REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
FAMILY DIVISION
SUCCESSION CAUSE NO. 160 OF 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MWANZIA NDONYI
DECEASED
DAVID MWANZIA ………………………….1ST PETITIONER/RESPONDENT
MUTUA MWANZIA ……………………...2ND PETITIONER/RESPONDENT
VERSUS
KITHEKA MWONGELA …………………….3RD PETITIONER/APPLICANT
RULING
1. Before the Court is the 3rd petitioner’s Chamber Summons dated 23 October 2025. Although the parties occasionally described the matter as an appeal, the application does not invite this Court to determine the intended appeal. It seeks leave to appeal the ruling delivered by Kemei, J on 13th July 2021.
2. The application is expressed to be brought under Article 48 of the Constitution, section 47 of the Law of Succession Act and rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules. The applicant seeks leave for Mahinda Makori & Company Advocates to come on record, leave to appeal, restraint against eviction or dealings with Plot 289 Kaluva Adjudication Section, now said to be Nzambani/Kaluva/3748, and costs. Prayer (a), for certification of urgency, and the interim aspect of prayers (b) and (c) have been spent.
3. The application is supported by the applicant’s affidavits sworn on 23 October 2025 and 17 December 2025. It is opposed through grounds of opposition dated 14 November 2025 and the replying affidavit of David Mwanzia sworn on 17 November 2025. Both sides filed written submissions.
4. Mwanzia Ndonyi died intestate on 12 August 2011. On 24 May 2018, the Court appointed David Mwanzia, Mutua Mwanzia and Kitheka Mwongela as administrators and directed that an application for confirmation of grant be filed.
5. The 1st and 2nd petitioners applied for confirmation by summons dated 2 July 2018. They proposed that Plot 289 Kaluva Adjudication Section be held jointly by Mutua Mwanzia and David Mwanzia, while Nzambani/Ithumula/906 would pass absolutely to David Mwanzia. The applicant, in a schedule dated 21 September 2020, proposed that Plot 289 be shared according to occupation. Owing to the disagreement, the Court received oral evidence.
6. In the ruling delivered on 13 July 2021, the Court found that the applicant, a grandson of the deceased, had not established dependency under sections 26 and 29 of the Law of Succession Act. It also accepted evidence that the applicant’s late father had been allocated Plots 1124 and 1130 and held that the applicant could pursue his father’s estate. The Court confirmed the 1st and 2nd petitioners’ proposed distribution. Plot 289 was awarded jointly to David Mwanzia and Mutua Mwanzia, and Nzambani/Ithumula/906 to David Mwanzia absolutely. Each party was ordered to bear his own costs.
7. The applicant did not lodge a notice of appeal against that ruling within the prescribed period. Instead, through counsel then acting for him on a pro bono basis, he filed an application seeking review or setting aside. On 24 February 2023, M. W. Muigai J held that reviewing the distribution would amount to reconsidering a matter determined after viva voce evidence, that the proper route was an appeal, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the same issue.
8. A notice of appeal dated 13 March 2023 was then lodged against the ruling of 24 February 2023, rather than against the ruling of 13 July 2021. The applicant says he believed his advocates had taken the proper appellate step and only discovered the position after the 1st petitioner filed Kitui Chief Magistrate’s Court ELC Case No. E065 of 2025 seeking his eviction.
9. The record further shows that Plot 289 was partitioned. A title for Nzambani/Kaluva/3748, described as a partition of Plot 289 and measuring approximately 1.05 hectares, was issued to David Mwanzia on 23 May 2025. The applicant maintains that he has lived on the relevant portion for more than thirty years and has erected a permanent home there.
