Civil law

Gas & Go Petroleum Productions Ltd v Malu (Civil Appeal E155 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 17498 (KLR)

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Court
High Court At Machakos
Case number
Civil Appeal E155 of 2025
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
E. N. Maina

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Background

The Respondent filed a material damage claim dated 17th October 2024 following a road traffic accident that occurred on 2nd June 2024 along the Nairobi-Mombasa Road near Kapiti. The accident involved the respondent's motor vehicle registration number KBA 935Q and the appellant's motor vehicle registration number KCG 521N. The respondent pleaded special damages of Kshs. 387,550/=.

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Reasoning passage

The learned trial magistrate gave reasons for discounting the report of DW2. I find no error in those reasons. A report that is not independent and in fact relies on an account by one of the parties is not weighty.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CIVIL APPEAL NO. E155 OF 2025

GAS & GO PETROLEUM

PRODUCTIONS LIMITED …………………………………….. APPELLANT

VERSUS

HENRY KAU MALU ………………………………………..… RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the judgment of Hon. E. K. Suter, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 12th June 2025 in Mavoko Chief Magistrate's Court Civil Suit No. E896 of 2024)

JUDGMENT

1. The Respondent filed a material damage claim dated 17th October 2024 following a road traffic accident that occurred on 2nd June 2024 along the Nairobi-Mombasa Road near Kapiti. The accident involved the respondent's motor vehicle registration number KBA 935Q and the appellant's motor vehicle registration number KCG 521N. The respondent pleaded special damages of Kshs. 387,550/=.

2. The Respondent called three witnesses. PW1 was the person who was driving his vehicle at the time, and his case was that he was hit while driving in his lane. PW2, Corporal Cherotich, produced a police abstract that indicated that the appellant's vehicle was to blame. PW3, Daniel Muchiri, a motor vehicle assessor, produced a report in which he found that the vehicle was written off because repairs would not be viable. He assessed its pre-accident value at Kshs. 450,000/= and its salvage value at Kshs. 100,000/=.

3. The appellant filed a defence dated 22nd November 2024 denying the claim and pleading contribution in the alternative. Its case was that the accident occurred when the respondent was overtaking and was in the rightful lane of the appellant's driver. It also called three witnesses. DW1, Corporal Munyao, produced an Occurrence Book extract that indicated that the respondent was overtaking when the accident occurred. DW2, Stephen Mwangi, an insurance investigator, produced an investigation report. DW3 was the driver of the appellant's vehicle.

4. In its judgment the trial court identified liability and quantum as the issues. On liability, it found that the police officers who testified were not the investigating officers and could not explain why the Occurrence Book and the police abstract were at variance, and that the report of DW2 was not independent. The trial court found the testimony of both sides plausible and, relying on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies, Civil Appeal No. 34 of 2005 [2006] eKLR, it apportioned liability equally at 50:50.

5. On special damages, the trial court found that the respondent had proved Kshs. 350,000/= being the pre-accident value of Kshs. 450,000/= less the salvage value of Kshs. 100,000/=, the assessment fee of Kshs. 7,000/= which was the sum pleaded, and Kshs. 550/= for copies of records, a total of Kshs. 357,550/=. It disallowed the claim of Kshs. 30,000/= for towing charges because no receipt was produced. After reducing the award by 50%, it entered judgment for Kshs. 178,775/= with costs and interest.

6. A decree issued on 22nd July 2025 for the principal sum of Kshs. 178,775/= with interest at 12% per annum, giving a decretal sum of Kshs. 193,821.49.

The Appeal

7. Aggrieved by the judgment, the appellant lodged this appeal by a memorandum of appeal dated 3rd July 2025 on the following grounds:

“(i) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in apportioning liability between the appellant and the respondent in the ratio 50%-50%.

(ii) That the learned magistrate erred in law in applying the wrong principles of law on standard of proof in civil cases.

(iii) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in relying on extraneous evidence in arriving at the decision on quantum.

(iv) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider and properly evaluate the defendant's evidence.

