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Makobo v Inspector General of Police & 4 others (Petition E027 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 17419 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Petition E027 of 2025
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
E. N. Maina

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Background

The Petitioner, Anne Mwikali Makobo, moves this court by an amended petition dated 20th March 2025. It is supported by her amended affidavit sworn on the same date and her supplementary affidavit sworn on 7th March 2026. The petition was filed at the High Court at Thika as Petition No. E003 of 2025. It was transferred to this court by a ruling of that court dated 3rd July 2025 and registered in this court as Petition No. E027 of 2025.

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Question before the court

From the pleadings, the evidence and the submissions, the court identifies the following issues for determination:

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Reasoning passage

The court notes that the amended petition does not plead that a criminal case was withdrawn, that the Independent Policing Oversight Authority directed a re-investigation, or that an order to arrest was issued. The withdrawal and the re-investigation, however, appear in the supplementary affidavit and the submissions. Even where an averment is not denied, the Petitioner must prove her case, and as held in Mumo Matemu (supra) the burden…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION

PETITION NO. E027 OF 2025

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2, 3, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 39, 40, 47, 50, 157(11), 243, 258 AND 165 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 10, 27, 28, 29, 39, 40, 47, 50, 157(11), 238, 243, 244 AND 245 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

BETWEEN

ANNE MWIKALI MAKOBO ..........................................................PETITIONER

VERSUS

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE ....................... 1ST RESPONDENT

THE ASSISTANT CHIEF NDITHINI (MASINGA) .......... 2ND RESPONDENT

JIMNA KALOKI .................................................................... 3RD RESPONDENT

OCS CAPITAL HILL POLICE STATION ......................... 4TH RESPONDENT

THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF

PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS ................................................... 5TH RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. The Petitioner, Anne Mwikali Makobo, moves this court by an amended petition dated 20th March 2025. It is supported by her amended affidavit sworn on the same date and her supplementary affidavit sworn on 7th March 2026. The petition was filed at the High Court at Thika as Petition No. E003 of 2025. It was transferred to this court by a ruling of that court dated 3rd July 2025 and registered in this court as Petition No. E027 of 2025.

2. The Petitioner seeks the following orders:

“(i) A declaration that the Respondents, by fabricating an allegation of criminal conduct against the Petitioner and seeking to arrest and detain her and threatening to prosecute her on false allegations, violated or threaten to violate her rights and fundamental freedoms under the Constitution.

(ii) A declaration that the intended prosecution infringes the Petitioner's fundamental rights and amounts to an abuse of the Respondents' constitutional mandate.

(iii) An order of prohibition restraining the Respondents from causing her apprehension, considering or preferring criminal charges against her in any court.

(iv) An order of certiorari quashing the summons issued to her by the DCIO Masinga Police Station.

(v) General damages for violation of her constitutional rights.

(vi) Any other relief the court deems just and appropriate.

(vii) Costs of the petition.”

3. The Petitioner is the administrator ad litem of the estate of her late father, James Makobo Muthwa. She states that in Nairobi High Court Civil Case No. 769 of 1992, which concerned ownership of Plots 1 and 12 of Matungulu Farmers Company Limited, a judgment delivered on 10th February 2006 declared her father the owner of the plots and permanently restrained the company from selling, alienating or interfering with them. She states that the company nevertheless sold Plot 12 (now Land Parcel Ndithini/Mananja Block 6/267, the suit property) to the 3rd Respondent. The 3rd Respondent's suit over the property, Environment and Land Court Case No. E018 of 2021, was dismissed as res judicata on 25th April 2023. The 2006 judgment was set aside by the Environment and Land Court on 25th March 2025, and she has appealed in Civil Appeal No. E737 of 2025. She does not ask this court to decide ownership.

4. On or about 20th May 2024 she visited the suit property to assert her father's ownership, and the 3rd Respondent signed a written agreement acknowledging her ownership, witnessed by the 2nd Respondent and two police officers. On or about 17th December 2024 the DCIO Masinga, Mr. Kibet, summoned her by WhatsApp message to Masinga Police Station on a matter she says she was unaware of. According to the 3rd Respondent, the complaint under investigation concerns malicious damage to property, killing of livestock and threats on the night of 20th May 2024. She states that the summons was orchestrated by the 3rd Respondent in collusion with the 2nd Respondent and the police, and that the allegations are fabricated. She states that the 5th Respondent did nothing when she became the target of a counter-complaint, despite having charged the directors of the company on her own complaint in Criminal Case No. E795 of 2022 with obtaining registration by false pretense and conspiracy to defraud the estate. She states that another criminal case, No. E620 of 2024, was withdrawn without notice to the complainant, that a re-investigation followed pressure from the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, and that an order to arrest her was issued.