The Application and the Proposed Grounds of Appeal
10. The applicant’s proposed appeal challenges the ruling of 13 July 2021 on eight grounds. In summary, he contends that the Court:
(i) failed to provide for the first house of the deceased and thereby rendered that house landless;
(ii) treated him merely as a grandson instead of determining whether he represented his predeceased father’s branch;
(iii) included Plot 289 in the estate although adjudication was allegedly incomplete and title had not issued in the deceased’s name;
(iv) assumed, without documentary proof, that Plots 1124 and 1130 belonged to the deceased and had been given to the applicant’s father;
(v) failed to apply section 40 of the Law of Succession Act correctly;
(vi) accepted the respondents’ proposed distribution without sufficient evidence of an inter vivos allocation by the deceased;
(vii) disregarded a letter dated 12 November 1996 said to show allocation among the three houses; and
(viii) made a distribution that disinherited the first house and exposed its descendants to eviction.
The Applicant’s Submissions
11. The applicant submits that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 48 of the Constitution, section 47 of the Law of Succession Act and rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, and that it is not functus officio because it is asked to grant leave and not to reconsider the merits. He relies on Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules for leave for Mahinda Makori & Company Advocates to come on record after judgment, and says the respondents will suffer no prejudice. He attributes the delay to successive mistakes by former counsel, who pursued review instead of appeal and later lodged a notice of appeal against the review ruling, and stresses that he is a lay and indigent litigant who was assisted by counsel through Kituo Cha Sheria. He contends that his draft memorandum of appeal raises triable issues, that eviction and demolition of his home would render the intended appeal nugatory, and that each party should bear its own costs because the dispute is a family matter.
12. The applicant relies on the case of Fahim Yasin Twaha v Timamy Issa Abdalla & 2 others [2015] KESC 20 (KLR), Supreme Court Civil Application No. 35 of 2014 to show that extension of time is a discretionary remedy meant to relieve against inadvertence or excusable mistake. He relies on the case of Philip Keipto Chemwolo & another v Augustine Kubende [1986] KECA 87 (KLR), Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1984 to show that a litigant should not suffer the penalty of counsel’s blunder. He relies on the case of Kariuki v Wangeci & 7 others (Civil Application E250 of 2023) [2024] KECA 1692 (KLR) to show that an advocate’s mistake may, in an appropriate case, justify extension of time, and on the case of Abdalla v Patel & another (1962) EA 447, as cited in that decision, to show that a poor litigant should be allowed to bring his proceedings without hindrance. He relies on the case of Paul Musili Wambua v Attorney General & 2 others [2015] KECA 471 (KLR) to show that the discretion to extend time is unfettered but must be exercised on reasons, with regard to the length and reason for the delay, the prospects of the appeal and prejudice to the respondent. He relies on the case of Job Kilach v Nation Media Group Ltd, Salaba Agencies Ltd & Michael Rono [2015] KECA 846 (KLR) to show what amounts to a triable issue. Finally, he relies on the case of Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited v Instalaciones Inabensa S.A., Supreme Court Petition No. 17 (E024) of 2021 to show that, on the nugatory aspect, the question is whether what is sought to be stayed is reversible or adequately compensable in damages.
The Respondents’ Submissions
13. The respondents oppose the application as frivolous, an abuse of process and an afterthought prompted by the eviction suit. They contend that the applicant knew the effect of the ruling, chose to seek review instead of appealing, and then waited about two further years after the review ruling. In their view, the explanation does not cover the entire period from July 2021 to October 2025, and counsel’s failure to advise the applicant to appeal is not an excuse.
14. They submit that the estate has already been distributed, Plot 289 has been partitioned, and title has issued. Granting relief, they say, would prejudice vested rights, reopen concluded litigation and interfere with Kitui Chief Magistrate’s Court ELC Case No. E065 of 2025. They also argue that Plot 289 and Nzambani/Kaluva/3748 are distinct.
15. The respondents invoke functus officio. They say that once the Court delivered its decision and later declined review, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the present application. They further maintain that the proposed appeal seeks to introduce new evidence and raises factual rather than legal questions.
16. The respondents rely on the case of Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 others (Application 16 of 2014) [2014] KESC 12 (KLR) to show that extension of time is not a right but an equitable remedy, and that the applicant must explain the delay to the satisfaction of the Court. They rely on the case of Dilpack Kenya Limited v William Muthama Kitonyi [2018] KEHC 4858 (KLR) to show that the discretion must be exercised on material before the Court and that unexplained default attracts no indulgence. They rely on the case of Alfred Induvuagwa Savatia v Nandi Tea Estates & another [2019] KECA 191 (KLR) and the case of Monica Malel & another v Republic & 2 others, Civil Application No. 246 of 2008 (UR 157/2008) [2009] eKLR to show that a reason for delay must be specific and not conjectural.