(v) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider and apply some weight on the evidence tendered by the defendant's witnesses.

(vi) That the learned magistrate misdirected himself by failing to consider the evidence and the submissions by the appellant while arriving at the judgment.

(vii) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in awarding costs of the suit to the respondent.”

8. The appellant seeks the following orders:

“(i) The appeal be allowed.

(ii) The judgment delivered on 12th June 2025 be varied or set aside.

(iii) The suit against the appellant be dismissed.

(iv) The quantum of damages awarded to the respondent be assessed downwards.

(v) The respondent pays the costs of this appeal and of the lower court.

(vi) Such further relief as the court considers just.”

9. On 30th July 2025 this court allowed the appellant's unopposed application dated 11th July 2025 for stay of execution of the decree, on condition that the appellant deposits the decretal sum either in court or in an interest earning account in the joint names of both counsel within 30 days. On 27th November 2025 counsel for the appellant stated that the conditions for stay had been complied with and that the record of appeal had been filed. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. On 8thJune 2026 counsel for the appellant confirmed that its submissions had been filed, the respondent was granted time to file his submissions, and the court fixed judgment for 29th October 2026.

The Submissions

The Appellant's Submissions

10.The appellant filed written submissions dated 4th June 2026. It relies on the case of Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd & others [1968] EA 123 and the case of Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424 on the duty of the court on a first appeal. On liability, it submits that the burden of proof remained on the respondent throughout under sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act and that the occurrence of the accident was not disputed. It submits that PW2 was not the investigating officer and confirmed that according to the investigation diary the respondent's vehicle was overtaking, which contradicted the respondent's testimony. It submits that the Occurrence Book extract was the contemporaneous police record and carried more probative value than the police abstract, that the learned trial magistrate did not decide which of the two documents carried greater weight, and that the report of DW2 only corroborated the Occurrence Book extract and the evidence of DW3. It further submits that the respondent admitted in cross-examination that he had been overtaking before the accident and called no eyewitness.

11. The appellant relies on the case of Lakhamshi v Attorney General [1971] EA 118 for the proposition that where there is credible evidence of how an accident occurred, a court ought not to resort to arbitrary apportionment of liability. It submits that the decision in Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies (supra) applies only where the evidence is so evenly balanced that it is impossible to determine who caused the accident. It relies on the case of Statpack Industries Ltd v James Mbithi Munyao [2005] eKLR for the proposition that where a plaintiff fails to prove negligence the claim must fail, and submits that the learned trial magistrate shifted the burden of proof to the appellant and that the respondent should have been held wholly liable.

12.The appellant invites the court to take judicial notice of Machakos SCCC No. E1418 of 2024, Machakos SCCC No. E1419 of 2024 and Mavoko CMCC No. E1000 of 2024, which it says arose from the same accident and in which the respondent was apportioned 90% of the liability in the first two and 80% in the third. It submits that consistency in findings arising from the same accident is important. On damages, it submits that the award of special damages depended on proof of liability and should be set aside if liability is displaced, and that the respondent in any event failed to strictly prove the special damages pleaded. It prays that the appeal be allowed, the judgment be set aside and the suit be dismissed with costs, or in the alternative that the respondent be held liable to a greater proportion of liability.

The respondent's submissions

13. The respondent filed written submissions. He relies on the case of Gitobu Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General, Civil Appeal No. 98 of 2014 [2016] eKLR for the conditions that must be met before an appellate court interferes with an award, namely that the trial court acted on wrong principles of law, that the award was extremely low or high, or that the trial court disregarded the facts tendered. On liability, he submits that the evidence showed that the appellant's vehicle left its lawful lane and damaged his vehicle. He points to the evidence that the appellant's investigator conducted his investigations long after the accident and did not interview him, that the appellant's driver was blamed by the police and produced no document showing that the respondent was to blame, and that the police officer who testified for the appellant was not the investigating officer. He relies on the case of Brian Muchiri Waihenya v Jubilee Hauliers Ltd & 2 others, High Court Civil Case No. 34 of 2014 [2017] eKLR, which was considered on appeal in the case of Jubilee Haulers Limited & 2 others v Brian Muchiri Waihenya, Civil Appeal No. 88 of 2017 [2021] KECA 923 (KLR), for the proposition that a driver who veers from his lane onto the lane of another vehicle and collides with it causes the accident.