The Respondents' case

5. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents state that the summons was issued in the exercise of the statutory mandate of the police to investigate a complaint, that investigations are ongoing, that no decision has been made to charge the Petitioner or close the file, and that the petition is premature and speculative. They contend that the 2nd and 4th Respondents were wrongly joined and should be struck out under Rule 5(d) of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013. The 5th Respondent relies on the replying affidavit of Agatha Abang, Prosecuting Counsel, sworn on 16th December 2025. She depones that the summons was not issued on its directive, that the charges in Criminal Case No. E795 of 2022 followed the Petitioner's own complaint, that no complaint was lodged with it, and that no failure to uphold its mandate under Article 157 of the Constitution is shown.

6. The 3rd Respondent swore a replying affidavit on 2nd July 2025. He states that the company sold him the suit property during the pendency of Civil Case No. 769 of 1992, the suit in which ownership of the suit property was in dispute and that on the night of 20th May 2024 the Petitioner marshalled a gang that invaded his home, destroyed property, killed livestock and threatened his family unless he signed a consent surrendering the land. He signed the agreement for fear of his life, on the advice of two police officers he had called. Criminal Case No. E620 of 2024 was withdrawn without reasons and without notice to him, and after he complained to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority fresh investigations followed. The Petitioner was summoned and refused to record a statement.

The Submissions

The Petitioner's submissions

7. The Petitioner filed submissions dated 7th March 2026. She submits that no Respondent has categorically denied the violations pleaded and that the failure to deny is an implied admission, relying on Mativo & 2 Others v Republic [2015] eKLR. She submits that the use of criminal process to stop her asserting the estate's claim infringes Article 40, relying on Kariuki v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others [2024] KEHC 834 (KLR), Justus Mwenda Kathenge v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] KEHC 7714 (KLR) and Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others (Petition 8 (E010) of 2021) [2023] KESC 30 (KLR). She submits that the WhatsApp summons and the order to arrest violated Articles 28 and 29, relying on Murunga v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others (Constitutional Petition E010 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 14103 (KLR). She submits that the summons was not accompanied by written reasons and breached Article 47 and Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, relying on Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another (Civil Appeal 52 of 2014) [2015] KECA 741 (KLR), and that the threat of prosecution denies her a fair hearing under Article 50.

8. On abuse of process she submits that the 5th Respondent's duty under Article 157(11) is proactive, that the 3rd Respondent's complaint is a counter-measure to the prosecution of the Matungulu directors, that the 3rd Respondent signed an agreement acknowledging her ownership, and that the police officers present on 20th May 2024 made no arrest. She relies on Kuria & 3 Others v Attorney General [2002] 2 KLR 69, Kangwana & 2 others v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others [2022] KEHC 170 (KLR), Maina v Inspector General of the National Police Service & 3 others (Petition E288 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 15728 (KLR), Rono & 3 others v Director of Public Prosecution & another (Constitutional Petition E515 of 2023) [2025] KEHC 19208 (KLR) and Wamburu v Director of Public Prosecution (Petition E430 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 11496 (KLR). She prays for the reliefs in the petition, including a substantial award of general damages, and costs.

The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents' submissions

9. These Respondents filed submissions dated 16th April 2026. They submit that courts intervene in investigations only in exceptional cases, that the Petitioner has shown no more than apprehension, and that the police acted on a valid complaint. They rely on Republic v Inspector General of the National Police Service & Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Exparte Beatrice Hilda Omunia; Peter Nganga Chege, Kenneth Ngotho Rieche & Bestimes Travel & Tours Ltd (Interested Parties) (Miscellaneous Application 69 of 2018) [2019] KEHC 10981 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (1 February 2019) (Judgment), Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application 4 of 1979) [1979] KEHC 30 (KLR) and Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (Civil Appeal 290 of 2012) [2013] KECA 445 (KLR) on the need for reasonable precision in constitutional petitions. They submit that the petition is in substance a judicial review application which fails the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety stated in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. They submit that certiorari and prohibition are discretionary and should be refused in the public interest, citing Kenya National Examinations Council v Republic ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 others (Civil Appeal 266 of 1996) [1997] eKLR. They submit that the 2nd and 4th Respondents were wrongly joined and that costs should not be awarded.