17. The respondents also list the following decisions generally to urge that the application be dismissed:
(i) Adana v Ogora (Civil Appeal E006 of 2021) [2025] KEHC 1462 (KLR),
(ii) Saptet Farm Company Limited v SK Soi Company Limited (Environment and Land Case 20 of 2006) [2025] KEELC 862 (KLR),
(iii) Ndura & another v Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited [2025] KEELC 91 (KLR),
(iv) Njiiri v National Police Service Commission (Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E007 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 1133 (KLR),
(v) Maclean & another v Kiago & another (Miscellaneous Civil Application E070 of 2023) [2025] KEHC 3572 (KLR),
(vi) Muchemi v Roy Transmotors Limited (Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E147 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 650 (KLR),
(vii) Elijah Seka & Others v Church of God in East Africa (Kenya), Civil Appeal E132 of 2022 and
(viii) Kioko v Karagu (Civil Appeal E848 of 2022) [2025] KEHC 2072 (KLR).
Issues for Determination
18. Having considered the application, affidavits, submissions and the law, the following issues arise:
(i) Whether counsel should be granted leave to come on record;
(ii) Whether leave to appeal is necessary and whether this can enlarge the time prescribed for lodging an appeal in the Court of Appeal;
(iii) Whether preservation orders should issue pending recourse to the Court of Appeal; and
(iv) Who should bear the costs of the application.
Analysis and Determination
Issue (i): Whether counsel should be granted leave to come on record
19. The change of advocates is sought after judgment. The application is made under Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules which requires an order of the Court upon application with notice to all the parties, or a consent between the outgoing and incoming advocates. Order 9 Rule 9 is not among the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules imported into the probate proceedings by Rule 63(1) of the Probate and Administration Rules, this as was held by Okwany, J in the case of Jackson M. Miyogo v Simeon Mose Omiti [2016] KEHC 4395 (KLR), where she observed:
“Clearly therefore, Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules is not one of the provisions that can be imported and applied in the succession cases.”
This court shall however allow that application under Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act and rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules which gives this court jurisdiction to hear and determine any application filed in the course of proceedings under the Law of Succession Act.
Issue (ii): whether leave to appeal sought is necessary
20. The issue of whether or not leave to appeal the judgment of a probate court was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Wandi v Muchira (Suing as the Administrator Ad Litem of Jane Muthoni Muchira) (Petition E029 of 2024) [2026] KESC 29 (KLR) (31 March 2026) (Judgment) where the court held that:
“ [54] We therefore come to the inevitable conclusion that there is no legal basis for imposing a requirement of leave as a prerequisite for lodging an appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in a succession matter. Such a requirement, not being anchored in either the Constitution or statute, cannot properly be sustained.
[55] This finding inevitably leads us to the closely related question of whether a decision of the High Court rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in a succession matter is appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. It is notable that Section 50(1) of the Law of Succession Act provides for an automatic right of appeal to the High Court from decisions of Resident Magistrates’ Courts. The question that arises is whether, in matters originating before the High Court, a litigant should be placed in a less favourable position. To countenance such a distinction would raise concerns under Article 27(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection and benefit of the law. It would be incongruous for litigants in succession matters to enjoy a right of appeal where proceedings originate in subordinate courts, but to be denied a corresponding avenue where the High Court is the court of first instance.
[56]In resolving this question, we are guided by Article 20(3)(a) of the Constitution, which obligates courts, in applying the Bill of Rights, to develop the law to the extent that it does not give effect to a right or fundamental freedom. As we observed in FAAF v RFM & 2 others [2025] KESC 45 (KLR), at para. 63, all laws must be interpreted and applied through the lens of the Bill of Rights, and where existing laws yield outcomes inconsistent with a right or fundamental freedom, the courts are under a duty to infuse those laws with the normative content of the Bill of Rights. This approach is consistent with the principle of harmonious interpretation under Articles 159 and 259, which require that the Constitution be construed in a manner that promotes its purposes, values, and principles, advances the rule of law, and facilitates the development of the law.