14. He further submitted that where each driver blames the other the court must decide whose evidence is more credible, that a driver on a public road owes a high duty of care to other road users, and that a court must establish the truth of the facts put forward and approve one party's version. He cites the case of Cosmas Mutiso Muema v Kenya Road Transporters Limited & another [2014] eKLR, the case of Savannah Hardware v EOO (Suing as representative of SO (deceased)) [2019] eKLR and the case of Japheth M Wepukhulu v Fred Simiyu [2020] eKLR for those propositions, and the case of Solomon Mwangi Karara v Rift Valley Bottlers Ltd & another [2017] KEHC 1074 (KLR) on general damages. This court does not place reliance on those decisions. They are decisions of the High Court that do not bind this court, and this appeal is decided on the evidence on record.

15. On quantum, the respondent submits that the special damages were supported by the assessment report produced, that no evidence to the contrary was adduced, and that the findings of the trial court were reasonable and should be upheld. He prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Issues for Determination

16. The following issues arise for determination:

(i) Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in the evaluation of the evidence and in apportioning liability equally at 50:50.

(ii) Whether this court should take judicial notice of the proceedings in the related suits arising from the same accident.

(iii) Whether the award of special damages and the order awarding costs of the suit to the respondent should be disturbed.

(iv) What orders should issue, including the costs of this appeal.

Analysis and Determination

17. This being a first appeal, this court is guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal for East Africa in the case of Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd & others (supra), where the duty of a first appellate court was stated as follows:

“An appeal to this court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect.”

18. I have considered the record of appeal, the memorandum of appeal and the submissions of both parties. The issues are determined in the order in which they are set out above.

Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in apportioning liability equally

19. It is not disputed that the accident occurred. The question was who caused it. The learned trial magistrate set out sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act at paragraph 5 of the judgment. Under those provisions the respondent bore the burden of proving negligence on the part of the appellant, and the appellant bore the burden of proving the contribution it pleaded against the respondent.

20. Where each driver blames the other and the evidence does not enable the court to say which of them is to blame, the Court of Appeal has held that they share liability equally. In the case of Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies (supra) the court stated:

“In our view, it is not reasonably possible to decide on the evidence of the witnesses who testified on both sides as to who is to blame for the accident. In this state of affairs the question arises whether both drivers should be held to blame. It has been held in our jurisdiction and also other jurisdictions that if there is no concrete evidence to determine who is to blame between two drivers, both should be held equally to blame.”

21. The principle does not relieve a court of the duty to decide where it can. In the case of Abbay Abubakar Haji & another v Marair Freight Agencies Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1983 [1984] eKLR, the Court of Appeal applied the law as stated by Spry V.P. in the case of Lakhamshi v Attorney General (supra), who said:

“A judge is under a duty when confronted by conflicting evidence to reach a decision on it.”

22. In the same passage Spry V.P. stated:

“Although it is usually possible, but nevertheless often extremely difficult, to apportion the degree of blame between two drivers both guilty of negligence, yet where it is not possible it is proper to divide the blame equally between them. Where, however, there is a lack of evidence, the position is different.”

23. The question is whether the evidence before the trial court enabled it to decide who was to blame. This was a case of conflicting evidence and not a lack of evidence. Each driver gave an account that, if accepted, placed the fault on the other. Each maintained throughout, in evidence in chief and under cross-examination, that he was in his own lane, and neither admitted at any point to having been in the lane of the other, yet the two vehicles collided.

24. The Occurrence Book entry records when the accident report was made but there was nothing to show that the account is true and it is not shown that the account was independent of the parties. The police abstract is in the same position. The two documents, while showing that the accident was reported, pointed in opposite directions on who was to blame. Neither of the officers who gave testimony was the investigating officer nor did they visit the scene.