The 3rd Respondent's submissions

10. The 3rd Respondent filed submissions dated 31st March 2026. He submits that the police acted within Articles 243 and 244 of the Constitution and Section 24 of the National Police Service Act, and that the Petitioner has refused to honour the summons. He relies on Baber A Mawji v United States International University & another [1976] KEHC 16 (KLR) on lis pendens. He submits that eviction must follow Section 152E of the Land Act, relying on Gacheri v M'Ikinyua Kagwiria (2024) KEELC 13369 (KLR). He relies on George Joshua Okungu & another v The Chief Magistrates Court, Nairobi & another [2014] eKLR for the proposition that the court will halt criminal proceedings only on proof of abuse, and on Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others Ex parte Praxides Namani Saisi [2016] KEHC 5698 (KLR) and Abey & Others v Director of Criminal Investigations & another [2025] KEHC 12490 (KLR) on the professional conduct of investigations. He submits that the Petitioner has not met the threshold in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application 4 of 1979) [1979] KEHC 30 (KLR) as read with Mumo Matemu (supra), that Article 24 limits her claim, and that the petition is premature.

The 5th Respondent

11. The 5th Respondent was represented at the mentions before this court and filed a replying affidavit, which the court has considered. It did not file submissions.

Issues for Determination

12. From the pleadings, the evidence and the submissions, the court identifies the following issues for determination:

(i) Whether the petition meets the threshold of precision and proof, and whether the 2nd and 4th Respondents were properly joined.

(ii) Whether the Petitioner has proved that her rights under Articles 27, 28, 29, 39, 40, 47 and 50 of the Constitution have been violated or threatened.

(iii) Whether the investigation and intended prosecution are an abuse of process contrary to Articles 157(11), 244 and 245 of the Constitution, and whether the 5th Respondent has failed in its mandate.

(iv) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought and who bears the costs.

Analysis and Determination

13. The court has carefully considered the petition, the affidavits, the rival submissions of the parties, the cases cited, the court record and the law.

14. The threshold for a constitutional petition was set in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application 4 of 1979) [1979] KEHC 30 (KLR), where the court stated:

"We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed."

15. The Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu (supra) reaffirmed that principle at paragraph 44 and stated at paragraph 66:

"Liberty, it has been said, finds no refuge in the jurisprudence of doubt. A court in doubt is not at liberty to arrive at a conclusion which is unsupported by the material before it. To do so would be to undermine the basic principle that any conclusion of a court must be based on findings premised on the applicable evidentiary standards otherwise its decision stands impugned. The evidentiary standard in constitutional cases of this nature is a balance of probabilities. In cases involving heightened review, or “intensely fact-based inquiry,” as noted by the superior court below, that balance acquires a higher gradation and must be exercised judiciously. Moreover, it does not do to shift the burden of proof to the institutions whose actions are impugned, or the person whose appointment is questioned, to prove procedural propriety or suitability. That would be an absurdity in this type of litigation, and we can almost foresee with certainty all that such an approach may entail The court also applies were this Court to endorse it."

16. Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act, which provides:

"Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist."

(i) Whether the petition meets the threshold of precision and proof, and whether the 2nd and 4th Respondents were properly joined.

17. The Petitioner's complaint and the Articles said to be violated are set out with enough precision to be answered, and the Respondents answered them. The petition does not fail for want of form.

18. The difficulty lies in what is pleaded and proved. The Court of Appeal stated in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another v Stephen Mutinda Mule & 3 others (Civil Appeal 219 of 2013) [2014] KECA 890 (KLR):

"As the authorities do accord with our own way of thinking, we hold them to be representative of the proper legal position that parties are bound by their pleadings which in turn limits the issues upon which a trial court may pronounce. The learned Judge, no matter how well-intentioned, went well beyond the grounds raised by the Petitioners and answered by the Respondents before her and thereby determined the Petition on the basis of matters not properly before her. To that extent, she committed a reversible error, and the Appeal succeeds on that score."

19. The court notes that the amended petition does not plead that a criminal case was withdrawn, that the Independent Policing Oversight Authority directed a re-investigation, or that an order to arrest was issued. The withdrawal and the re-investigation, however, appear in the supplementary affidavit and the submissions. Even where an averment is not denied, the Petitioner must prove her case, and as held in Mumo Matemu (supra) the burden does not shift to the impugned institutions. The court finds that the Petitioner has not proved that the withdrawal of the case without notice to the complainant shows that the authorities recognised the absence of a prosecutable case, or that the re-investigation that followed the intervention of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority was a step taken for an improper purpose. The same goes for the alleged arrest. It is asserted without a date, an issuing officer, a copy of a warrant or an OB number. The court thus finds that an order of arrest is not proven.

