution

(850,000/-)

Net general damages after apportionment

850,000/-

Add: Special damages as pleaded

35,000/-

NET AWARD

Kshs. 885,000/-

22. The Appellant, having succeeded on the single issue raised on appeal, shall have the costs of this appeal. The costs order made by the trial court is not disturbed.

23. Interest on special damages shall be at court rates from the date of filing suit in the court below while interest on General Damages from the date of judgment in the Court below.

Orders accordingly.

Judgment dated, signed and delivered virtually via Microsoft teams on this 29th day of October, 2026.

E. N. MAINA

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Ms Nyende for the Appellant

No appearance for the Respondents

Miriam – Court Assistant/Interpreter

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