25. In reviewing the evidence, the appellant relies on the evidence of PW2 that according to the investigation diary the respondent's vehicle was overtaking. As discussed, PW2 was not the investigating officer. Taken at its highest, that evidence shows that the police records conflict. It does not establish who was at fault.

26. The learned trial magistrate gave reasons for discounting the report of DW2. I find no error in those reasons. A report that is not independent and in fact relies on an account by one of the parties is not weighty.

27. DW3 was the driver of the appellant's vehicle. The judgment does not refer to his evidence and the appellant's criticism of that omission is fair. On my own evaluation, however, his evidence is that of a driver involved in the collision whose account is contradicted by the respondent, the driver of the other vehicle. Each is an interested witness. Consistency in cross-examination, where both parties were consistent in their accounts, does not give one account greater probability than that of the adversary.

28. The appellant submits that the respondent admitted in cross-examination that he had been overtaking before the accident. The typed proceedings record the respondent as stating in cross-examination that he was in his lane and was not overtaking, and I do not find the admission the appellant refers to. The appellant's driver likewise made no admission in cross-examination of having been in the respondent's lane. In any event, overtaking would not show that the appellant's driver was observing the rules of the road on seeing a vehicle overtaking, which is where a sketch plan or independent evidence would have helped. The appellant, who pleaded contribution, bore the burden of proving those facts.

29. The appellant also relies on the damage to the right front of the respondent's vehicle. The vehicles were travelling in opposite directions, so damage on that side is consistent with either vehicle having crossed into the other's lane. Neither side produced a sketch plan or called an eyewitness independent of the drivers.

30. The evidence does not enable this court to find that one driver rather than the other crossed into the lane of oncoming traffic. Neither driver admitted at any point to being in the other's lane, and neither version was shown to be more probable than the other. In those circumstances the principle in Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies (supra) applies and the learned trial magistrate was right to hold both drivers equally to blame.

31. On ground (ii), the learned trial magistrate set out the burden of proof correctly and I find nothing in the judgment showing that the burden was shifted to the appellant. Equal apportionment under Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies (supra) is not a shifting of the burden. The appellant relies on the High Court decision in the case of Statpack Industries Ltd v James Mbithi Munyao (supra) for the proposition that a plaintiff who fails to prove negligence fails. That proposition derives from sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act and is not in doubt. It does not assist the appellant, because this was a case of conflicting evidence and not the lack of evidence that Spry V.P. distinguished in the case of Lakhamshi v Attorney General (supra).

32. On grounds (iv), (v) and (vi), the judgment considers the evidence of DW1 and DW2. It does not refer to the evidence of DW3, and it refers to the submission of the plaintiff but not to the submissions of the appellant; this court has however considered those omissions and finds they are not a basis to set the judgment aside as they would not change the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial magistrate.

33. Grounds (i), (ii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of the memorandum of appeal fail.

Whether this court should take judicial notice of the related suits

34. The appellant invites the court to take judicial notice of the proceedings in three suits that it says arose from the same accident and in which the respondent was found to bear 90% and 80% of the blame. Under section 59 of the Evidence Act, a fact of which the court takes judicial notice need not be proved.

35. Section 60(1) of the Evidence Act lists the facts of which the court shall take judicial notice. They include all written laws and laws, rules and principles having the force of law in Kenya, the rules of the road, the ordinary course of nature, the meaning of English words and matters of general or local notoriety. Section 60(2) of the Evidence Act allows the court to refer to appropriate books or documents of reference in order to inform itself on those matters. Findings of fact made by another court on the evidence before it are not among the matters listed in section 60 of the Evidence Act, and they are therefore not exempt from proof under section 59 of the Evidence Act.

36. The judgments in those suits are also governed by section 46 of the Evidence Act, which provides:

“Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in sections 43, 44 and 45 are inadmissible except where the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act.”

37. The existence of those judgments is not a fact in issue in this appeal and the appellant does not point to any other provision of the Act under which they are relevant.