20.On joinder, Rule 5(d) of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 allows the court to strike out a party improperly joined. The petition pleads that the WhatsApp summons came from the DCIO Masinga, Mr. Kibet, and not from the 2nd or 4th Respondent. It pleads that the 2nd Respondent witnessed the agreement of 20th May 2024 and colluded with the 3rd Respondent, but gives no particulars of the collusion. It attributes no specific act to the 4th Respondent. The court declines to strike them out at this late stage. The claims against them fail on the merits because the petition particularizes no act by either that violated a right.

(ii) Whether the Petitioner has proved that her rights under Articles 27, 28, 29, 39, 40, 47 and 50 of the Constitution have been violated or threatened.

21. On Article 47, a summons to attend a police station and record a statement is a step in an investigation. It does not determine the Petitioner's guilt or take away any right. The duty to give written reasons under Article 47(2) arises where a right has been or is likely to be adversely affected by the action. The Petitioner has not shown how an invitation to give her account adversely affected a right. Article 47 is not shown to have been breached.

22. The Supreme Court stated in Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission & another v Ojienda & 2 others (Petition 30 & 31 of 2019 (Consolidated)) [2022] KESC 59 (KLR) at paragraph 58:

"Part IV of the ACECA specifically provides for the 1st appellant’s investigative powers. The powers granted therein include powers, privileges and immunities of a Police Officer under Section 23(3), to search premises under Section 29, to apply for surrender of travel documents under Section 31, to arrest persons under Section 32 amongst others. Strictly speaking, these powers when exercised cannot be described as “administrative action” within the meaning of Article 47. For example, how can “conducting a house search” or “effecting an arrest” be considered as exercising administrative action? On the contrary, these are special powers conferred by a specific legal regime, to be exercised for a special purpose."

23. The Court of Appeal in Kidero v Attorney General & 6 others (Civil Appeal 413 of 2018) [2024] KECA 1192 (KLR) followed that decision as binding under Article 163(7) of the Constitution and dismissed an appeal that sought to classify EACC investigations as administrative action.

24. The court is guided by those decisions. The reasoning applies with equal force to the police, whose investigative mandate under Articles 244 and 245 of the Constitution is likewise conferred by a specific legal regime for a special purpose. It supports the finding that Article 47 is not shown to have been breached.

25. On Article 29, the Petitioner was not arrested, detained or charged. A summons is not a deprivation of freedom, and the only allegation of arrest is the order the court has found unproved. On Article 28, no evidence shows any act of humiliation or degradation. The averment of humiliation and harassment is a conclusion.

26.On Article 27, the Petitioner pleads selective enforcement but names no comparator. On Article 39, she pleads no restriction on her movement. On Article 50, the right to a fair hearing protects a person in a dispute before a court or tribunal and an accused person at trial. She has not been charged, and the right is not engaged by a request for a statement.

27.On Article 40, the Petitioner's claim is that the use of the criminal process stops her from asserting the estate's claim. Ownership of the suit property is a live matter in the courts, and her appeal, Civil Appeal No. E737 of 2025, is still pending. The correct course is to await the determination of ownership in the appropriate forum. The court finds no violation of Article 40.

(iii) Whether the investigation and intended prosecution are an abuse of process contrary to Articles 157(11), 244 and 245 of the Constitution, and whether the 5th Respondent has failed in its mandate.

28. The Court of Appeal stated in Commissioner of Police & Director of Criminal Investigation Department & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 4 others (Civil Appeal 56 of 2012) [2013] KECA 182 (KLR) at paragraph 17:

"Whereas there can be no doubt that the field of investigation of criminal offences is exclusively within the domain of the police, it is too fairly well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that the aforesaid powers are designed to achieve a solitary public purpose, of inquiring into alleged crimes and, where necessary, calling upon the suspects to account before the law. That is why courts in this country have consistently held that it would be an unfortunate result for courts to interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. The courts must wait for the investigations to be complete and the suspect charged."

29. This power however is not unchecked. The Court of Appeal has set a limit in Commissioner of Police v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited (supra):

"While the law (section 193A of the Criminal Procedure Code) allows the concurrent litigation of civil and criminal proceedings arising from the same issues, and while it is the prerogative of the police to investigate crime, we reiterate that that power must be exercised responsibly, in accordance with the laws of the land and in good faith. What is it that the company was not able to do to prove its claim against the bank in the previous and present civil cases that must be done through the institution of criminal proceedings? It is not in the public interest or in the interest of the administration of justice to use criminal justice process as a pawn in civil disputes. It is unconscionable and a travesty of justice for the police to be involved in the settlement of what is purely a civil dispute being litigated in court."

30. The Supreme Court restated the limit in Saisi & 7 others v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others (Petition 39 & 40 of 2019 (Consolidated)) [2023] KESC 6 (KLR) at paragraph 82:

"the courts have consistently held that whenever it seems that the DPP is utilizing criminal proceedings to abuse the court process, to settle scores or to put an accused person to great expense in a case which is clearly not otherwise prosecutable, then the court may intervene."