[57]This interpretive approach has also been consistently affirmed in our jurisprudence. In Steyn v Ruscone [2013] KESC 11 (KLR) this Court was called upon to determine the scope of its review jurisdiction under Article 163(5) of the Constitution, which provides that a certification by the Court of Appeal under Article 163(4)(b) may be reviewed by the Supreme Court and either affirmed, varied, or overturned. A key issue for determination was whether such review jurisdiction was limited only to instances where a matter had been certified as being of general public importance. In resolving this question, the Court was guided by its constitutional mandate under Articles 159 and 259, which require that the Constitution be interpreted in a manner that promotes its purposes, values, and principles, advances the rule of law and fundamental rights, permits the development of the law, and contributes to good governance. At paragraph 33, the Court held that its review jurisdiction must be construed in harmony with these constitutional imperatives, emphasizing that access to justice and non-discrimination are fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. We held thus:
“Hence, in interpreting the review competence of the Supreme Court, the mandate must be harmonised with the Constitution. One of the fundamental rights under the Constitution is access to justice for all, and non- discrimination. Consequently, all litigants are to be accorded equal right of access to the Court. Either party can approach the Supreme Court for review under article 163(5). A party may come for review of the decision granting leave or denying leave. Hence, we hold that certification under article 163(5) should be broadly read as alluding to certification by the Court that a matter of public importance is involved, or is not involved. Hence, the applicant is rightly before the Court, despite seeking a review where there was no leave granted by the Court of Appeal.”
[58]Consequently, the Court affirmed that all litigants must be accorded equal access to the Court and that either party may approach the Supreme Court for review under Article 163(5), whether challenging the grant or refusal of certification. The Court thus adopted a broad interpretation of certification, holding that it encompasses both instances where a matter is certified as one of general public importance and where such certification is declined, thereby ensuring that access to justice is not unduly restricted. Guided by these constitutional dictates, we find that a restrictive interpretation that denies a right of appeal in succession matters originating from the High Court would undermine the values of equality and access to justice.
[59]Accordingly, and in the absence of any express statutory limitation, we hold that a decision of the High Court rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in a succession matter is appealable to the Court of Appeal as of right. Any contrary position would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s transformative vision of a fair, accessible, and non-discriminatory system of justice.” (emphasis mine)
The leave sought is hence not necessary as leave is automatic, or as a matter of right.
21. As for leave to appeal out of time, I am of the view that the same should be obtained in the court of Appeal as provided in Rule 4 of the Appellate jurisdiction Act (Court of Appeal Rules, 2022).
Issue (iii) whether an order to stay the ruling of the court ought to issue pending recourse to the Court of Appeal.
22. It is instructive that even in the ordinary civil proceedings stay of execution is granted only where there is an appeal in existence. In this case no appeal has been filed and it is noteworthy that a number of years have elapsed since the time the impugned ruling was delivered and the time this application was filed. In my view, to grant an order for stay of execution in the guise of preserving the estate pending an intended appeal would be unjust. That limb of the application is therefore also rejected.
Disposition
37. For the foregoing reasons, the Chamber Summons dated 23rd October 2025 is determined as follows:
(i) Mahinda Makori & Company Advocates are granted leave to come on record for Kitheka Mwongela in place of the advocates previously on record.
(ii) The orders of the court rendered vide the ruling delivered on 13th July 2021, shall subsist unless otherwise ordered by the Court of Appeal.
(iii) This being a family matter, each party shall bear their own costs of the application.
Orders accordingly.
Ruling dated, signed and delivered virtually via Microsoft teams on this 29th day of October, 2026.
E. N. MAINA
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Mr. Makori for the 3rd Petitioner/Applicant
No appearance for the other parties
Miriam – Court Assistant/Interpreter