38. The appellant in effect asks this court to receive the judgments and proceedings in the other suits, which were not before the trial court, as additional evidence on appeal. It does not invoke Order 42 rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, under which the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the court to which the appeal is preferred, except where the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or the appellate court requires a document to be produced or a witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. In any event, each of those courts decided on the evidence before it. Consistency is desirable, but it cannot be achieved by importing findings of fact made on other evidence in other suits, and this appeal must be decided on the record of the suit appealed from.

39. I decline therefore to take judicial notice of the proceedings in the related suits.

Whether the award of special damages and the order for costs should be disturbed

40. Ground (iii) complains that the learned trial magistrate relied on extraneous evidence on quantum. The appellant does not identify the evidence. Its submission on quantum is that the award depended on liability and that the special damages were not strictly proved. The first limb fails because the finding on liability is upheld. On the second, this court is guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Vishva Stones Supplies Company Limited v RSR Stone (2006) Limited, Civil Appeal (Application) E308 of 2020 [2024] KECA 978 (KLR), where it was stated:

“It is now firmly established that special damages must not only be specifically pleaded but also must be strictly proved, before they can be awarded by the court.”

41. On the evidence of an assessor in a material damage claim, the Court of Appeal stated in the case of Nkuene Dairy Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd & another v Ngacha Ndeiya, Civil Appeal No. 154 of 2005 [2010] eKLR:

“The experience of the Assessor was not challenged and we think Onyancha J. was right in describing him as an expert, and his report as being opinion evidence. The court had the right to accept or reject his opinion if the circumstances so dictated.”

42. The respondent pleaded special damages of Kshs. 387,550/=. The learned trial magistrate allowed Kshs. 357,550/=. That sum is made up of the pre-accident value of the vehicle of Kshs. 450,000/= less its salvage value of Kshs. 100,000/= as assessed by PW3, the assessment fee of Kshs. 7,000/= which was the sum pleaded, and Kshs. 550/= for copies of records. The claim of Kshs. 30,000/= for towing charges was disallowed because no receipt was produced. The respondent proved the net value of the vehicle, which is the greater part of the Kshs. 357,550/= allowed, through PW3, Daniel Muchiri, the motor vehicle assessor, who produced the assessment report and gave evidence of the pre-accident value of Kshs. 450,000/= and the salvage value of Kshs. 100,000/=. The appellant's complaint that the special damages were not strictly proved was raised in its submissions in general terms and it did not point to any particular item. It cross-examined PW3 on how he priced the spare parts and on his fee, but it called no evidence to counter the sums he assessed. That assessment was opinion evidence that the trial court was entitled to accept, and it did so. The trial court therefore applied the principles in Vishva Stones Supplies Company Limited v RSR Stone (2006) Limited (supra) and Nkuene Dairy Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd & another v Ngacha Ndeiya (supra), and the appellant has not identified any item that was not proved. The reduction of the award by 50% to Kshs. 178,775/= follows from the finding on liability.

43. No award of general damages or for future medical expenses was made, so the respondent's submissions on those heads do not hold. Ground (iii) fails.

44. Ground (vii) challenges the award of costs of the suit to the respondent. The appellant's submissions do not address the issue. Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act vests the award of costs in the discretion of the court and provides that costs follow the event unless the court for good reason orders otherwise. The Supreme Court stated in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others, Petition No. 4 of 2012 [2014] KESC 31 (KLR):

“So the basic rule on attribution of costs is: costs follow the event.”

45. The respondent succeeded in his suit. The appellant has shown no good reason to depart from the rule, and the fact that liability was apportioned equally is not a reason to disturb the finding on costs.

Disposition

46. The appeal has no merit. I make the following orders:

(i) The appeal is dismissed.

(ii) The judgment of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Mavoko delivered on 12th June 2025 in Civil Suit No. E896 of 2024 is upheld.

(iii) Costs of this appeal shall be borne by the Appellant.

Orders accordingly.

Judgment dated, signed and delivered virtually via Microsoft teams on this 29th day of October, 2026.

E. N. MAINA

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Ms Jeptoo for the Appellant

Ms Maina for the Respondent

Miriam – Court Assistant/Interpreter

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