31. The Supreme Court in Saisi (supra) adopted four guidelines for assessing alleged abuse of prosecutorial powers, namely (i) whether there is an abuse of process, (ii) whether there is a legal bar to the proceedings, (iii) whether the allegations on their face do not constitute the offence alleged, and (iv) whether there is no legal evidence or the evidence manifestly fails to prove the charge. The court tests the facts against those guidelines.

32. On the first guideline, the Petitioner points to several matters. The 3rd Respondent's claim to the land was found res judicata in the Environment and Land Court. The directors of the vendor company are before a criminal court on her complaint. The 3rd Respondent signed an agreement on 20th May 2024 acknowledging her ownership. A criminal case was withdrawn. The complaint against her followed the charging of the directors. These matters give the court some concern. They are not enough to prove an ulterior motive for the following reasons.

33. First, the complaint concerns a different matter from Criminal Case No. E795 of 2022. It alleges malicious damage to property, killing of livestock and threats on the night of 20th May 2024. Those are offences known to the law. The Petitioner admits attending the property that day with other people. She says the visit was peaceful and the 3rd Respondent says it was violent. That is a dispute of fact on the very conduct under investigation. It cannot be resolved on affidavits without usurping the role of the investigator and the trial court.

34. Second, both sides agree that the agreement of 20th May 2024 exists but disagree on whether it was voluntary. The presence of police officers and the Assistant Chief that night does not show that no offence occurred. It is a fact an investigator is entitled to explore.

35. Third, the withdrawal of a case without reasons does not show that the investigation is abusive. Although it raises questions, no evidence has been shown that raises abuse.

36. On the second guideline, no legal bar to the investigation or to any prosecution is shown. The pendency of the civil dispute is not a bar, as Section 193A of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that a pending civil matter is not a ground for any stay, prohibition or delay of criminal proceedings.

37. On the third guideline, the allegations of malicious damage to property, killing of livestock and threats, taken at face value, constitute offences known to the law.

38. On the fourth guideline, the Petitioner has not attended the police to record a statement. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents state that no decision has been made to charge her or close the file. No charge exists and no decision to charge has been made. The court cannot presume that the 5th Respondent will act unlawfully.

39. Whether there is sufficient evidence against the Petitioner has not been determined by the body charged with that decision. For this court to stop the process now would be to pre-empt that decision. The court makes no finding on whether the offences alleged were committed.

40. On the 5th Respondent, the duty in Article 157(11) of the Constitution to have regard to the public interest, the administration of justice and the prevention of abuse of the legal process applies when the Director exercises the powers conferred by the Article, namely deciding whether to institute, take over or discontinue a prosecution. No such decision has been made against the Petitioner. The summons was issued by the police, who by Article 245(4)(a) of the Constitution are not subject to direction on the investigation of a particular offence. The Petitioner does not say that she lodged a complaint with the 5th Respondent, and the petition does not say her letters were addressed to it. Her own account shows that the 5th Respondent is prosecuting the directors of Matungulu Farmers Company Limited on her complaint. The court finds that she has not proved a failure by the 5th Respondent to exercise its mandate. This court's refusal of relief today does not limit the Petitioner's right to approach it afresh should she be charged on facts she can show to be an abuse of process.

(iv) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought and who bears the costs.

41. The declarations in prayers (i) and (ii) depend on findings that the allegation was fabricated and the intended prosecution is an abuse. Neither is proved, and those prayers fail. Prohibition in prayer (iii) would stop an investigation the police are mandated to conduct, and as discussed in Commissioner of Police v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited (supra) the courts are restricted from interfering with the police in matters within their province, which investigations are. This is more so where a prosecution decision has not yet been made. Prayer (iii) therefore fails. Certiorari in prayer (iv) would quash a lawful summons to give a statement, and that prayer fails. Having found no violation, the court also declines general damages in prayer (v).

42. This petition arose from a long land dispute in which the Petitioner has a genuine pending appeal. The court finds good reason to order each party to bear its own costs.

Disposition

43. The court makes the following orders:

(i) The amended petition dated 20th March 2025 is dismissed.

(ii) Any interim or conservatory orders in force in this petition lapse.

(iii) Each party shall bear its own costs.

It is so ordered.

Judgment dated, signed and delivered virtually via Microsoft teams on this 29th day of October, 2026.

E. N. MAINA

JUDGE

In the presence of:

No appearance by either side

Miriam – Court Assistant/Interpreter

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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